What I'm reading this week #35

While I recognize that the next statement might alienate some of my readers, I have to admit that I'm not the biggest NASCAR fan. That fact, however, does not stop me from reporting that a former NASCAR official has sued the racing league for sexual harassment, seeking an astounding $225 million in damages (which makes NASCAR a whole lot more interesting to me). For an HR perspective on this issue, click on over to The HR Capitalist. Meanwhile, the Connecticut Employment Law Blog has some insightful thoughts on companies being fairly stereotyped by their public image.

Rush on Business advises that companies should "build an Ark" to avoid employment lawsuit. What does Rush mean? Like Noah, businesses should be proactive in attacking issues before they become a problem that can swamp the company. Some examples include having an effective harassment policy, promptly and accurately documenting performance problems, and reviewing wage and hour compliance.

Recall that in Thompson v. North Am. Stainless, the 6th Circuit went beyond the plain language of Title VII to find a claim for associational retaliation. Jottings by an Employer's Lawyer, the granddaddy of employment law blogs, reports on a case out of the 5th Circuit that came to the exact opposite conclusion under the FMLA.

The Delaware Employment Law Blog observes that in employment disputes, simply providing an employees a forum to air their grievances can often stave off a lawsuit.

The Pennsylvania Labor & Employment Blog reports on Klopfenstein v. National Sales & Supply, in which a Pennsylvania federal court found that the act of getting coffee is not gender specific and therefore cannot form the basis for a sexual harassment claim.

Finally, this week brings us a trio of thoughful articles on preventing and avoiding retaliation claims: the Labor & Employment Law Blog on training supervisors to avoid retaliation claims; BLR's HR Daily Advisor on how not to be blindsided by a retaliation claim, and BLR's HR Daily Advisor on rules to prevent retaliation.

Defining the proper "decisional unit" is key in legitimacy of RIFs

Today, we'll finish up our series on releases and waivers of age discrimination claims by looking at how courts examine the scope of the decisional unit for purposes of making the requisite disclosures under the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act ("OWBPA") for a group reduction. For the previous two posts, see Offering of severance package found to be evidence of a constructive discharge, and Refresher on age discrimination waivers.

According to the 6th Circuit in Raczak v. Ameritech Corp., the purpose of OWBPA is to ensure that "workers who signed a waiver had a clear idea of what they were giving up, particularly that they had the ability to assess the value of the right to sue for a possibly valid discrimination claim." Thus, a valid waiver under the OWBPA in a group reduction must include information - ages and job titles - of everyone in the decisional unit, whatever that decisional unit may be, and the status of each individual with respect to whether the employee was selected for termination or retention. The law requires employers engaging in a group layoff to give employees need data to conduct a meaningful analyses to determine whether an employer engaged in age discrimination before agreeing to sign a severance agreement. They key in determining whether employees are truly comparing apples to apples is the scope of the "decisional unit" the employer uses to compile is list of affected and unaffected employees.

The OWBPA's regulations (29 C.F.R. § 1625.22) define the term "decisional unit" as follows:

[D]ecisional unit is that portion of the employer's organizational structure from which the employer chose the persons who would be offered consideration for the signing of a waiver and those who would not be offered consideration for the signing of a waiver. The term "decisional unit" has been developed to reflect the process by which an employer chose certain employees for a program and ruled out others from that program.

The regulations offer several examples to assist companies in selecting the proper decisional unit:

• If an employer is attempting to reduce its workforce at a particular facility and undertakes a decision-making process by which some of the employees at the facility are selected for a program and others are not, then the facility will be the decisional unit.
• If the employer seeks to reduce the number of employees at a facility by exclusively considering a particular portion or sub-group of its operations at a facility, then the decisional unit would be that sub-group or portion of the workforce at the facility.
• The decisional unit may be larger than one facility if an employer is attempting to combine operations from several facilities and considers employees in several facilities for termination.

Thus, they key factors for deciding the proper scope of the decisional unit include the identity of the decision maker and the employees actually considered for the RIF. Several cases provide additional examples of these principles in action:

Burlison v. McDonald's Corp.

McDonald's engaged in a nationwide corporate reorganization. It charged each regional manager with the task of determining which employees to keep for each new region. McDonald's offered each RIFed employee a severance package in exchange for a release of all claims. In its effort to comply with the OWBPA, McDonald's provided with each severance agreement a region-specific information sheet. Each of the 5 plaintiffs (all of whom were over 40) signed the releases and accepted the severance packages. Two years later, however, they sued for age discrimination, claiming that the releases were void because McDonald's had engaged in a nationwide RIF, for which the OWBPA required that it provide them nationwide information, and not just information limited to their region. The 11th Circuit found that because the decisions as to who to terminate were made on the regional level, the region was the proper decisional unit. Because the local managers made the decision, the nationwide unit had no relevance to the plaintiffs.

Kruchowski v. Weyerhaeuser Co.

While the employees in Burlison were rebuked for arguing for an overly broad decisional unit, the employer in Kruchowski v. Weyerhaeuser Co. was punished for selecting a unit that was too wide for the actual scope of the RIF. The plaintiffs were 16 of the 31 employees selected for a RIF at the defendant's mill. The OWBPA notice advised the RIFed employees that the "decisional unit" was all salaried employees at the mill. The court of appeals found that the waivers were invalid because the Notice misidentified the decisional unit as all salaried employees. The actual unit was all salaried employees who directly reported to the mill manager. 15 salaried employees did not report to the mill manager, yet were included in the Notice. According to the court: "Defendant itself ignored its structure and decision-making hierarchy when the notified plaintiffs of the 'decisional unit.'" Because the decisional unit of which the plaintiffs were notified and the actual decisional unit were two separate groups, the waiver was void.

Conclusion

RIFs are not do-it-yourself projects for businesses. They raise myriad employment law issues, not the least of which is the scope of the proper decisional unit for purposes of making disclosures under the OWBPA. It is crucial to get these waivers absolutely right, or companies risk paying severance and still getting sued for age discrimination. Don't put yourself in that position - seek professional help before carrying out a RIF.

Refresher on age discrimination waivers

Yesterday, we looked at Coryell v. Bank One Trust, which found that the offering of a severance package could constitute evidence of a constructive discharge. Even though the employee was losing his job as part of a corporate reorganization, the court believed a question existed as to whether he had any meaningful choice but to accept the severance package.

As I mentioned yesterday, the lawsuit could have been avoided if the company required Coryell to sign a severance agreement that included a valid release of claims as a condition to receive the severance package. In fact, I'd go so far as to say that it would take a very rare case for me to feel comfortable with an employee receiving severance of any kind without signing a release in return.
Severance agreements for employees age 40 or over present their own set of problems. The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), which amended the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, requires that any releases and waivers of federal age discrimination claims be "knowing and voluntary." Simple enough, right?. What release is not entered into knowingly and voluntarily? Not so fast. The OWBPA specifically defines what a "knowing and voluntary" waiver means, and it is not as simple as it might sound:

1. The waiver must be part of an agreement between the employee and the employer.
2. The waiver must be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the employee.
3. The waiver must specifically refer to rights or claims arising under the ADEA.
4. The employee cannot be waiving any rights or claims that arise after the date he or she signs the agreement.
5. In exchange for the release, the employee must receive consideration in addition to that which he or she is already entitled.
6. The employee must be advised, in writing, to consult with any attorney before signing the agreement.
7. The employee must be given 21 days to consider whether to sign the agreement.
8. The agreement must provide for a period of at least 7 days following its execution for the employee to revoke the agreement, and the agreement cannot become effective or enforceable until that revocation period has expired.

If the release and waiver is provided as part of some severance program offered to a group of employees (such as a reduction in force), these requirements change. The 21 day period within which to consider the agreement is extended to 45 days. Moreover, at the start of that 45 day period (i.e., at the same time the employer gives the severance agreement to the employees), the employer must also disclose, in writing:

1. The eligibility criteria for inclusion in the group.
2. The job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or selected for the program.
3. The ages of all individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit who are not eligible or selected for the program.

Meeting these criteria is vitally important. The absence of even one of these factors invalidates the entire release as to the employee's federal age discrimination claim. Thus, even if an employee signs a severance agreement, the employee is free to bring a federal age discrimination claim if one of the above eight elements is missing from the agreement. To make matters worse, under Oubre v. Entergy Operations and current EEOC regulations, an employee is not required to tender back the severance pay as a condition to bringing an age discrimination claim under an invalid waiver. As Dan Schwartz points out in his Connecticut Employment Law Blog: "Employers are advised to seek legal counsel before using a model agreement."

Tomorrow, we'll examine the disclosures required in a group separation, and look at some cases from Ohio and elsewhere that talk about how to define the scope of the job classification for purposes of making these disclosures.

Offering of severance package found to be evidence of a constructive discharge

With the exception of a "for cause" termination, I am firm believer that most terminations should be communicated with an offer of some amount of severance pay. It not only cushions the blow for the employee who may be losing his or her job through no fault of his or her own, but also presents an opportunity for the employer to get something positive out of bad situation. For one thing, an offer of severance should always be tied to a release by the employee of any and all possible claims against the employer. Thus, the employer is buying certainty that the employee will not sue. The severance agreement also gives employers the chance to gain benefits such as a cooperation clause and promises as to non-disparagement and confidential information.

Courts should be protecting severance agreements as good policy in promoting harmonious employer/employee relationships. Yet, in Coryell v. Bank One Trust, the Franklin County Court of Appeals held that an employee who accepts a severance package in lieu of termination can claim a constructive discharge sufficient to satisfy the 2nd element of the prima facie case of age discrimination (the suffering of an adverse action).

As part of a reorganization of Bank One, James Coryell (age 49) accepted a severance package that provided him with 52 weeks salary and benefits continuation. The severance documents expressly stated that Coryell could continue to seek a new position with the company. Coryell testified that he believed he had no better option than accepting the severance package. Although Coryell did continue to look for an internal position, he ultimately obtained an job with a different company during the pay continuation period. Coryell alleged that after his separation he was replaced by a 42-year-old, which constituted age discrimination.

Coryell pursued his age discrimination claim under the indirect method of proof, which requires a prima facie showing that:

1. the plaintiff is a member of the statutorily protected class;
2. the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action;
3. the plaintiff was qualified for the position; and
4. the plaintiff was replaced by a substantially younger person or that a comparable, substantially younger person was treated more favorably.

The trial court found, as a matter of law, that Coryell was "neither directly nor constructively discharged because he chose between meaningful options when he accepted the severance package." Because he was not discharged, it concluded that he could not establish the second element of his prima facie case, that he suffered an adverse employment action.

Coryell is not the first time an Ohio court has faced the issue of whether an employee who accepts a severance package can claim discharge. In Barker v. Scovill, the Ohio Supreme Court found that an employee who was offered termination with severance pay "made a conscious ,well-informed, uncoerced decision [and] should not now be allowed to cry foul." In Caster v. Cincinnati Milacron, the Hamilton County Court of Appeals found that an employee who was offered either the opportunity to obtain other employment with the company, 12 weeks layoff with the potential for recall, or permanent severance with a $100,000 payout, and who chose the latter, could not claim termination.

The Coryell court, however, distinguished those precedents and found that Banc One constructively discharged him by offering the severance package.

When a plaintiff chooses termination in lieu of other options, courts will not construe his decision as an actual discharge. Rather, the plaintiff must show that he was constructively discharged, i.e., that his or her choice of termination was involuntary or coerced. Courts generally apply an objective test to determine whether a plaintiff was constructively discharged, asking "whether the employer's actions made working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person under the circumstances would have felt compelled to resign." ...

Here, in support of his contention that he was constructively discharged, Coryell argues that appellees stripped him of his title, position, responsibilities, functions, supervisory role, and involvement in day-to-day operations and management, leaving him with no real position. ... We agree with Coryell that this evidence creates a question of fact as to whether Coryell had any meaningful choice but to accept the severance package.

This case is a cautionary tale for all employers. If you are going to offer a severance package, make sure to get something of value in return. The best return on the investment is a clear, comprehensive, and enforceable release of all potential claims by the employee against the company. Once the employee releases the age discrimination claim, it becomes irrelevant if the employee had meaningful choice but to accept the severance package, or was constructively discharged.

Waivers of age discrimination claims present their own unique problems - namely a federal statute known as the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act. The OWBPA has specific requirements a release of federal age discrimination claims must meet to be valid and enforceable. Tomorrow, we'll take a look at the OWBPA and try to give a short refresher course on its key provisions.

Gas prices dictate new types of employment policies

Yesterday's Cleveland Plain Dealer ran an article on new types of perks that companies are making available to their employee to offset the rising gas prices. The options discussed:

• Helping potential car poolers connect.
• Adjusting workweeks so some employees can put in four 10-hour days instead of five 8-hour days, or offering flex time options.
• Handing out maps of bike routes and riding tips.
• Accommodating, and even subsidizing, mass-transit use.
• Offering work-from-home options.
• Making available forgivable, low-interest loans to help employees buy dwellings near work.
• Providing gas gift cards as rewards.
• Raising mileage reimbursements.
• Catering in-house breakfasts and lunches

I have some concerns about some of these perks. For example, gas cards might be a great idea, but it may have a negative impact on those who do not own cars. Thus, consider combining a gas card program with a bus pass program to make sure that all employees are equally covered by the benefit. In other words, my standard disclaimer with any employment policy applies - make sure that it applies on a non-discriminatory basis.

What I'm reading this week #34

For the past 12 years, it has been the law in the 6th Circuit that an employer cannot discriminate against a female employee because she had an abortion (see Turic v. Hollan Hospitality). This week the 3rd Circuit joined suit, and held that the term "related medical condition" in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act includes an abortion. The case is Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection, and you can read about it on the LawMemo Employment Law Blog and the Nolo Employment Law Blog.

WorkplaceHorizons posts this week on two separate recent legislative issues: the little known Child Labor Provisions of the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act, and a potential compromise between employers and disability rights advocates on the ADA Restoration Act. For my prior thoughts on the ADA Restoration Act, see ADA Restoration Act unnecessarily seeks to broaden the definition of "disability". While these changes would be a step in the right direction, it would be a big mistake to amend the ADA to affirmatively state that mitigating measures should not be considered when determining whether an impairment materially restricts an individual's major life activity.

The Pennsylvania Labor & Employment Blog has some information on a topic that often plagues HR professionals, whether an employer is required to continue an employee's accrual of vacation benefits while out on FMLA or military leave.

The Delaware Employment Law Blog reports on mixed results for employers from the Families & Work Institute's recent study of flexible work benefits among U.S. companies.

We'll finish this week's review with a trio of articles about e-discovery. HR Tech News reports that employment lawsuits cause the most e-discovery headaches, while Rush on Business tells us why document retention policies are so important for businesses to have in light of that news. Meanwhile, ediscoveryinfo gives us 5 key misconceptions that businesses have about electronically stored information and their e-discovery obligations.

Crusader seeks to ban cursing - should businesses comply?

Jim O'Connor runs the Cuss Control Academy. He believes that America has developed an addiction to swearing that needs to be curbed. According to Jim: "Swearing can be rude, crude and offensive. It can reflect a bad attitude that hurts your image and your relationships. People might perceive you as an abrasive person who lacks character, maturity, intelligence, manners and emotional control." He suggests that instead of cursing, people use substitute words such as "balderdash" instead of "bullshit."

So, do companies need anti-cursing policies? No. But, businesses should not totally ignore foul language either. Instead, it should be treated like any other workplace behavior - dealt with when it offends co-workers, alienates customers, or reaches a level so extreme or outrageous that it may create a hostile environment.