Tuesday, September 22, 2009

Update on ADA Amendments Act: EEOC Proposed Regulations are Now Available


Earlier today I wrote on the EEOC’s proposed regulation implementing the ADA Amendments Act. This evening, those proposed regulations finally became available. You can download them from HRhero.com. Thanks to Dan Schwartz for pointing this out.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus.

For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Do you know? What is a “disability” under the recent ADA Amendments Act


The ADA Amendments Act, which became effective January 1, 2009, is intended “to reinstate a broad scope of protection” by expanding the definition of the term “disability.” Recently, the EEOC published its proposed regulation interpreting these amended provisions. The regulations will be published this week, and the EEOC has already published a helpful Q&A discussing the proposed ADAAA regulations.

The core three-part definition of “disability” largely remains unaltered. An ADA-protected disability is still defined as:

  1. a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; or
  2. a record of a physical or mental impairment that substantially limited a major life activity; or
  3. when an employer takes an action prohibited by the ADA based on an actual or perceived impairment.

What has changed under the ADAAA is how these definitions are interpreted and applied. Indeed, according to the EEOC, “As a result of the ADAAA, it will be much easier for individuals seeking the law’s protection to demonstrate that they meet the definition of ‘disability….’”

Major Life Activities

“Major life activities” fall under one of two categories. An employee only needs one major life activity from either of the following:

  • Category One includes examples such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, interacting with others, and working at a type of work.
  • Category Two covers the operation of major bodily functions, including functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, circulatory, respiratory, endocrine, hemic, lymphatic, musculoskeletal, special sense organs and skin, genitourinary, cardiovascular and reproductive functions.

Substantially Limiting

To have a disability (or to have a record of a disability) an individual must be substantially limited in performing a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual in performing a major life activity to be considered “substantially limiting.” Determination of whether an individual is experiencing a substantial limitation in performing a major life activity is a common-sense assessment based on comparing an individual’s ability to perform a specific major life activity with that of most people in the general population.

Mitigating Measures

The positive effects from an individual’s use of one or more mitigating measures be ignored in determining if an impairment substantially limits a major life activity. In other words, an employer must ignore the fact that a mitigating measure removes or reduces an impairment in determining whether an employee is disabled. Mitigating measures include medication, medical equipment and devices, prosthetic limbs, low vision devices (devices that magnify a visual image), reasonable accommodations, and even behavioral modifications. Ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses do not count as mitigating measures.

Exemplar Impairments

  • The following are examples of impairments that consistently meet the definition of “disability”: deafness, blindness, intellectual disability (formerly known as mental retardation), partially or completely missing limbs, mobility impairments requiring use of a wheelchair (a mitigating measure), autism, cancer, cerebral palsy, diabetes, epilepsy, HIV/AIDS, multiple sclerosis, muscular dystrophy, major depression, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia.

  • The following are examples of impairments that may be substantially limiting for some individuals but not for others: asthma, back and leg impairments, and learning disabilities.

  • An impairment that is episodic or in remission meets the definition of disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active. Examples of such impairments include: epilepsy, hypertension, multiple sclerosis, asthma, diabetes, major depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia.

  • The following are examples of impairments that usually are not considered “disabilities”: the common cold, seasonal or common influenza, a sprained joint, minor and non-chronic gastrointestinal disorders, a broken bone that is expected to heal completely, appendicitis and seasonal allergies.

“Regarded as” Disabled

Under the ADAAA, an employer “regards” an individual as having a disability if it takes a prohibited action based on an individual’s impairment or on an impairment the employer believes the individual has, unless the impairment is transitory (lasting or expected to last for six months or less) and minor. No longer does one have to show that the employer believed the impairment (or perceived impairment) substantially limited performance of a major life activity. Employers have no obligation to provide reasonable accommodation to an individual who only meets the “regarded as” definition of disability.

The regulations are not final, and are subject to change after the public has had a 60-day opportunity to comment and make suggestions. I will report further on these regulations after they become final.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus.

For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Monday, September 21, 2009

Religious accommodation versus public image


According to an EEOC press release, the agency has filed suit against Ohio-based retailer Abercrombie & Fitch for alleged discrimination “against a 17-year-old Muslim by refusing to hire her because she wore a hijab, or head scarf, in observance of her sincerely held religious beliefs.” According to the lawsuit, pending in Tulsa, Okla., an Abercrombie Kids store refused to hire Samantha Elauf for a sales position because she was wearing a head covering during her interview, which violated the company’s “Look Policy.” The lawsuit also claims that the store failed to accommodate her religious beliefs by making an exception to the Look Policy

According to the EEOC Compliance Manual on Religions Discrimination, “An employer’s reliance on the broad rubric of ‘image’ to deny a requested religious accommodation may in a given case be tantamount to reliance on customer religious bias (so-called ‘customer preference’) in violation of Title VII.”

Title VII requires an employer, once on notice, to reasonably accommodate an employee whose sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance conflicts with a work requirement, unless providing the accommodation would create an undue hardship. Undue hardship is a low standard – the proposed accommodation need only pose more than a de minimis cost or burden. At least one court, the 1st Circuit in Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp. [PDF], has held that granting an exemption to a dress and grooming policy poses an undue hardship.

Anyone who has ever walked through a shopping mall knows that Abercrombie & Fitch portrays a certain image. Unless the EEOC can prove that the company promotes that image and maintains its “Look Policy” to exclude Muslim customers (or because of a preference for non-Muslim customers), it will have an uphill battle in proving that Abercrombie discriminated against this one job applicant by applying a facially neutral policy against her.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus.

For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Friday, September 18, 2009

WIRTW #96


Yesterday, I wrote about Ohio’s proposed law that would ban discrimination based on gender identity. Earlier this week, Dan Schwartz at the Connecticut Employment Law Blog weighed in on this issue in light of South African runner Caster Semenya, who competes as a woman but might genetically be a man.

In other pop culture news, Molly DiBianca at the Delaware Employment Law Blog gives her thoughts on workplace civility in light of recent outbursts by South Carolina GOP Rep. Joe Wilsonest, Serena Williams, and Kanye West.

Debra Reilly’s Workplace Investigations discusses employers’ bans on hiring employees with criminal histories. I’ve also touched on this topic before.

In other news about hiring decisions, Sindy Warren at the Warren & Hays Blog suggests that employers sparingly make word-of-mouth hiring decisions.

Both Philip Miles’s Lawffice Space and Walter Olson’s Overlawyered report on an Indiana court that has ruled that a pizza shop must pay for a 340-pound employee’s weight-loss surgery as a precursor to another operation for a workplace back injury.

LaborPains.org thinks unions efforts at a renaissance are futile. Meanwhile, the EFCA Report thinks that Senate Democrats are fractured on whether the controversial bill will pass this year.

Ann Bares at Compensation Cafe thinks that job titles can have some value to employees.

Ride the Lightning, courtesy of Eric Welter’s Laconic Law Blog, on whether employees have a right to privacy in personal emails sent via web-based email over an employer’s computer system.

Michael Maslanka’s Work Matters reminds us that often we need to start with the basics.

Melanie McClure at Arkansas Employment Law, on policies and exceptions.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus.

For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, September 17, 2009

Ohio House passes bill banning sexual orientation discrimination; fight moves to Senate


In yesterday's Columbus Dispatch, Jim Siegel reports that the Ohio House passed a bill that would prohibit employment discrimination based on sexual orientation by a vote of 53-39. If enacted, Ohio would join 20 other states with similar prohibitions. 17 Ohio cities, including Cleveland, already have similar laws.

The legislation would add sexual orientation and gender identity to the list of protected classes against whom employers cannot discriminate. The bill defines sexual orientation as “actual or perceived, heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.” It defines gender identity as “gender-related identity, appearance, or mannerisms or other gender-related characteristics of an individual, with or without regard to the individual's designated sex at birth.” Other key provisions include:

  • A limitation to employers with 15 or more employees. All other forms of discrimination apply to employers with 4 or more employees.
  • A carve out for religious groups.
  • Permission for employers to deny access to shared shower or dressing facilities in which being seen unclothed is unavoidable, provided that the employer provides reasonable access to adequate facilities that are not inconsistent with an employee’s gender identity.
  • No requirement that employers construct new or additional facilities to accommodate employees’ sexual orientation or gender identity.
  • No affirmative action requirements.
  • Employers can enforce otherwise legal dress codes and grooming standards, provided that the employer permits employees who have undergone or are undergoing gender transition to adhere to the same dress code or grooming standards as their new gender.

The bill now moves on to the Ohio Senate, where its Republican majority promises a fight. According to Senate President Bill Harris, “I talk to business people all the time, and they’re saying it’s not an issue.” So let me get this straight. It’s acceptable to oppose this bill because businesses are self-reporting that they are not discriminating. Isn’t that akin to asking a plantation owner in 1863 if he wants to abolish slavery?

If we want to be a state that is attractive to progressive businesses, we need to pass progressive legislation. Let’s hope the Senate gets its act together and sends this bill to Governor Strickland for his signature.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus.

For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Wednesday, September 16, 2009

Is “fat” the new protected class?


This week, Michael Haberman, at HR Observations, continues his series on “isms” with a post on what he calls “fatism” (or discrimination against the overweight). I found this post to be timely in light of recent headlines made by the Cleveland Clinic’s CEO that he would not hire obese people if the law allowed him to do so (he has since retracted those criticized comments).

Conventional wisdom says that with the exception of the morbidly obese, obesity is not a characteristic protected by the anti-discrimination laws. Indeed, in 2006, the 6th Circuit said as much in EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines [PDF], holding that “to constitute an ADA impairment, a person’s obesity, even morbid obesity,
must be the result of a physiological condition.” However, on Jan. 1, 2009, the ADA Amendments Act took effect. The ADAAA broadens what qualifies as a “disability” under the ADA.

It remains up in the air exactly how broadly this definition has been expanded. I do not believe it has been expanded so far as to encompass things such non-physiological obesity. We will have to wait and see, however, on the breadth of the ADAAA until courts and the EEOC start weighing in on exactly how broad the definition of “disability” has become.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus.

For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Tuesday, September 15, 2009

Do you know? Affirmative action and reverse discrimination


Many employers have affirmative action plans. However, just because you have a plan does not mean that the plan should be the only decision-making factor in hiring employees. In fact, sole reliance on an affirmative action plan in hiring could lead to a claim of reverse discrimination. In Humphries v. Pulaski County (8th Cir. 9/3/09) [PDF] examined the case of a white employee turned down for every promotion for which she applied in favor of African Americans. The court held:

[E]vidence that an employer followed an affirmative action plan in taking a challenged adverse employment action may constitute direct evidence of unlawful discrimination. If the employer defends by asserting that it acted pursuant to a valid affirmative action plan, the question then becomes whether the affirmative action plan is valid under Title VII….

To be valid, an affirmative action policy must be narrowly tailored to meet the goal of remedying past discrimination. It cannot, however, be used to maintain racial quotas. In the court’s words, it cannot be used to “unnecessarily trammel the rights of non-minorities.”

If your business has an affirmative action plan, use it as a factor in hiring decisions, but not the only factor.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus.

For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.