Counseling as an ADA-protected medical examination

The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits employers from “requir[ing] a medical examination” or “mak[ing] inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability … unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.” For this reason, an employer can only compel a current employee to undergo a medical examination in limited circumstances, confined by job-relatedness and business necessity.

The scope of what qualifies as a “medical examination” lies at the heart of Kroll v. White Lake Ambulance Authority (6th Cir. 8/22/12) [pdf]. When Emily Kroll, an EMT, showed on-the-job distress over an affair with a married co-worker, which included several outbursts at work, her employer tried to do something about it—compelling her to obtain psychological counseling, on her own terms and with any counselor she wished. Kroll refused, never returned to work, and sued for disability discrimination.

In concluding that counseling qualifies as medical examination under the ADA, the Sixth Circuit principally relied on the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees. That Guidance defines a “medical examination” as “a procedure or test that seeks information about an individual’s physical or mental impairments or health.” The Court focused on the employer’s intent in requiring the counseling:

[T]he fact that an employer’s intentions are disability neutral does not save from falling within [the ADA]’s purview a test routinely used and administered by psychologists to uncover mental illness….

[W]e conclude that Kroll has presented sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could conclude that the “psychological counseling” Kroll was instructed to attend did constitute a “medical examination” under the ADA. We reach this conclusion … because the “psychological counseling” in question was likely to probe and explore whether Kroll suffered from a mental-health disability, regardless of whether this was WLAA’s intention.

The dissenting opinion, however, believes that intent is irrelevant, instead focusing on the issue of who chose the nature and type of the counseling:

By any definition, compelled counseling does not compel a medical examination. As the EEOC guidelines recognize, some “psychological tests” amount to medical examinations, and others do not…. No evidence shows that White Lake Ambulance insisted that Kroll’s psychological counseling involve one type of test or another. No evidence, indeed, shows that the ambulance service insisted she submit to any test while obtaining counseling….

The breadth of services encompassed by a psychological-counseling requirement resolves this claim. For it means that Kroll, not the company, controlled her destiny—controlled in other words whether she sought counseling that included a medical examination or did not. No doubt, she might meet this requirement by seeing a psychologist or psychiatrist who used a medical examination. But, if so, that was her choice, not the company’s. If a trying boss insists that an employee arrive at work by eight o’clock the next morning, it is not the boss’s fault if the employee opts to meet the requirement by staying overnight in the office. So it is here. Kroll had the right to meet this counseling requirement on her own terms, some of which could lead to a medical examination and others of which would not.

While I believe the dissent has the better of the argument, the fact remains that, for now, counseling is a medical examination covered by the ADA. Employers cannot compel employees to undergo counseling unless it is job-related and consistent with business necessity.

Thus, if counseling qualifies as a covered medical exam, then employers, like WLAA, will have to rely on the statute’s defense of job-relatedness and business necessity if an employee needs counseling. What is the best practice for employers going forward? Create of record of job-relatedness and business necessity. If an employee is acting erratically, document the behavior. Take photographs. Obtain statements from co-workers. Explain, in writing, how the employee’s behavior is impacting your business. Otherwise, you will have a difficult time demonstrating that a specific employee’s needs meet the statute’s requirements for a permissible medical examination.

What qualifies as “opposition” under Title VII?

Last week, I discussed the limits of Title VII’s opposition clause in protecting (or not protecting, as the case may be) employees who make unreasonable or unfounded complaints about discrimination. Today, I am going to discuss another aspect of the opposition clause that can also provide some relief to employers — the specificity of one’s opposition to an act of discrimination.

Trujillo v. Henniges Automotive Sealing Systems NA, Inc. (6th Cir. 8/21/12) [pdf] involves two different allegations of protected activity:

1. After the company’s vice president referred to Mexican plant employees as “those fucking wetbacks,” Trujillo lightheartedly confronted him, resulting in an embarrassed apology.

2. After the same vice president made some disparaging remarks about a Latin American employee, Trujillo spoke to the company’s Vice President of Human Resources.

The 6th Circuit concluded that the only the latter constitutes protected opposition:

We have previously held that advocating for members of a protected class is protected activity for purposes of Title VII retaliation…. Trujillo could have engaged in protected activity if he had complained about Rollins’s comment at the time, even though those comments were not directed at Trujillo personally. However, Trujillo’s own testimony makes clear that he did not complain to Rollins about the comments at the time they were made. With regard to the “wetback” comment, Trujillo admits that he did not communicate that Rollins’s comment offended him, let alone that he was complaining about the racial or ethnic character of the conduct….

In contrast, the district court erred in holding that Trujillo’s statement to Gasperut was not in “opposition” to the alleged racial character of Rollins’s comments…. We have repeatedly held that complaints to human resources personnel regarding potential violations of Title VII constitute protected activity for purposes of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation…. The fact that it was, as the district court characterized it, an “informal conversation” does not change the nature and purpose of the conversation, which was a “discrete, identifiable, and purposive” opposition to racially-oriented language….

Part of the takeaway from this case is that not every response to a tinged or biased remark qualifies for Title VII’s anti-retaliation protections. This case, however, also teaches a different lesson. Opposition can rest in the eye of the beholder. The dissent, for example, would have refused to have protected any of Trujillo’s complaints, and would have concluded that he had merely engaged in non-protected venting:

If the plaintiff had complained that such comments constituted discrimination against him, I would have no quarrel with the majority opinion. If plaintiff had in any way intimated that such remarks could constitute discrimination against other people in the company, I would concur. However, plaintiff himself said: “I kind of was just venting. I was not intending for her to take action.” … Not every casual remonstrance against bad language equates to complaining of illegal discrimination.

What is the best practice? Assume all but the most attenuated of responses to a potentially discriminatory statement qualifies as protected, and do not leave it in the hands of judges or juries to draw these nuanced distinctions. And, if you have to take action against someone who has arguable engaged in protected opposition, involve counsel in the decision making before you draw yourself into a potential lawsuit.

The more you know… Determining when a company knows that an employee engaged in protected activity

“The check is in the mail” is one of the world’s oldest (and some would argue lamest) excuses. In Hicks v. SSP America (6th Cir. 8/3/12), the employer tried a variation in an attempt to avoid an employee’s retaliation claim. The employer argued that it was impossible for it have known that the plaintiff had filed an EEOC charge before it fired her because it has lost its mailbox key and therefore it could not have received its copy of the charge. Without debating the merits of the employer’s argument, the court of appeals still concluded that a factual issue existed on the issue of whether the employer knew of the protected activity, and reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. The court relied, in part, on testimony from Hicks’s direct supervisor that he “‘remember[ed] seeing  it’ (apparently meaning he had seen either the notice-of-charge envelope from the Commission or the charge itself).”

This case teaches two important points:

1. Retaliation claims are dangerous. In Hicks, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the underlying discrimination claim. Nevertheless, the employer still faces the risk of a trial on the retaliation claim.

2. When crafting a defense, it has to pass the B.S. test. Unsupported defenses that border on the ludicrous (I lost the mailbox key) better have some meat on their bones. Receipts from a locksmith? An affidavit from the mailman that mail was piling up inside the box? Other corroborating witnesses? The less support you can present, the less likely it will be that a judge or a jury will believe your cockamamie story. And, the less likely they are to believe you, the more zeros you can add to the verdict.

Courts inch closer to recognizing sexual orientation as a protected class

The Ohio Bell Telephone Company fired Plaintiff Jason Koren after he missed work for his father’s funeral. Koren suspected that Ohio Bell really fired him because he’s homosexual and took his husband’s last name. He sued for gender discrimination. Did the court: a) grant Ohio Bell’s motion for summary judgment because Title VII does not offer protections for sexual orientation; or b) deny the motion because Title VII does protect against the application of unlawful sex-based stereotypes? Give yourself a prize if you answered “b.”

Here’s what the court had to say in Koren v. The Ohio Bell Telephone Co. (N.D. Ohio 8/14/12) [pdf]:

“[A] plaintiff hoping to succeed on a claim of sex stereotyping [must] show that he fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender, … as all homosexuals, by definition, fail to conform to traditional gender norms in their sexual practices.” Koren’s position is that changing his name upon marriage was a nonconforming “behavior” that supports his gender discrimination claim…. Ohio Bell disagrees and attempts to frame Koren’s claims as a simple attempt “to bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.” …

The Court agrees with Koren: homosexual males do not “by definition, fail to conform to the traditional gender norms” by changing their surname upon marriage. And here, Koren chose to take his spouse’s surname—a “traditionally” feminine practice—and his co-workers and superiors observed that gender non-conformance when Koren requested to be called by his married name….

Koren has alleged just such a failure to conform. And he says that [manager] Miceli “harbored ill-will” because he changed his name but that she would not have done so if a female employee had changed her name. Koren testified that Miceli refused to call him by his married name, that Miceli went out of her way to call him by his previous last name, and that Miceli informed him that she did not recognize same-sex marriages. And that ill-will, Koren says, resulted in seven unexcused absences and, ultimately, his termination.

Nine out of the last 10 Congresses have tried to pass a version of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, which among other things, would add “sexual orientation and gender identity” to the list of classes protected under Title VII. It has failed each time. Courts and the EEOC, however, continue to give the LGBT community that which the legislature has rejected.

As for me, I’ll simply repeat the opinion I gave after the EEOC issued its groundbreaking pronouncement on this issue earlier this year:

The time is coming when this type of discrimination will no longer be an open issue. I suggest you get on the bandwagon now, and send a signal to all of your employees that you are a business of inclusion, not one of bigotry and exclusion.

WIRTW #238 (the “Doc Hopper” edition)

What does a labor and employment lawyer do to relax on the weekends? If it’s this labor and employment lawyer, and it happens to be the second Sunday in August, the answer is frog jumping (the Valley City Frog Jump Festival, to be precise). Click here for a full recap of my family’s not so stellar, but oh so fun, showing at this year’s event.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

• Sexual orientation and reverse discrimination — from EmployerLINC
• Harassment complaints by male Homeland Security employees — from Walter Olson’s Overlawyered
• Can a Netflixian Approach to Selection Decisions Eliminate Discrimination? — from Stephanie Thomas’s Proactive Employer Blog
• Employer wins lawsuit despite a "pattern of systematic sexual harassment" — from Eric Meyer’s The Employer Handbook Blog
• Helping Employers Against Employees Who Help Themselves to Company Information to Build a Discrimination Claim — from Jason Shinn’s Michigan Employment Law Advisor
• Discrimination claims by Muslims on the rise — from California Employment Law
• Employment Litigation: How Much Will You Pay? — from Mark Toth’s Manpower Employment Blawg
• Orders to “Go see the Doc” cost Baltimore County $475,000 — from Employment Discrimination Report
• The EEOC Came Knocking (Part Two): Effective Position Statements — from Suzanne Boy’s Southwest Florida HR Law & Solutions
• Virtually All of The Fortune 500 Companies Voluntarily Prohibit Discrimination On The Basis of Sexual Orientation — from Employment Discrimination Report

Social Media & Workplace Technology

• The Business BYO Craze: Has It Gone Too Far? — from hr bartender
• Use Your Email Signatures to Get Overeager Coworkers Off Your Back — from Lifehacker
• Does the Company or the Employee Own a Twitter Account? — from California Employment Law Report
• Social tools for tracking your employees — from Mike VanDervort’s The Human Race Horses
• CFO firing after Chick-fil-A post shows what's protected and what’s not in social media speech — from Phoenix Business Blog
• How to Use Social Media Evidence in Workplace Investigations — from i-Sight Investigation Software Blog

HR & Employee Relations

• “I Would Like To Extend You A Counter-Offer To Suck My Dick”: A Rejected Jobseeker Sends The Padres The Best Letter Ever — from Deadspin
• Separation Agreement or No Separation Agreement? — from Labor & Employment Law Perspectives
• Criminal Convictions and Arrests - To Hire Or Not To Hire? — from From the Sidebar
• Your employer sucks and isn’t going to change — from Ask a Manager
• My Employer Says I Have To Resign. What Should I Do? — from Donna Ballman’s Screw You Guys, I’m Going Home
• Locking Janitors in Wal-Mart - False Imprisonment? — from Phil Miles’s Lawffice Space

Wage & Hour

• The One In Which I Try to Explain the Joint Employer Test — from Dan Schwartz’s Connecticut Employment Law Blog
• FLSA Lessons from Gordon Ramsay — from Molly DiBianca’s Delaware Employment Law Blog
• Can my boss track my hours? — from Suzanne Lucas, the Evil HR Lady, writing at CBS Money Watch
• Tenth Circuit Upholds Salary Basis (and Thus Exempt Status) Despite Deductions From PTO Bank — from Wage and Hour Law Update
• Overtime and Exotic Dancers — from Alabama Employment Law Report
• Federal Judge Severely Limits Scope of Auto-Deduct Collective Action — from Healthcare Employment Counsel
• Beware the loose thread that can unravel the entire garment — from Mike Maslanka’s Work Matters
• Why You Should Know Your Rights Under FMLA — from Workplace Fairness

Labor Relations

• NLRB Taking Aggressive Legal Positions in Attempt to Remain Relevant — from Russell Cawyer’s Texas Employment Law Update
• An uninvited guest: the NLRB settles in — from John Holmquist’s Michigan Employment Law Connection
• Does the Golden Rule Violate Section 7 of the NLRA? — from Labor Relations Institute
• NLRB Sets Sights on “At-Will” Provisions — from Hiring & Firing
• Free Speech is not Protected at Work but Some things you say may be. — from Mike Haberman’s Omega HR Solutions

Piercing the bulletproof employee

Retaliation comes in two flavors: participation and opposition. The former protects employees who have “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under” the relevant statute; the latter protects employees who have “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice.” Jackson v. Board of Education of Memphis City Schools (6th Cir. 8/15/12) [pdf] answers the question of how far the opposition clause goes to protect employees who make unreasonable or unfounded complaints about discrimination. It also teaches an important lesson that not every employee who complains about discrimination is bulletproof.

The Memphis City Schools employed Janice Jackson (African-American), as a teacher’s assistant. She worked at a school run by an African-American principal. Ninety-seven percent of the school’s staff was African-American, including 29 of the school’s 31 teacher’s assistants. After being admonished by the principal for unprofessional behavior, Jackson delivered a personal letter, in which she indicated that she felt unfairly singled out because her White co-workers were allowed “duty[-]free breaks,” while African-Americans were “criticized for taking breaks”—“a clear violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” After her transfer to a different school, she sued, claiming retaliation.

The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of her retaliation claim. The court noted that to support a claim of retaliation under the opposition clause, an employee’s opposition must “be based on a reasonable and good faith belief that the opposed practices were unlawful.” In this case, Jackson did not come forward with any evidence that the school principal treated African-American employees differently than White employees. Instead, the court concluded that she was merely addressing a legitimate personnel issue raised by Jackson’s unprofessional behavior.

Critically, the court went out of its way to point out that employers do not always need to fear taking action when faced with a poor-performing employee who happens to complain about discrimination.

To hold that opposition is reasonable when the employer is addressing an apparent and legitimate personnel matter in a way that does not explicitly or implicitly implicate Title VII, with no other testimony or evidence of racial discrimination, would hamper an employer’s ability to address legitimate issues for fear that doing so could leave the employer vulnerable to liability under Title VII.

Many employees believe they can make themselves bulletproof merely by raising the specter of discrimination. They wrongly believe that the anti-retaliation statutes will automatically protect their jobs. Conversely, many employers have a paralyzing fear of terminating a complaining employee no matter the circumstances. Jackson demonstrates that both of these fear can be unfounded. The potential of a retaliation claim certainly ups the ante when terminating an employee who has complained about discrimination. Yet, in the right circumstances and for the right reasons, employers do not need to live in fear of firing a deserving employee, provided that they take the right steps and have the proper documentation.

The language of the modern workplace

Merriam-Webster's Collegiate® Dictionary just released its list of new words for 2012. Three caught my eye.

According to the publisher, Merriam-Webster adopts new words based on usage:

To decide which words to include in the dictionary and to determine what they mean, Merriam-Webster editors study the language as it's used. They carefully monitor which words people use most often and how they use them….

To be included in a Merriam-Webster dictionary, a word must be used in a substantial number of citations that come from a wide range of publications over a considerable period of time. Specifically, the word must have enough citations to allow accurate judgments about its establishment, currency, and meaning.

Because these words have crept into the American lexicon, they should be accounted for in your workplace policies. Technology policies should cover information stored in and accessed from the cloud. Harassment policies and training should teach employees about the dangers of texting and other co-worker communications via mobile phones, email, and social media. And, if you get into a hot legal mess because you omitted these ideas from your policies, drop a few f-bombs (then call your lawyer).