Tuesday, March 9, 2010

Hot off the press: 6th Circuit holds that discrimination laws apply to a teacher at a religious school


Certain employees of religious institutions are exempted from employment discrimination laws under what is known as the “ministerial exception.” It is an off-shoot of a religious institution’s constitutional right to be free from judicial interference in the selection ministerial employees. For this exception to bar an employment discrimination claim: (1) the employer must be a religious institution, and (2) the employee must be a ministerial employee. In EEOC v. Perich [pdf] (decided today), the 6th Circuit for the first time addressed the issue of the reach of this exception to a teacher at a religious school.

The court distinguished between an employee who primarily teaches secular subjects, and one who teaches primarily religious subjects or had a central role in the spiritual or pastoral mission of the church. The Court concluded that Perich –who only spent 30-45 minutes out of each 7-hour day on religious subjects – was not a ministerial employee. “The fact that Perich participated in and led some religious activities throughout the day does not make her primary function religious.” Thus, Perich was able to proceed with her ADA claim against her employer.

This case underscores that religious intuitions do not receive a free pass from discrimination laws. Instead, the application of these laws will depend on an individualized assessment of each employee’s job duties. Unless an employee’s primary function is “spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship,” that employee is entitled to the protections afforded by the discrimination laws.

If parochial schools believed they were exempt from anti-discrimination laws, they should be working with their employment attorneys to update their handbooks with EEO and harassment policies, and to train all of their employees as soon as possible on these issues.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Monday, March 8, 2010

Sniffing out the dangers of the new ADA


perfumeOnPoint News and Overlawyered report that the City of Detroit has settled a disability discrimination lawsuit brought by an employee with a perfume allergy. She had claimed that the city failed to reasonably accommodate her allergy after she complained that a co-worker’s perfume made it difficult for her to breathe. Per the settlement, the employee will receive $100,000, and the city will adopt a policy prohibiting employees from wearing scented products. Even though this lawsuit was brought prior to the ADA’s amendments took effect, it nevertheless serves as a good illustration of the breadth of the new ADA.

The ADA amendments are intended to make it much easier for individuals to demonstrate that they meet the definition of “disability.” To have a disability, an individual must be “substantially limited” in performing a “major life activity” as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment need not prevent, or even significantly or severely restrict, the individual’s performance of a major life activity The determination is supposed to be a common-sense assessment based on comparing the individual’s ability to perform a specific major life activity with that of most people in the general population. Major life activities include daily functions, as well as the operation of major bodily functions (which would include, for example, the respiratory system).

If an employee has a chemical sensitivity to certain smells, that allergy will likely substantially affect the employee’s respiratory system, thus rendering the employee “disabled” under the ADA.

The focus in ADA cases has shifted from the legal argument of whether an employee’s medical condition rises the level of an ADA-protected disability, to the factual issue of whether the employer reasonably accommodated that disability. Employers need to be very aware of this change in focus. Managers and supervisors should be trained in their obligations to engage in the interactive process with employees to determine what reasonable accommodations – if any – can be made to enable the employee to perform the essential functions of the job. Lots more employees will be able to claim the protections of the ADA for lots more medical issues. How managers and supervisors respond to requests for reasonable accommodations will dictate the strength of an employer’s position in ADA lawsuits going forward.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Friday, March 5, 2010

WIRTW #117


One story I missed this week was the extension of the federal and Ohio COBRA subsidies. These bloggers, however, are picking up the slack:

Wage & Hour

Labor

Litigation

Human Resources


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, March 4, 2010

It’s time to bring Ohio’s discrimination law in line with its federal counterparts


At Jottings By An Employer’s Lawyer, Michael Fox discusses pending legislation in Missouri that would bring that state’s employment discrimination laws into line with their federal counterparts. Ohio needs the same reforms.

There are at least four key areas in which Ohio law is out of line with its federal counterparts. This dissymmetry creates an uneven playing field, in which employees are encouraged to forum shop their claims.
  1. Exhaustion of administrative remedies. Under Ohio law, a plaintiff can proceed directly to court without first filing any claims with the state or federal agencies. The federal statutes require that an employee file a charge with the EEOC before filing a complaint alleging discrimination in court.
  2. Time periods for filing claims. Under Ohio law, an employee has 6 years to file all types of discrimination claims except age claims, for which they have 180 days to file. Under federal law, an employee has 300 days to file an agency charge, and an additional 90 days to file a lawsuit after final disposition by the agency.
  3. Supervisor and manager individual liability. Under Ohio law, managers and supervisors can be held personally liable for their own acts of discrimination. This type of liability does not exist under federal law.
  4. Damage caps. Damages for employment discrimination claims are uncapped under Ohio law. Under federal law, compensatory and punitive damages are capped based on the size of the employer, and max out at $300,000 for each.
These reforms are needed to: i) eliminate the confusion that exists between two different procedural schemes to remedy the same alleged conduct; ii) remedy the problems created by employees shopping their claims between state and federal forums; and iii) remove disincentives for businesses to choose Ohio as their place of operations.

Wednesday, March 3, 2010

Employers often don’t stand alone in lawsuits – let’s talk about manager and supervisor liability


Ohio’s discrimination law is quirky when compared to its federal counterparts. For one thing, an Ohio employee does not need to exhaust his or her remedies with the Civil Rights Commission before filing a discrimination lawsuit in court. Also, under Ohio law, supervisors and managers can be held personally liable for their own acts of discrimination.

Discrimination laws, however, are not the only laws that provide for this individual liability. Other federal statutes – namely the FLSA, the FMLA, and the Equal Pay Act – also provide for manager and supervisor liability. The FMLA’s regulations [section 825.104(d)] explain why managers and supervisors can be personally liable under these statutes:

An “employer” includes any person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer to any of the employer's employees. The definition of “employer” in section 3(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 203(d), similarly includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee. As under the FLSA, individuals such as corporate officers “acting in the interest of an employer” are individually liable for any violations of the requirements of FMLA.

This week, a Pennsylvania federal court explained the scope of this individual liability. In Narodetsky v. Cardone Industries (as discussed on law.com), the federal court permitted FMLA claims to proceed against the defendant’s HR manager, benefits manager, and plant manager, as well as its president and CEO. The court concluded that anyone who exercises control over plaintiff in the termination or medical leave decisions can be liable under the FMLA. At least one Ohio federal court – in Mueller v. J.P. Morgan – reached this same conclusion. Extrapolating this rule to the FLSA, individual liability would extend to anyone who exercises control over a pay decision.

Individual liability has significant implications for how employers litigate FMLA and FLSA cases. If a supervisor, manager, or executive is named in a lawsuit, you and your counsel need to determine quickly whether the individual(s) can be represented by the same lawyer as the company, or if there is a conflict. This issue is complicated when an individual has left your organization, and exponentially complicated when the departure was on bad terms.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Tuesday, March 2, 2010

Do you know? The duty of loyalty: illegal competition vs. legal preparation


There are right ways and wrong ways for an employee to leave your company. Just because an employee is not subject to a noncompetition agreement does not mean that he or she cannot be liable for mistakes made on the way out the door. In fact, each and every employee owes his or employer a duty of loyalty up to the moment he or she ceases employment.

Your employee may prepare to compete against you while still in your employ without violating this duty of loyalty. There are many reasons why an employee may choose to prepare to compete while still employed. Some need the income provided by ongoing employment. Some want a degree of certainty that their new competitive venture will be ready to operate. Some may derive an eventual competitive advantage from continued association with their present employer (such as knowledge of pricing or business plans, or ongoing associations with key employees, customers, and vendors).

There are certain steps that an employee can legally take to prepare to compete without violating this duty of loyalty, even while still employed and even if done stealthily:

  • Incorporating the new firm.

  • Arranging for space and equipment.

  • Securing financing.

  • Making future business plans.

But, those preparation are subject to certain legal limits while still employed. The duty of loyalty prohibits employees from doing any of the following while still your employee:

  • Using your property (computers, for instance) to prepare to compete.

  • Using confidential information or trade secrets to prepare to compete.

  • Starting the competing operation.

  • Soliciting employees or customers for the new enterprise.

  • Holding back business opportunities or diverting them to the new enterprise.

What can you do to prevent employees from engaging in these illegal activities? Consider these 6 ideas.

  1. Require that key employees sign noncompetition agreements.

  2. Consider requiring a wider subset of employees sign non-solicitation agreements.

  3. Have all employees sign confidential information and trade secret policies, or, at a minimum, incorporate these policies into your employee handbook.

  4. Incorporate statements about employee loyalty into the handbook.

  5. Do not accept notice periods upon resignation for any employee who you think is a risk to compete.

  6. Consider forensic examinations of computers and email accounts for any employee you reasonably believe was engaging in unlawful conduct during his or her employment.

These tips will not magically transform a disloyal employee into your lap dog. They will, however, place you in a position to hold the disloyal employee accountable for his or her actions.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Monday, March 1, 2010

Is it wrong to “friend” your boss on Facebook?


Mashable reports on a recent survey conducted by Liberty Mutual’s Responsibility Project, in which 56% of Americans reported that “it’s ‘irresponsible’ to friend your boss on Facebook, while 62% of bosses agree it’s wrong to friend an employee.” These numbers simply beg the question – what does your social media policy say about this issue? Here’s 5 suggestions (with attribution for the first three to Molly DiBianca at the Delaware Employment Law Blog):

  1. Anything goes. Any employee can friend any other employee regarding of rank or position.

  2. Supervisors are prohibited from friending direct reports, but employees can friend their supervisors (who can choose whether to accept the request).

  3. Supervisors and their reports cannot be Facebook friends, regardless of who initiates the request.

  4. Employees are only permitted to be Facebook friends with their peers. No one can friend anyone higher or lower on the org chart.

  5. Employees are expressly prohibited from being Facebook friends with any co-workers, regardless of position.

The option you choose has a lot more to do with your corporate culture than what is legal or illegal. Your choice, however, will impact certain legal issues, such as harassment liability.

Regardless of which option you choose, you should choose one to incorporate into your social media policy. You don’t have a social media policy? To get started, I suggest Drafting a social networking policy: 7 considerations.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.