Does inevitable disclosure protect your company’s trade secrets? It depends.

The most straightforward manner in which to prevent a former employee from jumping ship to one of your competitors is to have the employee sign a non-competition agreement. Absent a written agreement by an employee not to compete, however, are you out of luck if you want to stop an key employee with knowledge of sensitive corporate information from competing? The answer depends on what state you are in, and, more specifically, that state’s view of the inevitable disclosure doctrine.

The inevitable disclosure doctrine is an off-shoot of PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond (7th Cir. 1995), which upheld a preliminary injunction against a former Pepsi general manager that prevented him working for Quaker Oats (the manufacturer of Gatorade). What makes the case unique and important is that Redmond never had a non-compete with Pepsi. Instead, the court upheld the injunction because Redmond had detailed and comprehensive knowledge of Pepsi’s trade secrets, such that it was inevitable that he would disclose Pepsi’s trade secrets to Quaker Oats through his employment in a substantially similar position.

In the nearly 20 years since the PepsiCo decision, courts have debated the applicability of the inevitable disclosure doctrine to stop an employee, without a non-competition agreement but with knowledge of trade secrets, to work for a competitor in a similar capacity.

In sum, the issue boils down to whether your state’s trade-secrets law prohibits threatened misappropriation of trade secrets in addition to actual misappropriation.

• Thus, in Lumenate Technologies, LP v. Integrated Data Storage, LLC (N.D. Ill. 11/11/13), the court permitted the plaintiff to make an inevitable disclosure argument based on the Illinois Trade Secrets Act’s prohibition against the threatened misappropriation of trade secrets.

• Meanwhile, in Exal Corp. v. Roeslein & Associates, Inc. (N.D. Ohio 12/27/13), the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim under Ohio’s trade secret act. The court pointed out that Ohio’s statute specifically prohibits “actual or threatened misappropriation,” a threat means something more than mere speculation. The former employer must put forth evidence of a demonstrable risk of misappropriation. In Exal, this showing was lacking.

The lesson from this post isn’t really the differences in the application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Instead, consider this post a lesson on the importance of written agreements. If you have a written non-competition agreement, you need not worry about threatened versus actual misappropriation. More specifically, if you have employees who are privy to sensitive information, or who otherwise present a serious risk of competition, require a non-competition agreement as a condition of their employment. Otherwise, you are taking a huge risk with your trade secrets and other confidential information.

More on the EEOC’s position on retaliation in severance agreements: A proposed solution

Yesterday, I reported on a lawsuit the EEOC has filed, claiming that some fairly generic terms in an employee severance agreement constitute illegal retaliation. In EEOC v. CVS, the agency claims that an agreement that attempts to limit an employee’s communication with the EEOC unlawfully attempts to buy employee silence about potential violations of the law.

I try to shy away from hyperbole, but OH MY GOD, THIS CASE COULD BE RUINOUS!!!

When you compare the inoffensiveness of the provisions challenged in CVS to the hard-line position put forth by the EEOC, you begin to understand why this case has the potential to be most significant piece of litigation the EEOC has filed in recent memory.

Employers settle lawsuits and pay employees severance in exchange for certainty. Employer don’t write checks to litigants (or potential litigants) out of the goodness of their hearts. They do so because they want to get rid of claims and potential claims. The provisions with which the EEOC has taken issue — a general release, a covenant not to sue, cooperation, confidentiality, non-disparagement, and the payment of attorneys’ fees upon a breach — are crucial for employers. You’d be hard pressed to find an agreement that does not contain some combination of most, if not all, of these provisions.

Yes, the anti-retaliation provisions of the employment discrimination laws prohibit employers from requiring that employees give up their statutory rights to file discrimination charges, cooperate in investigations, or provide information to the EEOC. But, the CVS agreement that the EEOC is challenging did not contain those requirements.

Instead, the challenged agreement expressly protected the employees’ statutory rights:

Moreover, nothing is intended to or shall interfere with Employee’s right to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state, or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws, nor shall this Agreement prohibit Employee from cooperating with any such agency in its investigation. Employee shall not, however, be entitled to any relief, recovery, or monies in connection with any Released Claim brought against any of the Released Parties, regardless of who filed or initiated any such complaint, charge, or proceeding.

In re-reading the EEOC’s complaint, the agency seems to take issue with two key facets of the challenged agreement:

1. The carve-out existed as a “single, qualifying sentence” in the “Covenant Not to Sue” section of the Agreement.
2. The carve-out did not expressly touch all of the challenged provisions in the Agreement.

Don’t shred your settlement and severance agreements just yet. As a I promised yesterday, I have a potential solution. Modify your agreements to bolster and clarify the protected-activity carve-out. In a provision separate and distinct from the release, waiver, or covenant not to sue, consider something like the following (modeled on the provisions in CVS).

Nothing in this Agreement is intended to, or shall, interfere with Employee’s rights under federal, state, or local civil rights or employment discrimination laws (including, but not limited to, Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, GINA, USERRA, or their state or local counterparts) to file or otherwise institute a charge of discrimination, to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state, or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws, or to cooperate with any such agency in its investigation, none of which shall constitute a breach of the non-disparagement, confidentiality, or cooperation clauses of this Agreement. Employee shall not, however, be entitled to any relief, recovery, or monies in connection with any such brought against any of the Released Parties, regardless of who filed or initiated any such complaint, charge, or proceeding.

Given the EEOC’s position, prudence dictates the breadth of this carve-out, which is more expansive than what I traditionally use. The alternative, however, is to omit these provisions all together, and draft agreements that looks like a Swiss-cheese of risk.

I cannot understate the potential significance of the EEOC’s position in CVS. This case bear monitoring, and I will continue to update you as the case proceeds. In the meantime, consider adopting changes to your stock separation and settlement agreements; the EEOC is definitely watching.

EEOC claims retaliation over garden-variety severance terms

The EEOC announced that it has filed a lawsuit against CVS, claiming that a severance agreement it provided to three employees unlawfully restricted their rights to file discrimination charges or communicate and cooperate with the EEOC.

The EEOC claims that “CVS conditioned the receipt of severance benefits for certain employees on an overly broad severance agreement set forth in five pages of small print.”

What was the “fine print” that caused the EEOC to sue this employer? The EEOC did not specify in its news release, but the complaint the EEOC filed  took issue with the following provisions:

1. A cooperation clause, which required the employees to notify CVS’s general counsel upon receipt of, among other things, an administrative complaint.

2. A non-disparagement clause, which prohibited the employees from making any statements that disparage or harm CVS’s reputation. (I told you I don’t like these provisions.)

3. A confidentiality clause, which prohibited the employee from disclosing any personnel information.

4. A general release, which included any claims of discrimination.

5. A covenant not to sue, which prohibited the employee from filing any complaints, actions, lawsuits, or proceedings against CVS, but which expressly carved out the employee’s right to participate in, or cooperate with, any state or federal discrimination proceeding or investigation.

6. An attorneys’ fees provision, which required the employee to reimburse CVS for its reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred as the result of a breach of the agreement by the employee.

According to EEOC Regional Attorney John Hendrickson, the lead litigator in the case:

Charges and communication with employees play a critical role in the EEOC’s enforcement process because they inform the agency of employer practices that might violate the law. For this reason, the right to communicate with the EEOC is a right that is protected by federal law. When an employer attempts to limit that communication, the employer effectively is attempting to buy employee silence about potential violations of the law. Put simply, that is a deal that employers cannot lawfully make.

This case has the potential to be very significant, and warrants monitoring. Most (all?) of you reading this post have used agreements that contain language similar to each of the six issues the EEOC is challenging. If the EEOC is successful in this lawsuit, employers will have to reconsider key provisions in their severance and settlement agreements. Given that employers are paying ex-employees for certainty when an employee signs a release, this case has the potential to turn these agreements on their heads.

In tomorrow’s post, I will offer a potential solution for employer looking to maintain the vitality of a general release and covenant not to sue without walking into the EEOC’s enforcement crosshairs.

Another one bites the dust: NLRB invalidates confidentiality policy

If I’ve said it once, I’ve said it a thousand times — employers cannot maintain policies that restrict their employees’ ability to talk about how much they earn.

Thus, it shouldn’t surprise anyone that, in MCPc, Inc. (2/6/14) [pdf], the NLRB concluded that the following policy illegally restricted employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activity:

Dissemination of confidential information within [the company], such as personal or financial information, etc., will subject the responsible employee to disciplinary action or possible termination.

As the NLRB pointed out, the standard isn’t whether the policy actually restricted employees from discussing wages or other terms and conditions of employment with their coworkers, but whether they would reasonably construe the policy to have that effect. Never mind that in MCPc, Inc., the employer fired an employee for discussing with co-workers staffing shortages that resulted from a perception of high executive salaries.

You can draft a confidentiality policy that will not run afoul of protected-concerted-activity rights under the NLRA; you just have to draft narrowly. Thus, limiting discussion of trade secrets and other confidential, proprietary information is just fine. Wages and other terms and conditions of employment, however, are off limits, which should be clear from the policy. And, of course, don’t fire an employee for talking about wages or working conditions. I wonder how the NLRB would have even learned about MCPc’s overly broad policy if the company hadn’t fired a worker for violating it?

WIRTW #307 (the “Piet Mondrian” edition)

Today’s theme is a lesson in minimalism.

Here’s what I read this week:

Discrimination

• Fired For Reporting Dollar Bill With Swastikas And Noose On A “Blackened” George Washington Leads To Jury Award — from Employment Discrimination Report
• Do Managers Have a Bias For Hiring Attractive People? — from TLNT
• Employee claims discrimination, then her friend gets fired. Is that retaliation? — from Eric Meyer’s The Employer Handbook Blog
• An Employee Took Documents from her Employer to Support her Discrimination Claim and You Won’t Believe what Happened Next — from Toil and Trouble
• If men and women work the same number of hours, what is so unfair? — from Evil HR Lady, Suzanne Lucas
• EEOC Seeks Reversal of “Cherry Picked” Decision Regarding Criminal and Credit Checks — from All in a Day’s Work
• Employee acts as own lawyer? You’ll need to be patient — from Business Management Daily

Social Media & Workplace Technology

• Pass Along to Your Employees: Passwords to Avoid — from HR Daily Advisor
• She “tweeted” what?! — from EmployerLINC

HR & Employee Relations

• Are You One Cold (Or Super Bowl Flu) Away From Being Fired? — from Donna Ballman’s Screw You Guys, I’m Going Home
• Dazed and Confused About Medical Marijuana in the Workplace? Dude, It’s Just Starting — from Dan Schwartz’s Connecticut Employment Law Blog
• “But I’m a Whistleblower!”: Is an Employee Who Takes Confidential Documents Invincible? — from Trading Secrets
• Terminating an “At-Will” Employee: A Free Ride or Potential Time Bomb? — from CPEhr
• Why we need to take more time off from work — from Ragan.com
• my boss seems annoyed when I stay home every time it snows — from Ask a Manager
• Workplace Investigations — Dealing with the Aftermath — from WinWinHR

Wage & Hour

• Read this if you don’t want to overpay your salaried employees — from HR idiot
• Paid Sick Leave: Is it Worth it to Businesses? — from WSJ.com Law Blog
• FLSA Exemptions are about DUTIES not Titles — from Mike Haberman’s Omega HR Solutions
• A refresher on the breastfeeding at work rules — from Warren & Associates Blog

Labor Relations

• Super Bowl Ad Calls for Employee Rights Against Union Abuse — from LaborPains.org
• College Athletes to Unionize? More on the Northwestern University Football Players NLRB Petition — from Labor Relations Today
• They’re Ba-ack: NRLB to Re-Propose Election Regulations — from Labor Relations Update
• NLRB Proposes Amendments to Election Rules — from Phil Miles’s Lawffice Space
• Breaking: #NLRB posts new quickie election rules — from The Human Race Horses
• NLRB Proposed New/Old Election Rules — from Workplace Prof Blog

Proposed ambush election rules offer the best reason to be proactive about union avoidance

Last week I suggested that a pro-union NLRB has emboldened labor unions into more aggressive organizing efforts. You need not look any further than yesterday’s news that the NLRB has reissued its ambush-election rules.

According to the Wall Street Journal, the median time between the filing of a representation petition by employees, and the NLRB holding an election in a contested organizing campaign, is 59 days. The NLRB’s proposed rules would cut that time by more than half, to a lightning-quick 25 days or less.

Make no mistake, this proposal is primarily designed to help labor unions win elections. Often, an employer does not know that a labor union is attempting to organize until after the representation petition is filed. By that point, the union and its organizers have already planted the seeds of employer discontent with workers, leaving the employer to play catch-up. The quicker the election period, the less time the employer has to spread its message. Thus, these rules, if they take effect, will be a big win for labor unions.

There are two things you can do, right now, to protect yourself.

1. The NLRB is taking comments until April 7 on these proposed rules. Write to your Senator. Write to your Congressman. Talk to your trade and business organizations. Compel anyone you can to take a stand against these rules and hope for a more reasonable outcome.

2. Heed my call from last week to take steps now to formulate, and communicate to your employees, your corporate message on labor unions. The importance of having your strategy in place before a union comes knocking will be even more important if these new election rules take hold.

I (don’t) “like” this protected concerted activity

Last October, in Bland v. Roberts, the 4th Circuit held that a Facebook “like” qualifies as speech protected by the First Amendment. As we know, however, the First Amendment does not apply to private workplaces, in which employees do not enjoy constitutional free speech rights. Employees do, however, enjoy the right to talk among themselves about wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment—concerted activity protected by the National Labor Relations Act.

Soon, the NLRB will decide whether an employee clicking the “like” button on another employee’s Facebook post or comment is sufficient to qualify as protected concerted activity.

In Triple Play Sports Bar [pdf] (h/t: Wall Street Journal Morning Risk Report), an Administrative Law Judge

Spinella’s selecting the “Like” option on LaFrance’s Facebook account constituted participation in the discussion that was sufficiently meaningful as to rise to the level of concerted activity. Spinella’s selecting the “Like” option, so that the words “Vincent VinnyCenz Spinella…like[s] this” appeared on the account, constituted, in the context of Facebook communications, an assent to the comments being made, and a meaningful contribution to the discussion. [T]he Board has never parsed the participation of individual employees in otherwise concerted conversations, or deemed the protections of Section 7 to be contingent upon their level of engagement or enthusiasm. Indeed, so long as the topic is related to the employment relationship and group action, only a “speaker and a listener” is required.

As much as it pains me, the ALJ’s reasoning is sound. Speech is speech, whether it’s engaging in an oral conversation, writing a comment to a Facebook post, or clicking “Like.” Liking something on Facebook is akin to an endorsement of, or agreement with, the comment liked.

To paraphrase what I wrote when commenting on the the Bland v. Roberts decision, protected concerted activity rights likely extend to symbolic speech on social networks, such as liking a Facebook page or post, or retweeting someone’s tweet. I would expect the NLRB to agree with the ALJ when it announces its decision later this year. In the meantime, employers need to take heed before taking action based on these online activities.