NBC does itself a disservice by running classic episodes of Saturday Night Live each week, because the old episodes merely reinforce that the new episodes are longer appointment viewing. But, this sketch on diversity training (spoofing some very bad VHS videos you hopefully didn't use during the last millennium) from this past week’s episode made me laugh pretty hard. Enjoy.
It seems to be common sense that if the decision maker accused of a discriminatory adverse action is also the individual responsible for earlier hiring that same person, it is unlikely that a discriminatory reason motivated the latter decision. After all, if I discriminate against people of a certain race (or gender, age, religion, etc.), why would I hire them in the first place? Wouldn’t I just not hire them to keep them out of my organization?
Courts refer to this as the “same-actor inference” — inferring a lack of discrimination from the fact that the same individual both hired and fired the employee.
A recent decision from the Southern District of Ohio applied this inference in a case in which a fast-food manager claimed discrimination after the “same actor” hired him, and, shortly thereafter, fired him:
Even Plaintiff’s theory of this case does not suggest race discrimination: it defies logic that a Caucasian manager would hire him in an attempt to replace a minority manager and then “turn the tables” four months later and fire him for being Caucasian.
This is not to say that the same actor can never discriminate. After all, Chevy Chase hired Richard Pryor after lobbing the worst kind of racial bombs across the interview desk. Indeed, in the 6th Circuit, this “same actor” inference is insufficient, in and of itself, to entitle an employer to summary judgment. But, if you are faced with a case in which the same actor is accused of firing after hiring, absent other compelling evidence of discriminatory intent, you will have a great defense to the discrimination claim.
Wilson v. Chipotle Mexican Grille (6th Cir. 9/17/15) [pdf] is an unusual or distinct case, yet it teaches employers an important lesson about how to win a discrimination case.
Catherine Wilson, an African-American female, worked as a part-time crew member at a Cincinnati Chipotle. Her reviews listed her as a “low performer,” and her supervisors counseled her about her “attitude.” Wilson requested, and was denied, a 10-day leave of absence to go to Disney World. Because of her insistence for the time off, however, her manager took her off the schedule for those 10 days and considered her to have quit her job.
When she was fired after attempting to work after she “quit,” she sued the restaurant for race and sex discrimination.
The court had little trouble dispensing with the employer’s claim that Wilson had quit her job. Whether or not she requested time off, she returned to work the next day with the intent to work. Those actions do not demonstrate a voluntary resignation.
Regardless, the employer still won the case because Wilson could not show that she was replaced by someone outside the protected classes.
Wilson offered no evidence that Chipotle replaced her with white or male employees. To the contrary, Wilson’s part-time slot was picked up by three African-American females and one African-American male. The Clifton branch work force was 75% African American during the relevant period, and Wilson offers no evidence that this changed at the time.
So, what’s the best defense to a discrimination claim? Hire others in the same protected group. If your workplace is three-quarters black, it become very hard for a black employee to claim disparate treatment. If you replace that black, female employee with three other black females, and a black male, it’s case over.
An African-American, female employee cannot show discrimination when you replace her with another African-American female. All the more reason to maintain a diverse workforce. And, an important point to consider if you need to replace a fired employee that you think might turn around and sue.
Earlier this summer, I reported on Hauser v. City of Dayton, which I hoped would answer the question of whether Ohio’s employment discrimination statute still provided for individual liability for managers and supervisors.
Last week, the Court issued its ruling in Hauser, and, disappointingly, punted on the issue. Yes, the employer technically won the case, and the Court held political-subdivision employees (i.e., public-sector workers) are immune from discrimination lawsuits.
On the bigger question, however, of whether Revised Code chapter 4112 imposes liability on managers or supervisors in general, the Court punted. It concluded that it did not have to revisit Genero (the case that originally concluded that 4112 imposes liability on individual managers and supervisors), because the employer in that case was in the private sector. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that its “reasoning in this case calls the Genaro majority’s reasoning into question, particularly its basis for distinguishing the prevailing interpretation of Title VII.”
For now, Genaro and its imposition of individual liability lives to fight another day. Private-sector managers and supervisors can still be sued for their own individual acts of discrimination. Moreover, Ohio employers are now split down public / private lines as to whether managers and supervisors can be held individually liable for discrimination.
Yet, Ohio employers have hope that when presented with the right case, this Court will overturn Genaro and rid Ohio of its anomalous individual liability. Or, Ohio’s legislature can do right by our state’s employers and pass legislation ending this incorrect interpretation of R.C. 4112, which will bring Ohio into line with the discrimination laws of nearly every other state and Title VII.
Yesterday, WCPN’s The Sound of Ideas was kind enough to invite me to speak about criminal background checks in employment and the “Ban the Box” movement.
Did you miss the live broadcast? 1) shame on you; and 2) today’s your lucky day because WCPN archives all of its broadcasts on its website.
Thanks Mike McIntyre for having me on. Let’s do it again soon.
In a decision of startling breadth, the Court holds that commercial enterprises, including corporations, along with partnerships and sole proprietorships, can opt out of any law (saving only tax laws) they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs.What about Title VII and the other ant-discrimination laws? What if a company has a sincerely held religious belief that it is okay to discriminate based on race? Or, how about a company, that, because of its religious beliefs, segregates its men and women? Would Hobby Lobby permit those employers to opt out of Title VII? Hobby Lobby does not answer these questions. Instead, it leaves them to lower courts to interpret in future cases. We will have to watch and see how these issues play out down the road.
Combating discrimination in the workplace is a worthy goal and one that the Chamber supports. However, … EEOC’s abusive enforcement tactics can no longer be ignored. While some federal judges are pushing back in some cases, EEOC clearly has not received the message. Moreover, relying on judges as the final check on EEOC enforcement is often a case of “too little, too late”: by that time, employers have already spent significant time and resources defending themselves against unmeritorious allegations. In other words, even when employers win, they lose.…
What’s more, the courts’ rejection of EEOC’s underlying regulatory guidance leaves employers searching as to where to find accurate, reliable guidance on their legal obligations under federal non-discrimination laws. And, with a fully staffed Commission several new guidance positions are possible on a broad range of topics including: wellness plans, reasonable accommodations, pregnancy and national origin discrimination and credit-related background checks.While the entirety of the 25-page report is intellectually interesting to employers, it doesn’t mean a hill of beans if the EEOC sues you. As we all know, lawsuits are expensive. It could cost you millions of dollars to prove the EEOC wrong. I doubt you want to spend millions defending one lawsuit? So what are you to do? Sadly, you are to do what the EEOC says, or risk ending up in the agency’s money-vacuum crosshairs.
The views expressed by Mr. Sterling are deeply offensive and harmful; that they came from an NBA owner only heightens the damage and my personal outrage.
Sentiments of this kind are contrary to the principles of inclusion and respect that form the foundation of our diverse, multicultural and multiethnic league.
I am personally distraught that the views expressed by Mr. Sterling came from within an institution that has historically taken such a leadership role in matters of race relations and caused current and former players, coaches, fans and partners of the NBA to question their very association with the league.
To them, and pioneers of the game like Earl Lloyd, Chuck Cooper, Sweetwater Clifton, the great Bill Russell, and particularly Magic Johnson, I apologize.… This has been a painful moment for all members of the NBA family. I appreciate the support and understanding of our players during this process, and I am particularly grateful for the leadership shown by Coach Doc Rivers, Union President Chris Paul and Mayor Kevin Johnson of Sacramento, who has been acting as the players’ representative in this matter.
We stand together in condemning Mr. Sterling’s views. They simply have no place in the NBA.
It is reasonable to infer that Michael Brown knew of his sister’s motive for demoting Wyss and was referring to that motive in this email. This plausibly suggests that the decision to demote Wyss, who was otherwise a “good worker,” was motivated by Tracey’s intent to discriminate against men.
Suppose an employee applies for a transfer to an open position. The company decides to hire an external candidate and passes on transferring the employee. Yet, when the same position again becomes vacant nine months later, the company involuntarily transfers that same employee into the position. Is the transfer to the very same position (with the same pay, benefits, prestige, and responsibility), for which, just nine months earlier, that employee had applied, an “adverse employment action” sufficient to support a claim of discrimination?
Amazingly, in Deleon v. City of Kalamazoo (1/14/14) [pdf], the 6th Circuit answered, “Yes.”
[A]n employee’s transfer may constitute a materially adverse employment action, even in the absence of a demotion or pay decrease, so long as the particular circumstances present give rise to some level of objective intolerability…. [W]e conclude that Deleon has met his threshold at the summary judgment stage…. Deleon provided evidence that he was exposed to toxic and hazardous diesel fumes on a daily basis. He testified further that he had to wipe soot out of his office on a weekly basis. As a result, Deleon claims that he contracted bronchitis, had frequent sinus headaches, and would occasionally blow black soot out of his nostrils….
We emphasize that the key focus of the inquiry should not be whether the lateral transfer was requested or not requested, or whether the aggrieved plaintiff must ex tempore voice dissatisfaction, but whether the “conditions of the transfer” would have been “objectively intolerable to a reasonable person.”
There is so much wrong with this opinion that I don’t know where to start. Perhaps the best place is Judge Sutton’s scathing, common-sense dissent, which ends thusly (as will today’s post):
Whatever the correct interpretation of the employment retaliation laws may be, they surely stop at this line: imposing liability on employers whether they grant or deny an employee’s request for a transfer…. An interpretation of the retaliation laws that subjects employers to liability coming and going—whether after granting employee requests or denying them—will do more to breed confusion about the law than to advance the goals of a fair and respectful workplace. Even after plumbing the depths of logic, experience, case law and common sense, I must return to this surface point: When an employee voluntarily applies for, and obtains, a job transfer, his employer has not subjected him to an adverse employment action.
In Al-Maqablh v. University of Cincinnati College of Medicine (11/5/13), an Ohio federal court answered the question of whether graduate assistants are employees entitled to the protections of Title VII. As with most legal question, the answer depends.
The case concerned the race and national origin claims of a grad student placed on academic probation and ultimately dismissed from the University. Al-Maqablh sought Title VII’s protections as an employee because he “received a paycheck from the University and rendered services to the University by performing extensive research through lab work.” The court, however, disagreed:
Plaintiff received a stipend and/or scholarship after being accepted into the Program. Plaintiff has failed to show that this pay stub was based upon is employment with the University and not a portion of his stipend award. Furthermore, the fact that Plaintiff performed extensive research, as required under the Program, does not make him an employee under Title VII.
Instead, the court looked to the “economic realities” of the relationship between Al-Maqablh and the University to determine whether he was an employee or a student:
Plaintiff participated in the Graduate Program as a student engaging in “courses, seminars and laboratory research during the academic year.” … More importantly, the dominant purpose of Plaintiff’s relationship with the University was educational. Plaintiff’s complaint against the University asserts claims solely related to his academic activities as a graduate student…. [T]he undisputed evidence establishes that the University’s decision to dismiss Plaintiff from the Graduate Program was an academic decision unrelated to Plaintiff’s alleged employment with the University. As such, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff should not be considered an employee under Title VII....
Thus, in this case, the graduate assistant was a student, not an employee. The court made the point, however, that this rule is not universal; the status of a graduate assistant must be analyzed based on the “economic realities” of each individual. If the University had paid Al-Maqablh for his services (as opposed to providing him an academic scholarship), or if the University had dismissed him for an employment reason, as opposed to an academic, reasons, this case likely would have turned out differently.
If you are an educational institution using the services of graduate assistants, do not make this mistake of reading this decision as providing carte blanche to discriminate against graduate assistants (indeed, Title IX would instruct you differently). Instead, understand that these rules are fact specific, and seek legal counsel to guide your actions accordingly.
Today could prove to be a historic one for civil rights. According to reports, the Senate is likely to vote later today on the Employment Nondiscrimination Act [pdf]. ENDA, as it’s more commonly known, would amend Title VII to include protections for sexual orientation and gender identity. Early reports indicate that it could have enough support to pass in the Senate (even my home-state Republican Senator, Rob Portman, has indicated he may vote for it). Whether it can pass the Republican-controlled House and make it to President Obama’s desk for signature is another story. Trying to do his part, President Obama has penned an article for the Huffington Post urging both houses of Congress “to vote yes on ENDA.”
Those who have read my earlier thoughts on ENDA know that I’ve long preached that I believe it’s shameful that in 2013 there still exist minorities against who the government says it’s legal to discriminate. Critics of ENDA argue that it’s not necessary to impose legislative burdens on employers because most already prohibit this form of discrimination via their own internal policies, or because state and local jurisdictions that have passed similar laws do not report an increase of claims.
To these critics, I say that you miss the point. Anti-discrimination laws that exclude sexual orientation and gender identity suggest that these forms of discrimination are permissible. Additionally, while I look forward to embracing the day that all forms of discrimination cease to exist, I would not argue for the abolition of all anti-discrimination laws if that were to occur. Instead, I would argue that the laws are working, and are needed as a deterrent to maintain the status quo.
Perhaps Apple CEO Time Cook put it best in a Wall Street Journal Op-Ed urging for ENDA’s passage:
So long as the law remains silent on the workplace rights of gay and lesbian Americans, we as a nation are effectively consenting to discrimination against them.
As an advocate for employer rights, it’s rare that I’m in favor of increased regulations on businesses. Yet, this legislation is a no-brainier. As we approach the 50th anniversary of Title VII, now is the time to tell our workers that we, as a nation, support equality among all, including the LGBT community. Otherwise, the very principle upon which our country was founded (that all people are created equal) is nothing but a sham.
I will update the blog after the Senate holds its vote on ENDA.
In EEOC v. Freeman (D. Md. 8/9/13) [pdf], the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed a race discrimination lawsuit filed by the EEOC. Consistent with its Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions under Title VII, the EEOC alleged that Freeman’s criminal background checks on all job applicants violated Title VII by disparately impacting African-American job seekers.
In dismissing the lawsuit, the Court focused on the factual failings of the EEOC’s statistical expert. Eric Meyer’s Employer Handbook Blog has the details of the Court’s opinion.
The opinion also provides the most scathing indictment to date of the EEOC’s position on the use of criminal background checks by employers. Despite its length, it’s worth reprinting in its entirety.
For many employers, conducting a criminal history or credit record background check on a potential employee is a rational and legitimate component of a reasonable hiring process. The reasons for conducting such checks are obvious. Employers have a clear incentive to avoid hiring employees who have a proven tendency to defraud or steal from their employers, engage in workplace violence, or who otherwise appear to be untrustworthy and unreliable….
The present case is only one of a series of actions recently brought by the EEOC against employers who rely on criminal background and/or credit history checks in making hiring decisions. For example, in two recent complaints filed against discount retailer Dollar General Corp. and car manufacturer BMW, the EEOC claimed that those employers improperly used criminal background checks to bar potential employees, resulting in a disparate impact on African-American applicants….
Indeed, the higher incarceration rate [of African-Americans than Caucasians] might cause one to fear that any use of criminal history information would be in violation of Title VII. However, this is simply not the case. Careful and appropriate use of criminal history information is an important, and in many cases essential, part of the employment process of employers throughout the United States. As Freeman points out, even the EEOC conducts criminal background investigations as a condition of employment for all employees, and conducts credit background checks on approximately 90 percent of its positions….
By bringing actions of this nature, the EEOC has placed many employers in the “Hobson’s choice” of ignoring criminal history and credit background, thus exposing themselves to potential liability for criminal and fraudulent acts committed by employees, on the one hand, or incurring the wrath of the EEOC for having utilized information deemed fundamental by most employers. Something more, far more, than what is relied upon by the EEOC in this case must be utilized to justify a disparate impact claim based upon criminal history and credit checks. To require less, would be to condemn the use of common sense, and this is simply not what the discrimination laws of this country require.
This case is an important first step towards a reasoned and rational understanding of the role of criminal background checks for employers. The Freeman case, however, will not be the final word. District courts nationwide will face this issue and, depending on the judge hearing the case, will agree or disagree with the EEOC’s hard-line position. It will then be up to the appellate courts, and, hopefully, the Supreme Court, to have the final say.
In the meantime, employers need to understand that criminal background checks are the EEOC’s hit list. Regardless of how this issue ultimately plays out, using a conviction record as a disqualifying factor for employment without engaging in the individualized inquiry required by the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance will raise the EEOC’s ire and could subject an employer to an enforcement lawsuit.
I am hopeful that, in the end, common sense will prevail and rescue employers from the Hobson’s choice recognized by the Freeman court. Until then, these practices remain risky. Employers will have to balance the risk of an EEOC enforcement action against the benefit to be gained from the access to and use of criminal conviction records in hiring and employment.
And I said, I don’t care if they lay me off either, because I told, I told Bill that if they move my desk one more time, then, then I’m, I’m quitting … I’m going to quit. And, and I told Dom too, because they’ve moved my desk … four times already this year, and I used to be over by the window, and I could see … the squirrels, and they were merry, but then, they switched … from the Swingline to the Boston stapler, but I kept my Swingline stapler because it didn’t bind up as much … and I kept the staples for the Swingline stapler and it’s not okay because if they take my stapler then I’ll have to … I’ll set the building on fire...
– Milton Waddams, Office Space
I love the movie Office Space. One of the movie’s best sub-plots involves Milton Waddams. Milton works for Bill Lumbergh, and is Lumbergh’s punching bag. Lumbergh belittles him, steals his red Swingline stapler, continuously reduces the size of his cube, and, ultimately, transfers him to a basement storage closet. All the while, Milton mumbles under his breath that he’s going to set the building on fire. True to his word, Milton ultimately gets his revenge by burning down the office.
Why am I telling you the plot of Office Space? Because, according to this story in the St. Joseph, Missouri, News-Press, a former employee of the Missouri Department of Transportation is alleging that the department discriminated against her because of her age by … are you ready … moving her out of her office and forcing her to work from a moldy storage closet.
While there are two sides to every story, generally it is a bad idea to react to an employee’s internal complaint about age discrimination by moving her workspace from an office to a storage closet. Milton earned his revenge by arson. This employee is seeking hers via the courts. Either way, giving any employee the Milton treatment, let alone doing so on the heels of a complaint about discrimination or some other protected activity, is a horrendous idea.
This post originally appeared on The Legal Workplace Blog.
At the certification stage in a class-action lawsuit, a trial court must undertake a rigorous analysis, which may include probing the underlying merits of the plaintiff’s claim, but only for the purpose of determining whether the plaintiff has satisfied the prerequisites of Civ.R. 23.Implicitly adopting the logic of Comcast, the Court also held:
We now recognize that the need for individualized determinations is dispositive in concluding that the class does not comport with Civ.R. 23.
Unauthorized third-party charges are better resolved on an individual basis with the third party or UTO. UTO’s phone bills identify third-party charges, the entity responsible for the charge, and a toll-free number for billing inquiries. Moreover, UTO claims that it has a policy of removing third-party charges for the purpose of maintaining good will with its clients. Finally, for larger charges or where the charge cannot be resolved over the phone, small-claims court is also an option. Accordingly, because ascertaining whether third-party charges are authorized will require individualized determinations, common issues do not predominate.
One of the key analyses in any discrimination lawsuit is whether the plaintiff is “similarly situated” to those whom he or she claims the employer treated more favorably. If the plaintiff can establish disparate treatment of those “similarly situated,” he or she can make out a prima facie case and proceed to the discrimination bonus round to prove that the employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason was a pretext. Conversely, a failure to prove “similarly situated” dooms a claim to the summary judgment scrapheap.
Louzon v. Ford Motor Co. (6/4/13) [pdf] illustrates the important role a determination of “similarly situated” plays in discrimination cases.
Moien Louzon, a product engineer at Ford, took an approved leave of absence to visit family in Gaza. While abroad, Israel closed its borders, stranding Louzon in Gaza. Ford initially extended his leave of absence, but by the time the State Department could evacuate him, the extension had expired and Ford had terminated him.
In Louzon’s subsequent national-origin discrimination lawsuit, Ford filed a motion in limine, which sought to precluded Louzon from offering at trial any evidence of comparable employees on the basis that none were similarly situated as a matter of law. The district court granted Ford’s motion and, on its own accord, granted summary judgment to Ford and dismissed Louzon’s case.
The appellate opinion dealt with two issues — one procedural and one substantive.
Substantively, the court took up the issue of whether the trial court correctly determined that there did not exist any comparable employees similarly situated to Louzon. The court was concerned over the district court’s reliance on an outdated rule that mandated that comparative employees share the same supervisor. Instead, the 6th Circuit clarified that in determining whether employees are similarly situated, a court must “make an independent determination as to the relevancy of a particular aspect of the plaintiff’s employment status and that of the non-protected employee.” Merely examining whether there exists a shared supervisor is too narrow of a standard.
Similarly situated lies in the eyes of the beholder. How a court frames who is, and who is not, “similarly situated” can be dispositive of the issue of discrimination. For this reason, it is wise to examine any potential similarly situated employees for similar or dissimilar treatment under like circumstances before taking action against a protected employee.
Last year, the EEOC issued its long awaited Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions under Title VII. While the Guidance was much more fair and balanced than many employer advocates (me included) expected, it does include some head-scratchers for businesses. One such conundrum is how regulated employers are supposed to act when across-the-board criminal background searches are required by state law, as the EEOC takes the position that a blanket requirement violates Title VII.
Per the EEOC:
States and local jurisdictions also have laws and/or regulations that restrict or prohibit the employment of individuals with records of certain criminal conduct. Unlike federal laws or regulations, however, state and local laws or regulations are preempted by Title VII if they “purport[] to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice” under Title VII. Therefore, if an employer’s exclusionary policy or practice is not job related and consistent with business necessity, the fact that it was adopted to comply with a state or local law or regulation does not shield the employer from Title VII liability.
How is an employer supposed to handle this conflict? Waldon v. Cincinnati Public Schools, currently pending in the Southern District of Ohio, may provide some future guidance.
That case concerns the application of Ohio H.B. 190, which became law in 2007. That law requires criminal background checks of all current school employees, regardless of whether their duties involve the care, custody, or control of children, and mandates the termination of any employee with a certain number of historical convictions, regardless of the convictions’ age.
Two African-American employees challenge that H.B. 190 has an unlawful disparate impact because of race. Both were terminated based on decades-old convictions. All told, the Cincinnati Public Schools fired 10 employees as a result of background checks conducted pursuant to H.B. 190; nine of the 10 fired were African-American.
It is early in the litigation of the Waldon case. The court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss.
First, it concluded that it was clear that the Plaintiffs pleaded a prima facie case of disparate impact.
Although there appears to be no question that Defendant did not intend to discriminate, intent is irrelevant and the practice that it implemented allegedly had a greater impact on African-Americans than others.The existence of statistically significant disparate impact, however, if only the first step in the analysis. An employer can avoid liability if the challenged practice is justified by business necessity. While the court believed this issue to be “a close call,” it ultimately concluded that it could not make that call on a motion to dismiss:
Obviously the policy as applied to serious recent crimes addressed a level of risk the Defendant was justified in managing due to the nature of its employees’ proximity to children. However, in relation to the two Plaintiffs in this case, the policy operated to bar employment when their offenses were remote in time, when Plaintiff Britton’s offense was insubstantial, and when both had demonstrated decades of good performance. These Plaintiffs posed no obvious risk due to their past convictions, but rather, were valuable and respected employees, who merited a second chance.… Under these circumstances, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Defendant’s policy constituted a business necessity.Talk about a tough position in which to place an employer. Does the employer violate state law or violate Title VII? Ultimately, I think the correct answer should be neither. Shouldn’t the need to follow state law provide the employer’s “business necessity?” If not, employers will be faced in the untenable position of following one law and violating the other.
photo credit: kevin dooley via photopin cc
This post originally appeared on The Legal Workplace Blog.
Employees should not operate under any false ideas that they enjoy an expectation of privacy in their work email accounts. Just because an employer has the right to snoop through an employee’s email, however, does not mean the practice does not carry some degree of risk.
Consider, for example, Fields v. Fairfield County Board of Developmental Disabilities (6th Cir. 12/6/12). Fields claimed that her employer retaliated against her after it discovered an email she sent to some co-workers threatening a lawsuit against the Board. The court concluded that the email surveillance was insufficient evidence of pretext.
Simple enough? What if, however, the claim was that the company only started watching her email after it learned of the protected activity, and used evidence of misconduct in the email to support the termination decision. Could the email surveillance, in and of itself, be an adverse action sufficient to support a claim of retaliation? The legal standard for an adverse action sufficient to support a claim of retaliation is very broad. Anything that “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination,” qualifies as a retaliatory adverse action. If you don’t regularly review employee email accounts, and only start examining an employee’s electronic activities after that employee engages in some protected activity, might that dissuade others from engaging in protected activity?
If you are going to enforce a policy or exercise some employer right (like surveillance of corporate email or computer systems), do it consistently, not selectively and only after an employee complains about discrimination. Otherwise, you could change a legal and reasonable act (e.g., email surveillance) into evidence of unlawful retaliation.
Last Friday I had the pleasure of appearing on Huffington Post Live, in a segment entitled, “You’re Fired! No really.” We discussed the current state of employment at-will, and whether American workers need greater protections from being terminated without just cause.If you’ve read my blog for any length of time, you know what I have some pretty strong feelings on this topic. Heck, I’ve even written an entire book on this issue of employer rights.
If you missed the show, you can watch it here, or in the imbedded video below:
Following my appearance, Texas plaintiff-side employment lawyer Chris McKinney tweeted that he was surprised at my statement that it could cost a company $250,000 to defend an employment lawsuit:
Chris was responding to my comment that the myriad laws that already protect employees from arbitrary or capricious terminations (Title VII, ADA, ADEA, FMLA, etc.), coupled with the threat of defending an expensive lawsuit, serve as enough of a deterrent to most reasonable employers from firing an employee without a good reason.
The reality is that defending a discrimination or other employment lawsuit is expensive. Defending a case through discovery and a ruling on a motion for summary judgment can cost an employer between $75,000 and $125,000. If an employer loses summary judgment (which, much more often than not, is the case), the employer can expect to spend a total of $175,000 to $250,000 to take a case to a jury verdict at trial.
Most employers, if acting rationally, will chose to retain an employee instead of assuming the risk of a $250,000 legal bill with an uncertain outcome. Moreover, employers cannot avoid this risk simply by settling every claim that is filed, lest the company risk the perception of being an easy mark by every ex-employee.
If you must terminate an employee, however, the safest, most prudent course of action is to offer a severance package—but only in exchange for a waiver and release of claims, and covenant not to sue—for all terminated employees except those terminated for some egregious or intentional misconduct. By offering severance in exchange for a release, you are capping your exposure and buying off the risk of a costly, time consuming, and burdensome lawsuit.