6th Circuit re-affirms mixed-motive causation under the FMLA

Earlier this summer, the U.S. Supreme Court did away with the notion of a mixed motive termination in an age discrimination case. In Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., the Court held that to succeed on an disparate treatment claim under the ADEA, a plaintiff must prove that age was the only cause of the challenged action. I’m not breaking ground by reporting that employers make decisions that implicate statutes other than the ADEA. And, in those decisions, there are often more than one motive present. So, does the Gross, but-for rule apply in mixed-motive cases under other statutes, such as the FMLA? Last week, in Hunter v. Valley View Local Schools (8/26/09) [PDF], the 6th Circuit gave us the answer.

Before we get into what the court ruled, it helps to understand the issue by briefly looking at exactly what happened to Eunice Hunter, a custodian for the Valley View schools. Following a car accident, Hunter had three rounds of surgery over the span of two years. Following each surgery, she missed months of work, and returned with restrictions. Ultimately, the school district placed her on involuntary unpaid leave. The superintendent gave two reasons for the termination – her excessive use of FMLA leave, and her inability to perform her job because of her permanent restrictions. The district court dismissed Hunter’s FMLA claim because the school district would have placed her on involuntary leave regardless of her FMLA leave because of the permanent medical restrictions.

The 6th Circuit, however, reversed, finding that unlike the ADEA, the FMLA authorizes claims based on an adverse employment action motivated by both the employee’s use of FMLA leave and also other permissible factors. In such cases, if the employee presents evidence that the employer discriminated because of FMLA leave, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that it would have made the same decision absent the impermissible motive.

The standards might change, but for businesses the lesson is the same (and I apologize if you’ve heard this before). Documentation is key. Whether an employer can prove discrimination via a mixed motive or an only motive, it won’t mean a hill of beans to a company if it cannot prove that it had a legitimate reason for what it did.

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Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus.

For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

WIRTW #93

This week’s review starts with some of fellow blogger’s thoughts on the passing of Ted Kennedy:

• The Word on Employment Law with John Phillips, discusses Sen. Kennedy’s employment law legacy.
• Mike Elk at Today’s Workplace draws a lesson from the death of his brother.
• The EFCA Report, on Sen. Kennedy at the EFCA.
• Christopher McKinney at the HR Lawyer’s Blog.

This week also had an abundance of posts on social media in the workplace. I’m thinking a lot about this topic in light of KJK’s upcoming Breakfast Briefing on this issue:

• Mark Toth’s Manpower Employment Blawg, on how employers use social media.
• Elizabeth Bernstein at the Wall Street Journal shares her thoughts on how Facebook ruins friendships.
• Natalie Beck at the Employscreen IQ Blog on the downside of hiring based on a favorable Facebook profile.

Dan Schwartz at the Connecticut Employment Law Blog is focusing on Tropical Storm Dennis and whether workplaces are ready for really bad weather.

The Delaware Employment Law Blog’s Molly DiBianca suggests that employers put a time limit (5 years, according to Molly) on the use of criminal records.

With tongue planted in cheek, Jennifer Hays at the Warren & Hays Blog lists the top 5 reasons not to do an HR audit.

Ross Runkel’s LawMemo Employment Law Blog shares his thoughts on the EEOC’s recent class action filing against AT&T for age discrimination.

Michael Maslanka’s Work Matters suggests that we consider the effect a complaint will have on our intended target before we file it.

Rush Nigut’s Rush on Business draws a lesson for trial lawyers and their clients from Tiger’s loss at the PGA.

Jay Shepherd’s Grunted Employees thinks there are 7 deadly workplace sins.

Kris Dunn – The HR Capitalist – discusses the interplay between non-compete agreements and employee talent.

Wage & Hour Counsel examines the Department of Labor’s internal techniques and strategies for conducting wage and hour investigations.

According to World of Work, in Washington State it’s ok for an employer to fire employees who complain about their boss.

Nolo’s Employment Law Blog reports that managers may be personally liable for unpaid wages if a company goes bankrupt.

Jill Pugh’s Employment Law Blog discusses the recent uptick in pregnancy discrimination claims.

Michael Haberman’s HR Observations, on sexism.

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Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus.

For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Ohio Supreme Court avoids the issue of whether sex discrimination includes lactation

Totes/Isotoner Corp. fired LaNisa Allen for taking unauthorized, extra breaks during her work day. Allen claimed that her termination constituted unlawful sex discrimination because she had taken the breaks for lactation. This morning, in a terse three-page opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court – by a six to one vote – affirmed the legality of Allen’s termination. It did so based on a lack of evidence of pretext in the trial court. It also completed avoided the key issue – whether alleged discrimination due to lactation is included within the scope of Ohio’s employment-discrimination statute as sex discrimination.
Despite the six to one opinion for the employer, three Justices reached the ultimate issue and concluded that Ohio’s proscriptions against employment discrimination on the basis of sex/pregnancy includes lactation.
Justice O’Conner published a lengthy concurrence – with which Chief Justice Moyer concurs – that lactation is covered by Ohio’s proscriptions against employment discrimination on the basis of sex/pregnancy. However, because Allen did not obtain her employer’s permission before taking her lactation breaks, her claim failed:

Although Allen’s unauthorized breaks may have been to pump milk, Allen could not properly engage in such actions without her employer’s knowledge and permission. The [laws] mandate that an employer treat pregnancy with neutrality, but not preferentially.

Justice Pfeifer, dissenting, offers some key questions that he thinks a jury should have been given the opportunity to answer:

• Why Allen’s trips to the restroom outside scheduled break times were different from the restroom trips other employees made outside scheduled break times?
• Did employees have to seek permission from a supervisor to take an unscheduled restroom break.
• What makes Allen’s breaks different if other unscheduled bathroom breaks were allowed?

Despite totes/Isotoner’s victory, employers should not view this case as a license to deny breaks to lactating employees. To the contrary, if another opportunity arises, I have little doubt that a majority of the court will agree with Justice O’Conner, Chief Justice Moyer, and Justice Pfeifer that the definition of sex discrimination covers lactation.
Before you institute a policy prohibiting breast pumping or feeding at work, or terminate a lactating employee for taking breaks, consider how you’ve treated other employees’ breaks during the work day. If you can’t find a consistent pattern of discipline or termination of similar non-lactating employees, you should reconsider the decision.
A copy of the full opinion is available at Allen v. totes/Isotoner Corp. (8/27/09) [PDF].

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Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus.
For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Court finds no liability for conclusions reached during harassment investigation

Can an employee sue you for conclusions reached during an internal harassment complaint? According to the 6th Circuit in Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Products (8/18/09) [PDF], the answer is no.

Someone left an inappropriate note on an Alcoa cafeteria table where African-American employees sat. Alcoa’s HR department interviewed Courie during its investigation. Courie could not recall the name of the person sitting with him at that table on the day the note was left. Because he could not recall his co-worker’s name, he referred to him as “Jew Boy.” After the interview, Alcoa later sent Courie a warning that it considered that term “racially offensive.” In response, Courie filed a grievance with his union.

Courie later learned that Alcoa and his union had considered settling his original dispute by removing the discipline in exchange for a concession that the statement was inappropriate and that Alcoa reacted appropriately. Based on that proposed settlement, Courie sued Alcoa and his union. claiming discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation.

The court upheld the lower court’s decision dismissing all of Courie’s claims:

• The discrimination claim failed because the settlement agreement was not an “adverse action.” Indeed, according to the court, it was the opposite of adverse – it proposed to remove the traces of the original written warning from his record.

• Because the proposed settlement agreement was not discriminatory, it could not support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

• While the court did not address the defamation claim, I’ve previously noted that employers enjoy a (qualified) privilege for statements made during internal investigations.

So, what does this mean for employers? Reasoned rationales for the conclusions reached and discipline imposed during an internal investigation are paramount. The target of an investigation should not be able to come back at you for discrimination, defamation, or anything else in the kitchen sink if all your ducks are in a row.

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Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus.

For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Beware of discrimination risks when rehiring ex-employees

As the recession continues to show signs of ending, companies that had previously laid off employees will need to re-staff. According to CNN.com, a recent Department of Labor study finds that 38% of employers intend to recall cut workers. While a laid-off non-union employee has no right to be recalled or transferred into an open position, rehiring is not without legal risk. A recent 6th Circuit decision – Owens v. Wellmont, Inc. (6th Cir. 8/18/09) [PDF] – illustrates that employers need to pay as much attention to who is not recalled at to who is recalled.

After Wellmont eliminated Owens’s position in a reduction-in-force, she asked management about job openings in other departments. Wellmont hired younger candidates for those positions. The appellate court was bothered by the fact that management did not treat Owens’s discussions with management as formal applications for the open positions:

Owens did more than make a generalized expression of interest in working for Wellmont—Owens specifically informed Adams that Owens was interested in a position that was currently open.

As long as an employee makes a reasonable attempt to demonstrate to the employer an interest in the job, that employee can plead a discriminatory hiring claim if the job goes to someone else.

The lesson for employers is that if you are recalling RIF’ed employees, don’t discount someone merely because he or she did not make a formal application. If someone expressed interest in returning, it may be enough to trigger your responsibility to consider them for recall, or cause potential discrimination liability for failing to do so.

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Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus.

For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Do you know? What are an employer’s rights when an employee fails to give timely notice of FMLA leave?

Employees cannot simply take FMLA leave on a whim. They must provide their employers at least some notice, depending on the circumstances. An employee who needs foreseeable FMLA-qualifying leave is required to provide at least verbal notice sufficient to make the employer aware of the need for the leave and its anticipated timing and duration. An employee who needs unforeseeable FMLA-qualifying leave must, as soon as practical, provide sufficient information for the employer to reasonably determine whether the FMLA applies to the leave request.

What happens, though, if an employee fails to give timely notice?

1. Foreseeable leave – 30 days: When the need for FMLA leave is foreseeable at least 30 days in advance, and the employee fails to provide at least 30 days’ advance notice, the employer may delay FMLA coverage until 30 days after the date the employee provides notice. Thus, if an employee should have provided 30 days’ notice, but only provided 29 days’ notice, the employee can delay FMLA coverage for a full 30 days. This section is the most penal.

2. Foreseeable leave – less than 30 days: When the need for FMLA leave is foreseeable less than 30 days in advance, and an employee fails to give notice as soon as practicable under the facts and circumstances, the employer’s right to delay FMLA coverage for leave will vary from case to case. For example, if an employee reasonably should have given the employer two weeks notice but instead only provided one week notice, then the employer may delay FMLA-protected leave for one week.

3. Unforeseeable leave. When the need for FMLA leave is unforeseeable, and an employee fails to give notice as soon as practicable under the facts and circumstances, the employer’s right to delay FMLA coverage for leave will vary from case to case. For example, if it would have been practicable for an employee to have given the employer notice of the need for leave very soon after the need arises consistent with the employer's policy, but instead the employee provided notice two days after the leave began, then the employer may delay FMLA coverage of the leave by two days.

These rules provide employers and important tool. Delaying an employee FMLA coverage means that any absences can be considered unexcused. For an employee who fails to give timely notice of a foreseeable FMLA leave, the employee could accumulate enough absences to warrant termination before the FMLA coverage ever kicks in.

To take advantage of these provisions,the Department of Labor requires that the employee had actual notice of the FMLA notice requirements, through a proper workplace posting and a properly distributed FMLA policy. If you are unsure whether your postings and policies pass muster, check with your employment counsel.

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Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus.

For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

A lesson on reasonable accommodations

My family and I went to Sesame Place last Friday. As we were preparing to leave the park, my three-year-old daughter noticed a queue for Cookie Monster and Telly Monster, and asked if she could see the characters before we left. When we got to the end of the line, however, the handler told us that the line was closed. If you want to know what absolute dejection looks like, you should have seen the look on my daughter’s face. She began to uncontrollably cry, sobbing that she just wanted to give Cookie a hug. I began to plead with the employee to reopen the line for my daughter, but she told me that doing so would be unfair to the hundreds of other children she had already turned away. My daughter’s genuine tears must have moved the employee, though, because she granted us VIP access to the holding area where all of the characters that march in the parade. Instead of just getting to hug Cookie and Telly, my daughter got to meet and hug every character in the park.

This parable holds a very good lesson for employers when dealing with a disabled employee’s request for a reasonable accommodation. The employee is not entitled to an accommodation of his or her choosing. Instead, the employer may choose among available accommodations as long as the chosen accommodation is effective. If more than one accommodation is effective, the employer has the ultimate discretion to choose between effective accommodations. Cost, ease of provision, and the employee’s preference are factors to be considered, but are not dispositive. Instead, as part of the interactive process, the employer may offer alternative suggestions and discuss their effectiveness in removing the workplace barrier.

My daughter would have been very happy at the back of the line to meet Cookie Monster. That accommodation, however, was not feasible. In your workplace, the alternative will not always work out as well for the employee as it did for my daughter. Engaging in the required dialogue with the employee, however, helps both sides come to an understanding as to the reasonableness of the proffered accommodation.

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Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus.

For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com