Monday, May 4, 2015

Let’s start treating salaried workers like salaried workers


I’ve been thinking a lot lately about what it means to be a salaried exempt employee. The classification is significant, because it enables an employer not to pay the employee overtime for an hours worked over 40 in week.

To qualify under most of the FLSA’s exemptions, the employee must be paid on a salary basis, which means that the exempt employee must receive his or her full salary for any week in which the employee performs any work, without regard to the number of days or hours worked. For this reason, the FLSA only permits an employer to take deductions from an exempt employee’s salary in very limited circumstances:
  • For full workweeks in which the exempt employee performs no work.
  • For an exempt employee who is absent for a full work day for personal reasons other than sickness or accident. 
  • For an exempt employee absent a day or more for sickness or disability, if the company maintains a plan that provides compensation for loss of salary caused by sickness and disability and the employee exhausted that leave.
  • For penalties imposed for violation of safety rules of major significance.
  • To offset any amounts received by an employee as jury or witness fees, or military pay.
  • For unpaid disciplinary suspensions of one or more full work days for workplace conduct rule violations.
  • For partial weeks worked during the initial or final weeks of employment. 
  • For an exempt employee working a reduced or intermittent work schedule under the Family and Medical Leave Act.
Otherwise, if an employer deducts pay from an exempt employee’s salary for time missed for any other reason, that deduction will cause the employer to lose the benefit of that employee’s exemption for that work week. Moreover, it will also cause the employer to lose the benefit of the exemption for any other employee working in the job classification for the same manager, regardless of whether any of those other employees also suffered improper deductions that week. 

As Chris McKinney recently pointed out on his Texas Employment Law Blog, noticeably missing from any discussion of improper salary deductions is deductions from banks of paid time off. Indeed, the FLSA permits an employer to dock vacation time in any increment, and force a salaried exempt employee to use vacation or other paid time off to cover time away from work without jeopardizing that employee’s exempt status. 

Perhaps the question employers should be considering, however, isn’t whether the FLSA permits deductions from an employee’s paid time off in increments of less than a full work day, but whether it makes sense to take those deductions at all. Above all else, being a salaried exempt employee means that you work until you get the job done. Some weeks it means that the employee works 40 hours, some weeks 60 hours, and some weeks even more. And, it also means that some weeks, the employee works less than 40 hours. If a salaried exempt employee is performing (that is, getting the job done in a timely and quality manner), then if that employee needs a few hours off to take a child to a doctor’s appointment, or a half-day to attend an event at a child’s school, do we really need to nickel-and-dime that employee over a few hours of PTO? Or, do we recognize the employee’s diligent performance, permit the time off, with the understanding that the time will be “made up” when the employee works to get the job done? You can can which option I prefer.

Friday, May 1, 2015

WIRTW #366 (the “same-sex marriage” edition)


Earlier this week, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in Obergefell v. Hodges, one the Court’s most anticipated cases in years, which will (hopefully) decided the fate of same-sex marriage rights.

The web’s best coverage of the oral argument and its implications comes from SCOTUSblog:

Stay tuned. The decision is expected in June, and I’ll be sure to report on its implications for your workplace.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Thursday, April 30, 2015

Supreme Court ruling on EEOC conciliation obligations is a Pyrrhic victory for employers


One question that employers always ask upon receipt of an EEOC charge of discrimination is, “How does this process work?” After the EEOC concludes its investigation, it has two basic options. It can conclude that no reasonable cause exists that the employer violated Title VII and dismiss the charge (leaving the employee to file his or her own lawsuit in federal court within 90 days), or conclude that reasonable cause does exist (again leaving the employee to file his or her own lawsuit, or instituting a lawsuit on the employee’s behalf).

Before the EEOC can file its own discrimination lawsuit against an employer, Title VII requires that the agency “endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” What happens, however, if the EEOC fails to conciliate? What is scope of the EEOC’s conciliation obligation? And does a failure act as a bar to any subsequent lawsuit filed by the EEOC?

These were the question the Supreme Court considered in Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC [pdf]. This is what the Court unanimously concluded:

  1. Courts have authority to review whether the EEOC has fulfilled its Title VII duty to attempt conciliation.

  2. The statute only requires the EEOC to notify the employer of the claim and give the employer an opportunity to discuss the matter. Such notice must describe what the employer has done and identify the employees (or class of employees) that have suffered. The EEOC then must try to engage the employer in a discussion to provide the employer a chance to remedy the allegedly discriminatory practice. Title VII does not, however, require a good-faith negotiation.

  3. The appropriate scope of judicial review of the EEOC’s conciliation activities is narrow, enforcing only the EEOC’s statutory obligation to give the employer notice and an opportunity to achieve voluntary compliance. A sworn affidavit from the EEOC stating that it has performed these obligations should suffice to show that it has met the conciliation requirement.

  4. Should a court conclude (based on “concrete evidence” presented by the employer) that the EEOC did not provide the employer the requisite information about the charge or attempt to engage in a discussion about conciliating the claim, the appropriate remedy is to stay the proceedings and issue an order requiring the EEOC to undertake the mandated conciliation efforts. Dismissal of the lawsuit is not warranted in these circumstances.

Technically speaking, you can chalk this case up as a victory for employers, albeit a narrow one. The Supreme Court refused to hold that Title VII imposes a duty on the EEOC to negotiation in good faith, and that the agency satisfies its obligation to conciliate merely by providing notice and an opportunity to discuss. Moreover, a failure to conciliate doesn’t serve as a jurisdictional bar to litigation, but merely results in the EEOC being told to “try again, this time with meaning.”

If nothing else, this case sends a strong message that courts favor resolution, not litigation.

Wednesday, April 29, 2015

Supreme Court to consider time limits for constructive discharge claims


Yesterday, the Supreme Court finished its Spring 2015 term with oral argument in Obergefell v. Hodges, the same-sex-marriage case. Earlier in the week, it added another case to its docket for its 2015 – 2016 term, agreeing to hear Green v. Donahoe, which asks the following question:

Under federal employment discrimination law, does the filing period for a constructive discharge claim begin to run when an employee resigns, as five circuits have held, or at the time of an employer’s last allegedly discriminatory act giving rise to the resignation, as three other circuits have held?

While this case is not as sexy as some other employment issues recently before the Court, it is nevertheless important. Under the federal employment discrimination statutes, an employee only has 300 days to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which serves as the prerequisite to the filing of a later lawsuit in federal court. If the Supreme Court holds that the filing period begins to run at the employer’s last allegedly discriminatory act, then an employee who later resigns and claims constructive discharge will have a shorter window within which to file an administrative charge after the resignation.

Stay tuned, as this case will be heard towards the end of this year or early next year.

Tuesday, April 28, 2015

Asymptomatic HIV is a “disability,” no matter what one appellate court said


In Clayton v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, an Ohio appellate court was faced with the issue of whether Ohio’s disability discrimination statute protects asymptomatic HIV as a “disability.” The court relied on the following exchange from the plaintiff’s deposition to conclude, wrongly, that the employee was not suffering from a protected disability.

Q. How does your HIV status impair you?

A. It doesn’t.

Q. All right. So you would say that it doesn’t substantially limit any of your activities of daily life?

A. No. Thank God. Praise him.

Q. When you were at the Cleveland Clinic Foundation, would you agree with me that you could perform all of your essential functions of being a housekeeper without any accommodations?

A. I was able to perform any duty without any accommodations.

Let’s start with the basics. Even before Congress amended the ADA in 2009 to liberalize the statute’s definition of “disability,” the law recognized and protected asymptomatic HIV as a disability. The United States Supreme Court said as much as far back as 1998, in Bragdon v. Abbott:

In light of the immediacy with which the virus begins to damage the infected person’s white blood cells and the severity of the disease, we hold it is an impairment from the moment of infection. As noted earlier, infection with HIV causes immediate abnormalities in a person’s blood, and the infected person’s white cell count continues to drop throughout the course of the disease, even when the attack is concentrated in the lymph nodes. In light of these facts, HIV infection must be regarded as a physiological disorder with a constant and detrimental effect on the infected person’s hemic and lymphatic systems from the moment of infection. HIV infection satisfies the statutory and regulatory definition of a physical impairment during every stage of the disease.

The Clayton court was not only wrong about whether HIV qualifies as a disability, but also on the interplay between a disability and a reasonable accommodation. One has a “disability” if one has a a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, period. For the ADA to further protect that individual on the basis of that disability, the employee must be able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation. The determinations, however, are separate and distinct from each other. The essential function analysis has zero impact on whether one suffers from a protected disability as a threshold issue.

By conflating these two tests, this court set a dangerous precedent. Make no mistake, asymptomatic HIV is a disability. If an employee presents with HIV (or some other systemic illness), assume that the ADA covers the employee, and shift the analysis: 1) to ensure that the employee receives a reasonable accommodation if necessary to perform the essential function(s) of the job; and 2) to ensure that no one treats the employee differently because of the disability or some (mis)perception about the disability.

Monday, April 27, 2015

NLRB signs off on employer social media policy as legal


It’s not news that employer social media policies are on the NLRB’s radar. What is newsworthy, though, is when the NLRB considers a social media policy and concludes that it does not unlawfully infringe on employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activity under the National Labor Relations Act.

Consider, then, Landry’s Inc., decided last week by the NLRB, as newsworthy.

In that case, the NLRB considered the following social media policy:

While your free time is generally not subject to any restriction by the Company, the Company urges all employees not to post information regarding the Company, their jobs, or other employees which could lead to morale issues in the workplace or detrimentally affect the Company’s business. This can be accomplished by always thinking before you post, being civil to others and their opinions, and not posting personal information about others unless you have received their permission. You are personally responsible for the content you publish on blogs, wikis, or any other form of social media. Be mindful that what you publish will be public for a long time. Be also mindful that if the Company receives a complaint from an employee about information you have posted about that employee, the Company may need to investigate that complaint to insure that there has been no violation of the harassment policy or other Company policy. In the event there is such a complaint, you will be expected to cooperate in any investigation of that complaint, including providing access to the posts at issue.

The Board concluded that the policy was lawful:

Employees reading the Respondent’s social media policy could reasonably conclude … that they are being urged to be civil with others in posting job-related material and discussing on social media sites their grievances and disagreements with the Respondent or each other regarding job-related matters.… There is no restriction in the social media policy against posting “personnel” information or “payroll information,” or “wage-related information”; and obviously, posting information that in common parlance is generally understood to be personal such as, for example, matters regarding social relationships and similar private matters, could result not only in morale problems but could also constitute “harassment” to which the Respondent’s social media policy refers. It is readily apparent that such postings would likely create enmity among employees in the workplace which could, in turn, adversely affect the Respondent’s business.

Why is this newsworthy? Because, for years, the NLRB has urged for an expansive reading of employer policies, suggesting that a hypothetical parade-of-horribles that could lead to union-related, or other protected concerted, activity renders any facially neutral workplace policy unlawful. In Landry’s, the Board is adopting (at least in this case) a more reasonable, real-world reading of a social media policy to conclude that because no employee could reasonably read the policy, in context, to unreasonably infringe on employees’ rights.

This case provides a good illustration of the fine distinctions the NLRB is drawing between lawful and unlawful social media policies, and provides a good reminder of the need for all employers to routinely review your own social media and other workplace policies for compliance.

Friday, April 24, 2015

WIRTW #365 (the “on the road again” edition)


It’s been a crazy week. I gave four different seminar presentations over an eight-day span:

Thanks to all who invited me to speak to your organizations. It is always my pleasure.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Until next week…