According to a scathing report by The New York Times, employees nationwide are accusing Planned Parenthood of engaging in rampant pregnancy discrimination.
A: An employer must have one of these to avoid running afoul of discrimination laws when an employee is out on a medical leave of absence.
Is there a more controversial topic than abortion? As controversial and divisive as it might be, the law is pretty clear that an employer cannot fire an employee for having one.
1969. Woodstock. Abbey Road. The Moon Landing. |
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The EEOC recently announced that it has filed suit against a Texas home healthcare company for terminating a pregnant employee. The EEOC describes the key allegations:
EEOC charges in its suit, that Zanna Clore was told to obtain a doctor’s note after the employer learned of her pregnancy. Shortly thereafter, Clore provided Your Health Team with a release from her physician stating Clore could perform all job duties with the only limitation being that she should not lift or pull more than 25 lbs. Despite the medical release to work, the employer terminated her employment just minutes after she furnished the required note.
EEOC regional attorney Robert A. Canino sums up everything that is (allegedly) wrong with this employer’s action:
As a society, we should have already evolved well beyond the old-school thinking that a pregnant worker must be excluded from the workplace. Fortunately, the highest court in the land, in Young v. UPS, recently emphasized the employer’s responsibility to accommodate pregnant employees and thereby avoid discrimination against working women.
When an employee informs you that she is pregnant, your decision is not whether to fire her, but instead whether she can perform the essential duties of her job during her pregnancy. If she has physical limitations because of her pregnancy, you must accommodate her on the same terms and conditions as others who are similar in their ability or inability to work. In other words, if a pregnant employee cannot perform an essential function of lifting more than 25 pounds, and you have previous accommodated other non-pregnant employees in that job with similar lifting restrictions, then you must offer the same accommodation to the pregnant employee. It is not up to you to decide whether your pregnant employee can, or cannot, continue working.
May an employer impose greater restrictions on pregnancy-related medical leave than on other medical leave?
No. Under the PDA, an employer must allow women with physical limitations resulting from pregnancy to take leave on the same terms and conditions as others who are similar in their ability or inability to work. Thus, an employer:
Must an employer provide a reasonable accommodation to a worker with a pregnancy- related impairment who requests one?
- may not fire a pregnant employee for being absent if her absence is covered by the employer's sick leave policy;
- may not require employees limited by pregnancy or related medical conditions to first exhaust their sick leave before using other types of accrued leave if it does not impose the same requirements on employees who seek leave for other medical conditions;
- may not impose a shorter maximum period for pregnancy-related leave than for other types of medical or short-term disability leave; and
- must allow an employee who is temporarily disabled due to pregnancy to take leave without pay to the same extent that other employees who are similar in their ability or inability to work are allowed to do so.
Yes, if the accommodation is necessary because of a pregnancy-related impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. An employer may only deny a needed reasonable accommodation to an employee with a disability who has asked for one if it would result in an undue hardship. An undue hardship is defined as an action requiring significant difficulty or expense.
As the new guidance makes abundantly clear, while an employer cannot compel a pregnant employee to take an accommodation (such as a leave) if she is able to perform her job, it must allow women with physical limitations resulting from pregnancy to take leave (or other accommodations) on the same terms and conditions as others who are similar in their ability or inability to work. Thus, the EEOC has confirmed, as I’ve consistently said (here and here, for example), that if employers grant employees accommodations under the ADA, Title VII will almost certainly compel them to do the same for pregnant employees.
Examples of reasonable accommodations that may be necessary for someone whose pregnancy-related impairment is a disability include:
- Redistributing marginal or nonessential functions (for example, occasional lifting) that a pregnant worker cannot perform, or altering how an essential or marginal function is performed;
- Modifying workplace policies, such as allowing a pregnant worker more frequent breaks or allowing her to keep a water bottle at a workstation even though keeping drinks at workstations is generally prohibited;
- Modifying a work schedule so that someone who experiences severe morning sickness can arrive later than her usual start time and leave later to make up the time;
- Allowing a pregnant worker placed on bed rest to telework where feasible;
- Granting leave in addition to what an employer would normally provide under a sick leave policy;
- Purchasing or modifying equipment, such as a stool for a pregnant employee who needs to sit while performing job tasks typically performed while standing; and
- Temporarily reassigning an employee to a light duty position.
This morning, the U.S. Supreme Court issued one of its most anticipated employment-law rulings of this term, in Young v. United Parcel Service [pdf]. The case asked under what circumstances an employer must provide a workplace accommodation to a pregnant employee.
In its ruling, the court rejected the positions offered by both the employer and the employee.
Instead, the Court crafted its own interpretation by applying a modified McDonnell Douglas analysis to pregnancy accommodation claims:
Thus, a plaintiff alleging that the denial of an accommodation constituted disparate treatment under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s second clause may make out a prima facie case by showing, as in McDonnell Douglas, that she belongs to the protected class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate her, and that the employer did accommodate others “similar in their ability or inability to work.”
The employer may then seek to justify its refusal to accommodate the plaintiff by relying on “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons for denying her accommodation. But, consistent with the Act’s basic objective, that reason normally cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to add pregnant women to the category of those (“similar in their ability or inability to work”) whom the employer accommodates….
If the employer offers an apparently “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reason for its actions, the plaintiff may in turn show that the employer’s proffered reasons are in fact pretextual. We believe that the plaintiff may reach a jury on this issue by providing sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather—when considered along with the burden imposed—give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.
The plaintiff can create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a significant burden exists by providing evidence that the employer accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers. Here, for example, if the facts are as Young says they are, she can show that UPS accommodates most nonpregnant employees with lifting limitations while categorically failing to accommodate pregnant employees with lifting limitations. Young might also add that the fact that UPS has multiple policies that accommodate nonpregnant employees with lifting restrictions suggests that its reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employees with lifting restrictions are not sufficiently strong—to the point that a jury could find that its reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employees give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.
What’s the problem with this decision? As Justice Scalia astutely and correctly points out in his dissent, by permitting a pregnant worker to establish pretext by demonstrating a disadvantage presented by the application of a facially neutral work rule, the majority’s opinion allows one to establish intentional disparate treatment by demonstrating a disparate impact. What does this mean for employers? It means that employers must analyze the impact of work rules on pregnant workers and accommodate accordingly. Thus, in application, the majority’s rule grants pregnant workers the unconditional “most-favored-nation” status that the majority says it was rejecting.
My practical take for handling pregnant workers remains unchanged. Unless you can unequivocally demonstrate that you’ve never provided an accommodation to a disabled worker, you should be prepared to offer the same to your pregnant workers.
On Monday I published my list of the five biggest issues employers need to watch and manage in 2015. I listed “pregnancy leave rights” as number five. In reality, though, that issue could easily have been number one.
Consider that earlier this week, USA Today told the story of a North Carolina nursing assistant, who claims that she was forced to resign from her job after her employer refused to provide light duty to accommodate the medical complications of her pregnancy. According to the story, “The nursing home regularly provided ‘light duty’ to workers unable to lift, Cole says in the complaint. On light duty, nurse assistants can feed and clean residents and assist with oxygen tubing and nebulizers, she added.
This issue is not going away. Charges filed with the EEOC alleging pregnancy discrimination have increased by nearly 50% over the past 15 years. Moreover, women comprise nearly half of the workforce, and 75% of them will become pregnant at some point. Couple those stats with the fact that 40% households with children have mothers who are either the sole or primary source of income for the family, and you can see why this issue is so critical to the American worker (and, consequently, the American employer).
Yet, this should be a non-issue for most employers. Just this past summer, the EEOC issued enforcement guidance that affirmed my long-held belief that employers may have to provide light duty for pregnant workers, and must provide the same accommodations to pregnant workers as to other workers with similarly disabling medical conditions. This rule will impose a light-duty obligation on most employers.
Ask yourself—
If you answer “yes” to either of these questions (and most employers will), then you cannot deny the same light duty to a pregnant worker.
Yesterday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Young v. UPS, which will decide whether Title VII requires an employer to accommodate pregnant workers the same as non-pregnant workers similar in their inability to work.
UPS required Peggy Young to be able to lift up to 70 pounds as part of her job as a package delivery driver. After she became pregnant, her doctor limited her lifting. Ms. Young requested that UPS move her to a light duty assignment. UPS’s collective bargaining agreement allowed an employee to work a light duty assignment only because of an “on-the job” injury or when “disabled” under the ADA. Because Ms. Young did not meet either of these categories UPS denied her request.
Ms. Young’s lawsuit argued that UPS violated Title VII because the Pregnancy Discrimination Act required UPS to provide her with a “reasonable accommodation” to the same degree it accommodated a disabled employee. The 4th Circuit disagreed, finding that UPS’s policies did not treat pregnant workers less favorably, but the same as any other worker who did not meet the specific requirements for light duty under the CBA.
The case may hinge on where the justices fall on the right comparator for UPS’s pregnant workers. Is it those employees who are ADA-disabled or otherwise injured on-the-job, whom UPS accommodates, or those non-ADA employees injured off-the-job, whom UPS does not accommodate.
As one would expect, the Justices appear to be split down ideological (maybe gender) lines, and, as is often the case, Justice Kennedy may be the key that will unlock this issue. He, however, was relatively quiet during the argument, only asking a handful of questions, which failed to shed any light on his thought process. Truth be told, it was a very curious argument, and the case, at least based on the Justice’s queries, is not easily predictable.
I am hopeful that the court will side with working parents and rule in favor of the employee in this case. A ruling for UPS would, I fear, promote the unequal treatment of pregnant workers, which is anathema to the spirit, if not the letter, of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. No employer should be allowed to act as if it is exempt from the law.
A PDF of the compete oral argument transcript is available here.
On Monday, a California jury awarded a former Autozone employee $185 million in punitive damages. She had sued the company for pregnancy discrimination, claiming that the district manager who fired her was promised a promotion if he fired all of the women in his stores. Last week, the same jury awarded the plaintiff $900,000 in compensatory damages for lost wages and emotional distress.
While $185 million is a staggeringly huge number, this plaintiff will only ever collect a tiny fraction of it, at best. Due process tells us that punitive damages must bear some reasonable relationship to the size of the compensatory award, typically not to exceed a ratio of 9:1.
Moreover, if this case was filed in Ohio, and not California, damage caps would kick in to severely restrict the verdict. Ohio’s tort reform law caps punitive damages in state-law employment discrimination claims to two-times the compensatory award. Thus, in Ohio, this plaintiff’s punitive award would cap at $1.8 million, still a large number, but out of the nine-figure stratosphere.
Jury verdicts are headline grabbers—big splashy numbers that grab everyone’s attention. Trust me, Autozone’s attention has been grabbed. It will file a motion to reduce the jury verdict, and it will appeal, while, at the same time, this plaintiff will file motions seeking her attorneys’ fees. Ultimately, this case will confidentially settle, and we will never know the final dollars exchanged.
More damaging than the amount of the award is the negative publicity associated with it. Because of the verdict’s inordinate size, the press has labeled Autozone as a company that discriminates against women in the worst way possible—systemically and intentionally. That damage is much worse than this employee punching a lotto ticket that she will never cash.
Yesterday afternoon, Jeff Nowak and I had a lively tête-à-tête on Twitter—aka the #hrintelchat—on all things pregnancy discrimination. In case you missed it (and given the numbers of folks tweeting along, I’m going to guess that you did), below is a neat little summary of the hour-long tweetfest. The rights of pregnant workers is an important issue that will only get more important and dual-income families and single moms are the rule and not the exception.
Thanks to Thompson HR for the invitation and for hosting. I enjoyed my hour of tweeting (even if my wrists and fingers did not).
#hrintelchat Tweets