When retaliation stands the test of time

Often when we consider the issue of temporal proximity in a retaliation case, we examine it from the standpoint of whether temporal proximity is sufficient to infer retaliatory intent when the adverse action happens right on the heels of the protected activity. What happens, however, if the converse is true—if a long period of time elapses between the protected activity and the adverse action. Can an employer save itself from a retaliation claim simply by waiting it out? This was the question the court faced in Malin v. Hospira, Inc. (7th Cir. 8/7/14).

Deborah Malin worked in the IT department of the Abbott Laboratories’s hospital product division (spun off to a new company, Hospira, in 2006). In July 2003, she informed her direct boss, Bob Balogh, that she was going to complain to HR about sexual harassment by her indirect supervisor, Satish Shah, who reported to Mike Carlin. Before she could complain to HR, Balogh told her that Carlin told him to do everything in his power to stop Malin from going to HR. Malin ignored the stop sign and lodged her harassment complaint with HR.

Between the 2003 complaint and the 2006 Hospira reorganization, Malin applied for several promotions but received none of them. On June 14, 2006, the management team (including Carlin, then the CIO) met to discuss new roles for current IT employees. Five days later, Malin took emergency FMLA leave. Several weeks later, the IT department announced its reorganization, which again resulted in Malin being passed over for a promotion.

Among other claims, Malin claimed that when Hospira executed its 2006 reorganization, it retaliated against her for the 2003 harassment complaint. The court concluded that the intervening three-year gap between the harassment complaint and the decision not to promote Malin was insufficient to defeat her retaliation claim:

[A] long time interval between protected activity and adverse employment action may weaken but does not conclusively bar an inference of retaliation…. Rather, if the time interval standing alone is long enough to weaken an inference of retaliation, the plaintiff is entitled to rely on other circumstantial evidence to support her claim….

The evidence in this case permits an inference that Carlin had a long memory and repeatedly retaliated against Malin between 2003 and 2006. Malin was denied promotions numerous times between 2003 and 2006. During that time, Carlin was the final decision-maker on all promotions in the IT department, both at Abbott and after the spin-off at Hospira. Malin’s immediate supervisors repeatedly told her that she would be an excellent fit for newly-available positions at higher salary grades and that they would recommend that she be promoted into them. Nevertheless, Malin did not receive any promotions at Hospira between 2003 and 2006…. These incidents are circumstantial evidence that Carlin remembered Malin’s complaint about Shah and acted to prevent her from being promoted at Hospira long after the complaint was made.

This case serves as a solid reminder that an employer cannot hold a grudge against an employee who engaged in protected activity, with the hope that the passage of time will permit later retaliation. If an employee can connect the dots between the protected activity and the adverse action, the employer faces risk, no matter how much time has passed.

Image via Robbert van der Steeg (originally posted to Flickr as Eternal clock) [CC-BY-SA-2.0], via Wikimedia Commons

Time after time: temporal proximity and retaliation

Marla Montell reported an allegation of sexual harassment against her supervisor, Austin Day, to human resources  at Diversified Clinical Services. The HR rep contacted Day almost immediately. The next day, Day called Montell and told her that she should resign or would be fired. Chose the former, and then sued the company for retaliation. 

The only evidence Montell presented in support of her retaliation claim was the timing of her termination in relation to her internal harassment complaint. For its part, the company claimed that Day was motivated by Montell’s performance history, which included a PIP, a documented oral counseling and development plan, a Final Warning, and an Amended Final Warning. The Amended Final Warning, issued on May 3, 2011, provided Montell until June 2 to improve her performance or be fired. She resigned in lieu of termination on May 20.

In Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs. (6/27/14), the 6th Circuit was faced with the question of whether the mere timing of Montell’s resignation was sufficient to support her retaliation claim under Title VII. Following its own precedent, and that of the Supreme Court, the 6th Circuit concluded that Montell’s retaliation claim should go to a jury to determine whether there existed a nexus between her protected activity and her forced resignation:

[E]mployees who are about to be fired should not abuse the civil-rights protections by filing frivolous harassment complaints. However, it cannot be open season for supervisors to sexually harass poorly performing employees. Such employees must still be provided with their legal protections.… [W]e must analyze the evidence of how and when the adverse employment action occurred to determine whether it squares with the action previously contemplated. If it does, then temporal proximity is not evidence of causality, but if the adverse employment action is unlike the action previously contemplated or does not occur on the schedule previously laid out, then the temporal proximity of the adverse action to the protected conduct is certainly evidence of causation.

In other words, was the decision to terminate Montell a mere continuation of her performance history, or a reaction to her protected activity? In this case, because Montell faced termination before the June 2 date contemplated by the Amended Final Warning, the court concluded that the adverse action sufficiently deviated from the performance history to create a jury issue over the timing of the termination.

If you are going to terminate an employee on the heels of protected activity, you best have all of your ducks in a row. If Montell’s performance objectively had not improved by June 2, I suspect this case would have come out differently. Because the employer jumped the gun on the termination, it called into question the employer’s motivation, especially within 24 hours of a harassment complaint.

Employees who complain about harassment or discrimination aren’t bulletproof. But, you better be damn sure you’re using the right ammo. If there can be any doubt about your motivation, you take a huge risk in firing an employee on a timeline such as that in Montell.

Dont' be that boss: company pays big for use of the n-word

If you’re African-American, your boss (who happens to be the president’s son and part owner) calls you and other African-American employees a “n***er,” and places a handgun on his desk for intimidation whenever meeting with African-American employees, do you have a case for discrimination and harassment? You bet you do.

Those were the facts in Smith v. Superior Production (Ohio Ct. App. 5/8/14) [pdf], in which the trial court had tossed out a $550,000 jury verdict in favor of a laid-off African-American employee working under those conditions.

One issue in the case was the commonness of the use of the n-word. The majority opinion concluded that the use of the n-word, coupled with the brandishing of a handgun, was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict:

Reasonable minds can easily conclude that Holstein’s use of the n-word, directly to Smith, while on the production floor, at the same time telling him to go home, was humiliating. The trial court also disregarded the other testimony, including testimony about laying a cocked firearm on the desk when Holstein talked to Smith. Further, the trial court improperly discounted other evidence of a hostile work environment. The trial court argued that racially offensive language was bantered around the plant, but it was not humiliating because it was not directed at Smith most of time. The trial court also argued that Smith was not subject to a hostile work environment even though he was intimidated when Holstein would routinely pull his gun out of a drawer, cock it, and then set it on the desk when meeting with Smith.

The dissent, however, disagreed:

The majority decision also points to management’s common use of “n___” in the workplace as evidence of discriminatory animus. Smith testified that, during the ten-year period between 1998 and 2008, he heard five people—three co-workers, one of Superior’s owners, and Holstein—refer to African Americans as “n___s” in the workplace. Smith, however, failed to testify as to how frequently he heard that racial slur. Given this gap in the evidence, I do not believe that a factfinder could conclude that the use of  “n___” was common. 

How does one reconcile this differing opinions? You don’t. Instead, you understand that while differing minds could come to different decisions, the behavior exhibited in this case is abhorrent and has no place in your workplace. Have a strong anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policy. Train your employees on what it means. Take a zero-tolerance stance on this type of behavior. That way, you should never have to worry about what a judge or jury will do with these types of facts.

If you're caught sunbathing nude, on the roof of your elementary school-employer, don't sue for retaliation

Charles Davis is a long-time custodian for Unified School District No. 500. In 2007, he was caught on the roof of the elementary school at which he worked, sunbathing, in the nude. Instead of firing him, the school board suspended him for 30 days without pay and demoted him. Over the next five years, he applied for seven different head custodian jobs with the district. Each job went to a different applicant. Davis filed three different charges with the EEOC stemming from those rejections, first for race discrimination, and later for retaliation.

In Davis v. Unified School District No. 500, the 10th Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of Davis’s retaliation claim:

In a nutshell the key issue is whether a common purpose to retaliate against Davis must be inferred from the sheer volume of his promotion denials; we think not when seven independent and informed decision makers are involved.

Some employees are unworthy of protection by the anti-retaliation laws. Yes, Davis filed many EEOC charges claiming discrimination resulting from his employer’s failure to promote him. But, he was also caught sunbathing, nude, on the roof of the elementary school at which he worked. One decision maker would be justified in concluding that Davis was unworthy of a promotion. Seven different decision makers reached the same conclusion. Thus, barring evidence of a grand conspiracy against Davis because he had filed some EEOC charges, he could not prevail on his retaliation claim.

The moral of the story: not all protected activity is protected.

(Hat tip: Judy Greenwald at Business Insurance)

EEOC continues fight against severance agreements,while employers fight back

Earlier this year, I reported on a groundbreaking lawsuit the EEOC filed against CVS challenging as retaliatory some garden-variety provisions in employee separation agreements (here and here). 

Earlier this week, the EEOC reported that it has filed a similar lawsuit in Colorado, against CollegeAmerica. From the EEOC’s news release:

Debbi D. Potts, the campus director of CollegeAmerica's Cheyenne, Wyo., campus, resigned in July 2012 and signed a separation agreement in September 2012 that conditioned the receipt of separation benefits on, among other things, her promise not to file any complaint or grievance with any government agency or to disparage CollegeAmerica. These provisions would prevent Potts from reporting any alleged employment discrimination to the EEOC or filing a discrimination charge.…

The EEOC also claims that provisions which similarly chill employees’ rights to file charges and cooperate with the EEOC exist in CollegeAmerica’s form separation and release agreements, routinely used with its employees.…

“Rights granted to employees under federal law, like the right to file charges of discrimination and participate in EEOC investigations into alleged discrimination in the workplace, cannot be given up in agreements between private parties,” said Mary Jo O’Neill, Regional Attorney for the EEOC’s Phoenix District Office…. “Otherwise, employers could easily do an end run around the law, employees would not be free to complain about discrimination, and the EEOC would never learn about violations of the law or have an opportunity to enforce it.”

Meanwhile, CVS is fighting back against the EEOC in its lawsuit. CVS has asked the district court to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, cap arguing that the mere inclusion of terms in a severance agreement does not violate Title VII. Business groups are also weighing in, the court has granted permission to the Retail Litigation Center to file a brief in support of CVS’s motion to dismiss. 

I continue to believe that this issue is the most important issue to employers that the EEOC is currently litigating. 

It is becoming clear that the CVS lawsuit was not an anomaly, and that challenging these types of provisions in severance agreements is high on the EEOC’s radar. For now, however, I think employers should take a wait-and-see approach. This issue is too important for employers to knee-jerk pull these key clauses from their agreements.

For now, what I wrote in February (which includes a draft carve-out) still holds true:

Don’t shred your settlement and severance agreements just yet.… Modify your agreements to bolster and clarify the protected-activity carve-out.… Given the EEOC’s position, prudence dictates the breadth of this carve-out, which is more expansive than what I traditionally use. The alternative, however, is to omit these provisions all together, and draft agreements that looks like a Swiss-cheese of risk.

Examining the low standard for adverse actions in retaliation claims

Mark Laster worked as a Public Safety Officer/Emergency Officer for the Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety for more than 23 years. After complaining to his superiors that the department was treating him differently because of his race, he alleged that he was denied training opportunities and privileges, singled out for violating at least two department policies that were selectively enforced against him, and disciplined more harshly than his peers for identical violations. 

The district court, however, dismissed Laster’s Title VII retaliation claim, concluding that none of the challenged actions were materially adverse sufficient to support a claim of retaliation. 

The 6th Circuit disagreed. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo (3/13/14) hi-lights the low standard for establishing an “adverse action” to support a retaliation claim:

Plaintiff’s burden of establishing a materially adverse employment action is “less onerous in the retaliation context than in the anti-discrimination context.” … “[A] plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” … “This more liberal definition permits actions not materially adverse for purposes of an anti-discrimination claim to qualify as such in the retaliation context.”

Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded that the trial court had erred by dismissing Laster’s retaliation claim:

Facing heightened scrutiny, receiving frequent reprimands for breaking selectively enforced policies, being disciplined more harshly than similarly situated peers, and forced to attend a pre-determination hearing based on unfounded allegations of wrongdoing might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. There is a genuine issue of fact regarding whether or not Plaintiff was subject to materially adverse action, and whether Plaintiff’s protected activity was the cause of such action.

By way of contrast, the 6th Circuit also concluded that the same set of facts could not legally support Laster’s constructive discharge claim under Title VII, because of the higher “adverse action” standard under a Title VII disparate treatment claim.

What does all this legal jargon mean from a practical standpoint? It means that when an employee complains about discrimination, or otherwise engages in protected conduct, you must treat that employee with kid gloves. Any action you take against that employee, which one could view as reasonably dissuading any employees from engaging in other protected conduct, will likely be “adverse” under Title VII’s anti-retaliation protections.

Employees who complain aren’t bulletproof, and you can still discipline or terminate a worthy employee, even on the heals of complaint about discrimination or other protected conduct. You must, however, tread very carefully, and make sure that all your i’s are dotted and t’s are crossed, because even the slightest misstep could ring the retaliation bell.

Do you know? OSHA protects employees from retaliation for reporting injuries

Like many states, Ohio has a statute that protects workers from retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim. But that statute is not the only one that protects the rights of employees injured on the job. OSHA also protects employees from retaliation for reporting workplace injuries.

Case in point: the U.S. Department of Labor recently filed suit against Ohio Bell, claiming that it wrongfully suspended 13 employees who had reported workplace injuries to their employer, according to the Cleveland Plain Dealer.

And, these cases are only becoming more prevalent. According to the Wall Street Journal, in the last decade the number of workplace injuries has decreased by 31 percent, while the number of retaliation claims stemming from workplace injuries has doubled. In other words, employees are getting hurt less, but claiming retaliation more.

The Plain Dealer article quotes Dr. David Michaels, assistant secretary of labor for occupational safety and health, “It is against the law for employers to discipline or suspend employees for reporting injuries.” I think we can agree with Dr. Michael that this type of retaliation is illegal and shouldn’t happen.

Let’s suppose, however, that this employer wasn’t disciplining employees for suffering on-the-job injuries, but instead was disciplining employees for violating established safety rules. Doesn’t an employer have a legitimate interest in enforcing its safety rules to deter future violations and create a safer workplace, even if it results in discipline or termination? How does an employer walk this line without arousing the DOL’s ire?

• For starters, you can treat all employees the same, based on the severity of the safety violation, and regardless of whether the injured employee self-reported the injury or not. Thus, you can start to build a case that safety, and not retaliation, guided your decision-making.

• And, you should make safety a priority. Have clear written safety rules for employees to follow. Train your employees on your rules and others safe-workplace principles. Institute regular safety meetings. Creating a workplace built around safety is not only better for your employees, but it will help you show that you prioritize safety, not retaliation, if an injured employee (or the government) brings suit.

In the meantime, know that the DOL is watching this issue, these types of claims are increasing, and you take a risk of a retaliation claim if you terminate an employee who reported a workplace injury.

More on the EEOC’s position on retaliation in severance agreements: A proposed solution

Yesterday, I reported on a lawsuit the EEOC has filed, claiming that some fairly generic terms in an employee severance agreement constitute illegal retaliation. In EEOC v. CVS, the agency claims that an agreement that attempts to limit an employee’s communication with the EEOC unlawfully attempts to buy employee silence about potential violations of the law.

I try to shy away from hyperbole, but OH MY GOD, THIS CASE COULD BE RUINOUS!!!

When you compare the inoffensiveness of the provisions challenged in CVS to the hard-line position put forth by the EEOC, you begin to understand why this case has the potential to be most significant piece of litigation the EEOC has filed in recent memory.

Employers settle lawsuits and pay employees severance in exchange for certainty. Employer don’t write checks to litigants (or potential litigants) out of the goodness of their hearts. They do so because they want to get rid of claims and potential claims. The provisions with which the EEOC has taken issue — a general release, a covenant not to sue, cooperation, confidentiality, non-disparagement, and the payment of attorneys’ fees upon a breach — are crucial for employers. You’d be hard pressed to find an agreement that does not contain some combination of most, if not all, of these provisions.

Yes, the anti-retaliation provisions of the employment discrimination laws prohibit employers from requiring that employees give up their statutory rights to file discrimination charges, cooperate in investigations, or provide information to the EEOC. But, the CVS agreement that the EEOC is challenging did not contain those requirements.

Instead, the challenged agreement expressly protected the employees’ statutory rights:

Moreover, nothing is intended to or shall interfere with Employee’s right to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state, or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws, nor shall this Agreement prohibit Employee from cooperating with any such agency in its investigation. Employee shall not, however, be entitled to any relief, recovery, or monies in connection with any Released Claim brought against any of the Released Parties, regardless of who filed or initiated any such complaint, charge, or proceeding.

In re-reading the EEOC’s complaint, the agency seems to take issue with two key facets of the challenged agreement:

1. The carve-out existed as a “single, qualifying sentence” in the “Covenant Not to Sue” section of the Agreement.
2. The carve-out did not expressly touch all of the challenged provisions in the Agreement.

Don’t shred your settlement and severance agreements just yet. As a I promised yesterday, I have a potential solution. Modify your agreements to bolster and clarify the protected-activity carve-out. In a provision separate and distinct from the release, waiver, or covenant not to sue, consider something like the following (modeled on the provisions in CVS).

Nothing in this Agreement is intended to, or shall, interfere with Employee’s rights under federal, state, or local civil rights or employment discrimination laws (including, but not limited to, Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, GINA, USERRA, or their state or local counterparts) to file or otherwise institute a charge of discrimination, to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state, or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws, or to cooperate with any such agency in its investigation, none of which shall constitute a breach of the non-disparagement, confidentiality, or cooperation clauses of this Agreement. Employee shall not, however, be entitled to any relief, recovery, or monies in connection with any such brought against any of the Released Parties, regardless of who filed or initiated any such complaint, charge, or proceeding.

Given the EEOC’s position, prudence dictates the breadth of this carve-out, which is more expansive than what I traditionally use. The alternative, however, is to omit these provisions all together, and draft agreements that looks like a Swiss-cheese of risk.

I cannot understate the potential significance of the EEOC’s position in CVS. This case bear monitoring, and I will continue to update you as the case proceeds. In the meantime, consider adopting changes to your stock separation and settlement agreements; the EEOC is definitely watching.

EEOC claims retaliation over garden-variety severance terms

The EEOC announced that it has filed a lawsuit against CVS, claiming that a severance agreement it provided to three employees unlawfully restricted their rights to file discrimination charges or communicate and cooperate with the EEOC.

The EEOC claims that “CVS conditioned the receipt of severance benefits for certain employees on an overly broad severance agreement set forth in five pages of small print.”

What was the “fine print” that caused the EEOC to sue this employer? The EEOC did not specify in its news release, but the complaint the EEOC filed  took issue with the following provisions:

1. A cooperation clause, which required the employees to notify CVS’s general counsel upon receipt of, among other things, an administrative complaint.

2. A non-disparagement clause, which prohibited the employees from making any statements that disparage or harm CVS’s reputation. (I told you I don’t like these provisions.)

3. A confidentiality clause, which prohibited the employee from disclosing any personnel information.

4. A general release, which included any claims of discrimination.

5. A covenant not to sue, which prohibited the employee from filing any complaints, actions, lawsuits, or proceedings against CVS, but which expressly carved out the employee’s right to participate in, or cooperate with, any state or federal discrimination proceeding or investigation.

6. An attorneys’ fees provision, which required the employee to reimburse CVS for its reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred as the result of a breach of the agreement by the employee.

According to EEOC Regional Attorney John Hendrickson, the lead litigator in the case:

Charges and communication with employees play a critical role in the EEOC’s enforcement process because they inform the agency of employer practices that might violate the law. For this reason, the right to communicate with the EEOC is a right that is protected by federal law. When an employer attempts to limit that communication, the employer effectively is attempting to buy employee silence about potential violations of the law. Put simply, that is a deal that employers cannot lawfully make.

This case has the potential to be very significant, and warrants monitoring. Most (all?) of you reading this post have used agreements that contain language similar to each of the six issues the EEOC is challenging. If the EEOC is successful in this lawsuit, employers will have to reconsider key provisions in their severance and settlement agreements. Given that employers are paying ex-employees for certainty when an employee signs a release, this case has the potential to turn these agreements on their heads.

In tomorrow’s post, I will offer a potential solution for employer looking to maintain the vitality of a general release and covenant not to sue without walking into the EEOC’s enforcement crosshairs.

Separation of protected activity and discipline can protect employers from retaliation claims

Can an employee succeed on a retaliation claim if the decision maker did not know about the alleged protected activity at the time the employer decided to terminate? The answer, according to McElroy v. Sands Casino (E.D. Pa. 1/9/14), is no.

Darryl McElroy, a dealer at the Sands Casino, submitted his FMLA request to the employee in Defendant’s human resources department who deals with benefits inquiries, Stacey Berasley. As was her practice, Berasley sent the claim to the company’s outside third-party benefits administrator, for a determination on the FMLA request. She did not tell anyone at the company about McElroy’s request for FMLA leave. Two months later, the company fired McElroy for harassing a co-worker. Berasley played no role whatsoever in the termination. McElroy claimed the termination was in retaliation for his FMLA request. The court disagreed, and dismissed the FMLA-retaliation claim.

But there surely can be no causal relationship between an FMLA request and a termination, and any temporal proximity cannot be considered suggestive, if the party making the termination decision had no knowledge of the FMLA request…. Here, none of the individuals involved in Plaintiff’s termination knew about his FMLA inquiry…. The record indicates that only Berasley knew about Plaintiff’s FMLA inquiry, and she has declared, “As is my practice with all questions regarding FMLA leave, I did not tell anyone in the Human Resources department or any of Mr. McElroy’s managers about his inquiry.” Nothing in the record could support a jury’s determination that anyone else knew; therefore, the retaliation claim fails as a matter of law.

In a perfect world, every company would operate like the employer in this case, with a separate department to handle FMLA request, which, in turn, minimizes the risk that a decision maker will learn of an FMLA request before taking an adverse action. As we all know, however, our world is far from perfect. Your organization might not be big enough to enjoy this luxury, or, maybe the employee tells someone other than an FMLA administrator of a need for FMLA leave.

Whatever the case, you can help insulate your company from retaliation claims by training your employees to treat FMLA requests (and other instances of protected activity) as need-to-know. The less people who know that an employee asked for FMLA (or made a harassment complaint, or filed an EEOC charge…), the better you will be to claim that the decision maker had no knowledge of the protected activity.

Blackballing as retaliation

Do you remember Diana Wang, the unpaid intern who sued Hearst Corporation, claiming that the publisher violated that Fair Labor Standard Act by not paying her? Two years later, she claims that she cannot find work as a result of her lawsuit.

Let’s break this down. Filing a lawsuit claiming a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (or Title VII, or the ADA, or the ADEA…) is protected activity. Refusing to hire someone who engaged in protected activity is illegal retaliation. Ergo, refusing to hire someone who filed a lawsuit claiming a violation of the FLSA (or Title VII…) is illegal retaliation.

So, if Ms. Wang can prove that prospective employers are not hiring her because of her prior lawsuit against a former employer, then she would have a good retaliation claim. Hunches, however, do not equal proof, and, the proof, as they say, is in the pudding. It may be that other applicants are more qualified. Or, it may be that employers are wary of hiring a qualified, but litigious, employee.

Employers don’t like getting sued. Therefore, it makes sense that they want to minimize their risk of getting sued by not hiring employees who show a propensity to sue other employers. Employers need to understand, however, that such a rationale is retaliatory, and could result in the very lawsuit they are trying to protect against—provided, of course, that the applicant can prove the prior lawsuit was the reason (or a motivating factor, depending on the nature of the underlying protected activity) for the failure to hire.

What’s the answer for businesses? Hire blind. Not every lawsuit will be as highly publicized as Ms. Wang’s. If you are going to search applicants’ backgrounds for civil lawsuits, limit the search to lawsuits that relate to the job (lawsuits against the applicant involving issues of dishonesty, for example). If you don’t look for protected activity, you will be able to insulate yourself from a retaliation claim that could result from it. And, if you happen to come across a lawsuit against an ex-employer in an applicant’s past, do the right thing and ignore it. Hire based on ability and qualifications, not litigiousness and fear.

Is social media a valid vehicle for harassment complaints?

A nuclear-medicine technician posted the following three items on her Facebook wall:

(At 9:00 am) Sara DeBord loves it when my boss adds an extra $600.00 on my paycheck for hours I didn’t even work ... awesome!!

(At 1:37 pm) Sara DeBord is sooo disappointed ... can’t believe what a snake my boss is ... I know, I know everyone warned me:(

(At 2:53 pm) Oh, it’s hard to explain. . . . basically, the MRI tech is getting paid for doing MRI even though he’s not registered and myself, nor the CT tech are getting paid for our areas ... and he tells me ‘good luck taking it to HR because you’re not supposed to know that’ plus he adds money on peoples checks if he likes them (I’ve been one of them) ... and he needs to keep his creapy hands to himself ... just an all around d-bag!!

Many of her coworkers saw the posts, including the “snake” of a boss with the “creepy hands.” Three different times, she denied authoring the posts when asked by HR. The hospital fired her a week later.

In DeBord v. Mercy Health Services of Kansas (10th Cir. 11/26/13), the court affirmed the dismissal of DeBord’s retaliation claim, concluding that thrice lying about posting information on Facebook, in addition to other violations, justified her termination.

In analyzing the retaliation claim, the court noted that the “Facebook post was not in accordance with Mercy’s otherwise flexible reporting system for sexual harassment complaints, and the post, by itself, did not provide any notice to Mercy.” Nevermind that, according to the court, “Mercy's management first received notice of this behavior … through a publicly available message on Facebook.”

An employer has a legal obligation to take reasonable steps to remedy harassment that it knows about, or should know about. This obligation not only exists when an employee makes a formal complaint under an employer’s “reporting system,” but also when an employer otherwise learns that harassment might be occurring. An employer cannot go into ostrich-mode in the face of workplace harassment.

My fear is that the DeBord court’s statement about the Facebook post not being in compliance with the employer’s “reporting system” could lead to employers thinking that it’s okay to ignore harassment complaints made on an employee’s social media page. Ignoring information about harassment is not okay. An employer does not have an obligation to look for problems on every employee’s Facebook, Twitter, etc. However, once an employer becomes aware of harassment or other unlawful conduct, it cannot pretend it doesn’t exist.

If you’re taking an employee’s deposition, don’t charge them for a day off work

Today’s blog post is a multiple-choice quiz.

An employee takes a day off work to attend his own deposition, which you are taking in defense of the employee’s discrimination lawsuit. Do you:

A. Charge the employee attendance disciplinary points for missing work to attend his deposition;

B. Permit the absence as unexcused with no points accumulated?

If you chose “A,” you might be liable for unlawfully retaliating against that employee, at least according to the court in Younger v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. (S.D. Ohio 12/3/13).

The attendance points at issue were assessed to discipline Younger for missing work to attend a deposition scheduled and noticed by the Defendant. Defendant’s scheduling of Younger’s deposition for a date and time when Younger also was scheduled to be at work at the very least placed Younger in a Catch 22 in which he risked discipline from the Court in the form of sanctions if he chose to skip the deposition to attend work or risked discipline in relation to his employment for missing work to attend the deposition.

Under the Supreme Court’s generous l adverse-action standard set forth in Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, the court concluded that under the unique facts of this case, the assessment of disciplinary attendance points, albeit points that were later removed and resulted in no ultimate penalty, could constitute an adverse action.

Retaliation is a low standard for employees to meet. This case illustrates how carefully employers must treat when dealing with an employee who engaged in protected activity.

When Coyote Posts Get Ugly (My latest column in Workforce magazine)

Each month I write a featured column in Workforce magazine. This month, my column focuses on the risks businesses take when then take to social media to comment on pending litigation and the employees who’ve filed. The article—”When Coyote Posts Get Ugly”—is available here.

Can George Costanza sue for sexual harassment or retaliation?

In an episode of Seinfeld, George Costanza lost his job after the cleaning woman, with whom he had sex on his desk in his office after hours, ratted him out to management.

Could he have sued for sexual harassment? According to Stevens v. Saint Elizabeth Med. Ctr. (6th Cir. 8/29/13), the answer is no.

Caroline Stevens, worked as the personal assistant to defendant Dr. Donald Saelinger, the Chief Executive Officer of Patient First, which was later acquired by Saint Elizabeth Medical Center. After the hospital discovered a recently ended a consensual relationship between the two (which included after-hours sex in the office ), it offered both the option of resignation or termination. Stevens refused to resign, yada yada yada, and was fired.

The 6th Circuit affirmed the dismissal of both her sexual harassment claim (premised on some post-break-up love notes and other protestations of continued affection at the office) and her retaliation claim (premised on her termination after she had written a letter to Saelinger stating a desire to do her job in a non-threatening environment).

There is nothing wrong with employees dating. Nothing good, however, comes from a boss having relations with a subordinate employee, especially one who is a direct report. No matter your corporate position on employee romance, it’s probably best to prohibit managers and supervisors from dating (etc.) their direct reports. Untangling relationships is complicated enough. You do not need to complicate it more by engaging the possibility (and the resulting legal risk) of an employee reporting to an ex.

As for George’s possible legal claims, it’s no soup for you.

Litigation publicity as an adverse action for retaliation

Ray v. Ropes & Gray LLP [D. Mass. 8/16/13) [pdf] teaches a valuable lesson about what can go wrong when a dispute between an employer and a former employee goes public.

John Ray is a former associate of Boston white-shoe law firm Ropes & Gray. When the firm passed him over for partner, he first filed an EEOC discrimination charge, and then a lawsuit, claiming that the firm had illegally passed him over for partner. After Ray leaked to a legal blog a copy of an EEOC probable-cause finding on his retaliation claim, the blog sought comment from Ropes & Gray. The firm responded by providing a copy of an earlier EEOC no-probable-cause finding—which the blog published, and which included details about Ray’s performance reviews and an internal investigation into Ray’s alleged criminal conduct while at the firm.

In the subsequent litigation, Ray claimed that the release of the EEOC’s no-probable-cause finding was a sufficient adverse action to support a claim for retaliation under Title VII. The district court agreed:

Title VII prohibits an employer from responding to protected activity by taking an action that would “dissuade[] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” The threat of dissemination of derogatory private information, even if true, would likely deter any reasonable employee from pursuing a complaint against his employer.

On her Employment & Labor Insider blog, my friend, Robin Shea, takes issue with this aspect of the decision.

I don’t consider it “retaliatory” for the firm to want to protect its reputation by releasing, in pure self-defense, a document that is a public record. Mr. Ray had a right to file a charge and a lawsuit, but once he started bad-mouthing Ropes & Gray…, he opened a door that he shouldn’t have opened.

I agree with Robin. Ropes & Gray did not start the public war of words with its former employee. Ray took his issues public first. An employer should have the right to defend itself in the sphere of public opinion. If the employer fired the first publicity shot, I could better understand a finding of retaliation. Merely responding to a smear that someone else started, however, should not be viewed as an adverse action, no matter how wide Title VII’s retaliation lens might be.

Nevertheless, this case illustrates that retaliation comes in all shapes and sizes, and employers must act with extreme care when dealing with any employee who engaged in protected activity. If something such as responding to publicity started by a disgruntled ex-employee can constitute an adverse action, the scope of what acts fall outside Title VII’s definition of “adverse” is getting smaller and smaller, which makes these claims all the more dangerous for employers.

Giving Employee the “Milton Treatment” Leads to Discrimination Claim

And I said, I don’t care if they lay me off either, because I told, I told Bill that if they move my desk one more time, then, then I’m, I’m quitting … I’m going to quit. And, and I told Dom too, because they’ve moved my desk … four times already this year, and I used to be over by the window, and I could see … the squirrels, and they were merry, but then, they switched … from the Swingline to the Boston stapler, but I kept my Swingline stapler because it didn’t bind up as much … and I kept the staples for the Swingline stapler and it’s not okay because if they take my stapler then I’ll have to … I’ll set the building on fire...

– Milton Waddams, Office Space

I love the movie Office Space. One of the movie’s best sub-plots involves Milton Waddams. Milton works for Bill Lumbergh, and is Lumbergh’s punching bag. Lumbergh belittles him, steals his red Swingline stapler, continuously reduces the size of his cube, and, ultimately, transfers him to a basement storage closet. All the while, Milton mumbles under his breath that he’s going to set the building on fire. True to his word, Milton ultimately gets his revenge by burning down the office.

Why am I telling you the plot of Office Space? Because, according to this story in the St. Joseph, Missouri, News-Press, a former employee of the Missouri Department of Transportation is alleging that the department discriminated against her because of her age by … are you ready … moving her out of her office and forcing her to work from a moldy storage closet.

While there are two sides to every story, generally it is a bad idea to react to an employee’s internal complaint about age discrimination by moving her workspace from an office to a storage closet. Milton earned his revenge by arson. This employee is seeking hers via the courts. Either way, giving any employee the Milton treatment, let alone doing so on the heels of a complaint about discrimination or some other protected activity, is a horrendous idea.

This post originally appeared on The Legal Workplace Blog.

“That guy” has a valid retaliation claim?

Every workplace has “that guy.” The employee who can’t quite seem to keep his mouth shut, who says inappropriate things, the one you know will someday lead to a harassment lawsuit. (Hint: If you can’t think of who “that guy” is in your workplace, it might be you).

Dunn v. Automotive Finance Corp. (M.D. Tenn. 7/2/13) is about “that guy,” but with a twist. “That guy” was Robert Dunn, a manager terminated by Automotive Finance Corp. for making inappropriate racially based comments during a social gathering following a training session. Present for Dunn’s alleged comments were four other white managers, along with one African-American assistant manager, Rick Hopkins. Several of those present complained about Dunn’s comments; the company investigated and fired Dunn.

Dunn was accused of making three racially insensitive comments:

• A comment that Tiger Woods was being judged by a white man’s standard, as compared to Michael Vick, who went to prison.
• A comment that his mother was Indian and not allowed to sit with White people back in the day.
• In reference to a statement that Hopkins would be the next manager at the company, Dunn said, “Good luck. Have you seen a family photo of this place?” and that the company had very few African-American managers “walking the halls.”

What was Dunn’s explanation when a co-worker expressed her discomfort at his statements? “That’s just how I am, because I’m a country boy.” When that same co-worker complained to management about Dunn’s comments; the company investigated and fired him.

Here’s the twist. Dunn sued for retaliation, claiming that Title VII protected his comment about a lack of upward mobility for African-Americans within the company. Incredibly, the court agreed that Dunn’s statement at least presented a question for a jury to determine as to whether that comment is protected from retaliation under Title VII.

Dunn made one comment or a set of comments that could reasonably be construed as protected activity: complaining in front of the Branch Managers that AFC discriminated on the basis of race with regard to promoting black managers. There are competing accounts as to precisely what Dunn said, although the witnesses who recall the incident appear to agree that Dunn accused AFC of being a racist company and/or that Dunn stated that AFC would not promote Hopkins because he is black…. The fact that Dunn made this comment in front of a black Assistant Branch Manager and that it made the white employees “uncomfortable” was just a side effect of speaking his mind that the company had and would continue to practice illegal racial discrimination.

The company argued that Dunn was merely seeking “to insulate himself from the consequences of [his] inappropriate conduct by concocting a post hoc rationalization that he had actually engaged in some form of ‘opposition’ activity.” I agree.

Cases like this one undermine the protections offered by the anti-retaliation laws, and send the wrong message to employers. The company fired Dunn because a co-worker complained about inappropriate race-based comments. The employer met is obligation under Title VII to investigate the allegations, and implement corrective measures to ensure that the comments stopped. Yet, the employer got punished for meeting its anti-harassment obligations. If the employer retained Dunn, it could have faced a potential harassment lawsuit. An employer should not have to choose between a harassment lawsuit by an offended employee, or a retaliation lawsuit by an alleged harasser who appears less than genuine in his “complaints.”

This case also is a perfect example of the maxim that any employee can sue at any time for any reason, and helps illustrate my point that because of the risk of lawsuits, employers are exceedingly gun-shy about firing employees.

photo credit: foreverdigital via photopin cc

The one thing you can never release in a settlement agreement

Legal disputes end in one of two ways—either with a judgment by a court or an agreement between the parties. The vast majority of cases follow the latter course.

When parties enter an agreement to settle a dispute—either in a settlement agreement ending litigation or a severance agreement ending one’s employment—the goal is to release all claims brought, or that could have been brought. An employer is paying the employee, in part, for the certainty that the employee will not file other claims against it in the future for past acts. Thus, these agreements typically contain general releases, along with covenants not to sue.

Do not, however, make the mistake of including in your agreement a covenant forbidding the employee from filing a discrimination charge with the EEOC or other agency. The EEOC will view such a provision as retaliatory under Title VII.

Last week, the Agency announced that it had reached a settlement with Baker & Taylor over claims that the company “violated Title VII by conditioning employees’ receipt of severance pay on an overly broad, misleading and unenforceable severance agreement that interfered with employees’ rights to file charges and communicate with the EEOC.” The EEOC alleged that the company required employees “to sign a release agreement that could have been understood to bar the filing of charges with the EEOC and to limit communication with the agency” in order to receive their severance pay.

The offending provisions (taken from the EEOC’s Complaint) were as follows:

• “I further agree never to institute any complaint, proceeding, grievance, or action of any kind at law, in equity, or otherwise in any court of the United States or in any state, or in any administrative agency of the United States or any state, country, or municipality, or before any other tribunal, public or private, against the Company arising from or relating to my employment with or my termination of employment from the Company, the Severance Pay Plan, and/or any other occurrences up to and including the date of this Waiver and Release, other than for nonpayment of the above-described Severance Pay Plan.”

• “I agree that I will not make any disparaging remarks or take any other action that could reasonably be anticipated to damage the reputation and goodwill of Company or negatively reflect on Company.  I will not discuss or comment upon the termination of my employment in any way that would reflect negatively on the Company. However, nothing in this Release will prevent me from truthfully responding to a subpoena or otherwise complying with a government investigation.”

How could this problem have been avoided, while still providing the employer relative certainty that it will not have future legal dealings with the releasing employee? A simple disclaimer tacked onto the back-end of the release language, stating that nothing in agreement prevents, or is intended to prevent, the employee from filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, or with a state or local civil rights agency. You can couple that language with a covenant providing that in the event that the employee files such a charge, the employee disclaims the right to seek or recover money damages from such a filing.

With this language, the employee retains the right to file a charge (minus damages), the EEOC retains the right to seek redress of civil rights violations, and the employer retains peace of mind that the employee has signed as strong of a release as Title VII allows.

BREAKING: SCOTUS decides on but-for causation standard for retaliation under Title VII

In a busy, end-of-term day at the Supreme Court, the Court has issued its decision in University of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar. In this 5-4, partisan-line decision, the Court decided that but-for causation is the appropriate standard for retaliation claims under Title VII.

Thus, going forward, an employee cannot succeed on a Title VII retaliation claim without proving that the employer would not have taken the adverse employment action but for an improper, retaliatory motive.

Needless to say, this is huge win for employers by narrowing an employee’s likelihood of proving retaliation. It eliminates mixed-motive retaliation. Retaliation must be the cause for an employee to prove retaliation.

Aside from its legal implications, this case is significant because it is the first retaliation case that this Court has decided in favor of the employer.

Perhaps the most curious part of the opinion, however, comes from Justice Ginsberg, who calls for passage of a “Civil Rights Restoration Act” in light of this opinion and the opinion in Vance. Given the political climate in Congress, I’d say this is unlikely. The drumbeats of employment-law reform, however, will begin to beat loudly from the left.

The Court’s opinion is available for download here.