Adverse actions come in all shapes and sizes

Consider these facts, taken from Kudla v. Olympic Steel (Ohio Ct. App. 11/20/14). Employee, age 65, is fired from his job as part of a corporate reorganization. Employer has a change of heart, however, and rescinds the termination after Employee lawyers up and alleges age discrimination. He claimed, however, that his employment following his rehire was substantively different, including a forced move out of his prior office into a cubicle, the exclusion from meetings, and the placement on surveillance.

Based on these facts, the court of appeals had little problem deciding that the trial court should have allowed Kudla to present his claim to a jury:

He contends that he was essentially demoted and cites in support of his contention, for example, that many of his responsibilities, except clerical ones, were reassigned to his younger coworkers, and that he was moved out of his office into a cubicle.

Olympic Steel, on the other hand, denies Kudla's demotion claim and cites that his pay was not reduced, his job title did not change, and he still performed important work for the company. The company also contends that putting Kudla in a cubicle was a temporary situation necessitated by the reorganization of the human resources department; as part of the reorganization, Kudla no longer needed to discuss personal, confidential information with employees and managers and, thus, he did not need an office….

[W]e find that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Kudla did suffer an adverse employment action.

It is not impossible to terminate, or otherwise take an adverse action against, an employee on the heels of protected activity. Moreover, something as innocuous as moving an employee out of his office could be deemed sufficiently “adverse” to support a retaliation claim.

Bad employees cannot bulletproof themselves merely by complaining about discrimination. However, you must have a rock-solid legitimate non-retaliatory and non-pretextual reason for your action to survive the lawsuit that is likely to follow.

EEOC 0-2 on severance-agreement lawsuits … but does it matter?

Recall that in October, a Chicago federal court dismissed a lawsuit filed by the EEOC against CVS, claiming that the pharmacy retailer’s severance agreements violated Title VII by employing allegedly retaliatory language. That court, however, failed to reach the merits of the case, instead dismissing the EEOC’s claims on procedural grounds (the agency’s failure to engage in pre-suit conciliation), thereby depriving employers guidance on whether certain garden-variety provisions in employment agreements violate Title VII’s anti-retaliation provisions. I held out hope that the practical guidance employers seek on this issue would come from a similar lawsuit pending in Colorado.

Last week, a Denver federal court dismissed that other EEOC severance-agreement-as-retaliation lawsuit. Like the earlier CVS dismissal, however, the dismissal in EEOC v. CollegeAmerica Denver was on procedural grounds, and offers little practical import for employers moving forward on this important issue.

Perhaps if there is any solace for employers looking to sue separation agreements to halt future litigation, and not to buy a future lawsuit by the EEOC, employers can look to footnote 3 in the EEOC v. CVS decision:

The “covenant not to sue” provision prohibits an employee from “initat[ing] or fil[ing] … a complaint or proceeding asserting any of the Released Claims.” The general release of claims is set out in ¶ 7 of the Agreement, but that section also includes the caveat that the release does not limit “any rights that the Employee cannot lawfully waive.” However, there is a specific carve out for an employee’s “right to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws”; and further provides, “nor shall this Agreement prohibit [the employee] from cooperating with any such agency in its investigation.” … The verb participate is defined as “to be involved with others in doing something” and “to take part in an activity … with others.” http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/participate. It is not reasonable to construe “the right to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal … agency,” to exclude the right of the employee from filing an EEOC charge. And, even if the Separation Agreement explicitly banned filing charges, those provisions would be unenforceable and could not constitute resistance to the Act.

In other words, the CVS court, albeit in dicta, believes that the EEOC is chasing an unsupportable claim by arguing that covenants not to file charges violate Title VII’s prohibitions on retaliation.

Employers, however, should not lull themselves into a false sense of security. Neither employer won either of these cases on the merits. For whatever reason, this issue is on the agency’s radar, and it will likely seek another case to prove its point regarding these agreements.

For now, the prudent course of action is to make sure that your agreements clearly and unambiguously, in a provision separate and distinct from the release, waiver, and covenant not to sue, state that employees retain their federally protected rights. I am using something like the following:

Nothing in this Agreement is intended to, or shall, interfere with Employee’s rights under federal, state, or local civil rights or employment discrimination laws to file or otherwise institute a charge of discrimination, to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state, or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws, or to cooperate with any such agency in its investigation, none of which shall constitute a breach of any of the provisions of this Agreement. Employee shall not, however, be entitled to any relief, recovery, or monies in connection with any such brought against any of the Released Parties, regardless of who filed or initiated any such complaint, charge, or proceeding.

“He liked breasts” is never an appropriate response to a harassment complaint

Ruby Blackmon claimed that for a ten-month period, her second-level manager inappropriately stared at her breasts three to 10 times per day, would sexually rub her back, and would breath on her back and ear. Blackmon made ten different complaints to an HR manager, an administrative manager, and her immediate supervisor, all of which were ignored, except for one occasion when her immediate supervisor simply told her that the alleged harasser “liked breasts.” To make matters worse, on the heels of one complaint, her immediate supervisor gave her a negative evaluation. She filed suit after her termination.

Surprisingly, the district court granted this employer’s motion for summary judgment. Not surprisingly, the 6th Circuit reversed in Blackmon v. Eaton Corp. (10/16/14), concluding that genuine issues of material fact exists on the objectively hostile nature of the work environment and on whether there existed a causal nexus between Blackmon’s complaints and her termination.

We know that “He liked breasts” is an inappropriate response to a harassment complaint. What is an appropriate response? Here are 10 steps to follow if you receive a harassment complaint from an employee.

1. If you are not the person in your organization trained to address and investigation these situations, immediately refer the matter to the person who is. If no one is, hire a consultant or attorney who specializes in these issues to do the investigation for you. One word of caution. If you hire an attorney to do the investigation, do not make the mistake of assuming that the investigation will be privileged. It likely won’t be, meaning that the lawyer conducting the investigation might not be able to represent your company in any subsequent lawsuit.
2. Separate the complaining employee from the accused harasser. If that means you need to send someone home, with pay, while you complete the investigation, so be it. Better you eat a few days pay than risk the accused making matters worse by harassing again.
3. As soon as possible, interview the complaining employee (or, if someone else made the complaint, the victim), the accused, and any witnesses.
4. Don’t demean, belittle, or joke about the alleged victim. It will undermine the objectivity of your investigation.
5. Compile and review any pertinent documents. Don’t forget social media accounts, email, and text messages. They are your best friends in these cases.
6. Guard against retaliation, and ensure all employees that their participation will be free of retaliation.
7. Review all information and make a reasoned decision as to the credibility of those involved and what happened.
8. Take prompt and effective remedial action, and communicate your conclusions to the complaining employee.
9. Document the investigation.
10. Never, never, never retaliate.

This is what a retaliatory waiver of EEOC rights looks like

In case you missed it last Friday, a federal judge dismissed the EEOC’s lawsuit against CVS, which had challenged as retaliatory various garden-variety provisions in the retailer’s employment separation agreement.

On that same day, the EEOC announced the filing of another lawsuit, which also challenged as retaliatory a provision in an employment document. Unlike the CVS lawsuit, however, this lawsuit likely has merit.

The EEOC alleges that a Florida restaurant franchisor operator requires, as a condition of employment, all applicants and employees to submit all employment-related claims to binding arbitration, and waive their rights to file discrimination charges with the EEOC. You can read the allegedly offending arbitration clause here.

Unlike the challenged clauses in the CVS case, this clause expressly prohibits individuals from pursuing discrimination charges with the EEOC (or its state or local counterparts). The employment discrimination laws, however, prohibit as retaliatory any effort by an employer to require employees to forsake their rights to see redress with the EEOC. Thus, in my opinion, as a management-side employment lawyer, this employer’s agreement has problems.

The proper way to draft an arbitration agreement, or other agreement that waives certain rights or remedies, is to carve out EEOC charges. You would say something like this:

Nothing in this Agreement is intended to, or shall, interfere with the employee’s rights under federal, state, or local civil rights or employment discrimination laws to file or otherwise institute a charge of discrimination, to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state, or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws, or to cooperate with any such agency in its investigation, none of which shall constitute a breach of this Agreement. Employee shall not, however, be entitled to any relief, recovery, or monies in connection with any such brought against the Employer, regardless of who filed or initiated any such complaint, charge, or proceeding.

Because this clause protects the EEOC’s right to investigate and remedy violations of, and otherwise enforce, the law, it should pass muster with the EEOC. (Of course, before you implement any such language in your agreements, you must consult with your own employment counsel).

My advice to the employer in this case is to settle with the EEOC as soon as possible on the best terms possible, and avoid the expense of a costly uphill legal battle that will be difficult to win.

BREAKING: Federal judge dismisses EEOC severance agreement lawsuit against CVS

The Chicago Tribune is reporting that U.S. District Judge John Darrah has granted CVS’s motion to dismiss a lawsuit filed by EEOC, which challenged the company’s severance agreements as overly broad and retaliatory. 

Recall that the lawsuit challenged several garden-variety terms in standard employee severance agreements, including non-disparagement, confidentiality, and a covenant not to sue (which expressly disclaimed EEOC charges).

When the EEOC filed this lawsuit earlier this year, I exclaimed that a ruling for the agency could be ruinous for employers. Kudos to this judge for recognizing the folly of the EEOC’s position.

The Tribune reports that the court granted CVS’s motion at a hearing, and said that a written opinion would follow. I’ll have full coverage of this significant rebuking of the EEOC’s extreme position as soon as the opinion publishes.

In the meantime, this is not the end of this issue. It is possible, it not probable, that the EEOC will appeal this dismissal to the 7th Circuit. Also, the EEOC has filed a similar case in at least one other court. There is always a chance that another judge will see this issue the EEOC’s way, creating a split, and a headache for employers.

[Hat tip: Ameet Sachdev]

Protected activity doesn’t protect against poor performance

Yesterday brought us two different 6th Circuit cases upholding dismissals of lawsuits in which the employees alleged that their terminations followed their exercise of protected activity.

• In Wilson v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, the hospital fired a patient transporter for failing to follow proper procedures for moving a post-surgical patient. That incident was not her first breach of protocol, as the hospital had previously suspended her for leaving a corpse unattended in a patient room. She had filed an EEOC charge after the corpse incident.
• In Travers v. Cellco Partnership, the employer fired an employee with a history of performance problems on her first day back from FMLA leave, after she made yet another on-the-job mistake.

These cases illustrate that it is not impossible for fire an employee on the heels of protected activity. In both cases, the court concluded that there existed no factual dispute as to the veracity of the performance problems, and that each was a terminable offense.

“Terminability,” however, is the key. If an employee can show either that stated reason for the termination (1) had no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the employer’s action, or (3) was insufficient to motivate the employer’s action, then the employer cannot prevail on summary judgment.

Consistency is crucial. How did the Clinic and Verizon treat other employees who committed similar violations? If the treatment is consistent, it becomes difficult for the employee to establish either of the three indicia of pretext, even if the termination follows on the heels of the protected activity.

What can you learn from these cases? Protected activity does not per se protect a poor performer from termination, provided that you can demonstrate a history of treating similarly situated poor performers similarly.

When the cat’s paw strikes retaliation

What happens when a decision-maker acts with an innocent motive, but unwittingly carries out the retaliatory motive of a subordinate? Does the cat’s paw impute the unlawful intent to the otherwise innocent manager or supervisor? In Seoane-Vazque v. The Ohio State University (6th Cir. 8/19/14) [pdf], the 6th Circuit held that while the cat’s paw applies to retaliation claims, it is still bound by the higher but-for causation standard the Supreme Court applied to retaliation claims in University of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar.

Following Nassar, “a Title VII plaintiff alleging retaliation cannot establish liability if her firing was prompted by both legitimate and illegitimate factors.” … So long as the untainted factors were sufficient to justify [the] ultimate decision, the University will be entitled to summary judgment.

Thus, in any claim alleging retaliation under Title VII, courts must apply the stricter “but for” causation standard, regardless of the identity of the purported decision-maker. As a result, retaliation claims remain harder for employees to prove, and easier for employers to win on summary judgment.

This all makes for an interesting academic discussion, but once you reach these platitudes of burden of proof and causation, you’ve already lost. You’ve already fired an employee who engaged in protected conduct. You’ve already gotten sued. And, you’ve already spent a tidy sum investigating the complaint, taking discovery, and preparing a (hopefully winning) motion for summary judgment. You’ve spent $100,000 (or more) to justify the termination of a marginal employee. In that case, have you really won?

What’s the safer course of action? Only terminate as a last resort. Treat employees who engage in protected activity with kid gloves. Make an informed decision early in any case whether it is one worth fighting or settling. Better yet, consider severance pay in exchange for a release claims in all but the most egregious of terminations. Nassar’s “but-for” causation standard may shift employers’ decisions to fight over flight in more cases, but employers should resist the litigation urge, which is usually a losing proposition for all. I know this is odd advice coming from a litigator, but a termination decision must be fully informed, and the vast void of litigation costs must be a key part of that decision.

When retaliation stands the test of time

Often when we consider the issue of temporal proximity in a retaliation case, we examine it from the standpoint of whether temporal proximity is sufficient to infer retaliatory intent when the adverse action happens right on the heels of the protected activity. What happens, however, if the converse is true—if a long period of time elapses between the protected activity and the adverse action. Can an employer save itself from a retaliation claim simply by waiting it out? This was the question the court faced in Malin v. Hospira, Inc. (7th Cir. 8/7/14).

Deborah Malin worked in the IT department of the Abbott Laboratories’s hospital product division (spun off to a new company, Hospira, in 2006). In July 2003, she informed her direct boss, Bob Balogh, that she was going to complain to HR about sexual harassment by her indirect supervisor, Satish Shah, who reported to Mike Carlin. Before she could complain to HR, Balogh told her that Carlin told him to do everything in his power to stop Malin from going to HR. Malin ignored the stop sign and lodged her harassment complaint with HR.

Between the 2003 complaint and the 2006 Hospira reorganization, Malin applied for several promotions but received none of them. On June 14, 2006, the management team (including Carlin, then the CIO) met to discuss new roles for current IT employees. Five days later, Malin took emergency FMLA leave. Several weeks later, the IT department announced its reorganization, which again resulted in Malin being passed over for a promotion.

Among other claims, Malin claimed that when Hospira executed its 2006 reorganization, it retaliated against her for the 2003 harassment complaint. The court concluded that the intervening three-year gap between the harassment complaint and the decision not to promote Malin was insufficient to defeat her retaliation claim:

[A] long time interval between protected activity and adverse employment action may weaken but does not conclusively bar an inference of retaliation…. Rather, if the time interval standing alone is long enough to weaken an inference of retaliation, the plaintiff is entitled to rely on other circumstantial evidence to support her claim….

The evidence in this case permits an inference that Carlin had a long memory and repeatedly retaliated against Malin between 2003 and 2006. Malin was denied promotions numerous times between 2003 and 2006. During that time, Carlin was the final decision-maker on all promotions in the IT department, both at Abbott and after the spin-off at Hospira. Malin’s immediate supervisors repeatedly told her that she would be an excellent fit for newly-available positions at higher salary grades and that they would recommend that she be promoted into them. Nevertheless, Malin did not receive any promotions at Hospira between 2003 and 2006…. These incidents are circumstantial evidence that Carlin remembered Malin’s complaint about Shah and acted to prevent her from being promoted at Hospira long after the complaint was made.

This case serves as a solid reminder that an employer cannot hold a grudge against an employee who engaged in protected activity, with the hope that the passage of time will permit later retaliation. If an employee can connect the dots between the protected activity and the adverse action, the employer faces risk, no matter how much time has passed.

Image via Robbert van der Steeg (originally posted to Flickr as Eternal clock) [CC-BY-SA-2.0], via Wikimedia Commons

Time after time: temporal proximity and retaliation

Marla Montell reported an allegation of sexual harassment against her supervisor, Austin Day, to human resources  at Diversified Clinical Services. The HR rep contacted Day almost immediately. The next day, Day called Montell and told her that she should resign or would be fired. Chose the former, and then sued the company for retaliation. 

The only evidence Montell presented in support of her retaliation claim was the timing of her termination in relation to her internal harassment complaint. For its part, the company claimed that Day was motivated by Montell’s performance history, which included a PIP, a documented oral counseling and development plan, a Final Warning, and an Amended Final Warning. The Amended Final Warning, issued on May 3, 2011, provided Montell until June 2 to improve her performance or be fired. She resigned in lieu of termination on May 20.

In Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs. (6/27/14), the 6th Circuit was faced with the question of whether the mere timing of Montell’s resignation was sufficient to support her retaliation claim under Title VII. Following its own precedent, and that of the Supreme Court, the 6th Circuit concluded that Montell’s retaliation claim should go to a jury to determine whether there existed a nexus between her protected activity and her forced resignation:

[E]mployees who are about to be fired should not abuse the civil-rights protections by filing frivolous harassment complaints. However, it cannot be open season for supervisors to sexually harass poorly performing employees. Such employees must still be provided with their legal protections.… [W]e must analyze the evidence of how and when the adverse employment action occurred to determine whether it squares with the action previously contemplated. If it does, then temporal proximity is not evidence of causality, but if the adverse employment action is unlike the action previously contemplated or does not occur on the schedule previously laid out, then the temporal proximity of the adverse action to the protected conduct is certainly evidence of causation.

In other words, was the decision to terminate Montell a mere continuation of her performance history, or a reaction to her protected activity? In this case, because Montell faced termination before the June 2 date contemplated by the Amended Final Warning, the court concluded that the adverse action sufficiently deviated from the performance history to create a jury issue over the timing of the termination.

If you are going to terminate an employee on the heels of protected activity, you best have all of your ducks in a row. If Montell’s performance objectively had not improved by June 2, I suspect this case would have come out differently. Because the employer jumped the gun on the termination, it called into question the employer’s motivation, especially within 24 hours of a harassment complaint.

Employees who complain about harassment or discrimination aren’t bulletproof. But, you better be damn sure you’re using the right ammo. If there can be any doubt about your motivation, you take a huge risk in firing an employee on a timeline such as that in Montell.

Dont' be that boss: company pays big for use of the n-word

If you’re African-American, your boss (who happens to be the president’s son and part owner) calls you and other African-American employees a “n***er,” and places a handgun on his desk for intimidation whenever meeting with African-American employees, do you have a case for discrimination and harassment? You bet you do.

Those were the facts in Smith v. Superior Production (Ohio Ct. App. 5/8/14) [pdf], in which the trial court had tossed out a $550,000 jury verdict in favor of a laid-off African-American employee working under those conditions.

One issue in the case was the commonness of the use of the n-word. The majority opinion concluded that the use of the n-word, coupled with the brandishing of a handgun, was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict:

Reasonable minds can easily conclude that Holstein’s use of the n-word, directly to Smith, while on the production floor, at the same time telling him to go home, was humiliating. The trial court also disregarded the other testimony, including testimony about laying a cocked firearm on the desk when Holstein talked to Smith. Further, the trial court improperly discounted other evidence of a hostile work environment. The trial court argued that racially offensive language was bantered around the plant, but it was not humiliating because it was not directed at Smith most of time. The trial court also argued that Smith was not subject to a hostile work environment even though he was intimidated when Holstein would routinely pull his gun out of a drawer, cock it, and then set it on the desk when meeting with Smith.

The dissent, however, disagreed:

The majority decision also points to management’s common use of “n___” in the workplace as evidence of discriminatory animus. Smith testified that, during the ten-year period between 1998 and 2008, he heard five people—three co-workers, one of Superior’s owners, and Holstein—refer to African Americans as “n___s” in the workplace. Smith, however, failed to testify as to how frequently he heard that racial slur. Given this gap in the evidence, I do not believe that a factfinder could conclude that the use of  “n___” was common. 

How does one reconcile this differing opinions? You don’t. Instead, you understand that while differing minds could come to different decisions, the behavior exhibited in this case is abhorrent and has no place in your workplace. Have a strong anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policy. Train your employees on what it means. Take a zero-tolerance stance on this type of behavior. That way, you should never have to worry about what a judge or jury will do with these types of facts.

If you're caught sunbathing nude, on the roof of your elementary school-employer, don't sue for retaliation

Charles Davis is a long-time custodian for Unified School District No. 500. In 2007, he was caught on the roof of the elementary school at which he worked, sunbathing, in the nude. Instead of firing him, the school board suspended him for 30 days without pay and demoted him. Over the next five years, he applied for seven different head custodian jobs with the district. Each job went to a different applicant. Davis filed three different charges with the EEOC stemming from those rejections, first for race discrimination, and later for retaliation.

In Davis v. Unified School District No. 500, the 10th Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of Davis’s retaliation claim:

In a nutshell the key issue is whether a common purpose to retaliate against Davis must be inferred from the sheer volume of his promotion denials; we think not when seven independent and informed decision makers are involved.

Some employees are unworthy of protection by the anti-retaliation laws. Yes, Davis filed many EEOC charges claiming discrimination resulting from his employer’s failure to promote him. But, he was also caught sunbathing, nude, on the roof of the elementary school at which he worked. One decision maker would be justified in concluding that Davis was unworthy of a promotion. Seven different decision makers reached the same conclusion. Thus, barring evidence of a grand conspiracy against Davis because he had filed some EEOC charges, he could not prevail on his retaliation claim.

The moral of the story: not all protected activity is protected.

(Hat tip: Judy Greenwald at Business Insurance)

EEOC continues fight against severance agreements,while employers fight back

Earlier this year, I reported on a groundbreaking lawsuit the EEOC filed against CVS challenging as retaliatory some garden-variety provisions in employee separation agreements (here and here). 

Earlier this week, the EEOC reported that it has filed a similar lawsuit in Colorado, against CollegeAmerica. From the EEOC’s news release:

Debbi D. Potts, the campus director of CollegeAmerica's Cheyenne, Wyo., campus, resigned in July 2012 and signed a separation agreement in September 2012 that conditioned the receipt of separation benefits on, among other things, her promise not to file any complaint or grievance with any government agency or to disparage CollegeAmerica. These provisions would prevent Potts from reporting any alleged employment discrimination to the EEOC or filing a discrimination charge.…

The EEOC also claims that provisions which similarly chill employees’ rights to file charges and cooperate with the EEOC exist in CollegeAmerica’s form separation and release agreements, routinely used with its employees.…

“Rights granted to employees under federal law, like the right to file charges of discrimination and participate in EEOC investigations into alleged discrimination in the workplace, cannot be given up in agreements between private parties,” said Mary Jo O’Neill, Regional Attorney for the EEOC’s Phoenix District Office…. “Otherwise, employers could easily do an end run around the law, employees would not be free to complain about discrimination, and the EEOC would never learn about violations of the law or have an opportunity to enforce it.”

Meanwhile, CVS is fighting back against the EEOC in its lawsuit. CVS has asked the district court to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, cap arguing that the mere inclusion of terms in a severance agreement does not violate Title VII. Business groups are also weighing in, the court has granted permission to the Retail Litigation Center to file a brief in support of CVS’s motion to dismiss. 

I continue to believe that this issue is the most important issue to employers that the EEOC is currently litigating. 

It is becoming clear that the CVS lawsuit was not an anomaly, and that challenging these types of provisions in severance agreements is high on the EEOC’s radar. For now, however, I think employers should take a wait-and-see approach. This issue is too important for employers to knee-jerk pull these key clauses from their agreements.

For now, what I wrote in February (which includes a draft carve-out) still holds true:

Don’t shred your settlement and severance agreements just yet.… Modify your agreements to bolster and clarify the protected-activity carve-out.… Given the EEOC’s position, prudence dictates the breadth of this carve-out, which is more expansive than what I traditionally use. The alternative, however, is to omit these provisions all together, and draft agreements that looks like a Swiss-cheese of risk.

Examining the low standard for adverse actions in retaliation claims

Mark Laster worked as a Public Safety Officer/Emergency Officer for the Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety for more than 23 years. After complaining to his superiors that the department was treating him differently because of his race, he alleged that he was denied training opportunities and privileges, singled out for violating at least two department policies that were selectively enforced against him, and disciplined more harshly than his peers for identical violations. 

The district court, however, dismissed Laster’s Title VII retaliation claim, concluding that none of the challenged actions were materially adverse sufficient to support a claim of retaliation. 

The 6th Circuit disagreed. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo (3/13/14) hi-lights the low standard for establishing an “adverse action” to support a retaliation claim:

Plaintiff’s burden of establishing a materially adverse employment action is “less onerous in the retaliation context than in the anti-discrimination context.” … “[A] plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” … “This more liberal definition permits actions not materially adverse for purposes of an anti-discrimination claim to qualify as such in the retaliation context.”

Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded that the trial court had erred by dismissing Laster’s retaliation claim:

Facing heightened scrutiny, receiving frequent reprimands for breaking selectively enforced policies, being disciplined more harshly than similarly situated peers, and forced to attend a pre-determination hearing based on unfounded allegations of wrongdoing might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. There is a genuine issue of fact regarding whether or not Plaintiff was subject to materially adverse action, and whether Plaintiff’s protected activity was the cause of such action.

By way of contrast, the 6th Circuit also concluded that the same set of facts could not legally support Laster’s constructive discharge claim under Title VII, because of the higher “adverse action” standard under a Title VII disparate treatment claim.

What does all this legal jargon mean from a practical standpoint? It means that when an employee complains about discrimination, or otherwise engages in protected conduct, you must treat that employee with kid gloves. Any action you take against that employee, which one could view as reasonably dissuading any employees from engaging in other protected conduct, will likely be “adverse” under Title VII’s anti-retaliation protections.

Employees who complain aren’t bulletproof, and you can still discipline or terminate a worthy employee, even on the heals of complaint about discrimination or other protected conduct. You must, however, tread very carefully, and make sure that all your i’s are dotted and t’s are crossed, because even the slightest misstep could ring the retaliation bell.

Do you know? OSHA protects employees from retaliation for reporting injuries

Like many states, Ohio has a statute that protects workers from retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim. But that statute is not the only one that protects the rights of employees injured on the job. OSHA also protects employees from retaliation for reporting workplace injuries.

Case in point: the U.S. Department of Labor recently filed suit against Ohio Bell, claiming that it wrongfully suspended 13 employees who had reported workplace injuries to their employer, according to the Cleveland Plain Dealer.

And, these cases are only becoming more prevalent. According to the Wall Street Journal, in the last decade the number of workplace injuries has decreased by 31 percent, while the number of retaliation claims stemming from workplace injuries has doubled. In other words, employees are getting hurt less, but claiming retaliation more.

The Plain Dealer article quotes Dr. David Michaels, assistant secretary of labor for occupational safety and health, “It is against the law for employers to discipline or suspend employees for reporting injuries.” I think we can agree with Dr. Michael that this type of retaliation is illegal and shouldn’t happen.

Let’s suppose, however, that this employer wasn’t disciplining employees for suffering on-the-job injuries, but instead was disciplining employees for violating established safety rules. Doesn’t an employer have a legitimate interest in enforcing its safety rules to deter future violations and create a safer workplace, even if it results in discipline or termination? How does an employer walk this line without arousing the DOL’s ire?

• For starters, you can treat all employees the same, based on the severity of the safety violation, and regardless of whether the injured employee self-reported the injury or not. Thus, you can start to build a case that safety, and not retaliation, guided your decision-making.

• And, you should make safety a priority. Have clear written safety rules for employees to follow. Train your employees on your rules and others safe-workplace principles. Institute regular safety meetings. Creating a workplace built around safety is not only better for your employees, but it will help you show that you prioritize safety, not retaliation, if an injured employee (or the government) brings suit.

In the meantime, know that the DOL is watching this issue, these types of claims are increasing, and you take a risk of a retaliation claim if you terminate an employee who reported a workplace injury.

More on the EEOC’s position on retaliation in severance agreements: A proposed solution

Yesterday, I reported on a lawsuit the EEOC has filed, claiming that some fairly generic terms in an employee severance agreement constitute illegal retaliation. In EEOC v. CVS, the agency claims that an agreement that attempts to limit an employee’s communication with the EEOC unlawfully attempts to buy employee silence about potential violations of the law.

I try to shy away from hyperbole, but OH MY GOD, THIS CASE COULD BE RUINOUS!!!

When you compare the inoffensiveness of the provisions challenged in CVS to the hard-line position put forth by the EEOC, you begin to understand why this case has the potential to be most significant piece of litigation the EEOC has filed in recent memory.

Employers settle lawsuits and pay employees severance in exchange for certainty. Employer don’t write checks to litigants (or potential litigants) out of the goodness of their hearts. They do so because they want to get rid of claims and potential claims. The provisions with which the EEOC has taken issue — a general release, a covenant not to sue, cooperation, confidentiality, non-disparagement, and the payment of attorneys’ fees upon a breach — are crucial for employers. You’d be hard pressed to find an agreement that does not contain some combination of most, if not all, of these provisions.

Yes, the anti-retaliation provisions of the employment discrimination laws prohibit employers from requiring that employees give up their statutory rights to file discrimination charges, cooperate in investigations, or provide information to the EEOC. But, the CVS agreement that the EEOC is challenging did not contain those requirements.

Instead, the challenged agreement expressly protected the employees’ statutory rights:

Moreover, nothing is intended to or shall interfere with Employee’s right to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state, or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws, nor shall this Agreement prohibit Employee from cooperating with any such agency in its investigation. Employee shall not, however, be entitled to any relief, recovery, or monies in connection with any Released Claim brought against any of the Released Parties, regardless of who filed or initiated any such complaint, charge, or proceeding.

In re-reading the EEOC’s complaint, the agency seems to take issue with two key facets of the challenged agreement:

1. The carve-out existed as a “single, qualifying sentence” in the “Covenant Not to Sue” section of the Agreement.
2. The carve-out did not expressly touch all of the challenged provisions in the Agreement.

Don’t shred your settlement and severance agreements just yet. As a I promised yesterday, I have a potential solution. Modify your agreements to bolster and clarify the protected-activity carve-out. In a provision separate and distinct from the release, waiver, or covenant not to sue, consider something like the following (modeled on the provisions in CVS).

Nothing in this Agreement is intended to, or shall, interfere with Employee’s rights under federal, state, or local civil rights or employment discrimination laws (including, but not limited to, Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, GINA, USERRA, or their state or local counterparts) to file or otherwise institute a charge of discrimination, to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state, or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws, or to cooperate with any such agency in its investigation, none of which shall constitute a breach of the non-disparagement, confidentiality, or cooperation clauses of this Agreement. Employee shall not, however, be entitled to any relief, recovery, or monies in connection with any such brought against any of the Released Parties, regardless of who filed or initiated any such complaint, charge, or proceeding.

Given the EEOC’s position, prudence dictates the breadth of this carve-out, which is more expansive than what I traditionally use. The alternative, however, is to omit these provisions all together, and draft agreements that looks like a Swiss-cheese of risk.

I cannot understate the potential significance of the EEOC’s position in CVS. This case bear monitoring, and I will continue to update you as the case proceeds. In the meantime, consider adopting changes to your stock separation and settlement agreements; the EEOC is definitely watching.

EEOC claims retaliation over garden-variety severance terms

The EEOC announced that it has filed a lawsuit against CVS, claiming that a severance agreement it provided to three employees unlawfully restricted their rights to file discrimination charges or communicate and cooperate with the EEOC.

The EEOC claims that “CVS conditioned the receipt of severance benefits for certain employees on an overly broad severance agreement set forth in five pages of small print.”

What was the “fine print” that caused the EEOC to sue this employer? The EEOC did not specify in its news release, but the complaint the EEOC filed  took issue with the following provisions:

1. A cooperation clause, which required the employees to notify CVS’s general counsel upon receipt of, among other things, an administrative complaint.

2. A non-disparagement clause, which prohibited the employees from making any statements that disparage or harm CVS’s reputation. (I told you I don’t like these provisions.)

3. A confidentiality clause, which prohibited the employee from disclosing any personnel information.

4. A general release, which included any claims of discrimination.

5. A covenant not to sue, which prohibited the employee from filing any complaints, actions, lawsuits, or proceedings against CVS, but which expressly carved out the employee’s right to participate in, or cooperate with, any state or federal discrimination proceeding or investigation.

6. An attorneys’ fees provision, which required the employee to reimburse CVS for its reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred as the result of a breach of the agreement by the employee.

According to EEOC Regional Attorney John Hendrickson, the lead litigator in the case:

Charges and communication with employees play a critical role in the EEOC’s enforcement process because they inform the agency of employer practices that might violate the law. For this reason, the right to communicate with the EEOC is a right that is protected by federal law. When an employer attempts to limit that communication, the employer effectively is attempting to buy employee silence about potential violations of the law. Put simply, that is a deal that employers cannot lawfully make.

This case has the potential to be very significant, and warrants monitoring. Most (all?) of you reading this post have used agreements that contain language similar to each of the six issues the EEOC is challenging. If the EEOC is successful in this lawsuit, employers will have to reconsider key provisions in their severance and settlement agreements. Given that employers are paying ex-employees for certainty when an employee signs a release, this case has the potential to turn these agreements on their heads.

In tomorrow’s post, I will offer a potential solution for employer looking to maintain the vitality of a general release and covenant not to sue without walking into the EEOC’s enforcement crosshairs.

Separation of protected activity and discipline can protect employers from retaliation claims

Can an employee succeed on a retaliation claim if the decision maker did not know about the alleged protected activity at the time the employer decided to terminate? The answer, according to McElroy v. Sands Casino (E.D. Pa. 1/9/14), is no.

Darryl McElroy, a dealer at the Sands Casino, submitted his FMLA request to the employee in Defendant’s human resources department who deals with benefits inquiries, Stacey Berasley. As was her practice, Berasley sent the claim to the company’s outside third-party benefits administrator, for a determination on the FMLA request. She did not tell anyone at the company about McElroy’s request for FMLA leave. Two months later, the company fired McElroy for harassing a co-worker. Berasley played no role whatsoever in the termination. McElroy claimed the termination was in retaliation for his FMLA request. The court disagreed, and dismissed the FMLA-retaliation claim.

But there surely can be no causal relationship between an FMLA request and a termination, and any temporal proximity cannot be considered suggestive, if the party making the termination decision had no knowledge of the FMLA request…. Here, none of the individuals involved in Plaintiff’s termination knew about his FMLA inquiry…. The record indicates that only Berasley knew about Plaintiff’s FMLA inquiry, and she has declared, “As is my practice with all questions regarding FMLA leave, I did not tell anyone in the Human Resources department or any of Mr. McElroy’s managers about his inquiry.” Nothing in the record could support a jury’s determination that anyone else knew; therefore, the retaliation claim fails as a matter of law.

In a perfect world, every company would operate like the employer in this case, with a separate department to handle FMLA request, which, in turn, minimizes the risk that a decision maker will learn of an FMLA request before taking an adverse action. As we all know, however, our world is far from perfect. Your organization might not be big enough to enjoy this luxury, or, maybe the employee tells someone other than an FMLA administrator of a need for FMLA leave.

Whatever the case, you can help insulate your company from retaliation claims by training your employees to treat FMLA requests (and other instances of protected activity) as need-to-know. The less people who know that an employee asked for FMLA (or made a harassment complaint, or filed an EEOC charge…), the better you will be to claim that the decision maker had no knowledge of the protected activity.

Blackballing as retaliation

Do you remember Diana Wang, the unpaid intern who sued Hearst Corporation, claiming that the publisher violated that Fair Labor Standard Act by not paying her? Two years later, she claims that she cannot find work as a result of her lawsuit.

Let’s break this down. Filing a lawsuit claiming a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (or Title VII, or the ADA, or the ADEA…) is protected activity. Refusing to hire someone who engaged in protected activity is illegal retaliation. Ergo, refusing to hire someone who filed a lawsuit claiming a violation of the FLSA (or Title VII…) is illegal retaliation.

So, if Ms. Wang can prove that prospective employers are not hiring her because of her prior lawsuit against a former employer, then she would have a good retaliation claim. Hunches, however, do not equal proof, and, the proof, as they say, is in the pudding. It may be that other applicants are more qualified. Or, it may be that employers are wary of hiring a qualified, but litigious, employee.

Employers don’t like getting sued. Therefore, it makes sense that they want to minimize their risk of getting sued by not hiring employees who show a propensity to sue other employers. Employers need to understand, however, that such a rationale is retaliatory, and could result in the very lawsuit they are trying to protect against—provided, of course, that the applicant can prove the prior lawsuit was the reason (or a motivating factor, depending on the nature of the underlying protected activity) for the failure to hire.

What’s the answer for businesses? Hire blind. Not every lawsuit will be as highly publicized as Ms. Wang’s. If you are going to search applicants’ backgrounds for civil lawsuits, limit the search to lawsuits that relate to the job (lawsuits against the applicant involving issues of dishonesty, for example). If you don’t look for protected activity, you will be able to insulate yourself from a retaliation claim that could result from it. And, if you happen to come across a lawsuit against an ex-employer in an applicant’s past, do the right thing and ignore it. Hire based on ability and qualifications, not litigiousness and fear.

Is social media a valid vehicle for harassment complaints?

A nuclear-medicine technician posted the following three items on her Facebook wall:

(At 9:00 am) Sara DeBord loves it when my boss adds an extra $600.00 on my paycheck for hours I didn’t even work ... awesome!!

(At 1:37 pm) Sara DeBord is sooo disappointed ... can’t believe what a snake my boss is ... I know, I know everyone warned me:(

(At 2:53 pm) Oh, it’s hard to explain. . . . basically, the MRI tech is getting paid for doing MRI even though he’s not registered and myself, nor the CT tech are getting paid for our areas ... and he tells me ‘good luck taking it to HR because you’re not supposed to know that’ plus he adds money on peoples checks if he likes them (I’ve been one of them) ... and he needs to keep his creapy hands to himself ... just an all around d-bag!!

Many of her coworkers saw the posts, including the “snake” of a boss with the “creepy hands.” Three different times, she denied authoring the posts when asked by HR. The hospital fired her a week later.

In DeBord v. Mercy Health Services of Kansas (10th Cir. 11/26/13), the court affirmed the dismissal of DeBord’s retaliation claim, concluding that thrice lying about posting information on Facebook, in addition to other violations, justified her termination.

In analyzing the retaliation claim, the court noted that the “Facebook post was not in accordance with Mercy’s otherwise flexible reporting system for sexual harassment complaints, and the post, by itself, did not provide any notice to Mercy.” Nevermind that, according to the court, “Mercy's management first received notice of this behavior … through a publicly available message on Facebook.”

An employer has a legal obligation to take reasonable steps to remedy harassment that it knows about, or should know about. This obligation not only exists when an employee makes a formal complaint under an employer’s “reporting system,” but also when an employer otherwise learns that harassment might be occurring. An employer cannot go into ostrich-mode in the face of workplace harassment.

My fear is that the DeBord court’s statement about the Facebook post not being in compliance with the employer’s “reporting system” could lead to employers thinking that it’s okay to ignore harassment complaints made on an employee’s social media page. Ignoring information about harassment is not okay. An employer does not have an obligation to look for problems on every employee’s Facebook, Twitter, etc. However, once an employer becomes aware of harassment or other unlawful conduct, it cannot pretend it doesn’t exist.

If you’re taking an employee’s deposition, don’t charge them for a day off work

Today’s blog post is a multiple-choice quiz.

An employee takes a day off work to attend his own deposition, which you are taking in defense of the employee’s discrimination lawsuit. Do you:

A. Charge the employee attendance disciplinary points for missing work to attend his deposition;

B. Permit the absence as unexcused with no points accumulated?

If you chose “A,” you might be liable for unlawfully retaliating against that employee, at least according to the court in Younger v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. (S.D. Ohio 12/3/13).

The attendance points at issue were assessed to discipline Younger for missing work to attend a deposition scheduled and noticed by the Defendant. Defendant’s scheduling of Younger’s deposition for a date and time when Younger also was scheduled to be at work at the very least placed Younger in a Catch 22 in which he risked discipline from the Court in the form of sanctions if he chose to skip the deposition to attend work or risked discipline in relation to his employment for missing work to attend the deposition.

Under the Supreme Court’s generous l adverse-action standard set forth in Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, the court concluded that under the unique facts of this case, the assessment of disciplinary attendance points, albeit points that were later removed and resulted in no ultimate penalty, could constitute an adverse action.

Retaliation is a low standard for employees to meet. This case illustrates how carefully employers must treat when dealing with an employee who engaged in protected activity.