WIRTW #151 (the election recap edition)

Here’s my 140-character recap of Tuesday’s election: Obama did not learn from Clinton’s 92 – 94 mistakes. Cost Dems huge. We’ll see if Boehner learned anything from Gingrich’s post-1994 gaffes. Craving a more substantive analysis of the 2010 mid-term elections?

• State Secret Ballot Measures – from Workplace Prof Blog

• Post-elections Implications for Labor Bills in Congress – from Joe’s HR and Benefits Blog

• Impact of Midterm Election on Employment Law – from The Word on Employment Law with John Phillips

• Ohio: More Business-Friendly Approach Is Likely – from HR Hero’s Human Resources News

• Now That the Election is Done and Republicans Own the House, What Does that Mean for Labor? – from Wisconsin Employment & Labor Law Blog

• What did Election Day 2010 mean for the Healthy Workplace Bill? – from David Yamada’s Minding the Workplace

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

• Parents Need Not Apply – from WorkLife Law Blog

• Among Recent Lawsuits Filed By The EEOC, Disability, Retaliation Claims Most Prevalent, Employer Size Varies – from Hunton Employment & Labor Law Perspectives™

• Patience Is A Virtue With Workplace Investigations – from Colorado Employer’s Law Blog

• What Does Climbing the St. Louis Arch Have To Do With Proving Discrimination? Learning Employment Discrimination Law Basics From a Classic Civil Rights Story – from George’s Employment Blawg

• Halloween Harassment – from Abovethelaw.com

• Muslim Truck Driver Refuses to Deliver Alcohol – from Philip Miles’s Lawffice Space

Employee Relations

• “Use good judgment in all situations” – from Walter Olson’s Overlawyered

• Fired and Need Legal Advice? There’s an App for That – from Robert Ambrogi’s LawSites

• Business Case for Work/Life Balance--Really? – from The Careerist

• HR Plays Too Much Defense – from Fistful of Talent

• “Hire Attitude vs Aptitude”: A Lesson from Disney – from Michael Haberman’s HR Observations

• Referring to Former Boss as Slimebag Does Not Constitute Disparagement, At Least in Ohio – from Fitzpatrick on Employment Law

• Ohio School Employees Can Still Be Fired for Criminal Past – from employeescreenIQ Blog

Social Networking and Technology

• NLRB Alleges that Connecticut Company Illegally Fired Employee Over Comments on Facebook – from Dan Schwartz’s Connecticut Employment Law Blog

• Judge Obtains Protective Order Based on a Tweet – from Molly DiBianca at the Delaware Employment Law Blog

• Florida Issues New Jury Instructions: No Tweeting, Blogging, Net Research, etc. – from Sharon Nelson’s Ride The Lightning

Wage & Hour

• Strippers Claim Coverage Under FLSA And File Class Action! – from Wage & Hour - Development & Highlights

• USERRA coverage may be triggered prior to formal military orders – from Employment Law Matters

Trade Secrets & Competition

• Hire a Great Candidate, But Hopefully Avoid a Lawsuit – from Trade Secret / Noncompete Blog

• Just Because Trade Secrets Were Misappropriated Doesn’t Mean Unjust Enrichment Occurred – from Trade Secrets Blog

• Non-competition covenants’ restriction on innovation – from Maryland Employment Law Developments

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Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

6th Circuit holds that an individual must be disabled to challenge a selection criteria under the ADA (but does it matter?)

Employee use of prescription drugs has been in the news lately. Last week, the New York Times ran a piece discussing the drug testing of employees for prescription medications. The article discussed Dura Automotive Systems, which, over concerns about drug use and worker safety, hired an independent company to administer random drug tests of its employes. It chose to screen for 12 types of drugs, including hydrocodone and oxycodone. Seven Dura employees tested positive for lawful prescription medications and sued following their terminations.

Yesterday, in Bates v. Dura Automotive Systems, Inc. (6th Cir. 11/3/10) [pdf], the 6th Circuit dismissed the claims of any of the plaintiffs who are not disabled under the ADA.

Section 12112(b)(6) of the ADA prohibits discrimination based on qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria. It provides:

No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual [by] using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity.

The 6th Circuit concluded that the plain language of the statute barred non-disabled employees from pursuing a claim:

Although non-disabled individuals may bring claims under some provisions of the Act, the plain text of subsection (b)(6) only covers individuals with disabilities. The text of subsection (a) and (b)(6) specifically refers to “qualified individual[s] with disabilit[ies],” and not … a broader class of individuals such as “employees.” … A straightforward reading of this statute compels the conclusion that only a “qualified individual with a disability” is protected from the prohibited form of discrimination described in subsection (b)(6)…. Although other sections of the Act apply to non-disabled individuals, the Act’s primary purpose is to prevent discrimination against disabled individuals…. Interpreting subsection (b)(6) as being limited to individuals with disabilities better gives effect to Congress’s decision not to use the word “employees” in this subsection.

This case may end up being much ado about nothing. Because terminations occurred before Jan. 1, 2009, the 6th Circuit decided this case under the pre-amendment ADA, which had a might tighter definition of “disability.” As I have previously discussed, the ADA Amendments Act expands the definition of “disability” so broadly that virtually every employee with a medical condition could be considered “disabled.” Therefore, future drug testing cases likely will not be decided on the issue of whether the tested employees were “disabled.” Instead, courts will decide future cases on whether the drug testing was job related and consistent with business necessity—an affirmative defense under the ADA. For this reason, it is important for businesses to contemporaneously document the job nexus and business need for all employee drug testing.

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Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Does your social networking policy violate federal labor laws?

It was only a matter of time before the NLRB inserted itself into the intersection of social networking and employment relations. It has Twitter account. Now, it has issued its first complaint challenging an employer’s social networking policy.

The NLRB has issued a complaint against a company that fired an employee after posting negative comments about her supervisor on her personal Facebook page. The Blog of Legal Times reports that the NLRB not only alleges that the employer illegally fired the employee for the posting, but that the company “maintained and enforced an overly broad blogging and Internet posting policy.”

An NLRB investigation found that the Facebook postings were “protected concerted activity,” and that the company’s blogging and Internet posting policy contained unlawful provisions, including one that barred employees from making disparaging remarks when discussing the company or supervisors and another that prohibited employees from depicting the company in any way over the Internet without company permission.

“Such provisions constitute interference with employees in the exercise of their right to engage in protected concerted activity,” the NLRB found.

This case could have far reaching implications for all employers—not just those that are collectively bargained. If the NLRB concludes that a singular posting on a personal website constitutes protected concerted activity, then it will be nearly impossible for an employer to regulate off-the-clock Internet activity. The NLRB will hold a hearing on this case on January 25, 2011. I will be very interested to read the ALJ’s decision.

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Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Reading the tea leaves: Staub v. Proctor Hospital and the “Cat’s Paw”

Before we get into the specifics of the Staub case, let’s first discuss the relationship between a cat’s appendage and employment discrimination law. The “cat's paw” derives from a 17th century fable by French poet Jean de la Fontaine. In “The Money and the Cat,” a monkey tricks a cat into scooping chestnuts out of a fire so that the monkey can eagerly gobble them up, leaving none left for the cat. It generally describes a situation where one is unwittingly manipulated to do another’s bidding. Drawing the parallel between la Fontaine’s fable and discrimination law, one seeks to hold an employer (the cat) liable for the discriminatory animus of an employee who played no role in the decision, but nevertheless exerted some degree of influence (the monkey). As Mike Maslanka put it on his Work Matters blog, the question is what is an employer’s liability “when the guy who pulled the trigger is pure, but the guy who loads the gun is not?”

Thus, the argument in the case is framed like this:

• Employers argue that federal discrimination laws make the employer liable only for the actions of the employee or supervisor who takes the discriminatory action.
• Employees,  however, argue that the is enough that the person with the discriminatory animus (the money) played some role in the process, even if the decision maker (the cat) is completely unaware of the animus.

As for the specifics of the case, Staub brought his claim under USERRA, which, among other things, protects those in military service from discrimination upon their return to employment from active duty. Staub had been a long-time employee of Proctor Hospital before being called upon to serve in Iraq. Many at the hospital were critical of Staub’s military service because of the strain it put on those who had to cover from him in his absence. When the Vice President of HR, who held no hostility towards Staub, terminated him, he sued, claiming that although the decision maker was not personally biased against his military service, she fired him based on the hostility of Staub’s direct supervisors.

The 7th Circuit reversed a jury verdict for Staub, holding:

[W]here an employee without formal authority to materially alter the terms and conditions of a plaintiff’s employment nonetheless uses her “singular influence” over an employee who does have such power to harm the plaintiff for racial reasons, the actions of the employee without formal authority are imputed to the employer…. [W]here a decision maker is not wholly dependent on a single source of information, but instead conducts its own investigation into the facts relevant to the decision, the employer is not liable for an employee’s submission of misinformation to the decision maker.

In other words, under the 7th Circuit’s pronouncement of the cat’s paw, the employer can only be liable if the decision maker is only influenced by the animus of the non-decision makers.

Yesterday, the Supreme Court held oral argument [transcript, in pdf] in this case. It’s hard to read Supreme Court Justices at oral argument. Sometimes they play devil’s advocate, and sometimes they genuinely challenge the attorney. Regardless, I found the following question from Justice Breyer (one the Court’s more liberal justices) to the employer’s attorney to be insightful:

You have A and B, they are both supervisors; in the one case B fires the employee because he is in the Army, and he says it: Ha, ha, that’s why I’m doing it. In the second case he fires the employee … for a perfectly good reason, but A has lied about it. And the reason A lied about it was because she wanted to tell him a lie so B would fire the employee, and her reason is because he’s in the Army. Those two situations, the second seems to me one of … 80 million situations, fact-related, that could arise, and I don’t know why we want a special standard for such a situation. Why not just ask the overall question, was this action an action that was -­ in which the bad motive was a motivating factor. Forget psychoanalysis of A. B is good enough -- or vice versa.

I also found insightful the following exchange between Justices Alito and Kennedy and the employee’s attorney:

   Justice Alito: Even -- even if the employer at that time did every -- made every reasonable effort to investigate the validity of all the prior evaluations, still the employer would be on the hook?

   A: Yes. There is nothing in the statute or in the common law that creates a special rule for thorough investigation.

   Justice Kennedy: Well, that's a sweeping rule. I was going to ask a related hypothetical. Suppose the -- the officer who is in charge, charged with the decision to terminate or not to terminate says: I'm going to have a hearing. You can both have counsel. And you have who, is it -- suppose Buck -- suppose the two employees that were allegedly anti-military here testified and they said there was no anti-military bias, and the person is then terminated. Later the employee has evidence that those two were lying. Could he bring an action then?

   A: Yes. Yes.

   Justice Kennedy: That’s sweeping. That's almost an insurer’s liability insofar as the director of employment is concerned…. He has to insure. He has -- he has done everything he can, he has an hearing, and he has almost absolute liability.

Reading the tea leaves, it is likely that the cat’s paw will survive the Supreme Court’s review in a narrow form. I predict that the court will derive a standard that looks to the ultimate decision and the role that the animus of the non-decision maker played in that decision. I also think that the Court will craft an affirmative defense or other means to rebut the inference of the cat’s paw, such as the decision maker's independent investigation of the circumstances leading to the termination.

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Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Do you know? 10 provisions to include in severance and separation agreements

Last week, I wrote about problems in enforcing non-disparagement clauses in separation agreements. It got me to thinking—what other clauses should businesses prioritize for inclusion in separation agreements, other than the release and waiver? Here are my thoughts:

1. Consideration: A statement that the consideration provided to the employee is more than that to which the employee is otherwise entitled to employment by way of employment. Otherwise, the release and waiver could fail for the employee not receiving anything of value in exchange.
   
2. Confidentiality: A covenant as to the confidentiality of the agreement. You do not want other employees learning the terms of the separation, or that agreement was even reached. Otherwise, it could open the floodgates to other employees seeking separation packages.
   
3. Secrets: A covenant as to the confidentiality of employer’s confidential and proprietary information.
   
4. Return of Property: A covenant that all corporate property has been returned, or will be returned by a date certain.
   
5. Transition: A promise to reasonably cooperate with the employer as to the transition of job duties and responsibilities.
   
6. No-rehire: A promise that the employee will not apply for any positions in the future, and that the company is not obligated to consider him or her for future employment. Because there is some risk that a clause such as this could be viewed as retaliatory, indemnification language is not a bad idea.
   
7. No Liability: A statement that the agreement is not an admission of liability.
   
8. Governing law, Jurisdiction, and Venue: An agreement as to the law that will govern the agreement, and the jurisdiction and venue in which one must file any lawsuit regarding a breach of the agreement.
   
9. Entire Agreement: An integration clause, stating that the written agreement is the parties’ entire agreement, that no other written or oral agreements exist, and that the parties may only amend the agreement in writing signed by all.
   
10. Voluntariness: An acknowledgement that the employee read and understands the agreement, and had sufficient time and an opportunity to consult with his or her own legal advisor prior to signing the agreement.
    

What else are people including in their separation and severance agreements? Readers, did I miss any?

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Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

You deserve to be told who to vote for today … at McDonald’s

A McDonald’s franchisee in Canton finds itself in trouble this election season for including inside employees’ paychecks a pamphlet urging them to vote Republican. As if an employer’s inclusion of political literature with paychecks isn’t intimidating enough, the note stated, “If the right people are elected, we will be able to continue with raises and benefits at or above the current levels. If others are elected, we will not.”

These actions likely violate a little-known Ohio law that prohibits an employer from influencing the political opinions or votes of employees. O.R.C. § 3599.05 provides:

No employer or his agent or a corporation shall print or authorize to be printed upon any pay envelopes any statements intended or calculated to influence the political action of his or its employees; or post or exhibit in the establishment or anywhere in or about the establishment any posters, placards, or hand bills containing any threat, notice, or information that if any particular candidate is elected or defeated work in the establishment will cease in whole or in part, or other threats expressed or implied, intended to influence the political opinions or votes of his or its employees.

The lesson is simple—keep politics out of the workplace. It’s divisive, makes employees uncomfortable, and, at least in this instance, illegal.

For more on the intersection between election day and the workplace, see Time off to vote on election day.

[Hat tip: The Word on Employment Law with John Phillips and Joe’s HR and Benefits Blog]

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Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Is it illegal to ask employees to promise not to sign union authorization cards?

While the Employee Free Choice Act has stalled in Congress, it does not mean that it is no longer newsworthy. For example, tomorrow, four states (Arizona, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah) will have ballot measures aimed at preventing the EFCA from being implemented on a state level.

For more evidence of the continued relevancy of the debate over the ECFA, consider the case of Regis Corp. The NLRB issued a complaint against Regis as a result of allegations that it asked its employees to sign a document revoking their future right to form a union by using an authorization card. According to Regis, the purpose of the document was to protect the workers’ ability to vote in a secret ballot election. Regis also contends that the agreement was completely voluntary—up to 20% of its workers have refused to sign it and none have been terminated. Yet, five employees complained to the NLRB that they felt their jobs were at risk if they didn’t sign the form, or who said they lost jobs because they questioned it.

Last week, the NLRB issued a complaint against Regis as a result of the secret ballot pledge:

The NLRB today issued a complaint against Minneapolis-based Regis Corporation … alleging it illegally solicited employees to promise in writing that they would not sign union authorization cards in the future.

The complaint also alleges that, in a DVD played to employees across the country, the company’s Chief Executive Officer warned that hair stylists would be blacklisted from the industry if they supported a union. In the recording, he exhorted employees to sign a “Protection of Secret Vote Agreement”, which would prospectively revoke any union authorization cards signed in the future. The complaint further alleges that a district manager threatened employees with job loss if they refused to sign the agreement.

The alleged events occurred in the fall and winter of 2009-2010, at a time when legislation was pending in Congress that would have required employers to recognize a union if a majority of employees signed authorization cards. It has not been enacted.

I have not done the research to conclude whether Regis’s pledge is legal or illegal. But, as this case illustrates, under the current pro-labor NLRB labor practices that come close to the line scrutinized before being put into practice. As the NLRB is currently constituted, this federal agency is a hostile audience for employers accused of anti-union measures. When dealing with labor unions or employee concerted activities, employers should view their measures through the same labor-tinted glasses as will the NLRB.

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Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.