When English-only policies and federal labor law collide

It’s been nearly 8(!) years since I first wrote about the legality of English-only workplace rules. If you scan the archives, all of my coverage of this issue has focused on whether such policies discriminate on the basis of national origin in violation of Title VII.

Now the NLRB is attempting to interject itself into this debate.

Last month, in Valley Health System [pdf], an NLRB Administrative Law Judge concluded that a healthcare provider’s English-only rule violated employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activity under the National Labor Relations Act.

The policy in Valley Health System required that all employees speak and communicate only in English “when conducting business with each other,” “when patients or customers are present or in close proximity,” and “while on duty between staff, patients, visitors [and/or] customers … unless interpretation or translation is requested or required.”

The ALJ concluded:

Employees would reasonably construe [the] English-only rule to restrict them from engaging in concerted activity…. [The] English-only rule is vague as to time and location (i.e., must use English in patient and non-patient areas, in patient access areas, and between employees, staff, customers, patients and visitors), it infringes on an employee’s ability to freely discuss and communicate about work conditions, wages and other terms and conditions of employment.

What does this decision mean for your business?

1. It is only one decision of one ALJ. It is not binding on the Board, and it is not the law of the land. However, given how broadly the NLRB currently is interpreting employees’ section 7 rights under facially neutral workplace policies, businesses should nevertheless pay close attention.

2. It may not be sufficient that an English-only policy pass muster under Title VII as supported by a “business necessity.” Regardless of the business need for employees to communicate in English, a policy still may fall as unlawful if it prohibits or restricts employees from communicating about workplace terms and conditions.

Are Meerkat and Periscope the “next big thing” for employers to worry about?

Have you downloaded Meerkat or Periscope to your iPhone? Do you even know what Meerkat and Periscope are? They are new apps that permit you to live-stream video. They essentially work the same way—when you launch a live-stream, the app tweets out a link for your followers to watch your video. The only real difference in the experience (aside from the aesthetics of the apps) is that once you stop your stream on Meerkat the link goes dead and the video disappears, while Periscope can keep the link live for 24 hours of replay viewing.

Last week, within hours of Meerkat’s and Periscope’s launches, a massive building explosion on New York’s Lower East Side gave us a glimpse of the potential power of these apps, as they turned everyone with an iPhone into instant video-journalists. As for me, so far I’ve only used them to send out video of my dog sleeping on the couch (although I hope to put Periscope to use for some video legal updates in the near future).

Should employers worry about these apps? They offer employees tremendous power. Imagine your workers live-streaming alleged safety violations in your plant, or active sexual harassment, or a termination meeting, or an employer trying to break up a picket line?

Yet, this technology isn’t the-sky-is-falling for employers. For years, the iPhone has placed this same power into employees’ hands. An iPhone + an active internet connection + a YouTube account isn’t that much different than these new live-streaming apps. These apps remove some of the friction from the posting experience, but otherwise don’t create any new opportunities for your employees to journalize your workplace.

Employers shouldn’t knee-jerk ban these apps (or mobile devices in general) from the workplace. It’s possible that the NLRB would permit employers to ban the use of these apps in the workplace, but it’s just as likely that the NLRB will look at such policies with a harsh eye under its section-7 lens. Until we get some guidance from courts on these issues, there is real risk in broad-based bans of mobile technologies or apps.

Instead of rolling out a reactionary policy that could catch the NLRB’s attention, train your employees on their responsible use of the Internet, and your managers and supervisors on the need to be very aware of the possibility that everything that happens at work no longer necessarily stays at work. Indeed, if it happens at work, it is just as likely to end up on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube … or Periscope.

You can follow me on Periscope @jonhyman, and tune in at 5 pm on April 11, where I’ll be broadcasting some of my daughter’s performance live from the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame.

6th Circuit deals blow to independent contractors

Have you ever had the cable guy show up to your house, only to see the name of some random LLC on the side of his work truck? Many cable companies use the services of “independent contractor” installers. But, are those installers truly “independent contractors,” or are they employees of the cable company? According to the 6th Circuit, in Keller v. Miri Microsystems LLC (3/26/15) [pdf], the answer is likely the latter.

In examining whether the plaintiff satellite dish installer was an employee or contractor, the court applied the six-factored “economic realities” test:

1. the permanency of the relationship between the parties;
2. the degree of skill required for the rendering of the services;
3. the worker’s investment in equipment or materials for the task;
4. the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss, depending upon his skill;
5. the degree of the alleged employer’s right to control the manner in which the work is performed; and
6. whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s business.

The majority applied a fact-based analysis to conclude that there were too many facts in dispute to make a legal determination on the issue. The dissent, however, took a more common-sense approach to the issue:

Despite our cataloging of the various factors that inform our decision, in the end we must take a common sense approach and look at the situation in its entirety. What does that show? Miri [the plaintiff’s single-member LLC] served as a middleman in the satellite installation business. The LLC had a single member: Anthony Miri. Its business plan was to work with individuals such as plaintiff who carry out the actual installations. Miri does not provide benefits to these individuals or withhold taxes. Nor does it enter into an employment contract with them. Plaintiff moved from providing installation services for another middleman, to Miri, and later to HugesNet directly, and provided additional products and services to customers directly while doing installations for Miri. It seems abundantly clear that both plaintiff and Miri intended that plaintiff be an independent contractor and conducted themselves accordingly. It is not clear what more the parties could have done that would have satisfied the Majority that plaintiff was an independent contractor.

What does all this mean? It is very difficult to establish, as a matter of law, that a worker is an independent contractor. Unless you want a jury deciding this complex issue, err on the side of “employee” unless it is abundantly clear that the worker is an independent contractor under the above six-factored test.

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WIRTW #361 (the “#RaceTogether” edition)

Have you heard the one about the coffee chain that wants its employees to engage customers about issues of race and racism in America? Here are the best things I read this past week on this issue, courtesy of Robin Shea’s Employment & Labor Insider:

• A conversation about race
• A conversation about race: The Exciting Conclusion

And here’s the best thing I watched this past week on the issue, care of John Oliver’s Last Week Tonight on HBO.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

• Double Space in Docs Now Being Used for Age Discrimination — via The HR Capitalist, Kris Dunn
• In Employment Litigation, the Best Defense is a Good Defense — via Dan Schwartz’s Connecticut Employment Law Blog
• EEOC has defined “ability to interact with others” as a major life activity, making social anxiety disorder a disability under the ADA — via Employment Law Matters
• EEOC Settles ADA Case Against Employer Who Did Not Offer Leave to Probationary Employees — via Wisconsin Employment & Labor Law Blog
• 8th Circuit Rejects Trio of ADA cases — via Minnesota Labor & Employment Law Blog
• EEOC Sends Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on ADA and Wellness Programs to OMB for Clearance — via EEOC
• Will Kleiner Win the Discrimination Battle but Lose the Retaliation War? — via WinWinHR
• EEOC quietly moves forward with plans to collect compensation data — via HR Hero Line

Social Media & Workplace Technology

• Wearables for Your Wellness Program — via ERC Insights Blog
• Study: When it comes to security, smartphone users aren’t very smart — via Boy Genius Report
• This Arkansas bill would let bosses force employees to friend them on Facebook — via The Washington Post
• Have You Signed A Social Media Prenup? — via Fistful of Talent
• Three Risks That Come With Telecommuting — via In House
• Blogging Law II: Online Shaming — via HR Examiner with John Sumser
• How to Separate the Personal and Professional on Social Media — via Harvard Business Review
• Password security: Your pet’s name, birth date, and “password” are out — via Technology for HR
• Facebook Service: It's Real — via Phil Miles’s Lawffice Space

HR & Employee Relations

• Me - Still Evolving — via Rob Schwartz’s Dad Working
• Can medical marijuana be banned from the workplace? The answer is a bit hazy, expert says — via Washington Business Journal
• Biglaw Mommy: The Case for Flex-Time — via Above the Law
• 15 True Tales of Job Interview Embarrassment — via Evil HR Lady, Suzanne Lucas
• Panera Bread To Record Employees As They Work — via Workplace Diva

Wage & Hour

• When employees cash paychecks stamped “full payment,” are their OT claims waived? — via Eric Meyer’s The Employer Handbook Blog
• DOL Secretary Tells Congress New FLSA Regulations Are Delayed, Outlines Department Priorities — via Wage & Hour Insights
• When Isn’t Your Employee Eligible for FMLA Leave? — via The Emplawyerologist
• What the Heck is FMLA Leave?! — via Blogging4Jobs

Labor Relations

• NLRB to help illegal workers secure visas — via Walter Olson’s Overlawyered
• House Committee Grills NLRB Leaders on “Quickie” Union Election Rule — via TLNT
• Employee Manuals Need Spring Cleaning Thanks to the NLRB — via Michigan Employment Law Advisor
• Don’t Fear Recertification — via LaborPains.org
• How do You Lose a Union Election after Winning It? — via Matt Austin Labor Law

BREAKING: FMLA’s “same-sex spouse” rule on hold, for now

Today, the new rule that would permit FMLA benefits for same-sex spouses was to take effect. However, late yesterday, a federal judge in Texas granted a preliminary injunction [pdf] temporarily halting the rule.

The plaintiffs—the attorney generals of four states that do not recognize same-sex marriages—successfully argued that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the FMLA rule infringed on their states’ rights under section 2 of the Defense of Marriage Act to ignore same-sex marriages lawfully entered in other states.

This is only a temporary victory for the plaintiffs in this case. And, while it legally only impacts the four states that are plaintiffs in this action, practically, the DOL will hold any implementation of this rule until this case plays itself out.

As for the merits of the case itself, as Robin Shea points out, this case could become moot (clearing the way for the FMLA rule-change) if the Supreme Court legalizes same-sex marriage later this term. Fingers crossed.

I’ll give you one guess where the NLRB is holding its “ambush election” training?

Since I’ve already provided more than 3,000 words of quality labor-and-employment content this week, today’s post will be on the (much) shorter side.

On April 14, the NLRB’s “ambush election” rules take effect. You can read all about these rules here. In advance of this implementation, the NLRB is training its employees on the ins and outs of these new rules. Do you know where the NLRB is conducting this training?

According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the NLRB is holding its “ambush election” training at the New York City office of the Service Employees International Union. Does it seem a bit … disingenuous / offensive / plain-ol’-wrong … that the NLRB has chosen to train its own employees (federal employees, paid by your and my tax dollars) at the office of an organization that will be the beneficiary of these pro-union election rules? I’ll give the NLRB one thing. At least it doesn’t play hide-the-ball with its very pro-union agenda.

BREAKING: McDonnell Douglas lives! #SCOTUS applies decades-old test to pregnancy accommodation claims

This morning, the U.S. Supreme Court issued one of its most anticipated employment-law rulings of this term, in Young v. United Parcel Service [pdf]. The case asked under what circumstances an employer must provide a workplace accommodation to a pregnant employee.

In its ruling, the court rejected the positions offered by both the employer and the employee.

• UPS argued that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act requires courts to compare the accommodations an employer provides to pregnant women with the accommodations it provides to others within a facially neutral category (such as those with off-the-job injuries) to determine whether the employer has violated Title VII. The Court rejected this argument as too narrow of a reading of the statute.
• Young argued that the PDA requires an employer to provide the same accommodations to workplace disabilities caused by pregnancy that it provides to workplace disabilities that have other causes but have a similar effect on the ability to work. The Court rejected this argument because the PDA, on its face, does not grant pregnant workers an unconditional “most-favored-nation” status.

Instead, the Court crafted its own interpretation by applying a modified McDonnell Douglas analysis to pregnancy accommodation claims:

Thus, a plaintiff alleging that the denial of an accommodation constituted disparate treatment under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s second clause may make out a prima facie case by showing, as in McDonnell Douglas, that she belongs to the protected class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate her, and that the employer did accommodate others “similar in their ability or inability to work.”

The employer may then seek to justify its refusal to accommodate the plaintiff by relying on “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons for denying her accommodation. But, consistent with the Act’s basic objective, that reason normally cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to add pregnant women to the category of those (“similar in their ability or inability to work”) whom the employer accommodates….

If the employer offers an apparently “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reason for its actions, the plaintiff may in turn show that the employer’s proffered reasons are in fact pretextual. We believe that the plaintiff may reach a jury on this issue by providing sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather—when considered along with the burden imposed—give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.

The plaintiff can create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a significant burden exists by providing evidence that the employer accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers. Here, for example, if the facts are as Young says they are, she can show that UPS accommodates most nonpregnant employees with lifting limitations while categorically failing to accommodate pregnant employees with lifting limitations. Young might also add that the fact that UPS has multiple policies that accommodate nonpregnant employees with lifting restrictions suggests that its reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employees with lifting restrictions are not sufficiently strong—to the point that a jury could find that its reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employees give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.

What’s the problem with this decision? As Justice Scalia astutely and correctly points out in his dissent, by permitting a pregnant worker to establish pretext by demonstrating a disadvantage presented by the application of a facially neutral work rule, the majority’s opinion allows one to establish intentional disparate treatment by demonstrating a disparate impact. What does this mean for employers? It means that employers must analyze the impact of work rules on pregnant workers and accommodate accordingly. Thus, in application, the majority’s rule grants pregnant workers the unconditional “most-favored-nation” status that the majority says it was rejecting.

My practical take for handling pregnant workers remains unchanged. Unless you can unequivocally demonstrate that you’ve never provided an accommodation to a disabled worker, you should be prepared to offer the same to your pregnant workers.