Friday, June 29, 2012

WIRTW #231 (the “Obama <3 Roberts” edition)


Yesterday was the most anticipated day at the U.S. Supreme Court in quite some time. The Court handed down its opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, which decided the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act. And, Obamacare is alive and kicking. Here’s SCOTUSblog’s very tweetable summary of the historic opinion:

The key quote from the majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Roberts:

Our precedent demonstrates that Congress had the power to impose the exaction in §5000A under the taxing power, and that §5000A need not be read to do more than impose a tax. That is sufficient to sustain it.

In other words, the “mandate” to buy health insurance isn’t really a mandate at all, because individuals can simply refuse to buy health insurance and pay the resulting tax.

Here’s the entire 59-page opinion “in plain English,” again via SCOTUSblog (which gets huge props for its amazing live coverage):

If have a few spare moments and want to seek your teeth into the opinion, you can download all 187 pages here.

Or, you can read some summaries and commentaries from around the web:

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Thursday, June 28, 2012

Abandoning job because of harassment does not support retaliation claim, says the 6th Circuit


Last week, I discussed the 6th Circuit’s most recent pronouncement on same-sex harassment. I noted that while some would argue the Court’s dismissal of the harassment claim is evidence of the need for law against workplace bullying, in reality the Court’s dismissal of the retaliation claim was the more troubling aspect of the opinion. What did I mean?

Recall that in Wasek v. Arrow Energy Services [pdf], when Harold Wasek complained that his male co-worker, Paul Ottobre, was harassing him, his superiors first told him not to “make waves [by] whining,” and later told him he should just “kick [Ottobre’s] ass,” and that they should “duke it out” to “get it out of [their] systems.” In response to this supervisor’s advice, Wasek went AWOL from his Pennsylvania job site. When Wasek later pursued the issues with HR, the regional supervisor told him that it’s “the way the oil field is” and that if Wasek couldn’t handle it he “should find another line of work.” Ultimately, Arrow banned Wasek from working in Pennsylvania and reassigned him to a job site in Michigan. He ultimately quit to work for a different employer.

The Court concluded that Wasek going AWOL, and not his complaints about harassment, caused his job-site transfer:

Wasek’s claim fails, however, because he has not demonstrated a causal connection between his protected activity—the complaints—and Arrow Energy’s adverse employment action—the Pennsylvania ban….

Leaving the work site could be protected activity if leaving itself were a “complaint” about sexual harassment. But this would require a fact-intensive inquiry into whether or not leaving the work site was reasonable under the circumstances.

Lately, we've seen more than one example of employers who avoided liability despite encapsulating some pretty poor HR practices. This case provides another textbook case of how not to respond to an employee complaint. Yes, you can hope to avoid liability based on a legal argument that the employee was not engaging in protected activity because the underlying misconduct was not illegal. That hope, however, misses the point. Anyone who has responsibility for responding to harassment complaints should be troubled by a decision that justifies an excuse such as “that’s the way the oil field is,” and suggests that the complaining employee tough it out or find another job. Employers need to take all complaints seriously, not just those that the employer thinks will cause it legal problems down the road.

Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Did the 6th Circuit just approve a claim for benign discrimination?


In Litton v. Talawanda Sch. Dist. (6th Cir. 6/26/12) [pdf], a demoted and transferred custodian sued his employer for age and race discrimination. At trial, the jury returned the following special verdict:

The jury concluded that Litton did not prove that he had suffered an adverse action, yet proved that he was treated differently because of his race. Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the lack of an adverse action should dispose of the case. If one cannot show a prima facie case (which includes the suffering of an adverse action), the ultimate issue of discrimination should never be reached.

The 6th Circuit, however, disagreed. It disregarded the jury’s finding on the existence of an adverse action as irrelevant to its subsequent finding on the ultimate issue of whether discrimination occurred:

The jury’s assessment of Litton’s prima facie case did not control its finding on the ultimate question of discrimination…. he district court was not only permitted to disregard the jury’s answer to the adverse employment action question, it was required to do so, and instead to evaluate the strength of the evidence as a whole.

As I read the opinion in Litton, I mapped out in my head a grand critique. Then I read Judge Batchelder’s dissent, and decided I couldn’t say it any better:

The core problem with the majority’s holding is that it treats the question of whether Litton suffered adverse discrimination as distinct from “the ultimate question of discrimination vel non.” The two are one…. Title VII does not ban mere discrimination, but only adverse discrimination…. It is, to me, beyond obvious that Title VII applies only where there has been discrimination against an individual. That requirement is not merely some vestigial prima facie element that fades into the background as the case progresses—it is at the heart of the claim itself….

In sum, “the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” … The majority should not relieve Litton of his burden, and it certainly should not grant him victory in the face of a jury verdict finding that he never proved that he suffered adverse discrimination at all. The whole purpose of Title VII … is preventing harmful discrimination, not the lamentable-but-benign discrimination that the jury found Litton experienced.

Did the 6th Circuit unwittingly create a cause of action for benign discrimination? Or, is this case an anomaly that future courts will distinguish and disregard? Common sense mandates the latter. Right?

Tuesday, June 26, 2012

Will the Supreme Court (re)define employer liability for harassment by supervisors? Vance v. Ball St. Univ.


An employer’s liability for unlawful harassment depends, in part, on whether the alleged perpetrator of the harassment is a supervisor or a co-worker. Employers are strictly liable for unlawful harassment committed by a supervisor, but only liable for harassment committed by a non-supervisory co-worker if the company was negligent in discovering or remedying the harassment.

In Vance v. Ball St. Univ. (7th Cir. 6/3/11), the court concluded that for the purpose of imposing strict liability for harassment, “supervisor” means “direct supervisor.” That is, if the alleged harasser is a supervisor in title, but lacks the power to directly affect the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment, strict liability cannot attach, and the court must analyze the employer’s liability under a negligence standard.

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal of this case. The Court will decided the following two-part issue:

Whether the “supervisor” liability rule … (i) applies to harassment by those whom the employer vests with authority to direct and oversee their victim’s daily work, or (ii) is limited to those harassers who have the power to “hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline” their victim.

This case has the potential to be significant for employers. As the plaintiff argued in support of the Supreme Court hearing the case:

These issues are no small matter. During the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2010, 14,543 employment discrimination cases were filed in United States courts—the third-largest category of civil cases…. And in 2010 alone, the EEOC received more than 30,000 harassment charges…. Employers agree that this issue is “an important and recurring issue of federal law.” In the modern workforce, where many acts of discrimination are committed by intermediate-level individuals in a large hierarchical organization such as Ball State University, resolution of this issue will undoubtedly add clarity to a great many employment discrimination disputes.

This case presents an excellent opportunity to settle this important issue.

Indeed, the federal appellate courts are split on this issue. The 1st, 3rd, 6th (which includes Ohio), and 8th agree with the 7th Circuit’s opinion in Vance v. Ball St. Univ., while the 2nd, 4th, and 9th Circuits, in addition to the EEOC, conclude that a supervisor is a supervisor regardless of the degree of oversight or control over the alleged victim of the harassment.

Hopefully, this case will settle this dispute and provide much needed clarity on the scope of an employer’s liability for unlawful harassment. This supposedly business-friendly Court has proven itself to be an ally of employees in recent cases. Will this trend continue? Much more on this case in the coming months, including an attempt to handicap the outcome after oral argument.

[Hat tip: Phil Miles’s Lawffice Space]

Monday, June 25, 2012

Sporadic and isolated comments: “Regarded as” claims under the New ADA vs. the Old ADA


The ADA protects three classes of “disabled” employees:

  1. Those with a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual;
  2. Those with a record of such an impairment; and
  3. Those regarded as having such an impairment.

To qualify as “regarded as having” an ADA-protected impairment, one must show that the employer perceived a physical or mental
impairment, and that the impairment was one with a duration of more than six months.

In Gecewicz v. Henry Ford Macomb Hosp. (6th Cir. 6/22/12) [pdf], the employer terminated Janice Gecewicz for accruing too many absence under its attendance policy. In her disability discrimiation lawsuit, Gecewicz, who had undergone eight surgeries during the last 10 years of her employment, claimed that the hospital regarded her as disabled. In support of her claim, she pointed to three statements made by her supervisor, Carol Rogers:

  • “You’ve had a lot of surgeries for one person.” (made six years before her termination)
  • “[Gastric bypass] is a very risky surgery.” (made five years before her termination)
  • “If [you] didn’t have so many surgeries [you] wouldn’t have so much time off and [that you] need to take better care of [yourself].” (made one year before her termination)

The Court concluded that these remote and isolated statements could not support her “regarded as disabled” claim. The Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the ADA claim, stating:

First, none of Rogers’s statements shows that she believed Gecewicz had a physical or mental impairment of a duration longer than six months. Second, … the concern reflected in each of Rogers’s statements—including the third statement … —centers on Gecewicz’s excessive absenteeism, not a perceived disability. Being absent from work is not a disability.

What is the takeaway for businesses? Train your managers and supervisors never to discuss employees’ medical issues. “Regarded as” claims under the ADA are dangerous. Gecewicz was decided under the pre-amendments ADA. Under the ADAAA’s “regarded as” prong, a plaintiff only has to prove the existence of an impairment, and no longer has to prove that the employer regarded the impairment as substantially limiting a major life activity.

Under the ADAAA (under which employers now operate), employers will have hard time demonstrating that statements about an employee’s surgeries are not related to an impairment. It is imperative that businesses drill into managers and supervisors that discussions about employees’ medical issues have no place in the workplace. Businesses cannot rely on the rationale of Gecewicz to bail them out under the ADAAA.

Friday, June 22, 2012

WIRTW #230 (the “2012 tour” edition)


I’m taking my act on the road. I have a slew of speaking engagements lined up between now and the end of the year. Let me know if you’re planning on attending any of these so that we can connect.

You can now keep track of all of my past and upcoming gigs at the brand new “Speaking Engagements” tab on the toolbar at the top.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Thursday, June 21, 2012

6th Circuit moves the line between same-sex harassment and bullying


Oil rigs must be awful places to work. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services—the U.S. Supreme Court case the first recognized that Title VII protected employees from same-sex harassment (and which included allegations such as name-calling suggesting homosexuality, physical assaults, and attempted rape)—involved an oil platform. Yesterday, the 6th Circuit decided Wasek v. Arrow Energy Services [pdf], another same-sex harassment case involving oil rig employees. Wasek, however, did not turn out as well for the complaining employee as did Oncale.

To save money after accepting a job with Arrow Energy, Harold Wasek decided to share a hotel room with one of his new co-workers, Paul Ottobre. As it turns out, that decision proved to be a poor one. Ottobre tormented Wasek by grabbing his buttocks, poking him in the rear with a hammer handle and long sucker rod, making comments such as “you’ve got a pretty mouth,” “boy you have pretty lips,” and “you know you like it sweetheart,” telling sexually explicit jokes, stories, fantasies, and calling Wasek names. Wasek believed that Ottobre acted like this because he was bisexual.

When Wasek complained, his superiors first told him not to “make waves [by] whining,” and later told him he should just “kick [Ottobre’s] ass,” and that they should “duke it out” to “get it out of [their] systems.” When Wasek pursued the issues with HR, the regional supervisor told him that it’s “the way the oil field is” and that if Wasek could not handle it he “should find another line of work.”

The 6th Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Wasek’s harassment claim:

Title VII is not “a general civility code for the American workplace.” … [T]he conduct of jerks, bullies, and persecutors is simply not actionable under Title VII unless they are acting because of the victim’s gender….

No evidence exists that Ottobre was motivated by a general hostility towards men. And the oil rig was not a mixed-sex workplace, so there is no possibility of comparative evidence. Thus, in order to infer discrimination, Wasek must demonstrate that Ottobre was homosexual. In his deposition, Wasek speculated that Ottobre was “a little strange, possibly bisexual.”

We need not delve into what inferences — if any — might be drawn from a harasser’s bisexuality. A single speculative statement in a deposition cannot be the first link in the “chain of inference” that Oncale recognizes may follow from the harasser’s nonheterosexuality…. Therefore, Wasek’s Title VII hostile work environment claim cannot survive.

Advocates will argue that this case is proof of why we need legislation against generalized workplace bullying. To the contrary, the troubling aspect of this case is not the dismissal of the harassment claim, but the dismissal of Wasek’s retaliation claim (an issue that will get its own post next week).

Regardless of where you stand on the issue of whether there should exist a law against workplace bullying, employers should use this case as a teaching tool on how not to respond to a harassment complaint. It is shameful that the supervisors’ told Wasek to stop whining, suggested fisticuffs to settle the issue, and ultimately chalked it up to the nature of the workplace. There are a million better ways this employer could have handled these complaints, and not have to rely on a legal argument that this misconduct is not actionable Title VII harassment.