Monday, May 21, 2012

Can a poor performance review count as an “adverse action?”


For an act to be considered an “adverse employment action” sufficient to support a discrimination claim, it must constitute
”a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Traditionally, a negative performance review does not constitute an adverse employment action, unless “the evaluation has an adverse impact on an employee’s wages or salary.” Or does it?

In Goldfaden v. Wyeth Laboratories (5/14/12) [pdf], the Sixth Circuit concluded that a warning letter issued to an employee constituted an “adverse action” even though the employee quit her job before she could suffer any consequences from the warning:

She received a warning letter in September that limited her year-end performance evaluation to a three on a scale of one to five. However, she never made it to the year-end evaluation, as she resigned three weeks after receiving the evaluation. The parties dispute what the effect of the lower evaluation would have been…. We cannot know for sure what would have happened, but there was a possibility that she would have received a lower bonus. This doubt is sufficient to survive summary judgment….

This result is even more troubling because the same opinion affirmed summary judgment for the employer on Goldfaden’s constructive discharge claim. In other words, the warning letter was not so intolerable that it compelled Goldfaden to quit, but it nevertheless could rise to the level of an adverse employment action because it could, maybe, have resulted in a lower year-end bonus.

It’s cases like this one that make it so difficult (and often frustrating) to attempt to predict outcomes for clients.

Friday, May 18, 2012

WIRTW #226 (the “press 9 for more options” edition)


You’d think that with all the posting I do about Labor & Employment Law, it’s the only area in which my law firm—Kohrman Jackson & Krantz—practices. You’d also be very wrong. Our diverse practice also covers, for example, telemarketing law.

In fact, my parter, Brett Krantz, recently co-published an article on this issue:

Brett Krantz, Chair of the Litigation group, and associate Melissa Yasinow have co-authored an article with Mark Rasch, the director of Cybersecurity and Privacy Consulting at technology company CSC. The article, entitled Please Press #5 Now: How Businesses Can Use UETA and E-SIGN to Create Signed, Written Contracts Over the Telephone, explains how businesses can use recent federal and state pro-technology laws to create signed, written contracts over the telephone. Connections Magazine, the nation’s premier magazine for the telemarketing and teleservices industry, will be publishing a shortened version of the article in its upcoming July/August Issue. The full article has already been published online in Connections Magazine’s “White Papers” Section. Please click here to access the full article.

Enjoy!

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Thursday, May 17, 2012

6s wild! 6th Circuit affirms contractual 6 month limitation for employment claims


Between the following two options—a federal statute or a private employment agreement—which wins?

  • The federal statute (USERRA), which, at the time, provided for a four-year statute of limitations, and which states that it “supersedes any … contract, agreement, … or other matter that reduces, limits, or eliminates in any manner any right or benefit provided by this chapter.”

–or–

  • The employment agreement, which provides, “I … agree that any action, claim or suit against [Defendant] arising out of my application for employment, employment, or termination including, but not limited to, claims arising under State or Federal civil rights statutes must be brought within one hundred and eighty (180) days of the event giving rise to the claim or be forever barred. I waive any and all limitation periods to the contrary.”

In Oswald v. BAE Industries (5/16/12) [pdf], the 6th Circuit ruled that the contract trumped USERRA.

After returning from serving with the Marines in Iraq, Jerome Oswald claimed that BAE limited his duties and responsibilities compared to his pre-deployment work, failed to give him a raise, transferred him to a lesser position, and ultimately fired him.

Unfortunately for Oswald, he waited until almost three years after his termination to file suit against BAE. The 6th Circuit concluded that his feet-dragging doomed his lawsuit:

Plaintiff’s employment contract does not eliminate all procedural rights in that it only shortens the time frame that Plaintiff can raise a USERRA claim. Because the contractual period of limitations diminished a right under USERRA that was merely procedural, [it] does not override the contractual limitations period on that basis….

Because Plaintiff’s complaint was untimely under the 180-day period in the contract, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendant….

There are two key takeaways from this case:

  1. This case might no longer good law under USERRA. In 2008, the Veterans’ Benefits Improvement Act provided that there “shall be no limit on the period for filing the complaint or claim” under USERRA. If there cannot exist any “limit on the period for filing,” it is unlikely that a contract can impose such a bar.
  2. Even if employers no longer can shorten the statutory period to file a claim under USERRA, this case serves as a good reminder that employers can use contractual provisions to shorten the statutory period for host of other claims. In a state like Ohio, which has a six-year limitations period for all discrimination claims except age, the ability to significantly shorten the filing period is a powerful weapon that too few employers deploy.

Wednesday, May 16, 2012

Terminated CFO illustrates the confidentiality risks social media pose


According to a recent survey by Intel (h/t: Lifehacker), 85% of American adults share information about themselves online, while 90% think others are sharing too much. Maybe the former CFO of Francesca’s Holdings Corp., Gene Morphis, should have heeded the latter and shared less about his company’s inner workings.

On Monday, Francesca’s announced that it fired Morphis for improperly communicating company information through social media. A quick review of Morphis’s Twitter feed and (very public) Facebook Wall offers some possible suspects.

Maybe it was this tweet:

Dinner w/Board tonite. Used to be fun. Now one must be on guard every second.

Or maybe it was this one:

Board meeting. Good numbers=Happy Board.

Or maybe this one:

Earnings released. Conference call completed. How do you like me now Mr. Shortie?

Or, maybe it was this Facebook post:

Audit Committee. Damn you Paul Sarbanes! Damn you Michael Oxley!

Or, maybe it was this one:

Roadshow completed. Sold $275 million of secondary shares. Earned my pay this week.

Social media presents a real risk of corporate breaches of confidentiality. It is easy to tell your employees, “Think before you click.” (Hey, that’s a catchy title for a book.) Yet, 76% of the Inc. 500 lack a social media policy for their employees, and 73% of all employers conduct no social media training. If you aren’t educating your employees about the risks and benefits of social media, both in and out of the workplace, you are not only missing a golden opportunity, but you also leaving yourself exposed to breaches of confidentiality such as that which befell Francesca’s. These issues are not going away.

Businesses that ignore the possibility that their employees can divulge trade secrets and other confidential and proprietary information via Twitter, Facebook, and other social media do so at their own peril. Did Morphis’s disclosure harm his ex-employer? Probably not. But, the company’s swift and decisive reaction to any breach of confidentiality will make it easier down the road for it to protect its confidential information when it really matters. Mark my words. The day will come when a court will invalidate a corporate trade secret because of a lax social media policy.

As an aside, I’m leading off tomorrow’s NLRB Region 8 Labor Law Conference [pdf], discussing social media policies and protected concerted activity. NLRB Acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon is the lunch speaker. I am very interested to hear his thoughts on how employers can balance their right to limit disclosures of confidential information against his perception that social media policies that prohibit such disclosures violate the NLRA.

Tuesday, May 15, 2012

Reasonable accommodations and commute times


How far do you have to go to accommodate an employee’s disability? In Regan v. Faurecia Automotive Seating (5/10/12), the 6th Circuit provides some boundaries, and teaches us a lesson about accommodation best practices.

Alisha Regan—an assembly line worker at Faurecia—suffers from narcolepsy, a sleep disorder that causes excessive sleepiness and frequent daytime sleep attacks. When her supervisor pushed back by an hour the start and end times of her shift, Regan advised that her narcolepsy would make it difficult for her to get to work, as it would push her commute into rush hour, causing longer commute times and a greater likelihood of sleepiness.

When the company refused to allow her to work her original schedule, Regan resigned, noting the “tremendous consequence” the change in work hours would have on her narcolepsy. She then filed suit, claiming that the company’s refusal violated the disability discrimination laws.

The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision that the ADA does not require an employer to accommodate an employee’s commute to and from work:

While an employer is required to provide reasonable accommodations that eliminate barriers in the work environment, an employer is not required to eliminate those barriers which exist outside the work environment. We find … that the Americans with Disabilities Act does not require Faurecia to accommodate Regan’s request for a commute during more convenient hours.

This case is not the first I’ve covered discussing whether an employer has an obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s commute. For example, in Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., the 3rd Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, finding that an employer must change an employee’s work hours if needed to enable a disabled employee to commute to and from work.

The real lesson here isn’t whether employers do, or do not, have to accommodate a disabled employee’s commute to and from work. Given the conflict between Regan and Colwell, I’d say this issue of open for interpretation (even though Regan is controlling in Ohio). Instead, the lesson is how employers should handle these issues when they arise. The ADA requires that the employer and employee engage in an interactive process (a back and forth to determine whether and what type of accommodation would be effective).

What shouldn’t you do in a situation such as this one? Don’t dismiss the employee’s request outright (as the employer appears to have done in Regan). Don’t force the employee to take FMLA leave as a prerequisite to the interactive process (as the employer in Regan appears to have done).

Each conversation with an employee (which should be documented in his or her confidential medical file) is an opportunity to establish your consideration of the employee’s specific needs in light of the specific and essential job requirements. If you legitimately cannot start a production line an hour early to accommodate an employee’s commuting schedule request, then so be it. But, how can you (and a court) judge the reasonableness of your decision if you never even have the conversation in the first place?

Monday, May 14, 2012

I don’t like this opinion; Facebook “like” as free speech?


10bhbbaaOne of the biggest misnomers that people have about their rights in the workplace relates to free speech and the 1st Amendment. I could comfortably retire if I had a dollar for every time in my career that I have heard, “But I have a right to free speech; I can say what I want and not get fired.” The reality is that private-sector employees have no right to free speech. The 1st Amendment only protects public employees.

The issue of free speech arose in a novel context in Bland v. Roberts (E.D. Va. 4/24/12). B.J. Roberts, the sheriff of Hampton, Virginia, was running for reelection. He learned that some of his employees supported his opponent, Jim Adams, after discovering that they had “liked” Adams’s Facebook page. After Roberts won reelection, he decided not to retain the services of the Adams supporters. The employees claimed that Roberts had violated their free speech rights (as exercised via their Facebook “like” of his opponent).

The court disagreed, concluding that merely clicking the “like” button on a Facebook page is not Constitutionally protected speech:

It is the Court’s conclusion that merely “liking” a Facebook page is insufficient speech to merit constitutional protection…. It is not the kind of substantive statement that has previously warranted constitutional protection. The Court will not attempt to infer the actual content of [the] posts from one click of a button…. For the Court to assume that the Plaintiffs made some specific statement without evidence of such statements is improper.

I was going to write a long, detailed, explanation of how the court got it wrong in this case, how “liking” a Facebook page expresses one’s support for, or positive opinion about, that Page. But, Professor Eugene Volokh, writing at The Volokh Conspiracy, beat me to it:

A Facebook “like” is a means of conveying a message of support for the thing you’re liking. That’s the whole point of the “like” button; that’s what people intend by clicking “like,” and that’s what viewers will perceive. Moreover, the allegation is that the employees were fired precisely because the Sheriff disapproved of the message the “like” conveyed. I would treat “liking” as verbal expression—though it takes just one mouse-click, it publishes to the world text that says that you like something….

To be sure, the message isn’t highly detailed; it doesn’t explain why one is supporting the “liked” person or cause. But the First Amendment protects speech even when the speech is not rich with logical argument, or is even vague or ambiguous….

Putting a “Jim Adams” bumper sticker on one’s car would be constitutionally protected. Putting such a sign on one’s lawn would be constitutionally protected. “Liking” Jim Adams on Facebook is equally constitutionally protected. If the plaintiffs appeal, I expect the Fourth Circuit will reverse the district court on this point.

Thanks Professor Volokh. I couldn’t have said it better myself.

[Hat tip: Lawffice Space and Delaware Employment Law Blog]

Friday, May 11, 2012

WIRTW #225 (the “drive thru” edition)


Did you catch my appearance on DriveThruHR yesterday? You mean you weren’t glued to your computer at 1 pm, hanging on my every word about HR, employment law, social media, background checks, the EEOC, and the NLRB? I’ll put aside my offense, and offer you a second chance to hear my musings.

Listen to internet radio with Wempen and Tincup on Blog Talk Radio

Thanks to William Tincup and Bryan Wempen for having me on. Let’s do it again soon.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations