Some shameless self-promotion

I'm quoted in an article in Business Insurance Magazine on the Greer-Burger vs. Temesi Ohio Supreme Court retaliation decision:

Jonathan T. Hyman, an employer attorney with Kohrman Jackson & Krantz P.L.L. in Cleveland, said the decision was correct.

The court “was basically balancing employees’ right against retaliation against anybody’s right under the First Amendment of the Constitution to petition the court and file a lawsuit,” said Mr. Hyman, who was not involved the case. “When you’re balancing degrees of importance, the Constitution is going to, and should, trump” the employee’s right against retaliation.

He added, though, that employers should “think long and hard” before filing such suits against employees. The employee’s attorney would likely allege that such a suit is retaliatory, he said.

Employers “face an uphill battle in the courtroom anyway” because those who serve on juries are more likely to be employees than employers, said Mr. Hyman.

To read the full article, click here.

What else I'm reading this week #9

Not surprisingly, another active week across the blogosphere. Please support my fellow bloggers by checking out some of these links.

We'll start out with a couple of wage and hour issues. The Pennsylvania Employment Law Blog cautions companies that there are tricks and traps involved in holiday and year-end bonuses, and to watch out for wage and hour mistakes. Meanwhile, the Evil HR Lady answers a question on the legality and advisability of making deductions from the salary of an exempt employee for time away from work (hint, don't do it, as I advised back in June).

John Phillips, at The Word on Employment Law, has posted the 1st half of a 6-part series on the art of firing employees. (Part I, Part II, and Part III). The highlights so far - fairly evaluate performance, use progressive discipline, be consistent, and document everything. Good, basic, sound advice for all companies to follow. John tells me that Parts IV, V, and VI will be posted in the coming days, so keep an eye out for them.

HR World asks the question, "Are you pregnancy-friendly?", and suggests that such an approach is needed to prevent the loss of talented employees to motherhood.

Finally, Kris Dunn, The HR Capitalist, reports on the proposed Healthy Families Act, which would require employers with more than 15 employees to offer full-time employees seven days of paid sick leave.

House passes expansion of FMLA for military families

By an overwhelming vote of 370-49, the House yesterday approved legislation that would, among other things, expand FMLA leave rights for the families of wounded service members. President Bush will be hard-pressed to veto a bill that also authorizes $696 billion in military programs. If enacted, the legislation will amend the FMLA and provide up to 6 months of leave to family members (i.e., spouse, son, daughter, or parent) of combat-injured service members to care for their loved ones. Click here for the text of section 675 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.

Hat tip to The FMLA Blog.

The year's worst employees

It's the time of year when everyone is putting out their year-end best of lists, and the employment realm is no exception. Careerbuilder.com has published its list of the year's worst employees. If you thought your company had some doozies, check out the list, available here: Worst Employees of the Year.

My personal favorite:

An off-duty airline employee was arrested on assault charges after he sat down next to a woman trying to sleep and allegedly touched her inappropriately, according to an affidavit filed with a complaint from the woman. The employee was charged with simple assault and was suspended from the airline until further review of the incident.

Feel free to comment with your best employee horror story from the past year.

Ohio Supreme Court holds that an employer's lawsuit against an employee who has engaged in protected activity is not per se retaliation

This morning, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a significant retaliation decision, Greer-Burger v. Temesi, which holds that "an employer is not barred from filing a well-grounded, objectively based action against an employee who has engaged in protected activity." In so ruling, the Court stated that it is balancing "the statutory right of an employee to seek redress for claims of discrimination without retaliation against the constitutional right of an employer to petition courts for redress."

The facts of the case are as follows. In 1998, Tammy Greer-Burger filed a sexual harassment suit against Lazlow Temesi. The case proceeded to trial, at which Temesi prevailed. Thereafter, Temesi filed suit against Greer-Burger seeking to recover the $42,334 in attorneys fees and costs he had incurred defending against the harassment suit, plus compensatory and punitive damages. In response to Tamesi's lawsuit, Greer-Burger filed a charge of discrimination with the OCRC, claiming that Temesi's lawsuit was retaliation for her protected conduct, the prior sexual harassment suit. Based solely on the fact that Temesi had filed suit, the OCRC found that Tamesi's lawsuit was prohibited retaliatory conduct, and ordered Temesi to immediately cease and desist from pursuing his lawsuit and to pay Greer-Burger the $16,000 she claimed to have expended in defending against it. The common please court and appellate court both affirmed the OCRC's decision.

In reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court started and ended its analysis with the First Amendment's fundamental right to petition and seek redress in the courts. Despite the fundamental nature of that right, the Court recognized that the right to access courts is not absolute. The First Amendment does not protect "sham" litigation, that is, an objectively baseless lawsuit such that no reasonable litigant could expect success on the merits. To find that the mere act of filing a lawsuit is per se retaliatory, in the words of the Supreme Court, would "undermine the right to petition for redress by giving an administrative agency the power to punish a reasonably based suit filed in court whenever it concludes ... that the complainant had one motive rather than another.... This danger is further highlighted when the only evidence of the complainant's retaliatory motive is the simple act of filing a lawsuit." (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Because of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis used in retaliation cases, the Court placed the burden on the employer to demonstrate, as its legitimate non-retaliatory reason, that an alleged retaliatory lawsuit is not objectively baseless:

Instead, we find it more prudent to permit an employer the opportunity to demonstrate that the suit is not objectively baseless. In determining whether the employer’s action has an objective basis, the OCRC administrative law judge should review the employer's lawsuit pursuant to the standard for rendering summary judgment.... Thus, an employer needs to show his lawsuit raises genuine issues of material fact. If the employer satisfies this standard, the suit does not fall under the definition of sham litigation. The suit, therefore, shall proceed in court while the proceedings before the OCRC shall be stayed. The procedure outlined above falls within the jurisdiction of the OCRC as provided for in R.C. 4112.04 and promotes judicial economy because the employer's lawsuit will not have to be fully litigated in the trial court before the OCRC can make its determination as to the reasonableness of the suit. In this way, the OCRC essentially shall vet the action to ensure it is not sham litigation. (internal quotations and citations omitted)

The majority opinion concluded by recognizing the stigma of being falsely accused as a discriminator, and the importance of being able to seek legal redress to remedy that misclassification:

An employee's right to pursue a discrimination claim without fear of reprisal is a laudable goal entitled to considerable weight. The OCRC's position in this case, however, has the potential to give employees a carte blanche right to file malicious, defamatory, and otherwise false claims. As the concurring opinion of the appellate court astutely noted, the per se standard advocated by the OCRC does not advance the goal of Chapter 4112 when it "permits a claimant to engage in any kind of slander or defamation, and possibly even perjury, without consequence," and then precludes "those falsely accused of being discriminators from seeking legal redress." Greer-Burger, 2006-Ohio-3690, ¶ 38 (Corrigan, J., concurring).

Just because employees do not have carte blanche right to file malicious, defamatory, or otherwise false claims, does not mean that employers should rush into court to clear their names. Instead, employers should be wary in using Greer-Burger v. Temesi as carte blanche for filing lawsuits against unsuccessful discrimination plaintiffs. As the concurring opinion correctly points out, "the majority's 'not objectively baseless' test sets a very low threshold...." Merely because this case gives companies the apparent right to file a claim does not mean ultimate success on that claim. Indeed, the decision whether to pursue a claim against an employee or ex-employee who has brought a discrimination claim must be carefully thought out, and not merely filed as a knee-jerk reaction to being sued.

Should companies move their employment work to small and mid-sized law firms?

Last week, the Legal Intelligencer, as posted on Law.com, reported on the filing of a legal malpractice lawsuit by a nonprofit agency, the The Bair Foundation, against one of the world's largest law firms, Reed Smith. Now, you may ask yourself, why would the Ohio Employer's Law Blog care about a legal malpractice lawsuit filed in suburban Pittsburgh. The answer comes in two parts: 1) the underlying case was a religious discrimination case that was tried in federal court in Cleveland and resulted a nearly $200,000 jury verdict, and 2) the Bair foundation was charged $960,409 to defend the garden-variety discrimination case. According to the Law.com article:

The foundation said in the complaint that it was originally told the case would cost them $50,000. That was then upped to $112,000 during the case....

"In implementing its ambitious strategy of capturing global clients, which Reed Smith boasts results in 'a constant increase in revenue per partner,' it has acknowledged that comparatively small regional or local law firms can or perhaps should service smaller clients," the complaint stated. "This is so because such firms typically charge much lower fees than 'white shoe' international law firms like Reed Smith and are therefore more affordable to these smaller clients. However, Reed Smith has inexplicably continued to represent certain much smaller clients which lack substantial financial resources, such as Bair, a not-for-profit charitable foundation."

The foundation's [current] attorney, Bruce C. Fox of Obermayer Rebmann Maxwell & Hippel in Pittsburgh, said no explanation was ever given as to why the fees increased to nearly $1 million. He said his client was "badly taken advantage of."

Fox said he doesn't think large, international firms should represent clients like the Bair Foundation because of global law firms' economic models.

The lawsuit alleges inappropriate billing practices, including over-staffing the case, failing to adequately describe billing entries by subject matter or activity, and raising billing rates without notice.

The Bair Foundation's predicament illustrates two key trends to watch in the legal profession for 2008, as discussed in Robert Denney Associates' 19^th Annual Report on What’s Hot and What's Not in the Legal Profession (hat tip to Tom Kane at The Legal Marketing Blog): Labor and Employment continues to be a hot practice area, and mid-size firms are thriving by "attracting clients faced with the high rates – and often poor service – of the large firms." KJK has 31 lawyers, so I have a stake in this discussion. That stake, however, does not change the fact that the small and mid-size firms have as much to offer, if not more, than the large institutional firms. It's not just a question of hourly rates, but also more economical staffing, increased efficiency, and better client communication, all with the same or better quality of legal work. My hope is that these issues cause companies of all sizes to consider small and mid-sized law firms the next time they are sued in an employment case.

Supreme Court grants cert petition in Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores

Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores poses the following question: if an employer has an established policy to fill vacant job positions with the most qualified applicant, is that employer nevertheless required to reassign a qualified disabled employee to a vacant position even if that disabled employee is not the most qualified person for the job. The Supreme Court has agreed to review the decision of the 8th Circuit, which answered that question in the negative.

Pam Huber worked for Wal-Mart as a dry grocery order filler, earning $13 per hour. A permanent injury to her arm and hand left her unable to perform the essential functions of her job. As a reasonable accommodation for her disability, Huber asked that Wal-Mart reassign her to a vacant and equivalent position. Instead of agreeing to reassignment as the reasonable accomodation, Wal-Mart told Huber that she could apply and compete for the position. Huber ended up not being the most qualified applicant. Wal-Mart hired someone else for the job, and placed Huber in a janitorial position that paid her less than half of what she made before her injury.

Huber filed suit under the ADA, claiming that she should have been reassigned to the open position as a reasonable accommodation. Wal-Mart defended on the ground that it had a legitimate non-discriminatory policy of hiring the most qualified applicant for all job vacancies and was not required to violate that policy to accommodate Huber's disability. In a very rare instance, the trial court granted summary judgment in Huber's favor, which the 8th Circuit reversed.

The 8th Circuit's analysis starts with the general principle that reassignment to a vacant position generally qualifies as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. According to the 8th Circuit, however, the ADA is not a mandatory preference act, and it should not violate the ADA for an employer to make a legitimate non-discriminatory decision to hire the most qualified candidate, even if it results in a disadvantage to a disabled employee. Also, the ADA does not entitle a disabled employee to his or her preferred accommodation, only a reasonable accommodation. Thus, the 8th Circuit concluded: "The ADA does not require Wal-Mart to turn away a superior applicant for the router position in order to give the position to Huber. To conclude otherwise is affirmative action with a vengeance. That is giving a job to someone solely on the basis of his status a member of a protected class." (internal quotations omitted).

It is unclear in the 6th Circuit how this case would have come out, and there are courts (such as the 10th Circuit) that differ and hold that the ADA requires employers to automatically award an open position to a qualified disabled employee if even better qualified applicant are available and despite an employer's policy to hire the best person for the job.

A ruling for the employee in this case would undermine one of the most important commandments of employment law - Thou shalt hire the most qualified person for all open positions. When you don't hire the best person, it could lead a court to second-guess your judgment and question why a member of a protected class was overlooked in favor of the second/third/fourth/whatever best person. Which illustrates another important principle of employment law - when you're explaining, you're losing.

Has the time come for a workplace porn audit?

Last week I wrote about the importance of monitoring workplace technology in the context of a Second Circuit case, which held that the mere presence of pornography in the workplace can be enough to create an objectively hostile work environment (Computer awareness should be important part of harassment policies and training). This lesson hits a little closer to home today, as the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals has reversed a trial court's grant of summary judgment in a sexual harassment case. In Johnson v. Olmsted Township, the plaintiff, a female police department employee, claimed that a male co-worker had once shown her a pornographic magazine and had once comments about her putting her legs behind her head. Based on those two isolated incidents, the appellate court found that a jury question existed on the severity or pervasiveness of the alleged conduct:

A single act of sexual harassment may be sufficient to create a hostile work environment if it is such a nature and occurs in such circumstances that it may reasonably be said to characterize the atmosphere in which a plaintiff must work. David subjected Johnson to the pornographic magazine in the company of other male officers. The episode a few months later where Davis commented on his perception of Johnson's agility was also made in the presence of male coworkers. The presence of male coworkers makes Davis' act humiliating, which can be considered severe.

If an appellate court is going find two isolated incidents sufficient to hold a jury trial in a harassment claim, perhaps companies have to rethink internal initiatives to head off lawsuits involving porn in the workplace. The headline may be tongue-in-cheek, but the message is real - courts will be more prone to give employers a pass in cases where they acted proactively in trying to rid the workplace of porn than where they stuck their heads in the sand and failed to sanitize the environment.

What else I'm reading this week #8

The Evil HR Lady has had a busy week:

Internal Policy, on whether a company has an obligation to rehire a former employee.

Dress Codes, giving some advice on workplace dress codes and how to address violations.

Pregnancy, also from the Evil HR Lady, on when is the best time for a pregnant employee to disclose the fact of her pregnancy.

While we're on the topic of pregnancy/leaves of absence, take a look atTaking Time Off From Work Without Fearing a Pink Slip, from the Wall Street Journal's CareerJournal.com, on the general legal issues surrounding medical leaves.

New report claims workplace bills would kill jobs, from WorkplaceHorizons.com, on a report by Congressional Republicans detailing how the recent rash of Democratic employment legislation will end up costing people jobs.

Inclement Weather Policies: Don't Get Lost in the Storm, from the Pennsylvania Employment Law Blog, discussing inclement weather policies.

Age Discrimination Releases and Remedies from Suits in the Workplace, reporting on two recent federal court decision dealing with the enforceability of age discrimination releases under the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act.

Finally, How to Get Recruiters To Sign a Contract NOT To Poach Your Employees, from The HR Capitalist, on the wisdom of no-poaching agreements.

Don Imus case illustrates the difficulty of dealing with language in the workplace

There's been a lot of ink spilled this week in both the print media and the blogosphere about the return of Don Imus to the airwaves. (See Who’s the language police for Don Imus? and Imus Is Back, Chastened but Still Proudly Obnoxious). Recall that CBS Radio and MSNBC fired Imus in April after a firestorm erupted from his calling Rutgers women's basketball players "nappy-headed hos." In a post on The Word on Employment Law, John Phillips suggests most HR professionals and employment lawyers would agree with Imus's termination, and that often such comments by senior management and executives are overlooked because "money talks." That argument ignores CBS's hypocrisy in firing Imus over the type of statement that made him such a valuable commodity in the first place. Imus's popularity, and his ability to make millions of dollars for his employers, stems from his controversial nature and his propensity to make comments such as "nappy-headed hos." In fact, he has said much worse over the years, and, once he feels safe in his new job, will probably do so again. That is why he has a job in the first place.

It's difficult to draw any generalized employment law lessons from the Don Imus case because his case is so unique, just as it is difficult to draw any lessons on collective bargaining from the Writers Guild strike. Suffice it to say that language in contextual - it always has been and it always will be. In most contexts and most workplaces, "nappy-headed hos" should not be tolerated, and should result in an investigation, appropriate discipline, and some diversity and sensitivity training. These obligations exist whether an employee complains or not, as supervisors and managers have an affirmative duty to stamp out offensive conduct and the use of offensive language when they come across it or learn of it. The best lesson to draw is simply that companies act at their own peril by condoning or ignoring the use of offensive language in the workplace.

Binghamton University considers adding a law school

You may wonder why a lawyer in Cleveland, Ohio, would care if Binghamton University (nee, the State University of New York at Binghamton) is thinking about opening a law school. I happened to have spent my formative years studying (and other things) in the gray, snowy hills of the Southern Tier. Comments to this news on the Wall Street Journal's Law Blog are not very positive, and repeatedly question whether there is a need for another law school. Let me suggest that BU has an opportunity to think outside the box and try something different with legal education in this country. Whether it's less of a focus on the Socratic method and more on practical lawyering skills, problem solving, and case studies, integrating actual legal practice into the required curriculum through a clinical and internship program integrated with the community, or something else entirely, Binghamton can set itself apart by starting from scratch with a new kind of legal education that gives students an alternative. I'm proud to be a Binghamton alum, and I am proud that it is thinking about branching out into my chosen profession. I hope it continues to make me proud by creating a first rate legal institution. Qualifying for March Madness this year would be nice too.

EEOC issues guidance on testing and selection procedures

The EEOC yesterday published a fact sheet offering some guidance for employers on the use of employment tests and selection procedures, and how they are treated under the anti-discrimination laws. Some examples of such tests and selection procedures are cognitive tests, physical ability tests, sample job tasks, personality tests, medical exams, psychological tests, English proficiency tests, credit checks, and criminal background checks. The latter two are also covered by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which requires specific written consent by the employee, along with other specific notice and disclosure requirements (check with your counsel). The EEOC recommends that Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA be taken into consideration in the application of any of these tests or selection procedures. For example (and not to state the obvious), do not give whites one test and blacks another, or give an agility test only to employees over the age of 40 (I'm not making this up).

The area where the discrimination laws are usually implicated is when a neutrally applied test disparately impacts one group over another. For example, does a physical exam that is given to all job applicants disproportionately screen out female applicants? If it does, is it otherwise job-related and supported by business necessity? Typically, if a neutrally given test evaluates one's skills as a related to the particular job in question it will usually past muster.

The ADA has specific statutory provisions and regulations that apply to medical inquiries and testing:

• When hiring, an employer may not ask any questions about disabilities or require medical exams until after it makes a conditional job offer to the applicant.
• After making a job offer, but before the individual starts working, an employer may ask disability-related questions and require medical exams as long as it does so for all individuals entering the same job category.
• With respect to current employees, an employer may ask questions about disabilities or require medical exams only if doing so is job-related and consistent with business necessity. Examples of permissible inquiries of testing of current employees would be if the employer has a reasonable, objective belief that an employee cannot perform the job's essential functions or will pose a direct threat because of a medical condition, or if an employee requests a reasonable accommodation.
• Reasonable accommodations must be made in any employment testing or screening to enable a qualified individual with a disability to take the test, unless such accommodation poses an undue hardship.
• All employee medical information must be kept confidential, maintained securely and separately from personnel files, and only disclosed to supervisory personnel on a need to know basis.

The EEOC also gives some employer best practices for testing and selection. Many of these are common sense, but for the sake of completeness, I am going to list them all anyway:

• Employers should administer tests and other selection procedures without regard to race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age (40 or older), or disability.
• Employers should ensure that employment tests and other selection procedures are properly validated for the positions and purposes for which they are used. The test or selection procedure must be job-related and its results appropriate for the employer's purpose. While a test vendor's documentation supporting the validity of a test may be helpful, the employer is still responsible for ensuring that its tests are valid under the EEOC's Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures.
• If a selection procedure screens out a protected group, the employer should determine whether there is an equally effective alternative selection procedure that has less adverse impact and, if so, adopt the alternative procedure. For example, if the selection procedure is a test, the employer should determine whether another test would predict job performance but not disproportionately exclude the protected group.
• To ensure that a test or selection procedure remains predictive of success in a job, employers should keep abreast of changes in job requirements and should update the test specifications or selection procedures accordingly.
• Employers should ensure that tests and selection procedures are not adopted casually by managers who know little about these processes. A test or selection procedure can be an effective management tool, but no test or selection procedure should be implemented without an understanding of its effectiveness and limitations for the organization, its appropriateness for a specific job, and whether it can be appropriately administered and scored.

For more information, the EEOC's Fact Sheet on Employment Tests and Selection Procedures is available here.

BREAKING NEWS: State halts new maternity leave regulations

So I've been saying for the past few months that once the OCRC adopted its new maternity leave regulations, passage by the legislative Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review would be a mere formality. Boy do I have egg on my face.

In a 9-1 vote, the JCARR sent the new regulations back to the OCRC for a more complete fiscal analysis. The Committee was unhappy that the OCRC said there would be no fiscal impact on school districts or local governments from the rule change. Today's Plain Dealer quotes State Senator and JCARR member Tom Niehaus, who cited as an example a small township police department that would be forced to cover shifts for a pregnant employee and pay overtime costs. Sen. Niehaus also expressed concern as to whether the OCRC has the authority to enact these regulations, although the Committee as a whole sidestepped that issue. The OCRC must now wait at least 90 days before returning with an updated application for the rule change. One now has to question whether the JCARR will ever approve the new regulations.

The bottom line for employers is that for now the old rule remains, that women must given a "reasonable" amount of time off work for maternity leave. I caution, however, that courts that have looked at the current 4112-05-5(G) have interpreted 12 weeks as "reasonable" because it is what the FMLA provides.

How far to the right has the Supreme Court swung?

In reporting on yesterday's oral argument in Sprint/United Management v. Mendelsohn, the New York Times asks the question: "Has the Supreme Court drifted so far toward the employer's side in job discrimination cases that it is now to the right of the Bush administration?" The answer will not be known until all of this term's employment cases have been decided, but yesterday's oral argument may give us a clue that employees could have a tough go under the Roberts Court.

Many of the Justices seemed very concerned that the admission of "me, too" evidence in discrimination cases would lead to mini-trials of each "me, too" witness. The Justices were also concerned that admission of "me, too" testimony would require correlative admission of "but not us" witnesses in rebuttal by the employer. Trials that could last a mere two days could "last a thousand years," in the words of Justice Breyer, who is not known for his conservative views. The Justices questioned whether it was just simpler and cleaner to exclude the evidence in all but the clearest of cases, such as when the same decisionmaker is involved. After reading the argument transcript, I stand by yesterday's prediction -- the Court will hold that the appellate court erred in reversing the trial court's discretionary exclusion of the "me, too" evidence, and rule that such evidence is neither per se admissible or inadmissible in discrimination cases, but is left to the sound discretion of the trial court under Evidence Rule 403. The Court may also set forth some guideposts for trial courts to follow in exercising its discretion, such as whether the same decisionmaker was involved in the decision to terminate the "me, too" witnesses, or whether there is objective, independent evidence of a policy or practice of discrimination.

Supreme Court to hear arguments today on issue of "me too" discrimination

Sprint/United Management v. Mendelsohn, which will be argued today at the Supreme Court, raises an important evidentiary issue that arises time and again in discrimination cases: "whether a district court must admit 'me, too' evidence — testimony by nonparties, alleging discrimination at the hands of persons who played no role in the adverse employment decision challenged by the plaintiff." Although this is an age discrimination case, the Court's holding will almost certainly affect race, gender, and other discrimination lawsuits. The issue is important for businesses, as permitting "me, too" evidence of discrimination will likely make discrimination cases more time-consuming, expensive, and difficult to defend, by forcing companies to defend against allegations brought by employees not parties to the lawsuit.

The facts of Mendelsohn are relatively simple. Ellen Mendelsohn, 51 years old, was one of 18 people in her group laid off by Sprint in the fall of 2002. Company-wide, Sprint laid off 15,000 employees. Sprint claimed that it included Mendelsohn in the RIF because of poor job performance. Mendelsohn claimed age bias in the decision.

At trial, she sought to call five other former Sprint employees, all over the age of 40, to testify that they too suffered age discrimination at Sprint. Sprint objected on the grounds that none of those five employees had worked for the same supervisor who had made the decision to lay off Mendelsohn. The district court agreed, and ruled that only workers laid off by the same supervisor could be called to testify. Ultimately, the jury ruled in Sprint's favor.

The 10th Circuit reversed, ruling that a district court must admit any testimony of other workers who claimed to suffer the same sort of bias against them, even if a different decisionmaker was involved. It rejected Sprint's contention that the testimony was irrelevant because the witnesses were not terminated by the same supervisor as Mendelsohn. The court concluded that Mendelsohn was entitled to show that there was an unwritten "company-wide policy" of discrimination, under which multiple supervisors, and not just Mendelsohn's, were participating. Further, the court was unconcerned whether there was any evidence substantiating the existence of such a policy other than the plaintiff's subjective belief. Instead, the court found that the evidence is relevant and admissible because a jury could reasonably find the alleged discrimination was made more likely by proof of "an atmosphere of age discrimination" and "Sprint's selection of other older employees to the RIF."

There are any number of reasons why this decision should be reversed. In a discrimination case liability can only be shown by demonstrating discriminatory intent on the part of the decisionmaker (i.e, the person who made the relevant employment decision). Mendelsohn's five "me, too" witnesses, however, could offer nothing to show that Mendelsohn's supervisor acted with discriminatory intent. Additionally, no one had any proof that the various different decisionmakers were acting under some common scheme or plan, other than their own unsupported subjective beliefs. I would concede that the case would be different if there was some independent corroboration of a company-wide policy. Finally, I question the appellate court's reversal of a district court's discretionary evidentiary ruling.

This case will also be interesting from a Court-watching perspective, as it will be the third substantive employment decision out of the the Roberts Court. Last term, the Court was 1-1 in employments cases, with the Ledbetter pay discrimination case coming down for the employer, and the Burlington Northern retaliation decision for the employee. My prediction — a reversal with a holding that "me, too" evidence is not per se admissible in discrimination cases. Dicta will make it clear that such evidence is relevant when it is from the same decisionmaker, or from a different decisionmaker with independent evidence of a company-wide policy of discrimination.

A copy of the oral argument transcript is available from the Supreme Court here.

What else I'm reading this week #7

It's been a busy week in the blogosphere. Everyone is back at work, having digested their turkey and probably having started their holiday shopping. So, it is appropriate that we begin our weekly roundup with the following:

Beating the Crowds: Online Shopping at Work?, from HR World, on the monitoring of employees' use of work computers for holiday shopping.

Is the Family Leave Act Too Soft or Too Tough?, from the Wall Street Journal's Career Journal, debating whether the FMLA is too small of a benefit to employees or too big a burden to employers.

Exploring Tough Questions on E-Mail Confidentiality, from Ediscoveryinfo, noting the importance of reminding your employees that e-mails are not confidential. The advice that I always tell people in regards to whether to put something in an email -- if you do not want it read by your boss, shown to a jury, published on the front page of your local newspaper, or seen by your mother, it is probably best not to send it.

Business Week: "Unions: Less Impact and a Lower Profile", from The Union-Free Employer, commenting on the shrinking importance of labor unions in today's business climate.

Layoffs and Reductions in Force: Five Things every HR Generalist should know, from the Pennsylvania Employment Law Blog, giving a rundown of hot-button issues for mass layoffs and reductions in force.

Finally, we started with an issue of importance for the holiday season, and we'll finish with a couple of others:

Employer Liability at Office Holiday Parties - Beyond Sexual Harassment, Part I and Part II, from the Connecticut Employment Law Blog, summarizing the legal issues other than sexual harassment liability that can arise from over-lubricated employees at holiday parties.

For another reason why not to overindulge at the office holiday party:

Cheers!

Computer awareness should be important part of harassment policies and training

Danial Schwartz at the Connecticut Employment Law Blog posted yesterday on a case from the Second Circuit, which held that the mere presence of pornography in the workplace can be enough to create an objectively hostile work environment. Danial's point is similar to one that I wrote about couple of weeks ago, that businesses must take all harassment complaints seriously through prompt and thorough investigations. (See Remedial action must be meaningful to save employer from harassment liability).

Danial's post raises another important issue. Computers, email, and the Internet have become indispensable tools in most workplaces. They also make pornography readily available at the click of a mouse or the strike of a key. If courts are going to view the mere presence of pornography in the workplace sufficient to state a claim for sexual harassment, then employers must be vigilant about policing against it. This policing requires three important steps:

1. Implement a technology use policy (which includes computers, email, and the Internet), which patently forbids the downloading, display, or viewing of pornography, and makes it a terminable offense.
2. Incorporate training on the appropriate use of technology into your annual or every-other-year harassment training.
3. Consistently enforce the policy.

As I've repeatedly said, there is no such thing as a bulletproof employer. Taking these three simple, proactive steps, however, will go a long way towards limiting your risk and exposure should an employee file a harassment lawsuit based on workplace pornography.

Carnival of HR #21

The Carnival of HR (#21 for those keeping count) is available at Race in the Workplace. For those unfamiliar with the Carnival of HR, it is a traveling semimonthly compilation of the best HR-related posts in the blogosphere. Please jump on over to Race in the Workplace and support the efforts of the many bloggers who are linked.

ADA may require leaves of absence beyond FMLA mandates

Managing medical leaves of absence is the bane of nearly every HR department I come in contact with. In my experience, companies either react too harshly (immediate termination upon the expiration of 12 weeks of FMLA-eligible employees), or too passively (extending leaves of absence indefinitely). HR World has posted an interesting article on extending FMLA leaves of absence beyond 12 weeks, and attempts to strike a balance by asking how long is too long.

The article points out that a company may want to extend a leave beyond 12 weeks so as not to lose a valuable employee. The issue, however, runs much deeper, and under certain circumstances an extended unpaid leave of absence might be required as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA for employees with a qualifying disability. The ADA's regulations specifically provide that an unpaid medical leave qualifies as a reasonable accommodation and must be provided to an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o). Thus, an employer may still have to provide unpaid leave as a reasonable accommodation: 1) after an employee exhausts the 12 weeks of FMLA leave, or 2) if an employer has fewer than 50 employees or if the employee has less than one year of service.

The EEOC's Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (at Q. 21) gives the following helpful example:

An employee with an ADA disability needs 13 weeks of leave for treatment related to the disability. The employee is eligible under the FMLA for 12 weeks of leave (the maximum available), so this period of leave constitutes both FMLA leave and a reasonable accommodation. Under the FMLA, the employer could deny the employee the thirteenth week of leave. But, because the employee is also covered under the ADA, the employer cannot deny the request for the thirteenth week of leave unless it can show undue hardship. The employer may consider the impact on its operations caused by the initial 12-week absence, along with other undue hardship factors.

No leave must be extended indefinitely, and at some point a leave of absence is going become an undue hardship to the employer and can be ended. When that is, though, is not only going to vary from employer to employer, but also from employee to employee. Each specific leave of absence must be analyzed on its own merits, case by case. Six months is generally a good rule of thumb to follow, but there are many circumstances where a court could deem six months unreasonably short. The bottom line is to work with the employee and the medical caregiver to determine how long an employee needs to be off work, and make the best efforts, within reason, to accommodate the necessary leave for employees who qualify for protection under the ADA.

New I-9 form released - UPDATED

While not the most exciting news, all companies should update their hiring forms with the new I-9 available from the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Service. Use of the new form will become mandatory on December 26. Because no one knows for certain when this will occur, it is best to put the new form in place now to avoid incurring any fines or penalties for non-compliance. The new form only applies to new hires. Employers do not have to re-verify the immigration status of employees who have already completed I-9 forms.

The changes to the I-9 are as follows:

• 5 documents have been removed from List A of the List of Acceptable Documents -- Certificate of U.S. Citizenship, Certificate of Naturalization, Alien Registration Receipt Card, Unexpired Reentry Permit, and Unexpired Refugee Travel Document.
• One document -- Unexpired Employment Authorization Document -- was added to List A.
• All Employment Authorization Documents with photographs have been consolidated as one item on List A.
• Instructions regarding Section 1 of the Form I-9 now indicate that the employee is not obliged to provide his or her Social Security number, unless the employer participates in E-Verify.
• Employers may now sign and retain Forms I-9 electronically.

As always, employers do not file I-9 forms with the government, but must keep them either for three years after the date of hire or for one year after employment is terminated, whichever is later. All completed forms that fall within that time frame must be available for inspection by authorized U.S. government officials (such as Immigrations & Customs Enforcement or the Department of Labor).

Employers should use the publishing of this new I-9 form as a tickler to review and update document retention policies to ensure that the retention of I-9s is provided for, or to put a document retention policy in place if one does not exist.

Information about the new I-9 form, as well as a copy of the form for download, are available at www.uscis.gov/i-9.