Is the NLRB backing off its position on social media as protected, concerted activity?

A quartet of advice memos released by the NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel over the past weeks suggests that the NLRB may be backing of its extreme protections of employee social media posts as protected, concerted activity.

• In Children’s National Medical Center [pdf], the General Counsel recommended the dismissal of a charge brought by a respiratory therapist terminated for updating her Facebook status during an ambulance ride to threaten a co-worker who was committing the cardinal sin of sucking on her teeth:

“[T]here is no evidence to establish concert. The Charging Party did not discuss her Facebook post with any of her fellow employees, and none of her coworkers responded to the posts…. The Charging Party was merely airing a personal complaint about something that had happened on her shift.”

• In TAW Inc. [pdf], the General Counsel recommended the dismissal of a charge brought by an accountant terminated for refusing to remove a Facebook post which suggested that her employer was engaged in fraudulent accounting practices:

“Even if the Charging Party initially posted the comment in furtherance of alleged concerted activity …, her refusal to remove the comment after the April 18 meeting with the outside auditor was not protected…. [H]er comment suggesting that the Employer was engaged in fraud was false and, after April 18, she knew it was false. Her insistence on retaining the post after knowing it was false is not entitled to protection under the Act.”

• In Copiah Bank [pdf], the General Counsel recommended the dismissal of a charge brought by a bank teller terminated for off-duty Facebook posts complaining that employees at another branch had “narced” on her:

“The Charging Party did not post her comment on her Facebook page in furtherance of concerted activity for mutual aid or protection. The Charging Party admits that that she was not speaking on behalf of any other employees, nor is there evidence that that she was looking to group action when she posted her comments on Facebook.”

• In Intermountain Specialized Abuse Treatment Center [pdf], the General Counsel recommended the dismissal of a charge brought by a therapist who took to her Facebook wall to complain about staff meetings, including at least one interaction with a co-worker during which they agreed to use Facebook to “complain about work.”:

“The Charging Party’s Facebook posting was merely an expression of an individual gripe about … a staff meeting that affected only the Charging Party – her removal as the facilitator of her victims group. The posting contained no language suggesting that she sought to initiate or induce co-workers to engage in group action. And the only co-worker who commented in response to the posting stated that he did not think that the Charging Party’s post was an attempt to change anything at work.”

These G.C. memos suggest, as I suggested almost a year ago, that the sky may not be falling in regards to social media and the NLRB. Children’s National, TAW, and Copiah Bank are reasoned opinions on lone-wolf employees who took to social media to air gripes about work, or, in the case of Children’s National, to threaten a co-worker.

Intermountain, though, may have wider implications. One of my key concerns about the NLRB’s foray in regulating workplace social media is that by its very nature, social media is concerted, i.e., does a co-worker’s unsolicited comment or response to a social media post convert lone-wolf conduct into concerted activity? Intermountain suggests that the concerted nature of the social media activity depends on both the intent of the original poster and the understanding of that intent by any subsequent commenters.

These issues are far from settled. Intermountain, though, is a good first step in the right direction to providing employers some much needed clarity in this area. It’s also a welcoming sign that the NLRB isn’t forging ahead with blinders on in this area.

NLRB trumps U.S. Supreme Court on class action arbitrations

Last year, the U.S. Supreme Court, in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, held that a business could compel a group of individuals to waive their right to file a class action lawsuit and instead arbitrate their collective dispute. Employers rejoiced, believing that they finally had the weapon they needed to battle the scourge of wage and hour class actions. Last Friday, however, the NLRB struck a blow against this apparent victory.

In D. R. Horton, Inc. [pdf], the NLRB held that an arbitration agreement violated the National Labor Relations Act’s protections for employee concerted activity. The facts are pretty straight-forward. The employer required all of its employees, as a condition of their employment, to sign a master arbitration agreement, under which they agreed:

• to submit all disputes and claims relating to their employment to final and binding arbitration;
• that the arbitrator “may hear only … individual claims,” “will not have the authority to consolidate the claims of other employees,” and “does not have authority to fashion a proceeding as a class or collective action or to award relief to a group or class of employees in one arbitration proceeding”; and
• to waive “the right to file a lawsuit or other civil proceeding relating to … employment with the Company” and “the right to resolve employment-related disputes in a proceeding before a judge or jury.”

The NLRB concluded that the agreement “unlawfully restricts employees’ Section 7 right to engage in concerted action for mutual aid or protection,” and held that the employer “violated Section 8(a)(1) by requiring employees to waive their right to collectively pursue employment-related claims in all forums, arbitral and judicial.”

A few key points to make about this case:

1. This case continues the trend (as we’ve seen in the social media cases—more on this tomorrow) of the NLRB pursuing protected, concerted activity cases in non-union workplaces.
2. The NLRB did not concluded that all class action arbitration agreements are invalid, but merely those that leave employees without a collective remedy. An arbitration agreement, for example, that permits for a judicial filing would still be lawful. (But, then again, wouldn’t that fall-back nullify any benefit to be gained from the arbitration agreement in the first place?)
3. This decision likely is not the last we will hear on this issue. This case is almost certainly headed to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. Depending on that result, it will be curious to see if the Supreme Court picks up the ball to reconcile this case with AT&T Mobility. Until then, employers should tread carefully in trying to implement or enforce class action arbitration agreements.

WIRTW #207 (the “world tour” edition)

Okay, so it’s not really a world tour, but I do have a bunch of speaking engagements coming up in the next few weeks, all but one of which you can join.

• At 2 pm this afternoon, you can call in and speak to me live on the special 100th installment of Stephanie Thomas’s Proactive Employer Podcast. I’ll be appearing along with fellow employment law bloggers Dan Schwartz and Phil Miles. If you want to participate, the call-in number is (347) 945-5651, or you can tweet your question using the hashtag #TPE100. You will be able to listen live here.
• On January 11, I will be presenting the inaugural webinar in the Ohio Chamber of Commerce’s HR Academy, entitled Think Before You Click: Strategies for Managing Social Media in the Workplace. The live webinar runs from 10 – 11:30 am.
• On January 18, I will be leading a session on how-to blog for the Ohio Women’s Bar Association Leadership Institute.
• On February 9, I am presenting Lawyers, Booze and Money: Social Media Compliance for Regulated Industries, at the Social Media Strategies Summit in Las Vegas.
• On February 21, I will be part of a webinar panel entitled Understanding Unions, NLRB, and Social Media. The panel will be part of a webinar series run by Jessica Miller-Merrell on her blog, Blogging4Jobs. More info to follow.
• Also, last month I recorded an episode of the Fistful of Talent Podcast (the CYA Report, with co-host Dawn Burke and Kris Dunn) discussing current issues with the NLRB. You can download the podcast here.

The blogosphere never sleeps, even over the holidays. It’s been a busy couple of weeks. Let’s get to it.

Here’s what I read this week (and last week):

Discrimination

• The EEOC’s wish list for reasonable accommodations – from Sindy Warren’s Warren & Hays Employment Law Blog
• Going on offense—responding to a potential ADA suit – from John Holmquist’s Michigan Employment Law Connection
• Breast-Feeding Avengers – from Eve Tahmincioglu’s CareerDiva
• A Get Over It Guide to Transgender in the Workplace – from Jessica Miller-Merrell’s Blogging4Jobs

Social Media & Workplace Technology

• Poetic Justice - 2011 Wrap Up – from Social Media Employment Law Blog
• Top Ten 2012 Social Media Resolutions Every Organization Should Have – from Social Axcess
• Are employees’ LinkedIn contacts considered your trade secrets? and Who owns the LinkedIn account you maintain for an employee? – from Eric Meyer’s The Employer Handbook Blog
• Do Your Social Media Accounts Belong To Your Business? Why Worry, When There Are Safeguards You Can Take Now – from Social Media Law Update
• Why Owning Your Employee’s Twitter Account is Foolish – from Social Media Today
• My Interview with @noahkravitz (Noah Kravitz) - How Much is a Twitter Follower Worth? – from Social Media for Law Firms
• SEC issues investor alerts highlighting the perils of social media – from Kevin O’Keefe’s Real Lawyers Have Blogs
• Avoiding the Dangers of Social Media Background Checks – from i-Sight Investigation Software Blog
• Twitter, Anonymous, Occupy Wall Street, the First Amendment, and the Suffolk County district attorney – from The Verge

HR & Employee Relations

• Setting Precedents: What You Have Done Before Does Count – from Mike Haberman’s Omega HR Solutions
• Employment law leftovers: Best of 2011, what's up for 2012, and resolutions – from Robin Shea’s Employment and Labor Insider
• Things I Believe In – from The ChamberPost
• Sex Sells—And It’s A Trade Secret – from Fair Competition Law
• Employee Bathroom Surveillance Camera, Although Faulty, Could Be Invasion of Privacy – from Workplace Fairness
• Why You Really Shouldn’t Curse at Work (Much) – from Harvard Business Review
• Losing Your Driver’s License Can Impact Your Career – from hr bartender
• Workplace Rudeness Has a Ripple Effect – from Scientific American
• Ohio Court: Client List Was Not a Trade Secret – from The Personnel Files
• What Employers and Employees Should Understand About Conducting Background Checks from Jason Shinn’s Michigan Employment Law Advisor

Wage & Hour

• Does Lady Gaga Owe Assistant OT? – from Wage & Hour Insights
• Lady Gaga’s Personal Assistant Sues for Overtime: “At Her Side” 24/7 – from Wage and Hour Law Update
• Get a Fresh Start on Misclassification in 2012 – from Stephanie Thomas at Compensation Cafe
• Can my company force me to take health insurance? – from Evil HR Lady, Suzanne Lucas
• Employee Not Owed Reporting Time or Split Shift Pay for Scheduled Meetings – from Wage & Hour Counsel
• The DOL’s FMLA Forms Expired on December 31, 2011. Should Employers Still Use Them? – from FMLA Insights
• Invalid FMLA certification can form the basis of employment termination – from Employment Law Matters

Labor Relations

• Just In: Obama Taps Three for NLRB Vacancies – from Phil Miles’s Lawffice Space
• President Obama Announces Three Recess Appointments to NLRB Despite Senate in Pro Forma Session and More on President Obama’s “Recess” Appointments to the NLRB – from Seth Borden’s Labor Relations Today
• NLRB’s New “Vote Now, Litigate Later” Union Election Rules To Become Effective April 2012 – from World of Work
• When is a Supervisor Not a Supervisor? The NLRB Finds No Proof of Supervisory Authority – from Vorys on Labor

Disability discrimination law in Ohio is a mess

Let’s start with the obvious: it is illegal in Ohio for an employer to discriminate against an employee because of the employee’s disability. It is not always easy to figure out who this proscription covers, because Ohio’s statute (R.C. 4112) and the federal statute (the ADA) have their own respective definitions of what is a disability, which vary slightly:

     Ohio Law:

“Disability” means a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, including the functions of caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working; a record of a physical or mental impairment; or being regarded as having a physical or mental impairment.

     Federal Law:

The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual — (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

Before Congress amended the ADA in 2009, there existed another key difference between its and Ohio’s respective definitions of “disability.” To be “regarded as” disabled under Ohio law, one has to be “regarded as having a physical or mental impairment.” Under the pre-ADAAA ADA, to be “regarded as” disabled, one had to be perceived as having an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. By adding the “substantially limits” language, the federal definition was more restrictive.

Until recently, and despite these differences, Ohio law has almost always looked to federal law in interpreting its state disability discrimination statute. Last month, however, the rules changed. In Scalia v. Aldi, Inc. (12/21/11) [pdf] (discussed yesterday), one Ohio appellate court said the following:

Because the plain language of the definition of disability contained in R.C. 4112.01 differs in substance from the ADA, it is not appropriate to look to federal materials interpreting the pre-2008 ADA with respect to perceived disability claims under Ohio law.

The key language in that quote is “pre-2008 ADA.” The ADAAA amended the definition of “regarded as” disability. Under the amended ADA, it is now irrelevant whether the actual or perceived physical or mental condition substantially limits a major life activity:

An individual meets the requirement of “being regarded as having such an impairment” if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.

Thus, as the court pointed out in Scalia v. Aldi, Ohio law and federal law now match on this issue. Because Aldi terminated Scalia before Congress amended the ADA, the court applied the pre-amendment version of the statute, and left open the question of whether Ohio courts should look to federal caselaw interpreting the amended federal statute.

What does all this mean for Ohio employers? Disability discrimination law is a mess. Until the General Assembly passes legislation clarifying whether interpretations of “disability” under R.C. 4112 are supposed to mirror the ADA, companies doing business in Ohio would be best served following the most expansive interpretation of the definition of disability possible under either statute.

Resolve this year to properly handle no-fault attendance policies

For the uninitiated, a no-fault attendance policy terminates an employee who accumulates a pre-designated number of absences, regardless of the reason. For employers with high-volume, high-turnover operations, these policies make a lot of sense as the best tool to manage employee attendance. They are not, however, without their risk. For example, no-fault attendance policies cannot penalize absences that fall under the protective umbrella of statutes such as the FMLA or the ADA. As some employers have discovered, disciplining or firing disabled employees under a no-fault policy can be a costly error.

What about employees on leave for a workers’ comp injury? Can an employer count those absence under a no-fault policy? According to one recent Ohio appellate decision—Scalia v. Aldi, Inc. (12/21/11) [pdf]—the answer is a decided maybe. The court concluded that it is not per se retaliatory for an employer to terminate an employee on workers compensation leave pursuant to a facially neutral attendance policy. The court remanded the case back to the trial court to consider the issue of whether the employer—through the application of its attendance policy— terminated the plaintiff retaliation for instituting, pursuing, or testifying in a workers’ compensation proceeding.

What does this mean? This means that the plaintiff cannot rely solely on the attendance policy to prove retaliation, but must prove that the employer’s reliance on the attendance policy was a pretext for retaliation. A uniformly applied attendance policy will go a long way to disproving this pretext. As mentioned above, however, employers cannot apply attendance policies to penalize employees on leave for FMLA or ADA reasons. Will this lack of uniformity hurt employers in defending against workers’ comp retaliation cases? Or, can an employer lawfully treat FMLA-related and ADA-related absences differently than workers’ comp-related absences. Another court will have to answer these questions in another case. As this case illustrates, employers must tread very carefully when disciplining or terminating an employee who is absent from work because of work-related injury.

Does India have sex discrimination laws?

I have no idea if India has workplace sex discrimination laws. The following classified ad would suggest not:



Does anyone know if this is legal in India? Do I need to tell you that it is the absolute opposite of a best practice to list a position as one for a “Lady Computer Operator … preferably married”?

[Hat tip: my wife]

Did anyone resolve to be less connected in 2012?

Available at http://www.gocomics.com/nonsequitur/2011/12/26

Happy New Year!