Wednesday, February 27, 2008

Being upfront about a non-compete agreement can save a lot of headaches


Monday's Chicago Tribune had an interesting piece about the proliferation of non-compete agreements in today's business environment. Quoting from the article:

In an economy where information and relationships rule, businesses are quicker to try to limit the damage when people leave. And it's no longer just executives and high-tech workers whom companies worry about.... Employees encounter non-compete, non-disclosure and non-solicitation issues coming and going. The forms often sit in the stack of papers that new hires are asked to sign their first day on the job. And restrictive covenants invariably get tacked on severance offers in layoffs and firings.

The article quotes Diana Smith, managing director of The Novo Group, a Chicago recruiting firm, who advises that companies and job applicants should be up front and open about non-compete agreements:

"Companies that want to recruit from their competition will find ways to make it work. People should be really open in their discussions and not be afraid that it's going to stop the show. Chances are you're going to find a way to work around it."

Ms. Smith's point is important for employers to take to heart. Despite the existence of an agreement, companies may or may not have a real interest in enforcing a non-compete agreement against a former employee. Factors that the former employer might consider are the level of the employee, the circumstances surrounding the employee's departure, the employee's customer and industry contacts, and what trade secrets and other confidential information the employee was privy to.

Nevertheless, when an employee who has signed a non-compete goes behind the old employer's back to work for a competitor, the old employer is forced into action to send a message to all of the other employees who have signed non-compete agreements that the company takes them seriously and will enforce them if pushed to do so. Past enforcement is also a factor that courts look at in examining whether to grant an injunction enforcing a non-compete agreement.

On the other hand, what happens if the new employer picks up the phone and calls the old employer to ask for permission to hire the applicant despite the non-compete? The old employer may say yes if it does not want to run up attorneys' fees by attempting to enforce a non-compete against a marginal employee. Further, by allowing the new employer to hire the employee, the old employer will signal that it expects the same courtesy in the future - that is, at least a phone call before an employee is hired. And, if the old employer says no, the new employer has not lost anything, because hiring the employee will most likely result in litigation anyway.

Asking about the existence of a non-compete or other restrictive agreement should be boilerplate in virtually all hiring processes. Picking up the telephone and asking for an employee to be released from a non-compete for a particular job costs nothing, and could save significant heartache down the road by staving off litigation that the old employer may feel compelled to bring to save face.

Tuesday, February 26, 2008

The nation's focus turns to Cleveland (and lots of snow)


Presidential politics and employment law Today's snowstorm here in Cleveland notwithstanding, there will be a Democratic debate tonight. In honor of the debate, I suggest that anyone who has an interest on the candidates' position on labor and employment issues check out Presidential Politics – Predictions for the Workplace, by John Phillips. Even though the article was written almost two months ago, it's over-inclusive in its coverage of candidates. Because Senators Obama and Clinton have not changed their positions, the piece is as timely as to them as it was when is was written. Employment law issues have not gotten a lot of play in the campaign, and John's piece is the best primer on the subject I've come across.

There really is not all that much of a fundamental difference in the two candidates' positions on labor and employment law issues. If McCain (the presumptive Republican nominee) wins the general election, we can largely expect a maintenance of the status quo. If, however, either Senator Obama or Senator Clinton becomes our next POTUS, then it safe to assume that we will see some combination of the initiatives presented in the Civil Rights Act of 2008, the Fair Pay Restoration Act, the ADA Restoration Act, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, and the Employee Free Choice Act. Just one more factor to consider as everyone goes to the polls on March 4 and in November.

Supreme Court issues ruling in "me, too" evidence case


As predicted, the Supreme Court has reversed the 10th Circuit's decision in Sprint/United Management v. Mendelsohn, which had held that "me, too" evidence in discrimination cases is per se admissible, and that a trial court must admit any testimony of other workers who claimed to suffer the same sort of bias against them, even if a different decisionmaker was involved. In a unanimous decision, Justice Thomas wrote that it was error for the appellate court to announce per se rule of admissibility and disregard the trial's court discretionary weighing of the evidence. Thus, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not require admission of testimony by nonparties alleging discrimination at the hands of persons who played no role in the adverse employment decision challenged by the plaintiff. Instead, the trial court should balance the evidence under Evidence Rule 403 to decide on its ultimate admissibility: "The question whether evidence of discrimination by other supervisors is relevant in an individual ADEA case is fact based and depends on many factors, including how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff's circumstances and theory of the case."

This decision makes a lot of sense. It skirts the ultimate issue of whether "me, too" evidence is admissible or inadmissible because that decision should be fought in the trial court, which is in the best position to examine the evidence and weigh its relevance and admissibility. One can't judge whether evidence of discrimination by other supervisors is admissible without considering it in light of the context and theory of the case, all of which should be done by the trial judge. This decision may not give any guidance to trial judges on how and when to admit such evidence that some (including me) were hoping for, but that guidance would have impeded on their role as the ultimate gatekeepers of relevancy.

A copy of the Court's decision can be downloaded here.

[Hat tip: SCOTUS Blog]

Monday, February 25, 2008

Failure to document performance problems dooms employer's defense


In Birch v. Cuyahoga Cty. Probate Court, a court magistrate sued the court and its presiding judge, claiming that her status as the lowest paid court magistrate constituted wage-based sex discrimination. Specifically, Birch claimed that all of the female probate court magistrates were paid lower salaries than all of the male magistrates, that the highest paid female magistrate earned less than her lowest paid male counterpart, and that she was the lowest paid of all. In defense of the wage practice, the probate court claimed that it paid Birch less because of poor job performance. The Court, however, rebuked that claim because of the employer's failure to document any of the concerns in Birch's personnel file:

Appellees' assertions supported by documentary evidence might have established these facts beyond dispute. Due to a history of regrettably minimalist supervisory employment practices, however, the record is barren of evidence apart from the assertions of Judge Donnelly and Magistrate Polito to this effect. [The record demonstrates that there are no job descriptions for magistrates, no written description of the work performed by the various departments, and no protocol for determining magistrate salaries. Employees are not evaluated, and the court does not produce written documentation of performance concerns.] These assertions do not establish that appellees would have taken the same action in the absence of discriminatory motive. They do, however, create a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment.

The bottom line: if you plan on defending a discrimination case based on poor job performance, it's best to have the deficiencies documented somewhere, preferably in the employee's personnel file.

Sunday, February 24, 2008

Revisiting some lessons from childrens' lit


Dan Schwartz of the Connecticut Employment Law Blog has written on a topic close my heart and on which I've written before, Click Clack Moo, Cows That Type, my daughter's favorite book. Dan uses the book to teach some basic lesson about labor relations. When I wrote about this book back in May, I drew some general employment relations lessons, which I'm republishing below:
"Farmer Brown has a problem. His cows like to type. " So starts Click Clack Moo, Cows That Type, my soon to be one year old daughter's favorite book. In Click Clack Moo, Farmer Brown's cows and hens decide that they need electric blankets to keep warm at night in the barn. They deliver their demand to Farmer Brown on notes typed by the cows on a typewriter. When Farmer Brown refuses their demands, they go on strike, withholding milk and eggs. Ultimately, in a deal brokered by the duck, Farmer Brown agrees to accept the cows' typewriter in exchange for electric blankets. The labor dispute ended, and the cows and hens went back to producing milk and eggs. The deal backfired on Farmer Brown, though, as Duck absconds with the typewriter and leverages it into a diving board for the pond.

Click Clack Moo teaches us some valuable lessons:

  1. Fair Treatment: The best means to avoid collective action by your employees is to treat your employees fairly. The barn was cold, and the cows and hens perceived that they were being forced to work in intolerable conditions. When Farmer Brown refused even to consider any concessions, they went on strike. If you want your employees to work hard, not unionize, and not file lawsuits, treat them fairly. Maintain reasonable, even-handed work rules and policies. Apply them equally. Don't discriminate. There is no guarantee that you'll stay out of court, but if you end up there, you'll have a much easier time convincing a judge and a jury of the rightness of your decision if you are perceived as being fair, reasonable, and even-handed.
  2. Litigation is an Answer, But Not Always the Best Answer: Even in employment cases, where there are so many emotions in play on both sides of the table, it is only the most frivolous of cases that cannot not be resolved at some dollar figure. It is the job of the employer, working with its attorney, to strike the right balance between the cost of litigation and the cost of settlement. Convictions often get in the way, and often times litigation and trial is the only means to an outcome. But, you should always keep an open mind towards a resolution.
  3. Don't Go It Alone: When resolving any case, make sure all your loose ends are tied up in a tidy agreement. Farmer Brown missed this last point. A well drafted agreement that included Duck would have avoided the added expense of the diving board. If Farmer Brown had retained competent counsel, he could have potentially avoided the problem with Duck (who probably went to law school).

Friday, February 22, 2008

Article highlights the importance of medical confidentiality by employers


An article in Thursday's New York Times asks the question, "I'm Ill, but Who Really Needs to Know?"

One of the first decisions you make in the emotional hours after a scary diagnosis is whether to tell others. Most of us share the news with our loved ones, but what of the circles beyond, particularly those at work? Your boss?

If an employee chooses to disclose a medical condition to an employer, it should go without saying that it is illegal to take any adverse action against that employee because of the illness. Separate and apart from the obvious, employers have clearly defined responsibilities with the handling of employee medical information. The EEOC sets out an employer's specific responsibilities under the ADA when an employee discloses medical information:

Basic rule: With limited exceptions, you must keep confidential any medical information you learn about an applicant or employee. Information can be confidential even if it contains no medical diagnosis or treatment course and even if it is not generated by a health care professional.

Do not place medical information in regular personnel files. Rather, keep medical information in a separate medical file that is accessible only to designated officials. Medical information stored electronically must be similarly protected (e.g., by storing it on a separate database).

The ADA recognizes that employers may sometimes have to disclose medical information about applicants or employees. Therefore, the law contains certain exceptions to the general rule requiring confidentiality. Information that is otherwise confidential under the ADA may be disclosed:

  • to supervisors and managers where they need medical information in order to provide a reasonable accommodation or to meet an employee's work restrictions;
  • to first aid and safety personnel if an employee would need emergency treatment or require some other assistance (such as help during an emergency evacuation) because of a medical condition;
  • to individuals investigating compliance with the ADA and with similar state and local laws; and
  • pursuant to workers' compensation laws (e.g., to a state workers' compensation office in order to evaluate a claim) or for insurance purposes.

HIPAA also imposes certain privacy and confidentiality obligations on employers' handling of employee medical information.

It is best to advise employees in an employee handbook or policy statement about the handling of their medical information. In the handbooks I've written recently I've been incorporating a policy statement on "serious illnesses." That policy lets employees know that their medical information is confidential, limited to managers and supervisors on a need to know basis, kept in a separate file, and that anyone who makes unauthorized disclosure of employee medical information will be subject to discipline up to an including termination. This policy should be dovetailed with other policies on reasonable accommodations for disabilities.

What else I'm reading this week #19


Earlier this week, I gave my two-cents on Humphires v. CBOCS West, which will answer the question of whether 42 U.S.C. 1981 recognizes a cause of action for retaliation. The Workplace Prof Blog gives us some comprehensive analysis of this week's oral argument, and predicts a 5-4 victory for the employer. Meanwhile, Dan Schwartz at the Connecticut Employment Law Blog correctly and astutely points out that most federal retaliation claims are brought under Title VII, that Section 1981 is only used when a plaintiff misses a statute of limitations, and that we should "ignore the hype about these cases [because r]etaliation against employees for filing race ... discrimination claims would still violate state law." This point is especially true in Ohio, where an employee has 6 years to file a retaliation claim under state law, and there is no requirement that the employee first file a charge with the EEOC or OCRC.

The Workplace Prof Blog also has a very insightful post on the rising tide of employment discrimination claims being brought by Muslims.

Michael Moore from the Pennsylvania Employment Law Blog offers a different perspective on whether LaRue will open the floodgates to federal court.

Kris Dunn, The HR Capitalist, points out one of the thorny problems presented by intermittent leave under the FMLA, employees using blanket doctors' notes to work the system and take time off whenever they want even for the most trifling of ailments.

The Electronic Discovery Navigator asks the question, "Do You Know What's In Your Employee's Inbox?"

Finally, the Labor and Employment Law Blog reminds us of some the critical mistakes supervisors can make when dealing with employees.

Thursday, February 21, 2008

Some lessons in remedying sexual harassment


Today, we finish our look at Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch. We've already examined the opinion's recognition of a claim for coworker retaliation, and its ruling allowing the use of evidence of the serial harassment of non-plaintiffs. I want to finish by discussing what Anheuser-Busch did wrong and what it did right in responding to the various harassment complaints it received about Robinson, and draw some general conclusions on what is and is not an appropriate remedial response.

Before getting into the specifics of the case, it is helpful to review the standard for an employer's liability for coworker harassment. In a coworker harassment case, the employer is not vicariously liable for the acts of harassment, as it would be if the harasser is a manager or supervisor. Instead, an employer's liability for coworker harassment hinges on the reasonableness of the employer's own acts or omissions in responding to and remedying the harassment. An employer's response is unreasonable if it manifests indifference or unreasonableness in light of the facts that the employer knew or should have known. Conversely, an employer's response is adequate if it is reasonably calculated to end the harassment.

As the Court points out, merely having a harassment policy is not enough to shield an employer from liability:

The best anti-discrimination policy in the world will not help the employer who, rather than fulfill its duty to act on complaints about a serial harasser, lets the known harasser continue to injure new victims. Because Robinson was a known serial harasser, the brewery is liable its its response to Cunningham's or Hill's complaints demonstrates an attitude of permissiveness and was not reasonably calculated to end Robinson's pattern of harassment.

Armed with complaints of harassment by Cunningham and Hill against Robinson, coupled with the complaints by other employees, let's first look at what the brewery did wrong in responding to the harassment:

  • It removed the complainants from their line without undertaking any additional, fundamental remedial action, such as training, warning, or monitoring Robinson. Merely separating the complaining party from the harasser is not enough; instead, the company has to proactively take additional steps reasonably calculated to prevent and end the pattern of harassment.
  • It failed to counsel Robinson upon its first notice of a problem. Such counseling should have included the nature of the inappropriate behavior, a reminder of the company's prohibition against sexual harassment, and a warning that the company would not tolerate any future harassment or retaliation and that future harassment would result in discipline up to and including termination.
  • It failed to implement any additional checks to prevent future harassment, such as monitoring the harasser for future non-compliance, checking in with the victims to ensure that they was no longer being bothered, and additional follow-up counseling with the harasser.
  • It failed to reopen the investigation into Hill's complaint after it received information that witnesses were chilled from talking out of fear of Robinson.

The Court pointed out the "marked difference" in the brewery's handling of complaints against Robinson by 2 other employees 3 years after Cunningham's and Hill's complaints. In response to these later complaints, it promptly launched an investigation, suspended Robinson, and fired him. Given this prompt and effective remedial action, Anheuser-Busch was insulated from liability from the 2 later complaints.

So, at the end the day, what do we take away from the various pieces and parts of the Hawkins case. Perhaps it's best just to use the Court's own words:

The remedies of Title VII would be rendered impotent if employers dealing with serial harrassers were allowed to throw up their hands after their first effort to deal with the harrasser proved unsuccessful. A company faced with a pattern of harassment must both respond appropriately and take increasingly effective steps designed to end the harassment. The failure to do so suggests indifference and permissiveness on the part of management.

The existence of a serial harasser suggests a problem that goes deeper and is more systemic than merely one harasser and the specific victims. It suggests that something simply is not working in how a business is addressing workplace harassment and retaliation. An employee like Robinson should serve as a signal to a company that it needs to scrap its entire harassment protocols and rebuild them from the ground up. That rebuilding should start with the harassment policy and comprehensive re-training. The goal, however, must be to change the way a company, its manager and supervisors, and its employees think about harassment, both in their attitudes towards it and the collective effort to eliminate it from the workplace.

Supreme Court permits ERISA claim based on 401(k) losses


In a significant decision, the Supreme Court has decided that ERISA permits an employee to sue the plan fiduciary (often the employer) because of a fiduciary breach that resulted in individual losses to a 401(k) plan. In our unstable economy, this decision is bad news for employers and a boon for the plaintiffs' bar, as employees have the green light to sue for losses to their retirement accounts, even if they directed the accounts.

As for analysis, I'll leave the heavy lifting to others:

Wednesday, February 20, 2008

A couple of carnivals for everyone


Blawg Review #147 is available at Rush on Business, a friend of this blog that focuses on Iowa employment and business law. Blawg Reivew, for the unfamiliar, is a weekly review of the best law blog posts, hosted by a rotating cast of legal bloggers. Mark your calendars, as I'll be hosting Blawg Review #172 on August 11.

Meanwhile, HR Thoughts has this week's Carnival OF HR, highlighting various employment law and HR-related blog posts from the past 2 weeks.

Evidence of "serial harassment" permitted in sex harassment claim


Yesterday we looked at Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch's ruling on coworker retaliation. (See 6th Circuit recognizes claim for coworker retaliation). Today, we'll examine another aspect of this opinion, the issue of whether a harassment plaintiff can rely on evidence of the earlier harassment of others by the same coworker. Before we examine the specific issue, it's helpful to look at some additional facts specific to the harassment claims.
Anheuser-Busch first received a complaint of harassment concerning Bill Robinson in 1993. At that time, Diana Chiandet (not a plaintiff in the lawsuit), who worked on the same line as Robinson, complained that she had received 3 harassing and threatening anonymous notes. The notes included gems such as, "If you want something Hot and Hard call me.... They call me Mr. Big Daddy," and "I think it's about time we got together so we can have a good time all nite [sic] long. I no [sic] you like it long and Hard. And I have tools to do that all nite [sic] thing. P.S. Don't worry I will make real good to you. I no [sic] what you like PAIN." Shortly after Chiandet complained her car was sideswiped at work. A handwriting expert confirmed that Robinson was the author of the notes, a fact he also admitted. The brewery terminated his employment, but he was reinstated following a union grievance.
Jackie Cunningham, one of the plaintiffs, first complained about Robinson in 1999. Her allegations included:
  1. During a training session in 1999, Robinson sang a rap song to her with the lyrics: "Baby, won’t you back that thing up," and then held money in his hand and said: "Is that what it's gonna take?"
  2. Robinson tried to put his hand on her shoulder, but she moved away.
  3. Robinson said: "I will suck your p***y but you got to suck my d**k."
  4. Robinson caressed her back and she responded by screaming at him: "Don't touch me."
  5. Robinson told her to come over to his vehicle at work and, when she refused, he chased her around and tried to grab her as she ran away.
  6. Robinson asked her: "Why don't you just suck my d**k?"
  7. Robinson told Cunningham that he was getting rid of his girlfriend, and asked her: "Why don't you just make up your mind?" while trying "to feel on her."
  8. Robinson would harass her "on and off" and would "push on and on."
Cunningham repeatedly complained to her supervisor and was ultimately transferred to a different line.
Cherri Hill starting working on the same line as Robinson in January 2000, and alleged that Robinson began harassing her that November. Her allegations included:
  1. Robinson touched her arms, rubbed her shoulders, and walked up close behind her, all while making "lewd and explicit" comments.
  2. When Hill asked Robinson to stop, he said that he knew she "liked it" and that he "wanted to have sex" with her.
  3. Robinson would walk close to her, touch her behind, and that on one occasion he rubbed against her with "his private area" and grabbed her around the waist.
  4. On three or four occasions Robinson told her "she had big breasts" and a "big butt."
  5. On another occasion, Robinson told her "he wanted to f**k" her and said, "I bet you have some good p***y and I know that you would like this. You should let me take you away from your boyfriend."
  6. Robinson generally made lewd and sexual comments "all the time."
Recall that Hill complained to management and her car was set on fire. The brewery conducted an investigation and concluded that "Robinson did behave in a sexually inappropriate manner with both Cherri Hill and Jackie Cunningham." Remarkably, however, the brewery did not discipline Robinson. Instead, it sent Hill and Cunningham each a letter stating that their allegations were unsubstantiated, that corporate policy prohibited retaliation, and that each could contact management with any questions.
In support of their harassment claims, Cunningham and Hill each sought to rely on evidence of Robinson's earlier harassment of Diana Chiandet. Despite its remoteness in time (6 or 7 years), the Court permitted reliance on the earlier harassment as evidence of Cunningham's and Hill's hostile environment:
When determining the relative weight to assign similar past acts of harassment, the factfinder may consider factors such as the severity and prevalence of the similar acts of harassment, whether the similar acts have been clearly established or are mere conjecture, and the proximity in time of the similar acts to the harassment alleged by the plaintiff.
The degree to which a past act of harassment is relevant to the determination of whether a plaintiff's work environment is hostile is a fact-specific inquiry that requires courts to determine the relevancy of past acts on a case-by-case basis. In general, however, the appropriate weight to be given a prior act will be directly proportional to the act's proximity in time to the harassment at issue in the plaintiff's case. The further back in time the prior act occurred, in other words, the weaker the inference that the act bears a relationship to the current working environment. On the other hand, more weight should be given to acts committed by a serial harrasser if the plaintiff knows that the same individual committed offending acts in the past. This is because a serial harrasser left free to harass again leaves the impression that acts of harassment are tolerated at the workplace and supports a plaintiff's claim that the workplace is both objectively and subjectively hostile.
Both Cunningham and Hill testified at deposition that they had heard about Robinson's prior harassment of Chiandet. The Court permitted the evidence because it gave credence to the plaintiffs' claim that Robinson was a serial harasser who regularly intimidated women at work. While Chiandet's incidents were remote in time, they were entitled to some proportional consideration because of their similarity.
I have serious reservations about the relevance of harassment suffered by a different employee 7 years prior to the at-issue harassment. For one thing, even under Ohio's generous 6-year statute of limitations, Chiandet's ability to file a lawsuit had run out. More to the point though, neither Cunningham nor Hill were even employed at the brewery when the harassment of Chiandet occurred. Nevertheless, the Court permitted the evidence to be considered because the plaintiffs had heard about the harassment, and could process that second-hand information to reach subjective conclusions about the hostility of the work environment. Employers, however, are entitled to some degree of certainty, and it is unreasonable to dredge up 7-year-old allegations that were already investigated, and for which the harasser had already been terminated and reinstated per his labor union. That unreasonableness is magnified by the fact that neither plaintiff was even employed while Chiandet was being harassed.
This case exemplifies the expression "bad facts make bad law." The allegations of harassment were so outrageous, and Anheuser-Busch's lack of response so negligent, that the Court was looking for anything to support its decision. Now, however, companies are faced with the prospect of never being to close the book on old allegations of harassment, as plaintiffs will be able to reach back in time to recycle stale claims into
Tomorrow, we'll finish up our look at Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch and glean some lessons from the brewery's response and lack of response to the various harassment complaints.

Tuesday, February 19, 2008

6th Circuit recognizes claim for coworker retaliation


Employment discrimination laws prohibit retaliation against an employee who engages in protected activity. What happens, though, when it is not a manager or supervisor who is retaliating against an employee, but a coworker? For example, can an employer be held liable when a non-supervisory or non-managerial employee against whom a complaint of harassment or discrimination been lodged undertakes a plan to take revenge on the complaining party?

In Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., the 6th Circuit determined that "in appropriate circumstances, Title VII permits claims against an employer for coworker retaliation." To determine whether such "appropriate circumstances" exist to hold a company is liable for an employee's retaliation against a coworker, courts must determine if:

  1. the coworker's retaliatory conduct is sufficiently severe so as to dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination;
  2. supervisors or members of management have actual or constructive knowledge of the coworkers' retaliatory behavior; and
  3. supervisors or members of management have condoned, tolerated, or encouraged the acts of retaliation, or have responded to the plaintiff's complaints so inadequately that the response manifests indifference or unreasonableness under the circumstances.

The facts that pertain to Cherri Hill's retaliation claim are pretty outrageous. Bill Robinson frequently harassed many of his female coworkers with lewd, graphic, and often threatening language. After Hill reported that Robinson had harassed her, her car was set on fire. Following the close of its investigation into Hill's allegations, Anheuser-Busch corporate headquarters received an anonymous letter criticizing the investigation. The letter stated that "fellow employees on the line are intimidated from telling the truth because they are well aware of what [Robinson] is capable," and that employees were "afraid to get involved" because "bad things" happened to women who made accusations against Robinson. The letter recounted specific allegations of violence against women at the brewery, including Hill's car fire, that Robinson had threatened to "kill that Bitch" (meaning Hill) if he lost his job, and that the tires of another employee's car were slashed after she threatened to report Robinson for harassment. The letter also stated that Robinson had bragged that he had slashed the tires to "repay the woman for telling on him," and that it was "this type of retribution" that "keeps people from speaking out" against him.

In response, the brewery did nothing. It took no action against Robinson, did not reopen the investigation to interview additional employees, did not warn Hill, and did not set up a confidential way for employees to report harassment by Robinson. In fact, Robinson remained employed for another 3 years, until he was terminated for harassing another employee.

The 6th Circuit held that Hill's case presented appropriate circumstances for permitting her coworker retaliation claim to proceed. Anheuser-Busch management knew of the allegation that Robinson had set fire to Hill's car in retaliation for her complaint and that he had threatened to kill Hill if he lost his job. The Court found that "Robinson's threatening behavior and violent acts of retaliation were common knowledge to both coworkers and supervisors at the brewery," and that "Hill's allegations might ... have been substantiated by a more complete investigation."

The Court detailed Anheuser-Busch's failure in responding to Hill's complaint of retaliation:

Anheuser-Busch ... failed to show that it responded to Hill's complaint of retaliation in any meaningful way. The two members of management to whom Hill reported the fire ... allegedly not only failed to investigate Hill's allegation that Robinson had retaliated against her, but chided her for attempting to make a report. The brewery never bothered to investigate the incident, monitor Robinson, or create a safe environment for harassment complaints. A jury could find that, given what management knew about the fire, the brewery had an obligation to investigate the incident.... [T]he brewery never bothered to investigate Hill's allegation that Robinson was continuing to harass her in retaliation for her report. The serious nature of Hill's allegation could lead a jury to find that failing to investigate the incident and issuing a letter solely to Hill, as opposed to Robinson, was an insufficient response.

There are, therefore, sufficient facts in the record upon which a jury could find that Anheuser-Busch's failure to investigate the complaint of Robinson’s violent act of retaliation was both indifferent and unreasonable.

The lesson for businesses is an important one. A company cannot turn a blind eye to employee complaints, whether of harassment or retaliation, and expect to get a pass from a court. Burlington Northern made clear that any act that would "dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination" is considered adverse and therefore actionable as retaliation. Employers must be mindful not only of harassment complaints, but also retaliation complaints. One would be hard-pressed to argue that arson would not "dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." Armed with information of Robinson's culpability for the fire, among other things, the brewery simply could not sit on its hands and do nothing. As long as courts make an honest assessment of whether a particular case presents the "appropriate circumstances" to hold an employer liable for retaliation by a coworker, this rule makes sense.

Later this week, I'll take a look at the other aspects of the Hawkins decision -- whether other acts of harassment unrelated to the plaintiff are relevant to a harassment claim, and the appropriateness of an employer's response to an internal harassment complaint.

Postal worker illustrates problem of employee jury duty fraud


Because it's illegal to fire an employee who misses work for jury duty, companies may be more lax in their examination of jury summonses as excuses for employee absences. As this article from February 14th's Washington Post illustrates, companies should not necessarily accept employees at their word, and when circumstances suggest, dig a little deeper to determine whether that employee is legitimately excused from work.

Neither wind nor rain nor even ice storms kept Joseph S. Winstead from doing his job as a mail processor for the U.S. Postal Service in Washington. But pretending that he was serving on a jury sure did.

Winstead spent 144 days goofing off from his work at the Brentwood mail processing plant -- by telling his boss that the rigors of jury service prevented him from sorting the mail. Over the course of Winstead's hoax, from fall 2003 to fall 2004, court papers show, the Southeast Washington resident collected $31,000 in pay from the U.S. government that he didn't earn.

He listened to months of evidence in a trial of an alleged drug gang. But there were days when the court was in recess, and the jury did not meet -- and Winstead never reported to the Postal Service, which was picking up his salary.

Winstead didn't stay on the jury long enough to render a verdict, getting excused just before deliberations started in April 2004. Even though he no longer was going to court, Winstead continued for months to pretend that he was still serving on that jury, drawing his federal salary, prosecutors said.

And he might have gotten away with it, court papers show -- if he hadn't decided to repeat the scam.

In April 2006, Winstead got another summons and once again he wound up on a federal jury at the courthouse in Washington. This time, he submitted paperwork to his bosses showing he had been serving for 40 days when he really worked a fraction of that time.... Winstead confessed that he fabricated courthouse paperwork and sent it to his supervisor....

But the record ... shows that fooling his employer with fabricated paperwork wasn't that hard.

Jurors who are government employees are entitled to be paid their full salary when they are summoned to court and selected to serve on a jury. Clerks in the federal courthouse provide each juror with signed attendance sheets showing the days they have reported for duty in the courthouse. On some forms, the dates are printed out, on others they are handwritten.

For his troubles, Winstead pleaded guilty to a federal fraud indictment, will serve 8 to 14 months in a federal prison, and must repay $38,923.95 in ill-gotten wages. I'm guessing the Postal Service will not be holding his job for him while he's in prison.

What's troubling from Winstead's tale is just how easy it was for him to fabricate his paperwork. I've had the pleasure of serving jury duty in Cuyahoga County, and the documentation of your service consists of the original summons, and a (not so) fancy certificate you are given at the end of your service to document your time served. There is nothing, however, that documents what specific days or hours one was actually in attendance. It's a pretty scary prospect, especially for the 76% of employers (according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics) who provide paid jury duty leave for their full-time employees. Is it really a big problem that employees are stealing time from their employers when they are supposed to be serving jury duty? My sense is probably not. At the same time, however, there is often real workplace tension caused by an employee's right to serve jury duty without fear of termination or retaliation. Winstead took advantage of that tension, and it is incumbent on employers to ferret out those employees who are trying to game the system to ensure fairness for everyone else.

[Hat tip: ABA Journal]

Monday, February 18, 2008

Butt painter's lawsuit to go to trial


Stephen Murmer case Does anyone remember Stephen Murmer? He was the Virginia high school art teacher suing his former employer over his termination after school officials learned he moonlighted by creating paintings using his bare buttocks as a brush. (See Butt I was doing it on my free time). School officials terminated Murmer after they saw a YouTube video in which he wore a swim thong and a Groucho Marx mask to demonstrate how he applies paint to his rear and presses it onto a canvas. The ACLE filed the lawsuit, claiming that Murmer's termination violates his First Amendment right to free expression. According to the lawsuit, available via the ACLU, Murmer was terminated for art he created on his free time and under a pen name, all of which he kept private from his students:

18. Plaintiff has thus created paintings by using his posterior and other body parts as a stamp with which to imprint paint onto a canvas.

19. With this technique, which includes sitting in paint and then pressing his buttocks onto a canvas, Plaintiff has created paintings which range from depicting stylized flowers to portraiture and patterns.

20. These seemingly simple paintings thus have a surprise in store for the viewer: only gradually, if at all, comes the realization that the image has been created with monotypes of the human body, a realization intended to reverberate in the viewer, setting in motion a process of self-discovery of one’s own personality traits, oscillation between watching a flower (or portrait or pattern) and one's preconceived bias of the human body. The artist's hope is that the viewer thus discovers his individual personality characteristics through visual response – as well as his personal views on the concept and the purpose of art.…

22. On or about October 25, 2003, Stan Murmur appeared in a short-lived cable TV show entitled "Unscrewed with Martin Sargent," where he explained how he promoted his artwork using the Internet, demonstrated how he creates his art, and completed a composition for TechTV.

23. As character invention Stan Murmur, Plaintiff was wearing a costume consisting of a towel wrapped around his head in a turban, a Groucho Marx mask, a white bathrobe, and a black swim thong.…

26. Stan Murmur’s performance eventually found its way onto YouTube, an Internet website on which users post videos. Plaintiff had no role in posting the video on YouTube.…

28. Plaintiff has scrupulously kept his private artwork separate from his role as a teacher.

29. At no time did Murmer discuss his art in his classroom. Nor did he ever inform students about his art or the YouTube.com video.

Murmer and the ACLU claim that what Murmer did on his own time was his own personal business and that the termination violates his constitutional right to free speech. Last week, the trial court denied the school district's motion to dismiss, permitting the case to proceed to trial on March 11.

This case continues to illustrate the dangers that employees face when posting controversial material on websites. What do you think: should employers be allowed to fire employees over personal activities outside of work?

[Hat tip: Lowering the Bar]

Supreme Court to hear argument on racial retaliation under Section 1981


On Wednesday, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in CBOCS West Inc. v. Humphries, which asks whether an employee bringing a claim for retaliation stemming from a complaint of racial discrimination can file under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Enacted as part of the post-Civil War Civil Rights Act of 1866, Section 1981 requires that all people, regardless of race, have equal rights "to make and enforce contracts." The Civil Rights of 1991 affirmed the right of employees to sue under Section 1981 for employment discrimination. While Section 1981 only speaks of "race", courts have interpreted that term to also include ethnicity.

There are key differences between Title VII and Section 1981, which makes the outcome of this case important. First, Title VII requires an EEOC charge and a right to sue letter, while Section 1981 does not. Also, Title VII has a short limitations period, while one has 4 years to file under Section 1981. Finally, Title VII's damage caps do not carry over to Section 1981.

Humphries was an African-American manager at a Cracker Barrel restaurant, owned by CBOCS West. He alleged that he was fired because he complained about his supervisor's racially discriminatory behavior. The trial court dismissed his Title VII claims for procedural deficiencies, but the 7th Circuit permitted his claim to proceed under Section 1981, holding that it authorizes suits where employers retaliate against employees complaining of racial discrimination.

CBOCS West argues that if Congress intended Section 1981 to include retaliation claims, it would have specifically said so as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Under a plain reading of the statute, conduct is not unlawful under Section 1981 unless it is racially motivated. Because Retaliation is motivated by the employee's protected activity, and not the employee's race, it is not covered under Section 1981. CBOCS also argues that permitting retaliation claims under Section 1981 would undermine the EEOC's conciliation and mediation process and Title VII's statute of limitations.

Humphries, on the other hand, argues that retaliation claims are universally permitted under other companion provisions to Section 1981, and that the legislative history to the Civil Right Act of 1991 indicates that Congress intended for Section 1981 to cover "harassment, discharge, demotion, promotion, transfer, retaliation, and hiring."

Given that this case will hinge on statutory interpretation, some combination of Roberts, Alito, Scalia, and Thomas will dissent in favor of a reversal. Ultimately, however, a majority of the Court will probably find that Section 1981 allows for retaliation claims. More on this case after the argument on Wednesday.

Friday, February 15, 2008

Some folks call it a jury verdict, I call it a lot of money


A federal jury in Forth Worth, Texas, has answered the age old question: How much is it worth if a female employee receives depraved and violent phone calls from a male co-worker for more than two years, in which he apes the voice of Karl from Sling Blade, threatening to kill her and cut her up. The answer: $15.6 million. On the up-side, the verdict was solely against the co-worker. The employer, American Airlines, was dismissed from the case.

The Star-Telegram has the details.

What else I'm reading this week #18


It's been a very busy week, and as usual, I'm here to bring you the best the employment law and HR blogosphere (or blawgosphere, if you prefer) offered this week.

To follow up on my post yesterday about office romances, Mark Toth at the Manpower Employment Blawg reports on a case finding that the perpetual ogling of the a female employee's chest could create a sexually hostile work environment — even in the absence of any physical contact, sexual propositions, racy remarks or other types of hallmark harassing behavior. Also take a look at George's Employment Blawg on the issue of workplace romances.

The Evil HR Lady shares her own thoughts on anti-fraternization policies, which not only prohibit workplace romances, but any type of non-work-related socializing with co-workers.

Teri Rasmussen, the Ohio Practical Business Law Counsel, posts her own thoughts on the business implications of Minor & Assoc. v. Martin, in which the Ohio Supreme Court held that retained memories are protected as trade secrets.

Both the Pennsylvania Employment Law Blog and the Connecticut Employment Law Blog (good luck Dan on your new job) have written this week on the issue of Employment Practices Liability Insurance. For more information on the pros and cons on EPLI coverage, take a look at Untangling Employment Practices Liability insurance.

The FMLA Blog has the most comprehensive review I've seen of the proposed new FMLA regulations.

BLR's HR Daily Advisor, which I recently added to my RSS reader, has two very thoughtful posts on retaliation: Retaliation: The Dumbest Thing Managers Do and Retaliation: 6 Steps to Prevent It.

Michael Fox's Jottings By An Employer's Lawyer comments on recent research on the benefit of arbitration agreements to employers.

Finally, John Phillips' Word on Employment Law draws some employment law conclusions from the dust up between Hillary Clinton and MSNBC.

Thursday, February 14, 2008

When office romances go bad


Office Romances I've previously given some guidance for companies on dealing with office romances. This week's Business Week Magazine covers the same topic from a cautinary perspective. Business Week cautions, "If you're thinking about hooking up at work, you're looking for love in all the wrong places." The article explains:

The odds against an office romance succeeding are just slightly better than what you'd find at the worst casino in Las Vegas. When you lose at roulette or keno, though, you're out only a couple of bucks (if you're smart), and that's the end of it. When you lose the game of love at the office, you still have to face the other person day after day. That constant reminder of a relationship that didn't work out is a painful burden to bear, and it can affect how well you are able to do your job, which is the main, if not sole, reason we're employed in the first place.

On this Valentine's Day, I thought I'd pick up the theme from the Business Week article and take a look at an example, courtesy of the 7th Circuit's decision in Benders v. Bellows & Bellows, of some of the problems a company might face when an office romance goes south.

Bellows & Bellows is a Chicago law firm that concentrates in, of all things, employment law. The two Bellows, Joel and Laurel, are husband and wife. In 1996, B&B hired Evelyn Benders, an African-American women then in her 40s, as a legal secretary; she was promoted to office manager the following year. Shortly after she started with the firm, Benders started a five-year relationship with Mr. Bellows. Benders remained employed after the relationship ended.

Approximately two years after the break-up, in May 2003, Mr. Bellows privately informs Benders that his wife and another partner were "campaigning to get [her] out" and that she should begin to look for another job. A few weeks later, B&B hired a white woman 10 years Benders' junior who began to take over some her of responsibilities. In February 2004, Benders filed an age and race discrimination charge with the EEOC relating to the new hire and her loss of responsibilities. Attached to her charge were e-mails authored by her former lover referring to Benders as "Seabiscuit" who "should have been put down" long ago, and stating that other African-American members of the office staff were making Benders' employment situation "a racial thing."

After Benders filed the charge, she claims that Mr. Bellows became increasingly hostile towards her and made her working conditions difficult. According to B&B, however, it was Benders who caused problems by becoming disruptive and insubordinate, not actively seeking other employment, and not performing certain job duties. Three days after B&B filed its position statement with the EEOC, Benders alleges that Mr. Bellows told her that because she had filed an "awful EEOC charge" he would not consider paying her any severance.

Five days later B&B finally terminated Benders' employment. According to B&B, Benders was asked to leave because a day earlier she had become hostile with Mrs. Bellows, who subsequently told her husband that she would not come to the office until Benders was fired. Benders' retaliation claim followed shortly thereafter.

Ultimately, the appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal of Benders' retaliation claim on summary judgment. Specifically, the Court found that Mr. Bellow's comment about her "awful EEOC charge" coupled with her termination five days later created a factual issue on the issue of causation, whether there was a nexus between her EEOC charge and the termination. Also, the Court found enough of a factual dispute on whether Benders was actually under-performing and acting insubordinately.

While the opinion is not clear, it's pretty apparent that Mrs. Bellows knew about her husband's dalliance with Benders and wanted to rid her business of her husband's former lover. Can anyone really doubt that the broken relationship had something to do with Benders' demotion and subsequent termination? This case paints a picture of some of the dangers associated with office romances. The problems in this case were exacerbated by the fact that it involved an executive and a staff member. Relationships between co-workers are less tricky, but still pose their own problems. Because it is not illegal for co-workers to be romantically involved, how a company handles these issues is organizational. But, if a company is going to permit intra-office romances, it is best that it does so with eyes wide open, in tune to the various legal issues that can arise if a romance goes bad, as the Benders case points out.

Wednesday, February 13, 2008

EEOC targets use of arrest and conviction records


Last year, the EEOC launched it E-RACE Initiative. E-RACE stands for Eradicating Racism And Colorism from Employment. According to the EEOC:

The E-RACE Initiative is designed to improve EEOC's efforts to ensure workplaces are free of race and color discrimination. Specifically, the EEOC will identify issues, criteria and barriers that contribute to race and color discrimination, explore strategies to improve the administrative processing and the litigation of race and color discrimination claims, and enhance public awareness of race and color discrimination in employment.

One barrier that the EEOC identifies as contributing to race and color discrimination is employers' use of arrest and conviction records in hiring decisions. To remove or limit this barrier, the EEOC has set a 3 year goal to "develop and implement investigative and litigation strategies to address selection criteria and methods that may foster discrimination based on race and other prohibited bases, such as ... arrest and conviction records." In other words, the EEOC intends to litigate charges based on arrest or conviction records.

This EEOC initiative sets a dangerous precedent. I've always understood that using arrest records could cause a disparate impact, but that conviction records are fair game in employment decisions. E-RACE signals that use of the latter without a business necessity or job relatedness could also violate Title VII. This policy begs the question of what convictions are related to what job. Certain jobs are no-brainers. Anything with children will automatically disqualify a felon, for example. What about a warehouse worker, though? What is an employer's liability if a violent felon recidivates in the workplace? What about non-violent felons? Do you want a check kiter manning your cash register? These are difficult questions without easy answers. I'd like to give the EEOC the benefit of the doubt on this issue, but when it makes litigation a key cog in this initiative, it makes me nervous for companies that rely on criminal histories in employment decisions. For now, the safest course of action would be to tailor the use of specific convictions to related jobs. Practically, however, I doubt the feasibility of such limits, given the liability issues that swirl around the edges of such hires.

[Hat tip: Human Resource Executive Online]

Tuesday, February 12, 2008

Penny-wise, pound-foolish employment practices


Penny-wise, pound-foolish employment practices Rush Nigut of Rush on Business shares some words on wisdom for businesses on doing things right on the front end versus paying a lot more to fix them on the back end. His advice is tailored to general business issues, and it got me thinking about what employers can do proactively in their workplaces to avoid the headaches of litigation and its high costs. It may cost some legal fees up front to have an attorney bring your workplace into compliance, but that cost pales in comparison to what it would cost in legal fees to defend a bad policy or practice in litigation.

  1. Review and update handbooks, policy manuals, and forms (such as applications, FMLA forms, background check authorizations, etc.). While the Internet provides a wealth of business resources, using canned materials can be dangerous. One does not know who prepared the materials, if a lawyer reviewed them, and if they were reviewed, under which state's law the review was conducted. Laws change almost daily; it's dangerous to assume that free forms on the web are reviewed and updated that frequently.
  2. In this era of electronic discovery, a document retention and destruction program is a must. If documents are destroyed during litigation, even accidentally, it is virtually impossible to explain that destruction to a judge if you don't have a retention policy and a workable litigation hold in place. Lawyers need to be involved early in this process to advise how long to keep documents outside of litigation, and what documents need to be kept when litigation becomes reasonably anticipated.
  3. Implement a harassment training program, which includes a basic review of policies for new hires, and comprehensive training for all employees at least once every two years. A quick trip back through my archives will reveal how companies get tripped up by not providing this essential training. In my experience, employees tend to take this issue much more seriously when a lawyer is presenting as opposed to a co-worker.
  4. Audit job descriptions and employee classifications for wage and hour compliance. Again, my archives are filled with wage and hour nightmares. Wage and hour litigation has become the hot employment claim for 2007 and beyond. It's naive to think that at some point your company will not have a wage and hour issue to deal with. Better to get your hands around it now than when a class action or the Department of Labor forces your hand.
  5. Make sure that all managers and supervisors properly document all performance problems. This point should be self-evident, but it always amazes me how many issues I have with empty personnel files for so-called problem employees. A quick call to counsel to confirm whether an employee can be terminated would save a lot of heartache in having to defend a poorly documented firing.

Rush Nigut, citing to Chris Moander of the Wisconsin Business Law and Litigation Blog, sums up this idea by reminding businesses that they can pay for it now, or pay a lot more for it later: "Many business people sadly lump legal services into the 'too costly' or 'unnecessary' categories when it comes to starting or running a business. And while good legal services are not cheap it may actually save you in the long run.... It costs a lot more to repair ... than to do it right in the first place." I could not have said it better myself (which is why I didn't).