Monday, March 18, 2013

See Me, hear me: Upcoming speaking engagements


Every now and then, I like to update everyone where you can see or hear me wax poetically on all things employment law.

Let’s start with tomorrow (March 19), when I’ll make my triumphant return to DriveThruHR, one of the web’s most popular radio shows discussing human resources. You can listen live at  1 pm on Blog Talk Radio or on DriveThruHR.com. You can also follow the conversation on Twitter @drivethruhr and with the hashtag #dthr.

Here’s what else I have planned through the summer:

You can also keep up to date on where I am appearing throughout the year at the Speaking Engagements link at the top of the page. The page also indexes all of my old gigs.

If you are in attendance at any of the live events, please stop by and say hello.

Paying employees for accrued vacation upon termination—Yay or Nay?


One of the questions clients most frequently ask me is whether they have an obligation to pay employees for accrued, unused vacation days at the end of their employment. My default answer always is, “It depends. What does your handbook or vacation policy say?”

Under Ohio law, the default rule is as follows.

  • If an employer has no policy under which an employee forfeits unused vacation time or other paid time off at the end of employment, an employer must pay out any unused time.
  • If, however, an employer has a clear policy providing that paid vacation time or other paid time off is forfeited on resignation or discharge, then an employer is not obligated to pay out any unused time upon termination.

What does a policy look like that entitles an employer to withhold accrued, unused vacation time or other paid time off as a forfeiture at the end of employment? The employer in Broadstock v. Elmwood at the Springs (Ohio Ct. App. 3/15/13) [pdf] had the following policy:

When a team member leaves Elmwood, all accrued vacation time is paid to the end of the last pay period provided the team member requests the pay; a two (2) week notice is given and fulfilled; an exit conference has been conducted; all items (keys, uniforms, badges) have been returned; and the team member has not been terminated. (Emphasis added.)

According to the court, the employee handbook clearly stated that accrued vacation is forfeited to an employee upon termination. The employee was terminated. Therefore, the court held that the she was not entitled to her accrued vacation time.

To me, however, such as policy is draconian and overbearing. Instead, consider limiting vacation and other paid time off forfeitures to “for cause” terminations. In that case, you won’t benefit employees who lose their jobs because through their own misconduct, but you also won’t be punishing employees who lose their jobs through no fault of their own (i.e., downsizing, restructuring, etc.).

Friday, March 15, 2013

WIRTW #265 (the “Ides of March” edition)


Caesar:
Who is it in the press that calls on me?
I hear a tongue shriller than all the music
Cry “Caesar!” Speak, Caesar is turn’d to hear.

Soothsayer:
Beware the ides of March.

Caesar:
What man is that?

Brutus:
A soothsayer bids you beware the ides of March.

Julius Caesar Act 1, scene 2, 15–19

Today is March 15, the ideas of March. Two years ago, I used this day’s history to provide a lesson to employers of 10 types of problem employees to avoid in your workplaces. It’s worth reviewing.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Thursday, March 14, 2013

Do employees have any privacy rights in personal emails sent from corporate accounts?


Earlier this week, a story broke reporting that Harvard University surreptitiously viewed the work emails of 16 residential deans as part of its investigation into a cheating scandal. Your level of outrage at Harvard’s investigation will depend entirely on the degree to which you believe employees have an expectation of privacy in a corporate email account.

According to U.S. v. Finazzo (E.D.N.Y. 2/19/13), employees enjoy no such expectation of privacy, provided that you have the right language in your email policy.

In Finazzo, the U.S. government alleged that Christopher Finazzo, an executive at the clothing retailer Aéropostale, received illegal kickbacks from transactions between his employer and one of its vendors. During an unrelated internal investigation, Aéropostale discovered an email in Finazzo’s Aéropostale email account between him and his personal attorney. That email contained a list of Finazzo’s personal assets, which included several companies he co-owned with the vendor from whom he received the illegal kickbacks.

In his subsequent federal criminal trial, Finazzo attempted to block the government from using that email against him. The trial court denied his motion, holding that he had no expectation of privacy in his work email account.

In reaching this conclusion, the federal court relied upon Aéropostale’s email policies, which stated:

Except for limited and reasonable personal use (e.g., occasional personal phone calls or e-mails), Company Systems should be used for Company business only. Any limited exceptions to this rule must be approved through the IT department. Under no circumstances may Company Systems be used for personal gain or profit; solicitations for commercial ventures; religious or political issues; or outside organizations. Company Systems may not be used to distribute chain letters or copyrighted or otherwise protected materials….

You should have no expectation of privacy when using Company Systems. The Company may monitor, access, delete or disclose all use of the Company Systems, including e-mail, web sites visited, material downloaded or uploaded and the amount of time spent on-line, at any time without notification or your consent.

The court concluded that Aéropostale’s policy, and Finazzo’s knowledge of it, disposed of any claim  that the email exchange with the personal attorney was private and therefore privileged:

Finazzo has no reasonable expectation of privacy or confidentiality in any communications he made through his Aéropostale e-mail account. Aéropostale had a clear and long-consistent policy of limiting an employee's personal use of its systems, reserving its right to monitor an employee's usage of the system, and making abundantly clear to its employees, including Finazzo, that they had no right to privacy when using them.

Do you have an email or workplace technology policy? Do your employees know that you have such a policy? Does  your policy—

  1. Warn employees that they have no expectation of privacy in corporate emails or in their use of corporate systems?
  2. Ban personal use of corporate systems or email, or limit such personal use to what is reasonable and occasional?
  3. Reserve the right of the company to monitor employee use of its systems, including emails?

Following these simple steps will go a long way to dispelling any idea by your employees that their work email is private, while providing you sufficient coverage lest anyone challenge your ownership of employee corporate emails and or your right to search such emails.

Wednesday, March 13, 2013

Take a pregnant pause before firing that pregnant worker


Two pregnancy discrimination settlements recently announced by the EEOC illustrate the added risk employers assume when firing a pregnant worker.

  • In the first case, a Chicago-based childcare center paid $31,000 to settle allegations that it had forced a pregnant employee to quit by refusing to allow her to work after her fourth month of pregnancy.

  • In the second case, a Detroit-area hotel paid $27,500 to settle allegations that it had fired a housekeeper out of fear of potential harm to the development of her baby.

Last week, I wrote about whether an employer should choose to litigate a case or settle early. One consideration I did not cover, perhaps because it seems like common sense, is that the merits (or lack thereof) of the case can be a driving factor. In discussing the case involving the childcare center, the EEOC’s Chicago regional attorney underscored this important factor: “Really early resolution of this case—before any depositions were taken created a win-win situation for everyone. This employer avoided investing in litigation expenses which would not have yielded a different result and was able refocus on its business in a hurry.” Given the risk presented by these cases and the relatively low value settlement payments, it’s hard to argue with his opinion on the value of early resolutions.

Firing a pregnant employee is a risky proposition. You not only have to worry about Title VII, but also potential liability under the FMLA (if you are large enough to be covered), and the ADA (if the employee suffers from a pregnancy-related medical condition). Unless you want to face a settle-or-litigate Hobson’s choice, you need to think long and hard before firing, or taking any other adverse action against, a pregnant worker.

Tuesday, March 12, 2013

What do you do if you doubt an employee’s disability?


An employee asks you for time off and other accommodations for anxiety attacks. Do you—

  1. Confirm her diagnosis and meet with her to decide the right accommodation to enable her to perform the essential functions of her job; or
  2. Counter her claims with skepticism, fail to grant her leave or other accommodations, and fire her?

A Los Angeles waste disposal company chose option number 2. According to Judy Greenwald at businessinsurance.com, that choice cost the company a $21.7 million jury verdict.

I hope that I don’t have to lecture any of my readers about what is wrong about denying accommodations and firing disabled employees.

What rights do you have, however, if you doubt the legitimacy of an employee’s claimed disability? Here are six tips, culled from the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act:

  • If an employee’s claimed disability is not obvious, an employer is entitled to receive “reasonable documentation” about the disability and its functional limitations.

  • If an employee’s claimed disability is obvious, however, an employer cannot ask for any confirming documentation.

  • Reasonable documentation means only that which is needed to establish that an ADA disability that needs a reasonable accommodation. Thus, in most cases an employer cannot request an employee’s complete medical records. If  an employee has more than one disability, an employer can request information pertaining only to those that require reasonable accommodation.

  • An employer may require that the documentation about the disability and its functional limitations come from an appropriate health care or rehabilitation professional.

  • An employer can ask an employee “to sign a limited release allowing the employer to submit a list of specific questions to the health care or vocational professional.”

  • Instead of requesting documentation, “an employer may simply discuss with the person the nature of his/her disability and functional limitations.”

Monday, March 11, 2013

Are employers really asking for social media logins and passwords? [survey]


Last month, I discussed the recently introduced Ohio Senate Bill 45, which would prohibit employers “from requiring an applicant or employee to provide access to private electronic accounts of the applicant or employee.” As I’ve earlier noted, this bill has many problems. One of its biggest problems, though, is whether an issue even exists that this type of legislation needs to address.

Last week, the Senate’s Commerce & Labor Committee heard sponsor’s testimony on the bill. Gary Daniels, the Associate Director of the ACLU of Ohio, was among those who testified in favor of this bill.

Mr. Daniels’s testimony (which you can download in its entirety here), includes his unsubstantiated belief that this legislation is necessary to combat the “disturbing trend … developing across the country whereby prospective and current employers demand access to usernames and passwords….”

You would think that if the practice of employers requiring applicants and employees to disclose login and password information has reached epidemic proportions, I would have heard of or encountered at least one employer engaging in this practice. I haven’t. At his Connecticut Employment Law Blog, Dan Schwartz calls these password privacy bills “an answer in search of a problem.” I think Dan is spot on. Yet, is it possible that we are that far off-base, and the ACLU is correct?

Since my last survey (on the FMLA) worked out so well, I decided to try again. I’d like to gauge public opinion on whether employers are insisting on social media logins and passwords, or if this is an illusory problem trumped up by the news media and special interest groups.

Please take a few minutes to answer a short survey on your opinions about and personal experience with these issues. I’ll keep the survey open through March 22, and publish the results the following week.

You can answer the survey embedded below, or the survey is also available at this link. I thank you in advance for the few moments of your time in responding.

Friday, March 8, 2013

WIRTW #264 (the “never go to work, part 2” edition)


Marissa Meyers and her edict ending telecommuting at Yahoo continues to dominate the headlines. Here are the best articles from around the blogosphere I’ve read on this story this week:

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations 

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Thursday, March 7, 2013

Fight or flight? When an employee sues you, should you litigate or settle?


Two weeks ago, the New York Times’s You’re the Boss Blog asked the following question:

How do you handle employee litigation?

Do you dig in your heels and fight, settle, or some combination of the two?

The NYT’s blog post recounted the story of one small business owner who chose to stand his ground and assume the risk of taking an employment case to trial. As a result the employee dropped his settlement demand to a nuisance value, $10,000.

The reality, however, is that there is no easy answer to the question of how your company should respond to a lawsuit by an employee. You must weigh all of the following factors to come to the right decision for your business in each case.

  • Is the plaintiff a current or former employee?
  • How much can you afford to spend, and will litigation now impede your ability to fund a settlement later?
  • Do you have employment practices liability insurance coverage?
  • Is there a risk that a settlement will incent other employees to bring claims, or will long, protected litigation deter copycat claims?
  • What is your tolerance for the distractions of litigation—responding to discovery, gathering documents, dealing with the hassles of electronic discovery, attending depositions, and attending court dates?
  • Do you want to subject your managers, supervisors, and other employees to depositions?
  • What is the reputation of the plaintiff’s attorney—is s/he going to make the case more difficult and expensive than necessary?
  • What is the likelihood the assigned judge will grant a summary judgment motion and dismiss the case?
  • How tight or loose are juries in your jurisdiction?

How you answer these question will dictate whether you litigate or offer a settlement, and, if it’s the latter, when you make that offer. Keep in mind, however, that even if you choose to offer a settlement, no case resolves without two willing parties. If the other side is not willing to meet you at a fair and reasonable value for the claim, then the choice has been made for you, lest you become an easy mark for every disgruntled employee.

This post originally appeared on The Legal Workplace Blog.

Wednesday, March 6, 2013

Who's the "knucklehead?" Employee loses retaliation claim after slurring co-worker


The original "knucklehead"
Noreen Wilson worked as a pharmacist for The Cleveland Clinic. From August 24 through November 4, 2010, she racked up three corrective actions -- the first for calling a coworker a "knucklehead," the second for sending an improper email to a job applicant, and the third for disconnecting a telephone while a coworker was on a call. After the last corrective action, the hospital transferred Wilson to a different shift. Three days later, she applied for, and was granted, FMLA leave. She then appealed the corrective actions through the Clinic's internal processes. After the hospital rejected her appeal and upheld the correction actions, she resigned to take a job with a different employer. She then sued the Clinic for, among other things, FMLA retaliation relating to the corrective actions.

In Wilson v. CCF (N.D. Ohio 2/6/13), the district court concluded that the corrective actions were not "adverse" to support a claim of retaliation under the FMLA.

The Court finds that the corrective action Plaintiff received for calling a customer/coworker a "knucklehead" is not an adverse employment action.... Plaintiff received a corrective action for calling a coworker a "knucklehead." Plaintiff does not dispute doing so and therefore, cannot rely on this as evidence of constructive discharge when it was based on her own misconduct.
Exercising control to dole out legitimate discipline is not retaliation or discrimination. It's sound management of your people. Provided the punishment fits the crime, and provided the punishment is consistent with your past practices, you can discipline without fear of retribution.

Tuesday, March 5, 2013

Beware saying too much when engaging in pre-suit settlement negotiations


Most lawsuits between employers and employees do not start out as lawsuits. They start out as conversations between the aggrieved employee's lawyer and the company's counsel. This order of events makes sense for both sides. If the parties can negotiate a deal pre-suit, everyone can save the time, expense, and aggravation of a protracted lawsuit. Additionally, a negotiated deal provides both sides certainty; once a lawsuit is filed, all bets are off and everyone's fate rests in the unpredictable hands of a judge or jury. 

When negotiating, Evidence Rule 408 (which bars the use of offers to compromise) provides everyone some peace of mind that the settlement offers will not end up in front of the jury at trial. This fact is important, because a company does not want a jury learning that an offer of settlement had been made. A jury might perceive such an offer as an admission of liability, or a floor below which its verdict cannot fall.

What happens, however, when, in the course of pre-suit negotiations, counsel makes statements that go beyond an offer of settlement, and discuss the merits of the underlying case? Bourhill v. Sprint Nextel Corp. (D.N.J. 1/23/13) [pdf] is a cautionary tale for employers' counsel responding to pre-suit settlement demands.

After Sprint terminated Bourhill, he retained an attorney to pursue a disability discrimination claim on his behalf. Before filing suit, Bourhill's attorney wrote the following to Sprint, to gauge the hope of a negotiated resolution:

While we have advised Mr. Bourhill that we are prepared to take his claims forward to litigation, he has advised us that he would prefer at this time to resolve this situation informally, by means of a [sic] adequate compensatory settlement. Please contact me, or have your attorney contact me, to discuss whether you desire to resolve this matter amicably, privately, and without resort to litigation. If I do not hear from you by February 22, 2010, we will proceed to take action to enforce Mr. Bourhill's rights.

Sprint's in-house counsel responded with a letter of his own, captioned, "Confidential/For Settlement Purposes Only".

I spoke to your assistant last week regarding your client's allegations that Sprint violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. As I advised her, my investigation does not support your allegations. Mr. Bourhill's employment was terminated when, after being out of work for eight months, he went on long-term disability, a termination which was mandated by the Plan documents. Our records show his long-term disability benefits were approved through May 31, 2010. Even if Mr. Bourhill was able to return to work without restrictions in December 2009, Sprint does not grant employees one-year leaves of absences and, in this case, would have been prohibited from doing so by the Plan documents requiring termination of employment. While Mr. Bourhill remained free to re-apply for available positions at Sprint once he was cleared for work, our records show he failed to do so.

I also further noted that although your letter of February 3 inquires as to Sprint's interest in an amicable resolution, the letter does not request any specific relief. I asked your assistant if your client was attempting perhaps to use this letter as leverage to avoid repaying Sprint the overpayments he received in the amount of $7,564.57. She did not know but indicated you would get back to me. As I have not heard from you to date, I am following up via letter. In short, it is difficult to consider an amicable resolution without knowing the relief sought by your client. If you would like to get back to me with a specific proposal that also addresses the overpayments received by your client, I remain available. Thank you.

In the ensuing litigation, Bourhill's attorney attempted to use Sprint's counsel's letter to defeat Sprint's motion for summary judgment. Sprint objected, arguing that the letter was an inadmissible offer to compromise, barred by Evidence Rule 408. The trial court agreed with Sprint, but only as to the second paragraph of its letter, which discussed the money. The court allowed Bourhill to use the letter's opening paragraph, which discussed the merits of the termination. The court believed that it could divorce the two paragraphs from each other if the first paragraph was not logically connected to the second. Because the first paragraph discussed the merits of the case, and the second monetary compensation, the court redacted the second paragraph under Evidence Rule 408, and considered the redacted letter as part of the record on Sprint's motion for summary judgment.

This case teaches employers' counsel a valuable lesson. We can fall into a trap of Rule 408 myopathy -- that if we caption something "Rule 408 Confidential and Inadmissible Settlement Negotiations", courts will consider it as such and bar its use. As Bourhill makes clear, courts can divorce substantive statements from settlement negotiations, and only bar the latter. 

What is the lesson here? As a management lawyer, keep written settlement communications short and to the point -- the offer itself. If you have to discuss the merits of the case with the employee's lawyer, either do so over the phone or only put in writing what you live with a judge or jury considering.

Monday, March 4, 2013

Is an employer obligated to provide light duty to an employee returning from FMLA leave?


Many employers use temporary light duty assignments to enable ill or injured employees to return to work before they are fully healed. In fact, rehabilitation specialists will tell you that it is better for both the employee and the employer for one to return to work sooner on a modified assignment than to wait until full recovery. Is an employer required to offer light duty to an ill or hurt employee out on FMLA leave, or can an employer require an employee to remain on FMLA leave until full recovery? According to James v. Hyatt Regency Chicago (7th Cir. 2/13/13), light duty is not a right to which employees can insist under the FMLA.

Carris James spent his 22-year career with the Hyatt Regency Chicago as a banquet steward. In March 2007, he suffered a non-work-related eye injury and required surgery. The company offered him FMLA leave, which he accepted. Before his medical leave ended (which his collective bargaining agreement had extended beyond the FMLA’s required 12 weeks), James faxed a note from one of his physicians, which stated that James could return to work with certain lifting and bending restrictions. Those restrictions would have prevented him from returning to his banquet steward position. When Hyatt refused to offer light duty, James sued.

James argued that Hyatt interfered with his FMLA entitlement when it did not reinstate him to a light duty position. The court disagreed. It relied on the plain language of the FMLA’s regulations: “If the employee is unable to perform an essential function of the position because of a physical or mental condition … the employee has no right to restoration to another position under the FMLA.” Because light duty is not an “equivalent” position, the FMLA does not mandate restoration to a light duty position. It only protects employees who can return and perform all of the essential functions of their position. Because James’s doctor only released him to light duty, the company had no obligation under the FMLA to bring him back to work.

While the answer to this issue under the FMLA is fairly straight forward, often times the ADA will dictate a different result. Before denying light duty to an employee returning from FMLA leave, you must consider whether the ADA requires the light duty as a reasonable accommodation. If you have light duty available, and do not have to create a light duty position to accommodate the employee, the ADA will likely require the consideration of temporary light duty as a reasonable accommodation.

Friday, March 1, 2013

WIRTW #263 (the “never go to work” edition)


I’m writing this week’s recap from the comfort of my home study, a fact that strongly suggests my opinion on Yahoo’s recent mandate prohibiting its employees from telecommuting. What do some other bloggers think?

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Until next week…

Thursday, February 28, 2013

New FMLA forms, posters, coming next week


If you are an FMLA-covered business, you need to know that FMLA posters and forms you use are about to change.

The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) recently issued new FMLA regulations. The substance of these new regulations, which go into place March 8, relate to the FMLA's military leave provisions and airline flight crew personnel. For your convenience, the DOL has prepared a side-by-side comparison of the old and new regulations.

Importantly, the regulations require covered employers to post a new, updated FMLA poster no later than March 8, 2013. The new poster is available for download at the DOL's website:
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/posters/fmlaen.pdf 

Finally, the FMLA has also made available new certification, eligibility, and designation forms, which are also available for download on its website:
http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/2013rule/militaryForms.htm

Wednesday, February 27, 2013

How long is too long for an unpaid medical leave of absence? Not two weeks and a day.


Unpaid medical leaves of absence are the bane of many employers. There should be little doubt that employers must consider an unpaid leave as a possible reasonable accommodation for an employee’s disability. Thus, when considering unpaid leaves, the key question typically isn’t if the leave should be granted, but, instead, for how long.

I don’t have an answer to the question, “For how long,” other than long enough to provide the employee a reasonable opportunity to return to work, and not forever. The answer depends on the facts and circumstances of each employee, each leave request, and each company. One answer I can provide with certainty, however, is that when an employee asks for “one more day” of unpaid leave, most often an employer will act unreasonably (and in violation of the ADA) by denying the request.

Such was the case with a recent settlement between the EEOC and a Maryland medical practice. Per the EEOC,

Doneen King, a medical practice representative whose duties included answering phone calls and scheduling appointments, was unable to work for two weeks while undergoing medical treatment for her disability, Crohn’s disease, including two emergency room visits and a hospitalization…. [W]hen King requested an additional day of unpaid leave as a reasonable accommodation, the medical practice instead terminated her.

University of Maryland Faculty Physicians, Inc.’ lateness and attendance policy violated the [ADA] because it did not provide for exceptions or modifications to the attendance policy as a reasonable accommodation for individuals with disabilities.

The medical practice paid $92,500 to the terminated employee. It also agreed to a three-year consent decree that prohibits it from violating the ADA, requires it to revise its attendance policy to permit disability-related accommodations, mandates management training on the ADA and reasonable accommodations, and obligates the employer to report to the EEOC on its compliance with the consent decree.

Spencer H. Lewis, Jr., district director of the EEOC’s Philadelphia District Office, provides the takeaway for employers: “It is not only a good business practice to provide reasonable and inexpensive accommodations that allow employees with disabilities to remain employed, it is required by federal law.” In other words, think long and hard before you deny a request for unpaid time off for an employee’s medical issue, and, when in doubt, call your employment counsel for a sanity check.

photo credit: Derek Bridges via photopin cc

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Ohio attempts to ban employers from seeking social media passwords (take 2)


Last week, seven Ohio democratic senators introduced Senate Bill 45, which would prohibit employers “from requiring an applicant or employee to provide access to private electronic accounts of the applicant or employee.” It is identical to last year’s S.B. 351, which never made it out of committee. I have a feeling this year’s S.B. 45 will meet a similar fate, which is a good thing. For an analysis of what this bill says, you can read last year’s blog post on S.B. 351.

This bill has lots wrong with it.

  1. It attempts to add to Ohio’s protected classes. It would elevate asking an employee for a social media login or password to the same level of importance  as discrimination based on race, sex, religious, national origin, age, disability, and military status. For a practice in which few, if any, employers engage, such protections are over reaching and beyond ridiculous.

  2. It contains no exceptions for internal investigations. Suppose, for example, Jane Doe reports that a co-worker is sending her sexually explicit messages via Facebook. You have an absolute duty under both Title VII and Ohio’s employment discrimination statute to investigate and take whatever remedial action is necessary to ensure that any misconduct ends. Yet, this bill would prohibit you from even asking the accused to provide access to his Facebook account as part of your investigation.

  3. It contains no exceptions for regulated industries. For example, registered representatives have special rules that dictate what they can or cannot say to clients and prospective clients via social media. FINRA requires employers to track and maintain records of the communications between registered reps and the public. Yet, this bill would prohibit a securities firm from requiring its registered reps to turn over these communications. It would also prohibit the firm from even asking for access to a rep’s social media account to investigate a customer complaint or regulatory issue.

  4. Check out the penalties. In addition to civil fines, violations bring into play the full panoply of damages available under Ohio’s civil rights statute, including compensatory damages, pain and suffering, emotional distress, and punitive damages.

Just because something is a bad HR practice does not mean we need a law to regulate it. Nevertheless, the solution proposed by S.B. 45 has so many problems that, as proposed, it presents an unworkable and dangerous solution to an illusory problem.

photo credit: totumweb via photopin cc

Monday, February 25, 2013

Does social media change the meaning of “solicitation?”


Consider the following scenario. Your company uses sales representatives to sell its products. To protect your company’s relationship with its other employees, you require all sales reps to sign a no-solicitation agreement as a condition of their employment. Under the agreement reps cannot “directly or indirectly solicit, entice, persuade or induce any … employee … of the Company … to terminate or refrain from renewing or extending his or her employment, association or membership with the Company … or to become employed by or enter into a contractual relationship” with the employee executing the no-solicitation agreement.

If an employee connects with co-workers on Facebook or any other social network, and then leaves your company, has he violated the no-solicitation agreement by maintaining the connections?

According to the court in Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc. v. Cahill (E.D. Okla. 1/22/13), the answer is, “No.”

In this case, PPLSI complains that Facebook posts that tout generally the benefits of Nerium as a product and Defendant's professional satisfaction with Nerium constitute solicitations presumably because some of Defendant's Facebook “friends” are also PPLSI sales associates and may view Defendant’s posts….

PPLSI has not shown any intent on Defendant’s part to solicit current PPLSI associates…. There was no evidence presented that Defendant’s Facebook posts have resulted in the departure of a single PPLSI associate, nor was there any evidence indicating that Defendant is targeting PPLSI sales associates by posting directly on their walls or through private messaging.

In other words, because the employer could not demonstrate any intent on the part of the departed employee to solicit other employees via Facebook, the mere fact that they are Facebook friends is not enough to violate the no-solicitation covenant. Presumably, the same logic would hold true if the no-solicitation covenant applied to customers instead of employees.

One case does not equal dogma (although Cahill did discuss and agree with another similar case from an Indiana appellate court). These cases are highly fact specific and depend as much on the court's perception of the parties’ equities as they do on the language of the challenged agreements.

If, however, you are concerned about ex-employees using Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and other social networks to lure employees or customers, why not include language in your no-solicitation agreement to cover such a possibility?

“Solicitation” includes, but is not limited to, offering to make, accepting an offer to make, or continuing an already existing online relationship via a Social Media Site. “Social Media Site” means all means of communicating or posting information or content of any sort on the Internet, including to your own or someone else’s web log or blog, journal or diary, personal web site, social networking or affinity web site, web bulletin board or a chat room, in addition to any other form of electronic communication.

By defining “solicitation” to include passive social media connections and activities, you are at least putting yourself into a position to have a court consider shutting down an ex-employee for maintaining online relationships.

Friday, February 22, 2013

WIRTW #262 (the “what would you do” edition)


By now you’ve probably heard about the man who slapped crying toddler on an airplane after dropping an n-bomb on the child. In addition to facing criminal charges, the accused slapper, Joe Rickey Hundley, is out of a job. Prior to the incident, he worked as an executive for AGC Aerospace & Defense. Within days of the story going viral, AGC fired Hundley, and issued a statement by its CEO decrying Hundley’s behavior as “embarrassing” and “not in any way reflect[ing] the patriotic character of the men and women of diverse backgrounds who work tirelessly in our business.” (side note: would anyone have thought that the company was in favor of n-bombs and baby slapping if it did not issue a public statement?)

Here’s my question for you, dear readers. If Hundley worked for you, would you have fired him? Did Joe Rickey Hundley deserve to lose his job?

Answer in the comments below, or tweet me @jonhyman.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

 

Thursday, February 21, 2013

It’s your last chance … to avoid retaliation


Last month, the EEOC announced a half-million dollar settlement with BASF Corporation. The agency alleged that BASF retaliated against a poor performing employee by insisting, as part of a “last-chance agreement”, that the employee not file any charges of discrimination with the EEOC. Concerned about the agreement’s effect on his civil rights, the employee refused to sign; the company fired him.

Agreements are wonderful tools to use with our employees. They come in all shapes and sizes—employment agreements, severance agreements, settlement agreements, and last-chance agreements, to name a few. One benefit from an agreement is that it can limit an employee’s ability to bring suit against an employer. For example, many employment agreements contain clauses that waive one’s right to ask for a jury trial. Severance agreements customarily contain releases of claims, waivers of rights, and covenants not to sue.

No matter the agreement, however, there is one clause that it cannot contain—a covenant by the employee waiving his or her right to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Employees have an absolute right to seek vindication of their rights with the EEOC, and a requirement that an employee waive that right is retaliation. You can require that the employee waive his or her right to collect any money as a result of any charge filed with, or lawsuit filed by, the EEOC. Once you cross the line and mandate a waiver of the right to file a charge, you have retaliated.

In this case, this lesson cost BASF $500,000. The EEOC and I do not always see eye to eye. The lesson for employers to take away from this case, however, is valuable, and comes courtesy of the agency:

“The EEOC has an inherent, institutional interest in maintaining open lines of communication with people who believe they may be victims of discrimination,” said John Hendrickson, the EEOC’s regional attorney in Chicago. “That is why employers who attempt to break that line of communication by dissuading employees from filing EEOC charges are breaking the law.  Courts get that, and with this case, we hope more employers will as well.”

The EEOC’s Chicago District Director John Rowe, added, “Cognis presented the victims in this case with a terrible, illegal choice: lose your job or lose your civil rights. Under the law, no worker has to make that kind of choice. Employers would be better served by working to ensure that their employees are free from discrimination, rather than threatening their workers with termination in an effort to make sure that employees don’t complain.”

This post originally appeared on The Legal Workplace Blog.

Wednesday, February 20, 2013

Customer preference does not protect employers from race discrimination claims


CNN reports that a Flint, Michigan, nurse is suing her hospitalbecause it kowtowed to a man’s request that no African-American employees care for his baby. The lawsuit [pdf] outlines her key allegations:

     11. The father told the Charge Nurse that he did not want any African Americans taking care of his baby. While telling the Charge Nurse, he pulled up his sleeve and showed some type of tattoo which was believed to be a swastika of some kind.

     12. After the father made the discriminatory request to not allow African Americans to take care of his baby, instead of flatly denying the request, the Charge Nurse called the Nurse Manager, Defendant Osika.

     13. Defendant Osika told the Charge Nurse, Herholz, to re-assign the baby to another nurse and to advise Plaintiff that Defendant Osika, would speak to her supervisor and take care of it the next day.

     14. Plaintiff was re-assigned on or about October 31, 2012 because she is African American….

     19. When Plaintiff reported to her work, she learned that during that day there was a note prominently posted on the assignment clipboard that read as follows: “NO AFRICAN AMERICAN NURSE TO TAKE CARE OF BABY.” Plaintiff was shown a picture of the note.

Let’s make this as clear as possible. Adhering to the request of a customer is not a defense to a race discrimination claim. As one court succinctly stated : “It is now widely accepted that a company’s desire to cater to the perceived racial preferences of its customers is not a defense under Title VII for treating employees differently based on race.” (Note that the same might not hold true for a customer preference based on gender, because employers can claim a bona fide occupational qualification as a defense to a sex discrimination claim).

If you find yourself in a position of having to face down a customer making such a request, take a stand. Tell the customer, “We don’t treat our employees like that, and if you can’t deal, we don’t need your business.” Be the better corporate citizen. It’s not just the legal way to act, it’s the moral way to act.

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Of storks and honesty—avoid shifting reasons when defending an employment decision


small__8375898146“Norah doesn’t want to have babies when she’s older because she doesn’t want them cut out of her belly.” This is what my wife reports our six-year-old daughter told her a few weeks ago.

“I told her,” my wife continues,” that they don’t always have to cut them out of your belly. Sometimes, babies come out through your private parts.” Then she tells my daughter to leave it at that until she’s older. Norah,  curiosity apparently sated, hasn’t brought it up since.

My response: “What’s wrong with the stork?”

“I don’t want to lie to her,” my wife retorts.

“Santa Claus, Easter Bunny, Tooth Fairy … Stork. We lie to her all the time about these things. What’s wrong with the stork?!”

As it turns out, my wife is right (don’t let her read this; I’ll never hear the end of it). When we are caught in a lie, we lose credibility. And when we lose credibility, we are not trusted on the important stuff.

Case in point—Jones & Carter, Inc., which the National Labor Relations Board decided earlier this month. In that case, the Board found that the charged employer had unlawfully fired an employee for discussing salaries with coworkers. In and of itself, this case is not newsworthy. As the November 26, 2012, opinion of the Administrative Law Judge in the same case [pdf] pointed out in ruling for the terminated employee:

The Board has long held that an employer cannot lawfully prohibit employees from discussing matters such as their pay raises, rates of pay, and perceived inequities. Accordingly, when an employer forbids employees from discussing their wages among themselves without establishing a substantial and legitimate business justification for its policy, the employer violates the Act.

Pay attention, however, to why the ALJ and the NLRB ruled in the employee’s favor. They ruled for the employee because the employer lied about the reason for the termination:

Williams [the HR manager] and Cotton [the chief operating officer] gave markedly different testimony at the [unemployment] hearing as compared to their testimony in these proceedings. During the hearing before the Board, both Williams and Cotton maintained that Teare was terminated for harassing Janik rather than for discussing salary information. During the [unemployment] hearing, however, both Williams and Cotton asserted that Teare’s discharge resulted from her violation of Respondent’s confidentiality policy…. [A]n employer’s shifting reasons for discharge may provide evidence of an unlawful motivation.

It’s trite to say honesty is the best policy. But, when defending an employment case, honesty and consistency are essential. And, if you can’t be honest because the honest reason is illegal, then maybe you should consider biting the bullet and settling.

photo credit: Enokson via photopin cc

Monday, February 18, 2013

Obsessing (compulsively) over reasonable accommodations


I grew up with a guy who really liked the Presidents of the United States (the actual Presidents, not the 90s alt-rock band). He was so fond of them, in fact, that he had a complete collection of presidential figurines in his bedroom. He kept them in chronological order, in perfectly straight rows, on his dresser. And he instinctively knew if you moved one out of line. He’d swoop in and fix it almost as quickly as one could say “John Adams.”

As far as I know, this person did not have obsessive-compulsive disorder. But, what if he did, and he what if he worked for you? Would you have to accommodate this employee’s OCD, and if so, how?

The first question is the easy one to answer. Under the ADA’s liberal definition of disability, OCD is almost certainly a covered mental disability.

The second question, however, is trickier. If the OCD inhibits the employee’s ability to perform the essential functions or his or her job, then, yes, you have to make a reasonable accommodation, but only if you can do so in way that will enable the employee to perform those affected essential functions.

In other words, it depends. Consider these two examples—

  • In Earl v. Mervyns, Inc. (11th Cir. 2000), the plaintiff, a retail manager, claimed that his OCD prevented him from arriving to work on time in the morning. The court agreed with the employer that punctuality was an essential function of his position, and concluded that no accommodation would meet the needs of his OCD. Thus, the court deemed the plaintiff “not qualified” under the ADA and upheld the dismissal of his disability discrimination claim.

  • Yet, in Humphrey v. Memorial Hosps. Ass’n (9th Cir. 2001), the court concluded that the employer failed to consider whether either a leave of absence or telecommuting arrangement would have enabled the plaintiff, a medical records transcriber, to perform her job with her OCD.

The lesson here is not so much about accommodating OCD as an ADA-covered disability, but a broader lesson about handling any disability in the workplace. You need to have a dialogue with an employee about reasonable accommodations. Without opening the channels of communication, you will never know what is feasible. More importantly, without the dialogue, you probably have not satisfied your obligations under the ADA. As the court in Humphrey correctly pointed out:

Once an employer becomes aware of the need for accommodation, that employer has a mandatory obligation under the ADA to engage in an interactive process with the employee to identify and implement appropriate reasonable accommodations…. The interactive process requires communication and good-faith exploration of possible accommodations between employers and individual employees…. Employers, who fail to engage in the interactive process in good faith, face liability for the remedies imposed by the statute if a reasonable accommodation would have been possible….

Moreover, … the employer’s obligation to engage in the interactive process extends beyond the first attempt at accommodation and continues when the employee asks for a different accommodation or where the employer is aware that the initial accommodation is failing and further accommodation is needed. This rule fosters the framework of cooperative problem-solving contemplated by the ADA, by encouraging employers to seek to find accommodations that really work, and by avoiding the creation of a perverse incentive for employees to request the most drastic and burdensome accommodation possible out of fear that a lesser accommodation might be ineffective.

In other words, talk with the employee. You’d be surprised how many employment problems you could head off with an earnest and open conversation.

Until tomorrow…

Friday, February 15, 2013

WIRTW #261 (the “lonely hearts club” edition)


Since this is Valentine’s week, I thought I’d share of the best “workplace romance” themed posts I read this week:
Here’s the rest of what I read this week:
Discrimination
Social Media & Workplace Technology
HR & Employee Relations
Wage & Hour
Labor Relations
 
photo credit: SunnySideUpStudio via photopin cc

Thursday, February 14, 2013

We ♥ our phones, but should employees be paid for using them off-duty?


True confession time. I have a Pavlovian response to the new message chime on my iPhone. I can’t help myself. When my phone beeps, I reach for it. I have no choice.

I’m an exempt employee, which means that I am paid a weekly salary, with no eligibility for overtime, regardless of how many hours I work per week. What, however, if I was non-exempt? Could I be owed overtime for my Pavlovian email checking?

Three and a half years ago, I asked, “Lawsuits over off-the-clock smart phone use ask, “What is work?” Last month, one federal court provided us the beginning of an answer.

In Allen v. City of Chicago, a police sergeant filed a collective action on behalf of himself and all similarly situated employees for the city’s failure to pay overtime for time spent outside of work reading and responding to emails on their city-issued Blackberries. According to the plaintiff:

All of the depositions taken to date reveal a workforce… that is expected to be available twenty-four [hours] per day via Blackberry. All of the deponents receive and respond to an onerous amount of email and telephone calls on a daily basis. All deponents felt obligated to respond to these email communications and telephone calls while off duty. Regrettably, a culture has developed where police officers feel compelled to work for free in order to possibly gain a promotion and/or maintain their coveted assignment in a specialized unit.

The district court conditionally certified the collective action:

[W]hile the amount of overtime officers spent on their department-issued BlackBerries may have varied, the policy that allegedly violated the FLSA did not vary: the policy of not granting overtime compensation for off-duty work on BlackBerries…. At the first stage, despite the potential variations in or de minimis use of the department-issued BlackBerries, the Court can “envision a scenario” where the Plaintiffs  and potential class members are similarly situated.

A few points to make—

  1. This opinion is not a decision on the ultimate issue of whether the employees are owed overtime for their off-the-clock use of their mobile devices. It is a conditional certification of a collective action based on a low threshold showing of similarity. We will have to wait and see how the court handles the central legal issue, whether reading and replying to work emails off the clock is compensable “work” under the FLSA.

  2. Even if reading and replying to work-related email is compensable “work,” I’m not convinced that employers should have to pay employees for it. Most messages can be read in a matter of seconds or, at most, a few short minutes. The FLSA calls such time de minimus, and does not require compensation for it. “Insubstantial or insignificant periods of time beyond the scheduled working hours, which cannot as a practical administrative matter be precisely recorded for payroll purposes, may be disregarded.” Think of the administrative nightmare if an HR or payroll department has to track, record, and pay for each and every fraction of a minute an employee spends reading an email.

  3. In reporting on the opinion, The Huffington Post quotes the plaintiffs’ lawyer, “Everybody can relate to this because people are being asked all the time these days to work for free and they are being told to work for free using their phones.” In other words, these claims are dangerous. If you require non-exempt employees to be available by email 24/7, then you are potentially exposed. To protect yourself, let your non-exempt employees go off the clock. If you provide them mobile devices, or let them BYOD and connect them to your network, have a written policy that tells them they are not required to read or reply to emails after hours. Create a culture that lets your employees escape from work while not at work. You cannot prevent a wage and hour lawsuit raising these issues from being filed against you, but you can position yourself to present the best defense possible, and (hopefully) head off the defense of an expensive class or collective action.