Wednesday, February 12, 2014

More on the EEOC’s position on retaliation in severance agreements: A proposed solution


Yesterday, I reported on a lawsuit the EEOC has filed, claiming that some fairly generic terms in an employee severance agreement constitute illegal retaliation. In EEOC v. CVS, the agency claims that an agreement that attempts to limit an employee’s communication with the EEOC unlawfully attempts to buy employee silence about potential violations of the law.

I try to shy away from hyperbole, but OH MY GOD, THIS CASE COULD BE RUINOUS!!!

When you compare the inoffensiveness of the provisions challenged in CVS to the hard-line position put forth by the EEOC, you begin to understand why this case has the potential to be most significant piece of litigation the EEOC has filed in recent memory.

Employers settle lawsuits and pay employees severance in exchange for certainty. Employer don’t write checks to litigants (or potential litigants) out of the goodness of their hearts. They do so because they want to get rid of claims and potential claims. The provisions with which the EEOC has taken issue — a general release, a covenant not to sue, cooperation, confidentiality, non-disparagement, and the payment of attorneys’ fees upon a breach — are crucial for employers. You’d be hard pressed to find an agreement that does not contain some combination of most, if not all, of these provisions.

Yes, the anti-retaliation provisions of the employment discrimination laws prohibit employers from requiring that employees give up their statutory rights to file discrimination charges, cooperate in investigations, or provide information to the EEOC. But, the CVS agreement that the EEOC is challenging did not contain those requirements.

Instead, the challenged agreement expressly protected the employees’ statutory rights:
Moreover, nothing is intended to or shall interfere with Employee’s right to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state, or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws, nor shall this Agreement prohibit Employee from cooperating with any such agency in its investigation. Employee shall not, however, be entitled to any relief, recovery, or monies in connection with any Released Claim brought against any of the Released Parties, regardless of who filed or initiated any such complaint, charge, or proceeding.
In re-reading the EEOC’s complaint, the agency seems to take issue with two key facets of the challenged agreement:
  1. The carve-out existed as a “single, qualifying sentence” in the “Covenant Not to Sue” section of the Agreement.
  2. The carve-out did not expressly touch all of the challenged provisions in the Agreement.
Don’t shred your settlement and severance agreements just yet. As a I promised yesterday, I have a potential solution. Modify your agreements to bolster and clarify the protected-activity carve-out. In a provision separate and distinct from the release, waiver, or covenant not to sue, consider something like the following (modeled on the provisions in CVS).
Nothing in this Agreement is intended to, or shall, interfere with Employee’s rights under federal, state, or local civil rights or employment discrimination laws (including, but not limited to, Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, GINA, USERRA, or their state or local counterparts) to file or otherwise institute a charge of discrimination, to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state, or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws, or to cooperate with any such agency in its investigation, none of which shall constitute a breach of the non-disparagement, confidentiality, or cooperation clauses of this Agreement. Employee shall not, however, be entitled to any relief, recovery, or monies in connection with any such brought against any of the Released Parties, regardless of who filed or initiated any such complaint, charge, or proceeding.
Given the EEOC’s position, prudence dictates the breadth of this carve-out, which is more expansive than what I traditionally use. The alternative, however, is to omit these provisions all together, and draft agreements that looks like a Swiss-cheese of risk.

I cannot understate the potential significance of the EEOC’s position in CVS. This case bear monitoring, and I will continue to update you as the case proceeds. In the meantime, consider adopting changes to your stock separation and settlement agreements; the EEOC is definitely watching.

Tuesday, February 11, 2014

EEOC claims retaliation over garden-variety severance terms


The EEOC announced that it has filed a lawsuit against CVS, claiming that a severance agreement it provided to three employees unlawfully restricted their rights to file discrimination charges or communicate and cooperate with the EEOC.

The EEOC claims that “CVS conditioned the receipt of severance benefits for certain employees on an overly broad severance agreement set forth in five pages of small print.”

What was the “fine print” that caused the EEOC to sue this employer? The EEOC did not specify in its news release, but the complaint the EEOC filed  took issue with the following provisions:

    1. A cooperation clause, which required the employees to notify CVS’s general counsel upon receipt of, among other things, an administrative complaint.

    2. A non-disparagement clause, which prohibited the employees from making any statements that disparage or harm CVS’s reputation. (I told you I don’t like these provisions.)

    3. A confidentiality clause, which prohibited the employee from disclosing any personnel information.

    4. A general release, which included any claims of discrimination.

    5. A covenant not to sue, which prohibited the employee from filing any complaints, actions, lawsuits, or proceedings against CVS, but which expressly carved out the employee’s right to participate in, or cooperate with, any state or federal discrimination proceeding or investigation.

    6. An attorneys’ fees provision, which required the employee to reimburse CVS for its reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred as the result of a breach of the agreement by the employee.

      According to EEOC Regional Attorney John Hendrickson, the lead litigator in the case:

        Charges and communication with employees play a critical role in the EEOC’s enforcement process because they inform the agency of employer practices that might violate the law. For this reason, the right to communicate with the EEOC is a right that is protected by federal law. When an employer attempts to limit that communication, the employer effectively is attempting to buy employee silence about potential violations of the law. Put simply, that is a deal that employers cannot lawfully make.

        This case has the potential to be very significant, and warrants monitoring. Most (all?) of you reading this post have used agreements that contain language similar to each of the six issues the EEOC is challenging. If the EEOC is successful in this lawsuit, employers will have to reconsider key provisions in their severance and settlement agreements. Given that employers are paying ex-employees for certainty when an employee signs a release, this case has the potential to turn these agreements on their heads.

        In tomorrow’s post, I will offer a potential solution for employer looking to maintain the vitality of a general release and covenant not to sue without walking into the EEOC’s enforcement crosshairs.

        Monday, February 10, 2014

        Another one bites the dust: NLRB invalidates confidentiality policy


        If I’ve said it once, I’ve said it a thousand times — employers cannot maintain policies that restrict their employees’ ability to talk about how much they earn.

        Thus, it shouldn’t surprise anyone that, in MCPc, Inc. (2/6/14) [pdf], the NLRB concluded that the following policy illegally restricted employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activity:

        Dissemination of confidential information within [the company], such as personal or financial information, etc., will subject the responsible employee to disciplinary action or possible termination.

        As the NLRB pointed out, the standard isn’t whether the policy actually restricted employees from discussing wages or other terms and conditions of employment with their coworkers, but whether they would reasonably construe the policy to have that effect. Never mind that in MCPc, Inc., the employer fired an employee for discussing with co-workers staffing shortages that resulted from a perception of high executive salaries.

        You can draft a confidentiality policy that will not run afoul of protected-concerted-activity rights under the NLRA; you just have to draft narrowly. Thus, limiting discussion of trade secrets and other confidential, proprietary information is just fine. Wages and other terms and conditions of employment, however, are off limits, which should be clear from the policy. And, of course, don’t fire an employee for talking about wages or working conditions. I wonder how the NLRB would have even learned about MCPc’s overly broad policy if the company hadn’t fired a worker for violating it?

        Friday, February 7, 2014

        WIRTW #307 (the “Piet Mondrian” edition)


        Today’s theme is a lesson in minimalism.

        Here’s what I read this week:

        Discrimination

        Social Media & Workplace Technology

        HR & Employee Relations

        Wage & Hour

        Labor Relations

        Thursday, February 6, 2014

        Proposed ambush election rules offer the best reason to be proactive about union avoidance


        Last week I suggested that a pro-union NLRB has emboldened labor unions into more aggressive organizing efforts. You need not look any further than yesterday’s news that the NLRB has reissued its ambush-election rules.

        According to the Wall Street Journal, the median time between the filing of a representation petition by employees, and the NLRB holding an election in a contested organizing campaign, is 59 days. The NLRB’s proposed rules would cut that time by more than half, to a lightning-quick 25 days or less.

        Make no mistake, this proposal is primarily designed to help labor unions win elections. Often, an employer does not know that a labor union is attempting to organize until after the representation petition is filed. By that point, the union and its organizers have already planted the seeds of employer discontent with workers, leaving the employer to play catch-up. The quicker the election period, the less time the employer has to spread its message. Thus, these rules, if they take effect, will be a big win for labor unions.

        There are two things you can do, right now, to protect yourself.

        1. The NLRB is taking comments until April 7 on these proposed rules. Write to your Senator. Write to your Congressman. Talk to your trade and business organizations. Compel anyone you can to take a stand against these rules and hope for a more reasonable outcome.

        2. Heed my call from last week to take steps now to formulate, and communicate to your employees, your corporate message on labor unions. The importance of having your strategy in place before a union comes knocking will be even more important if these new election rules take hold.

        Wednesday, February 5, 2014

        I (don’t) “like” this protected concerted activity


        Last October, in Bland v. Roberts, the 4th Circuit held that a Facebook “like” qualifies as speech protected by the First Amendment. As we know, however, the First Amendment does not apply to private workplaces, in which employees do not enjoy constitutional free speech rights. Employees do, however, enjoy the right to talk among themselves about wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment—concerted activity protected by the National Labor Relations Act.

        Soon, the NLRB will decide whether an employee clicking the “like” button on another employee’s Facebook post or comment is sufficient to qualify as protected concerted activity.

        In Triple Play Sports Bar [pdf] (h/t: Wall Street Journal Morning Risk Report), an Administrative Law Judge
        Spinella’s selecting the “Like” option on LaFrance’s Facebook account constituted participation in the discussion that was sufficiently meaningful as to rise to the level of concerted activity. Spinella’s selecting the “Like” option, so that the words “Vincent VinnyCenz Spinella…like[s] this” appeared on the account, constituted, in the context of Facebook communications, an assent to the comments being made, and a meaningful contribution to the discussion. [T]he Board has never parsed the participation of individual employees in otherwise concerted conversations, or deemed the protections of Section 7 to be contingent upon their level of engagement or enthusiasm. Indeed, so long as the topic is related to the employment relationship and group action, only a “speaker and a listener” is required.
        As much as it pains me, the ALJ’s reasoning is sound. Speech is speech, whether it’s engaging in an oral conversation, writing a comment to a Facebook post, or clicking “Like.” Liking something on Facebook is akin to an endorsement of, or agreement with, the comment liked.

        To paraphrase what I wrote when commenting on the the Bland v. Roberts decision, protected concerted activity rights likely extend to symbolic speech on social networks, such as liking a Facebook page or post, or retweeting someone’s tweet. I would expect the NLRB to agree with the ALJ when it announces its decision later this year. In the meantime, employers need to take heed before taking action based on these online activities.

        Tuesday, February 4, 2014

        Deterring the wage-and-hour scofflaw


        The New York Times reported late last week that a Manhattan Domino’s Pizza franchisee has settled a wage-and-hour class action lawsuit for $1.28 million.

        Sixty-one delivery drivers alleged that managers told them that they would only be paid for 40 hours per week, no matter how many hours they worked. The drivers alleged that they often worked more than 40 hours in a week, sometimes as many as 65. The awards range from $61,300 to $400 per delivery person, depending on length of employment.

        I suppose cases like this one shouldn’t stun me, but they still do. I’m appalled that employers, in 2014, remain ignorant about, or, worse, deliberately ignore, their obligations under the wage-and-hour laws. And, I’m not talking about the law’s minutia, like payment for travel time, or calculating an overtime rates on performance bonuses. I’m taking about the basics, such as you have to pay overtime to non-exempt employees who work more than 40 hours in a week.

        Some argue that stories like this one illustrate that we need tougher wage-and-hour laws to deter employers from stealing wages from their employees. I think the laws are tough enough. $1.28 million is a tough nut for any business to swallow. Instead, we need education. For the ignorant, we need to teach them about the FLSA and its complex web of requirements. For the scofflaws, we need to continue to publicize cases like the Domino’s Pizza settlement in the hope that they get the message. The laws we have are more than sufficient to protect employees’ wages, provided we do our share to secure compliance.