Tuesday, September 21, 2010

Do you know? Men are entitled to protection from sexually hostile work environments too


The typical sexual harassment case involves a man harassing a woman. Harassment, however, isn’t limited to just man-on-woman. The umbrella of sexual harassment also includes man-on-man, woman-on-woman, and, as recently discussed by the 9th Circuit, women-on-men. In EEOC v. Prospect Airport Services (9th Cir. 9/3/10) [pdf], the 9th Circuit held that that a female co-worker’s “relentless” pursuit of a male employee—which included six months of constant sexual pressure and humiliation—could form the basis of a sexually hostile work environment. In ruling, the court rejected any stereotypes that man would welcome harassment from a female co-worker:

It cannot be assumed that because a man receives sexual advances from a woman that those advances are welcome…. [T]hat is a stereotype…. Title VII is not a beauty contest, and even if Munoz looks like Marilyn Monroe, Lamas might not want to have sex with her, for all sorts of possible reasons. He might feel that fornication is wrong, and that adultery is wrong as is supported by his remark about being a Christian. He might fear her husband. He might fear a sexual harassment complaint or other accusation if her feelings about him changed. He might fear complication in his workday. He might fear that his preoccupation with his deceased wife would take any pleasure out of it. He might just not be attracted to her. He may fear eighteen years of child support payments. He might feel that something was mentally off about a woman that sexually aggressive toward him. Some men might feel that chivalry obligates a man to say yes, but the law does not….

This case serves as a good reminder to review your harassment policy for completeness. Does it cover all kinds of unlawful harassment? Not just the reverse sexual harassment discussed in Prospect Airport Services, but harassment based on race, national origin, religion, age, disability, military status, genetic information, and (where applicable) sexual orientation? If not, it’s time to call your lawyer, update your policy, and re-train your employees on their non-harassment responsibilities.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Monday, September 20, 2010

More on cancer as a disability


Last week I wrote how businesses would likely see more employees claim cancer as a protected disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The EEOC proves my point. The agency recently announced that it has sued a Michigan company for failing to accommodate an employee who needed a reduced work schedule while undergoing cancer treatments:
According to the agency’s pre-suit investigation, Derek Nelson, who had been employed by IPC as a machinist for over ten years, went on medical leave in 2008 in order to undergo chemotherapy. The EEOC’s suit alleges that in January 2009, when Nelson sought to continue working part-time while he completed his treatment, IPC discharged Nelson for exceeding the maximum hours of leave allowed under company policy. That decision, the agency contends, violated IPC’s obligation to reasonably accommodate Nelson’s disability.
Meanwhile, in Boca Raton, Florida, a federal jury awarded Kara Jorud $8.1 million for her claim that Michael’s Arts and Crafts terminated her because of her cancer.   Ms. Jorud, suffering from breast cancer, had a double mastectomy and was ill from the follow-up chemotherapy. She claimed that her manager forced her back to work early following her surgery, required her to work while ill, and harassed her. The Palm Beach Post recounts Jorud’s manager telling her, “How often do you have to do this? You will be here on Monday after chemo.” LawyersandSettlements.com fills in the rest of the details:
In her lawsuit, Jorud said she had taken a six-week medical leave following her surgery, but within days the cancer patient began taking calls from her District Manager inquiring as to her return. Jorud was originally tasked to turn around the store’s reportedly failing operations.
Jorud returned to work less than a month after surgery because, she testified, she feared for her job.
At one point, the plaintiff brought her fiancé and his son into the store to help her shift inventory ahead of a pending delivery because she was weak from the aftereffects of chemotherapy. The cancer patient was fired three days later, reportedly one day before her next scheduled chemotherapy treatment.
The plaintiff was also accused of theft prior to her firing, a charge that Jorud later disproved and the district manager later admitted to be false, according to the newspaper account.

These cases should serve as a warning sign for employers dealing with employees with serious treatable illnesses. It is no longer enough to provide an employee the statutorily mandated 12 weeks of FMLA leave, or to merely follow one’s own leave of absence policy. Instead, as these cases illustrate, employers should consider reasonable accommodations such as part-time or modified work schedules.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Friday, September 17, 2010

WIRTW #144 (the shameless plug edition)


plug For the last three years, the ABA has published its Blawg 100—a list of the best legal blogs as judged the the editors of the ABA Journal. The ABA will publish its 2010 list in December. This year, however, the ABA is soliciting recommendations:

Use the form below to tell us about a blawg—not your own—that you read regularly and think other lawyers should know about. If there is more than one blawg you want to support, feel free to send us more amici through the form. We’ll be including some of the best comments in our Blawg 100 coverage. But keep your remarks pithy—you have a 500-character limit…. Friend-of-the-blawg briefs are due no later than Friday, Oct. 1.

I’ve already made my votes (which I’m keeping to myself).

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Labor Law

HR & Employee Relations

Social Media & Technology

Wage & Hour


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, September 16, 2010

Taking more than one bite at the apple in discrimination cases


7. snow white and poison apple eat

One of the anomalies of Ohio’s employment discrimination statute is that it provides for individual liability for managers’ and supervisors’ own acts of discrimination. This peculiarity presents at least three issues for businesses to deal with:

  1. By adding an in-state manager or supervisor as a defendant, Ohio employees can make it difficult for out-of-state businesses to remove discrimination cases to federal court based on diversity of citizenship.

  2. A conflict of interest may prevent one attorney from defending both the business and the individual defendant, thus signaling to the plaintiff that there may be liability problems.

  3. A federal court may pass on hearing the state law claims against the individual defendant, thereby giving the plaintiff two bites at the apple.

Price v. Carter Lumber Co. (Ohio Ct. App. 9/15/10) [pdf] is a poignant illustration of this third issue.

Gerald Price claimed that his former supervisor, Jim Collins, told him that Carter Lumber was not willing to work around his dialysis schedule and therefore would not rehired him. Price sued Carter Lumber and Collins in federal district court for disability discrimination. The federal court dismissed without prejudice (meaning Price was free to re-file) the state-law claims against Collins. Price then sued Carter Lumber and Collins in state court. After Carter Lumber won a jury verdict in federal court, both it and Collins moved the state court for dismissal.

The law uses a lot of Latin phrases, one of which I am about to introduce—res judicata. Ohio law uses res judicata as an umbrella term to cover both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Claim preclusion bars subsequent actions between the same parties (or those related to them) on all claims arising out of the transaction that was the subject of a previous action. Issue preclusion bars the same parties (or those related to them) from re-litigating an issue in a subsequent action if the fact or point was directly at issue in a previous action and was ruled upon by a court. In other words, a plaintiff is only supposed to get one bite at the proverbial apple.

The court of appeals concluded that even though a federal jury concluded that Carter Lumber did not discriminate against Price, a state court jury might have the opportunity to determine the same issue as to Collins, one of its supervisors. Whether Price was able to litigate his discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against Collins would hinge on the trial court’s review of the specific issues decided by federal jury.

It is likely that Collins will ultimately succeed and have the state court claims dismissed. Yet, that fact that he has to spend time and money litigating the issue—when a jury has already concluded that the employer did not discriminate—is reason enough for Ohio’s legislature to amend our state discrimination statute to bring it on par with its federal counterpart by eliminating individual liability. 


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Wednesday, September 15, 2010

Card check is dead … long live card check


download The NLRB is set to revisit its rules for secret ballot elections for voluntarily recognized unions. If it reverses course, it will administratively do that which Congress has been unable to do—make secret ballot elections that much harder to obtain. The process the NLRB is reconsidering—its 2007 decision in Dana Corp.—is needed to ensure that employees always have access to a secret ballot election to protect their free choice in deciding whether or not to be represented by a labor union. And, I have the anecdotal evidence to prove it. First, some background.

Generally, a union can become employees’ exclusive bargaining representative in one of two ways: a secret ballot election following a presentation of signed cards by more than 30% of the bargaining unit members, or a presentation of signed cards by more than 50%. An employer, however, does not have to recognize a union based solely on a majority of signed cards, and can require a secret-ballot vote overseen by the NLRB. Some card checks, however, are done by agreement whereby the employer recognizes the union upon the showing of a card majority and/or the employer remains neutral during the union’s organizational campaign (known as a “neutrality agreement”).

In Dana Corp., NLRB established that employees always have a right to a secret ballot election. The Board held that when an employer voluntarily recognizes a union based on a card-check, the employer must post a notice of the recognition and of employees’ opportunity to file for an election to decertify the union or in support of a rival union within 45 days of the notice. If within that 45-day window 30% of the bargaining unit members produce evidence that they support decertification, the NLRB will hold a secret ballot election. The NLRB adopted this rule “to achieve a ‘finer balance’ of interests that better protects employees’ free choice.”

Dana Corp. was decided at the height of the Bush-era, pro-management NLRB. Now, the Obama NLRB is considering overturning Dana, and going back to the prior rule that barred any election petitions for up to one year following a voluntary recognition. Following its decision in Rite Aid Store #6473 and Lamons Gasket Co., the NLRB issued a Notice and Invitation to File Briefs [pdf] on the following six issues:

  1. What has been their experience under Dana and what have other parties to voluntary recognition agreements experienced under Dana?
  2. In what ways has the application of Dana furthered or hindered employees’ choice of whether to be represented?
  3. In what ways has the application of Dana destabilized or furthered collective bargaining?
  4. What is the appropriate scope of application of the rule announced in Dana, specifically, should the rule apply in situations governed by the Board’s decision regarding after-acquired clauses in Kroger Co., 219 NLRB 388 (1975), or in mergers such as the one presented in Green-Wood Cemetery, 280 NLRB 1359 (1986)?
  5. Under what circumstances should substantial compliance be sufficient to satisfy the notice-posting requirements established in Dana?
  6. If the Board modifies or overrules Dana, should it do so retroactively or prospectively only?

I can provide an anecdotal answer to number one. Since the NLRB decided Dana Corp. in 2007, employers and unions have filed 1,111 requests for voluntary recognition (The NLRB has put together a spreadsheet summarizing all of these cases). Those requests resulted 85 election petitions, 15 of which the employees voted against the voluntarily recognized union. I was one of those 15 elections. The employees presented a nearly-unanimous showing of cards. After the Dana posting, 21 out of 33 employees signed a petition for a decertification election. All 33 employees voted, resulting in decertification by a vote of 17-16. In other words, the card check did not accurately represent the employees’ free choice. For this reason alone, Dana is an important rule that is needed to ensure that employees always have the opportunity to exercise and express their free choice through a secret ballot election.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Tuesday, September 14, 2010

Do you know? Discrimination against Muslims


We are now nine years post-9/11. To say that relations between Americans and Muslim-Americans are poor is an understatement. Our country has been worked into a froth over a proposed Mosque at Ground Zero. It seems that Muslims rank first in the category, “People against whom discrimination and marginalization is culturally acceptable.” Employment discrimination claims brought by Muslims have hit record numbers—higher in 2009 than even in 2002.

Discrimination against Muslims comes in two forms: national origin discrimination and religious discrimination. Both types are not that much different than a race discrimination claim. Failures to hire or promote, terminations, other unlawful employment actions, or harassment because of on one’s national origin or religion all constitute unlawful discrimination. For example, take the recent pair of cases filed by the EEOC against meatpacker JBS Swift, in which Muslim employees alleged that  blood and bones were hurled at them, bathroom walls were covered with vile graffiti and company supervisors fired many Islamic employees.

Religious discrimination, however, presents its own unique set of issues, because employers have an affirmative obligation to reasonably accommodate an employee whose sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance conflicts with a work requirement, unless doing so would pose an undue hardship. Two recent stories illustrate the problems that these claims present for employers. Muslim employees continue to sue retailer Abercrombie & Fitch, challenging its “Look Policy” that prevents those who wear hijabs (religious head scarves) from being hired. Then, there is the Disneyland case, in which a Muslim employee, working as a hostess at a restaurant, protesting the theme park’s insistence that her costume cover her hijab so that she meets the “The Disney Look”—a 17-page document [pdf] outlining dress and grooming guidelines for all Cast Members to maintain uniformity and the suspension of disbelief, which has been used since Disneyland opened in 1955.

We all know that discrimination of all kinds is wrong. But, Muslim-Americans are practicing politics of exclusion in a time that calls for the opposite so that we, as a nation, can heal. The issue isn’t one of rights. Of course, one has a right to build a Mosque where one wants (and the law cannot stop the Ground Zero Mosque from being built). One should have the right to pray at work (as long as it doesn’t interfere with job performance or otherwise disrupt the workplace). One should have the right to wear religious garments in the workplace (although Abercrombie and Disney have the right to protect and project the public image that forms the foundation of their companies). Yet, as long as people insist on building a Mosque at Ground Zero, others will feel it’s okay to hurl meat and epithets.

There are no easy answers to these ugly problems. But, it’s not enough simply to say that employers have to cease discrimination. For the healing to begin, and for the discrimination to stop, there also has to be a showing of willingness, participation, and inclusion from the other side of the argument.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Monday, September 13, 2010

ADA Amendments redefine cancer as a disability


More than two years ago, I criticized a case that dismissed an employee’s disability discrimination claim on the basis that his cancer was limiting enough to qualify as a protectable disability:

This case leaves a bad taste in my mouth. An employee, suffering from cancer, who had a piece of his jaw replaced with a prosthesis, should be protected as having a “disability.” This case would allow a termination of female employee with breast cancer post-mastectomy. That result just doesn't sit right with me.

I think the cancer-is-not-an-ADA-disability cases are a thing of the past. Effective January 1, 2009, Congress amended the ADA to reinstate “a broad scope of protection.” Specifically, Congress found that the United States Supreme Court had narrowed the protections intended by the ADA, and rejected the holdings of Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams. The ADAAA did not change the statutory definition of “disability,” but made significant changes in how it is interpreted. Importantly, the ADAAA clarified that the operation of “major bodily functions,” including “functions of the immune system,” constitute major life activities under the ADA. Moreover, the ADAAA provides that “an impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.” The “question of whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis.”

Hoffman v. Carefirst of Fort Wayne (N.D. Ind. 8/31/10) is one of the first cases decided under 2008’s ADA Amendments. It provides a poignant example of these new definitions in practice.

Stephen Hoffman claimed that his employer, Advanced Healthcare, terminated him because of his Stage III renal cancer (in remission at the time of his termination). In its defense, Advanced Healthcare argued that because Hoffman did not have a physical impairment which substantially limited a major life activity, he was not disabled under the ADA—the cancer was in remission, Hoffman returned to work without restrictions, he carried out his regular job duties of 40 hours a week a full year, and he did not miss any significant work-time.

The court rejected Advanced Healthcare’s argument that it “highly doubts that Congress intended all cancer survivors in remission, with no medical evidence of active disease, to be considered disabled as a matter of law for the rest of their lives.” Instead, the court concluded:

Because it clearly provides that “an impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active,” and neither side disputes that Stage III Renal Cancer, when active, constitutes a disability, this Court must find that Hoffman was “disabled” under the ADAAA. In other words, under the ADAAA, because Hoffman had cancer in remission (and that cancer would have substantially limited a major life activity when it was active), Hoffman does not need to show that he was substantially limited in a major life activity at the actual time of the alleged adverse employment action.

This case not only serves as an excellent illustration of the problems addressed by the ADA Amendments, but is also shows how difficult it will be going forward for employers to prove that an employee’s medical condition does not qualify as an ADA-disability. If we assume that nearly all medical conditions are “disabilities” (and this assumption is pretty safe), then employers needs to refocus on the interactive process to reach a reasonable accommodation necessary to enable an employee to perform the essential functions of the job. Most ADA cases will now be won or lost on this issue, and it is incumbent on employers to put their best foot forward by appearing to have been as reasonable as possible with disabled employees.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Friday, September 10, 2010

WIRTW #143 (the “Are you ready for some football edition?”)


This weekend truly is one of the best sports weekends of the year. It’s opening Sunday for the NFL. Everyone’s 0-0 (even the Browns, who, for the record, I predict will be a very competitive 6-10 this season). For the fantasy football junkies out there, I recommend Happy New Year! Or, Happy First Day of (Fantasy) Football – from Daniel Schwartz’s Connecticut Employment Law Blog. As for my fantasy team, Adrian Peterson had a very pedestrian 19 carries for 87 yards last night. AP’s gotta pick it up if I’m going to make it back to the Superbowl this year.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week;

Discrimination

Wage & Hour

Social Media

Background Screening


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, September 9, 2010

Is organized labor finally making its resurgence?


Maybe its appropriate (or entirely a coincidence) that during the week in which we celebrate Labor Day, there have been so many stories in the news and in blogs discussing organized labor. Some proof, you ask?

    What does this all mean? Maybe nothing? More likely, organized labor has decided to stop waiting for President Obama to make good on certain campaign promises (like the Employee Free Choice Act) and take matters into its own hands by taking advantage of its majority on the NLRB. Businesses should prepare themselves for an upswing in organizing efforts, in addition to the possibility of a pro-union NLRB making decisions that reach outside of unionized workplaces to regulate the employer/employee relationship in general.


      Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

      Wednesday, September 8, 2010

      EEOC settlement provides really good practice points for combating harassment


      Last week, the EEOC announced the settlement of the sexual harassment claims of 21 female janitorial workers against their employer, ABM Industries. The allegations were pretty horrific:

      The EEOC asserted that the 21 class members were victims of varying degrees of unwelcome touching, explicit sexual comments and requests for sex by 14 male co-workers and supervisors, one of whom was a registered sex offender. Some of the harassers allegedly often exposed themselves, groped female employees’ private parts from behind, and even raped at least one of the victims, the EEOC said.

      Worse yet, the lawsuit “charged that ABM failed to respond to the employees’ repeated complaints of harassment.” According to the EEOC, “Employers must implement strict policies and procedures to safeguard against such harassment, and take employee complaints seriously so that they not rise to the level of severity we saw in this case.”

      The employer agreed to pay the class $5.8M, in addition to changes in how it handles workplace harassment. The agreed-to policy changes offer all employers some good lessons in how to proactively handle harassment:

      • Designate an outside equal employment opportunity monitor to ensure the effectiveness of investigations, complaint policies and procedures, and assist in anti-harassment training to employees.
      • Ensure that investigators of harassment complaints are trained thoroughly to investigate internal complaints of discrimination, harassment and retaliation 
      • Establish a toll-free telephone hotline to receive complaints of harassment and retaliation.
      • Provide anti-harassment training to employees in both English and Spanish to include a video message from the chief executive officer emphasizing zero tolerance for harassment and retaliation. 
      • Conduct internal compliance audits at worksites.

      Depending on the size of your organization, these specifics may not make sense. All businesses, though, should take the general lesson to heart. An anti-harassment policy is not worth the paper it’s printed on unless the company has a culture that not only abhors harassment, but takes all complaints seriously. Taking complaints seriously includes ensuring that all employees (no matter their native language or level of education) understand the harassment policy, that employees have more than one avenue to make complaints, that investigators are properly trained, and that the company regularly reviews its policies and procedures for compliance and effectiveness. No anti-harassment program is perfect, but designing one around these guidelines will greatly help in keeping you away from multi-million dollar lawsuits.


      Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

      Tuesday, September 7, 2010

      Do you know? FMLA medical certifications: if you don't ask, then you can't deny


      In Branham v. Gannett Satellite Information (9/2/10) [pdf], the Sixth Circuit faced the issue of whether a negative medical certification (that is, one that says an employee is not limited in performing the essential functions of the job) bars FMLA leave if the employee presents an opposite certification during the same certification period. Under the FMLA's regulations, an employer must give an employee 15 days to prevent a medical certification for an unforeseeable leave. During that 15 day period, Deborah Branham presented Gannett an initial form from her doctor which stated that she could perform the essential functions of her job, and a second form which stated that she could not. While the latter would have qualified her for FMLA leave, Gannett took the position that the initial negative certification disposed of the issue for the entire leave, and it could ignore the second certification. The Sixth Circuit skirted this interesting issue, but in the process made an important point about employers' obligations in following the rules and asking for medical certifications.

      The rules on medical certifications under the FMLA are fairly straight-forward. After an employee asks for FMLA leave, an employer may require that the employee support the request with a certification issued by the employee's health care provider. This request by the employer must be in writing and must detail the employee’s specific obligation to provide the certification and the consequences of failing to do so (such as the denial of leave). The request may be oral only if (1) the employee handbook or other written FMLA policy clearly provided that medical certification would be required, and (2) the employee sought FMLA leave some time in the previous six months and received written notice of the medical-certification requirement at that time. If an employer uses the FMLA forms drafted by the DOL, the written notice will take care of itself in most instances. Based on these rules, the court denied concluded that Gannett's denial of Branham's leave request violated the FMLA.
      Branham satisfied her notification requirement on November 13, 2006, when she asked Buhler “about taking leave, because [she] still wasn’t feeling well and had numerous doctors’ appointments scheduled for November and December.” But Gannett never properly triggered the additional duty to provide a medical certification supporting her claim. The district court found that Gannett requested certification on November 13, the day on which Buhler told Branham over the phone to come to the office and sign a short-term-disability form to “see if she qualified for anything.” In her deposition, however, Buhler testified that “Michele and I never at any time discussed FMLA leave.” It is true that Gannett’s short-term-disability form doubled as its FMLA leave form, but it is clear that Buhler communicated to Branham no information about the FMLA certification requirement, the fact that such certification was due within fifteen days, or the consequences of failing to return an adequate certification.... We therefore must conclude that Gannett was not entitled to delay or deny leave to Branham on the basis of the certification requirement. 
      In this case, Gannett's biggest mistake was using its own form (the short term disability form) for FMLA purposes. It should have used the DOL's suggested forms. Part B of form WH-381, entitled "Notice of Eligibility and Rights & Responsibilities" [pdf], states:

      As explained in Part A, you meet the eligibility requirements for taking FMLA leave and still have FMLA leave available in the applicable 12-month period. However, in order for us to determine whether your absence qualifies as FMLA leave, you must return the following information to us by _________________. (If a certification is requested, employers must allow at least 15 calendar days from receipt of this notice; additional time may be required in some circumstances.) If sufficient information is not provided in a timely manner, your leave may be denied.
      The form then has this check-box: "Sufficient certification to support your request for FMLA leave. A certification form that sets forth the information necessary to support your request ____is/____ is not enclosed." All an employer needs to do to satisfy its requirement to ask for the certification in writing is use this form, fill in the date by which certification must be returned, check the box asking for the certification, and provide a copy of form WH-380-E, Certification of Health Care Provider for Employee’s Serious Health Condition [pdf]. The rules are not complicated, but, as Branham v. Gannett Satellite Information illustrates, the penalties for not following them are punitive.



      Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

      Monday, September 6, 2010

      Happy Labor Day


      http://www.gocomics.com/reallifeadventures/2010/09/06/


      Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

      Friday, September 3, 2010

      WIRTW #142 (“It’s the bitches that’ll get yas” edition)


      Earlier this month, the Second Circuit, in Pucino v. Verizon Communications, held that repeated use of the word “bitch” could create a hostile work environment. I decided Dan Schwartz’s (of the Connecticut Employment Law Blog) blog post was worthy of the following tweet:

      jthtweet

      Misinterpreting my tweet, @CarlosDuranLive responded with the following:

      replytweet.jp

      Yikes. I share this little back-and-forth for two reasons: 1) words can often be misunderstood or taken out of context, and 2) your duty as an employer is to take seriously and investigate every complaint by every employee about words, no matter how silly the interpretation of events might be.

      Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

      Discrimination

      Wage & Hour

      FMLA

      Litigation

      Trade Secrets / Non-Competes

      Labor


      Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

      Thursday, September 2, 2010

      6th Circuit re-defines walking time as working time under the FLSA


      In June, the DOL’s Wage & Hour Division issued an Administrator’s Interpretation finding that that the time spent by employees donning and doffing (that is, putting on and taking off) protective equipment required by law is compensable and must be paid. It also means that an employee’s work day begins with the donning of required protective equipment and ends with its doffing, and all of the time in-between is payable work-time. On Tuesday, the 6th Circuit, addressed the same issue in an opinion that is binding on all Ohio employers.

      In Franklin v. Kellogg Company [pdf], the Court concluded that the time spent walking between the locker room and the time clock after donning and before doffing protective gear is compensable working time.

      The Court started with restating some general principles. Federal wage and hour laws define the “workday” as “the period between the commencement and completion on the same workday of an employee’s principal activity or activities.” Generally, time spent walking to and from a time clock is not compensable. During a “continuous workday,” however, the FLSA covers “any walking time that occurs after the beginning of the employee’s first principal activity and before the end of the employee’s last principal activity … must be compensated.” Principal activities are those that are an integral and indispensable part of the activities which the employee is employed to perform.

      Kellogg required all hourly employees to wear company-provided uniforms (pants, snap-front shirts bearing the Kellogg logo and employee’s name, and slip-resistant shoes, and safety equipment (hair and beard nets, safety glasses, ear plugs, and bump caps). Kellogg mandated that employees change into their uniform and safety equipment upon arriving at the plant, and to change back into their regular clothes before leaving the plant, so that the uniform and safety equipment could be washed and cleaned. Kellogg claimed that changing into and out of the uniform and safety equipment is not “integral and indispensable” (and is therefore not compensable) under the FLSA.

      The 6th Circuit disagreed, applying a broad interpretation of what is necessary for an employee to perform his or her job. The court evaluated these three factors—(1) whether the activity is required by the employer; (2) whether the activity is necessary for the employee to perform his or her duties; and (3) whether the activity primarily benefits the employer—and concluded:

      [D]onning and doffing the uniform and equipment is both integral and indispensable. First, the activity is required by Kellogg. Second, wearing the uniform and equipment primarily benefits Kellogg. Certainly, the employees receive protection from physical harm by wearing the equipment. However, the benefit is primarily for Kellogg, because the uniform and equipment ensures sanitary working conditions and untainted products. Because Franklin would be able to physically complete her job without donning the uniform and equipment, … it is difficult to say that donning the items are necessary for her to perform her duties. Nonetheless, … we conclude that donning and doffing the uniform and standard equipment at issue here is a principal activity. Accordingly, under the continuous workday rule, Franklin may be entitled to payment for her post-donning and pre-doffing walking time.

      This opinion has significant implications for any Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, or Tennessee employer that requires its employees to change into protective gear or mandatory uniforms. After Kellogg, it is clear that the 6th Circuit is going to apply a very broad definition of “integral and indispensable,” even where uniforms or safety gear are not necessary for an employee to perform the job. As long as the donning and doffing is mandatory and provides some benefit to the employer (here, a sanitary workplace), it is compensable working time.


      Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

      Wednesday, September 1, 2010

      You are what you wear—at least according to the 6th Circuit and “donning and doffing”


      Section 203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act allows an employer to refuse to pay employees for time spent changing clothes if it has been excluded by custom or practice under a bona fide collective bargaining agreement:

      Hours Worked.—In determining for the purposes of sections 206 and 207 of this title the hours for which an employee is employed, there shall be excluded any time spent in changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of each workday which was excluded from measured working time during the week involved by the express terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement applicable to the particular employee.

      Yesterday, in Franklin v. Kellogg Company [pdf], the 6th Circuit was presented with the question of whether the donning and doffing of safety equipment constitutes “changing clothes” under section 203(o). At issue was Kellogg’s long-standing policy, adopted by its union contract, of not paying employees for time spent putting on and taking off company-provided uniforms (pants, snap-front shirts bearing the
      Kellogg logo and employee’s name, and slip-resistant shoes) and standard safety equipment (hair and beard nets, safety glasses, ear plugs, and bump caps).

      After noting that the Department of Labor has changed its mind at least three times on whether safety equipment qualifies as “clothes” under 203(o), the 6th Circuit applied a common sense, dictionary definition to settle the dispute:

      A leading dictionary defines “clothes” as “clothing,” which itself is defined as “covering for the human body or garments in general: all the garments and accessories worn by a person at one time.” … Thus, the plain meaning of the word “clothes” is quite expansive. However, because the statute indicates that § 203(o) applies to changing into clothes worn during the workday, Congress was referring to clothes worn for the workday and not simply “ordinary” clothes. … Accordingly, there is no reason to limit the definition of clothes to uniforms, which are made up of pants and shirts…. Instead, “clothes” within the meaning of § 203(o) refers to any “covering for the human body or garments in general,” particularly those worn for work….

      Given the context of the workday, § 203(o) clearly applies to the uniform at issue in the case at hand. The remaining items—hair and beard nets, goggles, ear plugs, nonslip shoes, and a bump cap—are also properly construed as clothes within the meaning of § 203(o). Each of these items provides covering for the body. Although they also provide protection to the body, we see no reason to distinguish between protective and non-protective clothes. It is arguable that even the uniform, which is clearly clothing, provides protection to the body. We recognize that there may be some heavier protective equipment than what is at issue here that is not clothing within the meaning of § 203(o). However, the items at issue here are simply “standard safety equipment.”

      In other words, because the safety equipment serves as a covering for the body, it qualifies as “clothes” under section 203(o).

      Unless you are a unionized employer with a contract that codifies a custom or practice of nonpayment for time spent changing clothes, this opinion is of little practical import. It serves, however, as a good example of a court cutting to the chaff and applying its common sense to arrive at a practical result.

      Tomorrow, I’ll be back with an analysis of the second part of this opinion (which will be of greater interest to many more employers)—whether Kellogg’s employees are entitled to be paid for time spent walking between the locker room and the time clock.


      Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

      Tuesday, August 31, 2010

      Do you know? Challenging non-competition agreements


      While my practice is heavily slanted towards the representation of management in employment disputes, from time to time I represent employees. Usually, it’s in an advisory role with non-compete agreements, when someone leaves one position for another.

      Employees faced with a non-compete when leaving a job to work for a competitor or quasi-competitor have three choices:

      1. Approach the old employer—either as part of severance negotiations or otherwise—and attempt to negotiate or buy your way out of the non-compete.
      2. Work for the competitor and wait to get sued.
      3. Preemptively sue your old employer seeking a declaration that the non-compete is invalid.

      In all likelihood, if you ignore option number 1, or negotiations fail, you, and maybe your new employer, will get sued. The latter option, though, has some great upside for employees with specious non-competes. It lets you control the timing and venue of the lawsuit. It also lets you play offense instead of defense in trying to void or modify an overly broad agreement. For a good example of where this strategy worked well, see Jacono v. Invacare Corp. The downside, of course, is the expense. Something to consider if you are faced with a new job and a non-compete of dubious enforceability.


      Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

      Monday, August 30, 2010

      Not another post on wage and hour class actions?


      I know what you’re thinking—not another post on wage and hour compliance. Workplace compliance specialist ELT published the results of a recent survey that caught my eye:

      The money on the table for wage and hour class action settlements is huge, averaging $23.5M at the federal level and $24.4M at the state level. With the majority of employers already out of compliance with wage and hour laws, these are the kind of open and shut cases plaintiff’s law firms love to take on. Although these lawsuits are often positioned as valiant efforts toward worker protection, most of the money ends up in the hands of the attorneys while many class participants see as little as a few hundred dollars.

      Average settlements over $20 million for “open and shut” cases should certainly get your attention. Yet, as long as businesses continue to ignore wage and hour compliance, I’ll continue to write posts about it.


      Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

      Friday, August 27, 2010

      WIRTW #141 (the creepy-crawly edition)


      It all started with a short press release from the National Pest Management Association, which announced the results of the 2010 Comprehensive Global Bed Bug Study. Now the press is all over this bed bug story (The Bed Bug Hub: One-Stop Shop for Bed Bug Information for a collection of links), and people everywhere are itching. Once limited to hotels, the little buggers are even showing up in downtown offices, which poses its own unique set of problems for employers (More offices see bedbug infestations). I’m phantom-scratching myself as I write this. Yick!

      Anyhow, here’s the rest of what I read this week:

      Social Media & Technology

      Wage & Hour

      Discrimination

      Litigation

      Employee Relations

      Trade Secrets and Competition


      Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

      Thursday, August 26, 2010

      Wal-Mart seeks Supreme Court review of billion-dollar class action


      Yesterday, the nation’s largest private employer asked the Supreme Court to review the class certification of the nation’s largest employment discrimination lawsuit. The case—Dukes v. Wal-Mart—is remarkable for several reasons:

      1. It has been pending for nine years, and yet the parties are still dealing with the preliminary procedural issue of whether this case will proceed as a class action.
      2. The plaintiffs seek a nationwide class, to include every woman employed by Wal-Mart for the past decade, in any of Wal-Mart’s 3,400 separately managed stores, across 41 regions and 400 districts, in any of 53 departments and 170 different job classifications. In other words, there is not much similar about these women other then the fact that they all worked for Wal-Mart.
      3. The potential class is more than 1.5 million women.
      4. The potential damages are billions.

      Steven Greenhouse, at the New York Times, frames the dispute on the class certification issue:

      Mr. Boutrous [one of Wal-Mart’s lawyers] said that even if the seven lead plaintiffs had suffered discrimination, that did not mean there was across-the-board bias at thousands of stores nationwide. He said the women’s claims should be tried individually, or if a manager discriminated against a store’s 200 women employees, then perhaps as a 200-member class action for those women.

      Joseph Sellers, a lawyer for the plaintiffs, said the case should be a class action because Wal-Mart had and still has a common set of personnel policies at all of its stores. “We regard them as cookie-cutter operations that are similar to each other,” he said.

      Wal-Mart—which strongly disputes liability and describes itself as “a leader in fostering the advancement and success of women in the workplace”—has asked the Supreme Court to review the propriety of a class action seeking money damages under the class action provision for injunctive or declaratory relief. The New York Times has available for download a PDF of Wal-Mart’s brief.

      There is a lot at stake for businesses in the Supreme Court’s decision of whether to accept review of this class certification. A refusal by the Supreme Court to hear this case, or, worse yet, an affirming of the class by the Court, would greatly increase the risk for employers defending employment decisions (and resulting class actions) that involve disparate groups of employees, reporting to different managers, and working in different facilities. It would result in larger classes with a higher potential for recovery, neither of which is good for companies. It’s safe to say that the class action epidemic in this country would get a whole lot worse.

      I am certain I will be one of many blogger commenting today on this case. For a snapshot of what some others have already said, take a look at the following:


      Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

      Wednesday, August 25, 2010

      The worst feeling ever, and importance of candor


      deposition photo Imagine a sexual harassment EEOC charge which alleges that a corporate executive displayed pornographic images on his computer to a female subordinate. You interview the executive, in addition to everyone else at the company who could have seen the images; everyone denies they existed. In fact, the executive has a plausible explanation. The charging party is a disgruntled, terminated employee who may have accidentally received an email forward of a dirty joke, and is now exaggerating that one isolated incident to extort money through a bogus claim. You have no reason to disbelieve this executive and everyone else at the company. You respond accordingly in the company’s position statement to the EEOC, which finds no probable cause.

      Flash forward six months. The lawyer for the ex-employee (now a plaintiff) is deposing the same executive. Her lawyer marks your position statement as Exhibit 1, and the executive re-affirms his story. Her lawyer then marks as Exhibit 2 the discovery responses in which the company denied that any pornographic photos existed, and the executive again re-affirms his story. When her lawyer marks a manila envelope as Exhibit 3, you start to feel a pit in your stomach. When the executive opens the envelope and reveals a half-dozen pornographic photos, the pit moves up into your throat. When you realize that the photos are of the same executive cavorting with two women—whom he identifies as “escorts”—you just about throw up. And the case settles for much more than it was worth.

      I often relay this story to clients from whom I think I may not be getting the whole story. I remind them that whatever they tell me is privileged. I tell them that they might think they are protecting their company, but in this age of email, and Facebook, and computer forensics, it is likely, if not certain, that the truth will eventually come out. I explain that when it does, the liability risk, potential verdict amount, and the value of any settlement goes up exponentially.

      The word “candor” is one of the the most important words to lawyers. It’s in our ethical rules—attorneys owe a duty of candor to the tribunal. Almost as important, however, is the candor between a lawyer and client. We owe you a responsibility to be completely honest with you about your case and the risks it presents. We cannot do that, however, without your reciprocal honesty about the facts. It’s our job to tell your most compelling story. We cannot do that, though, if we don’t know what that story truly is.


      Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

      Tuesday, August 24, 2010

      Do you know? The Department of Labor updates its strategic plan for the next five years


      Earlier this year, the Department of Labor launched its We Can Help website, offering employees a one-stop-shop for wage and hour information, and information on how to file complaints against their employers. The DOL recently put a little more meat on its regulatory plans, announcing its updated five-year strategic plan, called “Good Jobs for Everyone” [pdf]. The plan has five strategic goals:

      1. Prepare workers for good jobs and ensure fair compensation.
      2. Ensure workplaces are safe and healthy.
      3. Assure fair and high quality work‐life environments.
      4. Secure health benefits and, for those not working, provide income security.
      5. Produce timely and accurate data on the economic conditions of workers and their families.

      One key provision of this plan caught my eye, and should concern employers.

      Outcome Goal 1.5—Secure wages and overtime. This goal has four key components:

      • Protecting vulnerable workers: The DOL believes that employers who use contract or temporary workers, in addition to young workers, are at a greater risk for wage and hour violations. It will target these types of workers for greater protection and enforcement efforts.

      • Targeting high-risk fissured industries: The DOL will specifically target the following “high‐risk” industries for greater enforcement: agriculture, janitorial services, construction, and hotels/motels. The DOL will continue to conduct investigation‐based compliance evaluations to determine the percent of prior violators who come into and stay in compliance with the FLSA.

      • Securing sustained compliance: The DOL will enhance its complaint investigation program, in addition to expanding pubic awareness and outreach. Most notably, the DOL will target the most persistent violators by pursuing corporate‐wide compliance strategies and by imposing appropriate penalties and sanctions.

      • Identifying employee misclassifications: The DOL is concerned that employers are misclassifying employees and independent contractors to deny access to benefits and legal protections, such as family and medical leave, overtime, minimum wage, and unemployment insurance. The FLSA recordkeeping regulations under development will require that employers notify each worker of their rights under the FLSA, and provide employees with information regarding their hours worked and wage computations.

      In other words, the DOL is making good on its promise to increase monitoring and enforcement of wage and hour laws, specifically as they pertain to low-wage/high-risk employees, and employee/contractor misclassifications. For more on what this means for you and your business, I recommend the following:


      Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.