Friday, October 25, 2013

WIRTW #294 (the “all I want” edition)


Satellite radio has so overplayed Kodaline’s All I Want that, even though I like the song, I instinctively switch channels any time it comes on.

Then, I saw the video:

The lesson for employers and employees to take to heart? What defines a person is one’s actions, not one’s appearance. (And, apparently, that sexual harassment laws are much different in Ireland that here in the States. I’d love to hear from an Irish employment lawyer on this point.)

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Thursday, October 24, 2013

The legal reason why you shouldn’t force employees to turn over social media passwords


There has been a lot of ink spilled out on the supposed practice of employers requiring employees to provide access to their private social media accounts. I’ve long espoused both that this practice is not occurring with sufficient regularity to justify a legislative fix (despite New Jersey just becoming the 12th state to enact a legislative ban), and that employers should nevertheless avoid this practice because it erodes the trust that is necessary to build a workable employer/employee relationship.

Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hospital Service Corp. (D.N.J. 8/20/13) provides further legal justification for employers to avoid this practice.

Deborah Ehling worked as a registered nurse and paramedic for MONOC beginning in 2004. Beginning in 2008, Ehling maintained a Facebook account with approximately 300 “friends.” She chose restrictive privacy settings on that account so that only her Facebook friend could see her wall posts. While Ehling had no MONOC managers as Facebook friends, she did add many coworkers, including a paramedic named Tim Ronco. Unbeknownst to Ehling, Ronco was taking screenshots of her Facebook wall and printing them or emailing them to MONOC manager Andrew Caruso. Caruso never asked Ronco for information about Ehling, and never requested that Ronco share Ehling’s Facebook activity. Nevertheless, once Caruso received copies of the Facebook posts, he passed them on to MONOC’s Executive Director of Administration.

On June 8, 2009, Ehling posted the following statement to her Facebook wall:

An 88 yr old sociopath white supremacist opened fire in the Wash D.C. Holocaust Museum this morning and killed an innocent guard (leaving children). Other guards opened fire. The 88 yr old was shot. He survived. I blame the DC paramedics. I want to say 2 things to the DC medics. 1. WHAT WERE YOU THINKING? and 2. This was your opportunity to really make a difference! WTF!!!! And to the other guards....go to target practice.

After MONOC management learned of the post, it temporarily suspended Ehling with pay. After MONOC fired Ehling for unrelated attendance issues, she sued, and claimed, among other things, that MONOC’s access of her private Facebook wall violated the Stored Communications Act and her common law right to privacy.

The SCA covers (1) electronic communications, (2) that were transmitted via an electronic communication service, (3) that are in electronic storage, and (4) that are not public. The Court had little issue concluding that the SCA covers non-public Facebook wall posts.

The SCA, however, has an exception for “authorized users.” This exception applies where (1) access to the communication was “authorized,” without coercion or pressure, (2) “by a user of that service,” (3) “with respect to a communication … intended for that user.” Ehling had no evidence to support her claim that MONOC’s access of her Facebook page was unauthorized. To the contrary, the evidence showed that Ronco voluntarily shared the information with Caruso, and, therefore, was “authorized” under the SCA. Thus, no violation of the SCA occurred via MONOC’s possession of wall posts from Ehling’s private Facebook page.

The Court disposed of Ehling’s invasion of privacy claim on similar grounds. In doing so, however, the Court made the following interesting observation:

The evidence does not show that Defendants obtained access to Plaintiff’s Facebook page by, say, logging into her account, logging into another employee’s account, or asking another employee to log into Facebook. Instead, the evidence shows that Defendants were the passive recipients of information that they did not seek out or ask for. Plaintiff voluntarily gave information to her Facebook friend, and her Facebook friend voluntarily gave that information to someone else … This may have been a violation of trust, but it was not a violation of privacy.

In other words, the Court may have found a privacy invasion if the employer had used surreptitious or coercive means to gain access to its employee’s Facebook page. Thus, whether or not a statute specifically prohibits employers from requiring the disclosure of social media account information, this court makes it clear that an employer’s demand of such information is nevertheless illegal. Or, to put it another way, please don’t ask your employees to turn over their online passwords.

This post originally appeared on The Legal Workplace Blog.

Wednesday, October 23, 2013

When Coyote Posts Get Ugly (My latest column in Workforce magazine)


Each month I write a featured column in Workforce magazine. This month, my column focuses on the risks businesses take when then take to social media to comment on pending litigation and the employees who’ve filed. The article—”When Coyote Posts Get Ugly”—is available here.

Tuesday, October 22, 2013

A hypnotic tale about choice of law and non-compete agreements


Choice of law is one of the most important, and, often, most ignored decisions you can making in drafting a non-competition agreement. Lifestyle Improvement Centers, LLC v. East Bay Health, LLC (S.D. Ohio 10/7/13), illustrates how the choice of which state’s law will govern the contact can govern the enforceability of the restrictive covenant.

Patrick Porter owned Positive Changes Hypnosis Centers, a successful hypnosis-therapy center, which included a network of franchises. In 2003, Porter sold the business to an Ohio-based company, Lifestyle Improvement Centers. Years later, while running a competing California-based self-improvement company called East Bay Health, Lifestyle reached out to the Porters for help with a struggling Positive Changes franchise in California. Ultimately, the Porters acquired the struggling Positive Changes franchise from Lifestyle. The Porters’ company, East Bay, entered both a franchise agreement and a non-compete agreement with Lifestyle.

The Porters spent a year trying to turn around the Positive Changes franchise location, ultimately concluding it was a lost cause. The Porters shut down the franchise and converted it into The Smart Body Institute, operated through their East Bay Health company. When the Smart Body Institute entered the hypnotherapy business, Lifestyle sued under the non-compete agreement, which stated that Ohio law governed the parties’ relationship.

The Porters and East Bay argued that because California law forbids non-compete agreements, it violates the law and public policy of the state in which their business is located to enforce a non-compete agreement under a competing state’s law. The Ohio federal court hearing the dispute agreed, concluding that despite the Ohio choice of law provision, California law applied. Thus, an Ohio company, with an Ohio choice of law contract, in an Ohio court, could not enforce its non-compete agreement.

In this case, the court ignored the parties’ choice of law because of the strength of the public policy of the state in which the competing business was located. Yet, this case illustrates a larger point. Choice of law can be outcome determinative in non-compete cases. Because state law governs the enforceability of non-compete agreements, there are 50 different possible sets of rules for your contract. The set that you choose could determine your case. For example, Ohio enforces non-compete agreements based on their overall reasonableness. California, on the other hand, has decided that its public policy renders most non-compete agreements per se unenforceable. Do not ignore the selection of the controlling law in your non-competition agreements. Otherwise, you could be missing a golden opportunity to dictate the terms of the agreement’s interpretation, and, ultimately, its enforceability.

Monday, October 21, 2013

Riffing on the right way to do workforce reductions


Anthony Rachells was a top performer at Cingular Wireless. As a National Retail Account Executive in Cingular’s Cleveland region, he received numerous sales awards, consistently exceeded company sales goals by the greatest margin of any of his co-workers, and, in 2003 earned the top performance review among his peers. Yet, when AT&T acquired Cingular in 2004, and eliminated five of the nine employees in Rachells’s position. Rachells received the lowest 2004 performance review score of any candidate, ranked seventh in the overall selection process, and was terminated.

Rachells—who was the only African-American National Retail Account Executive—sued, claiming that his manager (who other testified had a history of discriminating against minorities) included him in the workforce reduction because of his race.

Last week, in Rachells v. Cingular Wireless Employee Services [pdf], the 6th Circuit concluded that it should be up to a jury to determine whether the decision-making manager singled out Rachells because of his race.

Here, among the Cingular candidates, Rachells was the only person of color and the only individual discharged in the RIF. Given this small sample size of the Cingular candidates, however, this is not sufficient to conclude that Cingular’s actions were racially motivated…. The district court erred in dismissing two other crucial categories of evidence tending to show race-based discrimination: evidence of Rachells’ superior qualifications and evidence of a discriminatory atmosphere at Cingular….

Here are three factors to think about when using subjective criteria (such as rankings) when deciding on who to include in a RIF:

  1. Comparability. What do your workforce demographics look like before and after the RIF, company wide, department by department, and job function by job function? If it looks like your RIF affected women, minorities, or older workers more than their comparators, it will become harder to justify the legitimacy of the subjective criteria. In this case, Cingular’s RIF failed the smell test by including the only African-American account executive.

  2. Consistency. Do you always use subjective criteria as part of your decision-making? If not, it will look like you added a subjective component to this RIF for a reason (to single out someone or some group). If nothing else, you will have to explain why you deviated from the norm. In this case, it was not a stretch for the court to conclude that the manager rigged the ranking to single out Rachells.

  3. Honesty. Was everyone honest in their subjective evaluations? The quickest way to buy yourself a jury trial is for the plaintiff to uncover dishonesty or other shenanigans in the decision-making process. If you are going to have a subjective component to any RIF, make sure the evaluations pass muster. How do they compare to past performance reviews? Have the employees ever been counseled, disciplined, or put on a performance plan? Do the objective criteria (sales numbers, for example) contradict the subjective evaluation? In this case, Cingular’s RIF failed because the objective criteria (sales figures, awards, and prior performance reviews) did not match the subjective ranking prepared solely for purposes of the RIF.

RIFs, done correctly, provide employers wide protections from allegations of discrimination. Done poorly, however, RIFs open employer to widespread claims of discrimination that can prove more difficult to defend than the savings the employer hoped to realize from the layoffs.

Friday, October 18, 2013

WIRTW #293 (the “interview from hell” edition)


Is this the worst (fake) job interview ever?

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Thursday, October 17, 2013

Smoking out the law on e-cigarettes in the workplace


29 states, plus the District of Columbia, have laws prohibiting anyone from smoking in the workplace. Like similar bans in other states, Ohio’s statewide workplace ban applies to “smoking,” which means “inhaling, exhaling, burning, or carrying any lighted cigar, cigarette, pipe, or other lighted smoking device for burning tobacco or any other plant.”

Electronic cigarettes do not burn tobacco. Instead, they use a heating element to vaporize a liquid solution that includes a concentration of nicotine. Because these vaporizing devices do not contain tobacco, they are not prohibited by workplace smoking laws.

According to the Zanesville Times Recorder, e-cigarettes will be coming to your workplace, and will test the limit of your anti-smoking policy:

As vaporing becomes more prevalent, it’s quickly evolving into a controversial workplace issue. Employers will be faced with the challenge of contemplating the pros and cons of e-cigarettes for their workplaces and will need to consider adapting a policy that reflects their position

Proponents of e-cigarettes in the workplace argue that there exists no proof of any associated health risks, and that they improve employee productivity by eliminating the need of smoke breaks during the workday.

Opponents argue that these devices contain nicotine and detectable levels of known carcinogens and toxic chemicals, and that prohibiting their use in the workplace eliminates the risk of any complaints from nonsmoking co-workers, customers or others annoyed by the vapors.

There are no laws requiring that you allow e-cigarettes in your workplace. Laws that prohibit smoking in the workplace are a floor, not a ceiling. You are free to ban these devices in your workplace, and should consider doing so.

Companies should review their smoke-free workplace policies specifically to prohibit e-cigarettes, and consider including employees that use e-cigarettes as “smokers” for purposes of any wellness or smoking-cessation initiatives.

This post originally appeared on The Legal Workplace Blog.