Wednesday, June 10, 2009

Drafting a social networking policy: 7 considerations


I could draft a perfect social networking policy using only a few words: “Be mature, be ethical, and think before you type.” Ultimately, you may decide that such brevity is what you want for you business. For the sake of completeness, though, I offer seven thoughts to consider when drafting a social networking policy.
  1. How far do you want to reach? Social networking presents two concerns for employers – how employees are spending their time at work, and how employees are portraying your company online when they are not at work. Any social networking policy must address both types of online use.
  2. Do you want to permit social networking at work, at all? It is not realistic to ban all social networking at work. For one thing, you will lose the benefit of business-related networking, such as LinkedIn. Without turning off internet access or blocking certain sites, a blanket ban is also hard to monitor and enforce.
  3. If you prohibit social networking, how will you monitor it? Turning off internet access, installing software to block certain sites, or monitoring employees’ use and disciplining offenders are all possibilities, depending on how aggressive you want to be and how much time you want to spend watching what your employees do online.
  4. If you permit employees to social network at work, do you want to limit it to work-related conduct, or permit limited personal use? How you answer this question depends on how you balance productivity versus marketing return.
  5. Do you want employees to identify with your business when networking online? Because this blog is affiliated with my law firm, Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, I am cognizant that everything I write reflects on my partners and my business. Employees should be made aware that if they post as an employee of your company, the company will hold them responsible for any negative portrayals. Or, you could simply require that employees not affiliate with your business and lose the networking and marketing potential Web 2.0 offers.
  6. How do you define “appropriate business behavior?” Employees need to understand that what they post online is public, and they have no privacy rights in what they put out for the world to see. Anything in cyberspace can be used as grounds to discipline an employee, no matter whether the employee wrote it from work or outside of work. There should be consequences for any information that negatively reflects on your business.
  7. How will social networking intersect with your broader harassment, technology, and confidentiality policies? Employment policies do not work in a vacuum. Employees’ online presence, depending on what they are posting, can violate any number of other corporate policies. Drafting a social networking policy is an excellent opportunity to revisit, update, and fine-tune other policies.
For more information on social networking, revisit yesterday’s post -- Do you know? Facebook and Twitter and blogs, oh my! What is social networking and why should you care?

Tuesday, June 9, 2009

Do you know? Facebook and Twitter and blogs, oh my! What is social networking and why should you care?


The history of social networking Cave drawings were likely the earliest form of social networking. Today people tweet their thoughts for the world to see. In between we’ve had instant messaging, MySpace, Facebook, and blogs. The next several big things are already being hatched by some students at Stanford or MIT. Online social networking is here to stay – the only change will be in what form it takes.

According to a recent survey conducted by Deloitte, 22% of employees say that they use some form of social networking five or more times per week, and 15% of employees admit they access social networking while at work for personal reasons. Yet, only 22% of companies have a formal policy that guides employees in how they can use social networking at work.

Before we can figure out what to do about these exploding media at work, we first need to know exactly what we are dealing with. So, for the uninitiated, the following is a short lesson on the various types of social networking that are likely being accessed from your workplace right now.
  • Blogs: Blog is short for weblog. Blogs either provide commentary on news or a particular subject (such as the Ohio Employer’s Law Blog), or serve as an online diary. Most are text-based, but blogs can also focus on art, photos, videos, and audio (you may have heard of podcasts). There are hundreds of millions of blogs on the internet, many updated as often as every day.
  • Facebook: Facebook started as an online tool for college and university students to connect with each other. It has since expanded to allow anyone over the age of 13 with a valid email address to open a free account. It is loosely organized into a variety of networks based on schools, location, employers, charities, and other causes. Connections are known as “friends.” People update with short written blurbs about what they’re doing, pictures, video, and the like. Users can also post on friends’ pages. If you’re not on Facebook, I guarantee someone you know is. In fact, Facebook has over 200 million registered users. Even my mom has a Facebook page.
  • LinkedIn: LinkedIn is an online network for professionals. It allows people to search and connect via alma mater, location, employer, or various user-created groups. It has over 41 million members.
  • Twitter: Twitter is latest big-thing in social networking. It is what is known as “micro-bloggings.” “Tweets” are text-based posts of up to 140 characters, displayed on the user’s profile page and delivered to followers, other users who have subscribed.
Employers have three options to try to regulate social networking by employees at work: 1) turn off their internet access; 2) institute progressively harsher discipline against employees caught Facebooking or tweeting at work; or 3) draft a reasonable policy that recognizes the intersection of technology in the workplace and employees’ lives, and establishes reasonable baseline expectations about what is and is not acceptable use at work. Only the latter option makes any real sense.

Tomorrow, we’ll explore the pieces and parts that comprise a useable social networking policy. Until then, feel free to follow my 140 character thoughts on Twitter @jonhyman.

Monday, June 8, 2009

Let’s start the week with a laugh


So much of the news is doom and gloom, I thought I’d start everyone’s week with a little humor from one of my all-time favorite movies, Office Space. If you haven’t seen it, it’s definitely worth queuing on Netflix. Besides being hilarious, it offers an excellent glimpse in how not to manage employees.

Back to more substantive stuff tomorrow, I promise.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus.

For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Friday, June 5, 2009

BREAKING NEWS: En banc panel of 6th Circuit reverses prior holding in Thompson v. North American Stainless and rejects associational retaliation claims


There are many types of relationships among employees in a workplace besides being co-workers. Many employees develop close friendships. Many businesses employee individuals from the same family – parents and their children, siblings, cousins, etc. Some employees work with their spouse. And some friendships develop into more, leading to dating, engagement, and even marriage.

Suppose an employee files a charge with the EEOC, and three weeks later, that employee’s fiancée is fired? Does the fiancée have a retaliation claim? Despite the fact that the fiancée engaged in no protected activity of his own, early last year in Thompson v. North American Stainless, the 6th Circuit permitted the employee to proceed with a retaliation claim by recognizing a claim for associational retaliation:

Title VII prohibit[s] employers from taking retaliatory action against employees not directly involved in protected activity, but who are so closely related to or associated with those who are directly involved, that it is clear that the protected activity motivated the employer's action. (emphasis added).

This morning, an en banc panel of the same court overturned its prior holding and expressly rejected this theory of associational retaliation.

Significantly, Thompson does not claim that he engaged in any statutorily protected activity, either on his own behalf or on behalf of Miriam Regalado…. By application of the plain language of the statute, Thompson is not included in the class of persons for whom Congress created a retaliation cause of action because he personally did not oppose an unlawful employment practice, make a charge, testify, assist, or participate in an investigation….

We must look to what Congress actually enacted, not what we believe Congress might have passed were it confronted with the facts at bar. For the reasons we have laid out, it was not “absurd” for Congress to limit the class of persons who are entitled to sue to employees who personally opposed a practice, made a charge, assisted, or participated in an investigation. Our interpretation does not undermine the anti-retaliation provision’s purpose because retaliation is still actionable, but only in a suit by a primary actor who engaged in protected activity and not by a passive bystander.

Retaliation continues to be of the most dangerous employment-law risks to face employers. By limiting this potential liability, this decision is a huge win for Ohio businesses. Employers no longer have to worry about how close of a relationship is close enough for a potential retaliation claim. As far as retaliation is concerned, employers need only worry about employees who actually engage in their own protected activity. Isn’t that enough for employers to worry about? 


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus.

For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

WIRTW #82


I have a confession to make. I’ve never watched an episode of Jon & Kate Plus 8. I know that I am confessing to being a pop-culture Neanderthal. I guess I can live with that. This week, the Pennsylvania Labor Department launched an investigation into whether the show violates child labor laws. Michael Moore at the Pennsylvania Labor & Employment Blog and Jeffrey Hirsch at the Workplace Prof Blog have the details. For more information on child labor laws generally, check out Jennifer Hays’s thoughts at the Warren & Hays Blog.

I have another confession to make. I had been working on a piece that draws some lessons on talent management from the Cavs’s crushing loss in the Eastern Conference Finals. The HR Capitalist beat me to it.

During a White House press conference earlier this week, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs offered what can best be described as lukewarm support for the Employee Free Choice Act. LaborPains.org details his comments. Meanwhile, Michael Fox at Jottings by an Employer’s Lawyer reminds everyone that card check is only one of three key parts of the EFCA. In other labor law news, Michael Maslanka at Work Matters draws three important lessons from a recent viewing of Norma Rae.

BLR’s HR Daily Advisor ran a two part series this week on how to avoid lawsuits during a RIF: Part One and Part Two.

The Word on Employment Law with John Phillips, on playing hardball with former employees.

Patrick Smith at the Iowa Employment Law Blog talks about the legal risks in asking exempt employees to take time off for economic reasons. For my thoughts on this issue, see Do you know? Mandatory unpaid time off may affect salaried employees’ exemptions.

Employment Law Bits has information on potential paid sick leave legislation.

Wage Law itemizes some of Supreme Court nominee Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s more important employment law opinions.

Ann Barnes at Compensation Force details a recent survey of severance pay and other separation policies.

Jay Shepherd at Gruntled Employees thinks Twitter will kill annual employee performance reviews.

The Laconic Law Blog reports on a decision out the D.C. Circuit discussing the distinctions between employees and independent contractors.

Becky Regan at Compensation Cafe lists 7 considerations for an effective sales plan.

Finally, I Hate People...But It's Nothing Personal reminds everyone that while it’s easy to hate lawyers, “savvy lawyers save your company time, aggravation and money.” Well said.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus.

For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, June 4, 2009

3 lessons in handling workplace harassment


Gallagher v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide (6th Cir. 5/22/09) [PDF] offers an excellent example of how businesses get themselves into trouble by failing to actively and effectively police workplace offensive conduct.

Julie Gallagher began working at C.H. Robinson Worldwide, a Cleveland trucking company, in September 2002. She held an office job at CHR, working with two dozen other employees in a relatively small office. She quit CHR after only four months. In the interim, she claims that she was subjected to repeated sex-based harassment and offensive conduct, including:

  • The prevalent use of foul language by mostly male coworkers who openly and loudly referred to female customers, truck drivers, coworkers and others as bitches, whores, sluts, dykes and cunts.
  • The frequent display of pornographic websites and magazines.
  • Co-workers who shared nude pictures of their girlfriends in different sexual poses.
  • Male co-workers who daily traded sexual jokes and engaged in graphic discussions about their sexual liaisons, fantasies, and preferences.
  • One co-worker angrily called her a “bitch” on several occasions.
  • Male co-workers called her fat, a “heifer” with “milking udders,” and “moo”ed at her. 

Gallagher admitted that she did not avail herself of CHR’s formal harassment policy and complaint mechanism, but did sometimes complain to the branch manager, Greg Quast, to no avail.

The trial court granted CHR’s summary judgment motion and dismissed Gallagher’s case. The 6th Circuit, however, reversed and sent the case back for trial. Why? And what can employers learn from this case?

  1. Offensive conduct can be “based on sex” whether or not it is directed at a woman. In this case, most of the complained of harassment was not directed at Gallagher, but was explicitly sexual and degrading of women in general. Such conduct is actionable whether or not the complaining employee is specifically targeted. The lesson: Employers should not ignore harassment complaints just because the complaining employee was only subjected to general workplace misconduct.

  2. A jury could conclude that the harassment was severe and pervasive: “Considering the totality of the circumstances …, the conclusion is inescapable that a reasonable person could have found the Cleveland office—permeated with vulgar language, demeaning conversations and images, and palpable anti-female animus—objectively hostile.” The lesson: Businesses are not fraternity houses, and employers that allow frat-like antics to permeate the workplace will often find themselves on the losing end of a harassment lawsuit.

  3. The branch manager should have taken greater steps to correct or remedy the harassment: “It is true that Gallagher did not report all of her concerns to Quast and did not necessarily characterize all of her complaints as sexual harassment complaints. Still, when the conduct Gallagher did report to Quast is considered alongside the pervasive conduct Quast himself witnessed, it can hardly be denied that there is a genuine fact issue as to what Quast, and therefore C.H. Robinson, knew or should have known.” The lesson: Once management knows or should know of inappropriate conduct (whether by a complaint or otherwise), it cannot borough its head in the sand, but must undertake a reasonable investigation and implement prompt remediation if warranted.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus.

For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Wednesday, June 3, 2009

Ohio Supreme Court confirms 180-day statute of limitations for most age discrimination claims


Ohio has what can best be described as a disjointed statute for age discrimination claims. Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code has four different provisions that cover age discrimination:

4112.14(B) While a six-year statute of limitations applies to claim under this section, it provides limited remedies – lost wages and benefits, reinstatement, costs, and attorneys’ fees.
4112.02(N) An age-discrimination claim under this section must be brought within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice. Unlike 4112.14(B), it allows for the full list of available remedies, including compensatory and punitive damages.
4112.05 Allows for an individual to file an administrative charge with the OCRC, but acts as an absolute bar to filing a civil action in court for age discrimination.
4112.99 Provides an independent civil action to seek redress for any form of discrimination identified in Chapter 4112, including age discrimination.

 

In January 2008, the Hamilton County Court of Appeals held, in Meyer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., that 4112.99 creates its own independent cause of action for age discrimination, which is subject to its own six-year statute of limitations. At the time, I argued that the Meyer case was an anomaly, and that the conventional 180-day statute of limitations for claims under 4112.02(B) was likely still good law. Yesterday, the Ohio Supreme Court agreed with my instincts and reversed the Meyer decision. In Meyer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. (6/2/09) [PDF], the Ohio Supreme Court held that 4112.99 does not create its own cause of action, but instead any age claim brought under 4112.99 is merely subject to the specific provisions of 4112.02 and 4112.14.

Thus, a plaintiff only has 180 days to pursue an age claim and seek full remedies. Thereafter, any age claim brought up to six years hence would be restricted to 4112.14(B)’s limited damages. A plaintiff can still plead an age claim under 4112.99, but ultimately will have to elect either 4112.02 or 4112.14 as the statute under which the claim is being brought.

While Meyer may not break new ground, employers should nevertheless breathe a sigh of relief that the appellate court’s anomalous opinion was reversed. Employers will continue to enjoy Ohio’s very short window for individuals to seek a full slate of damages for age discrimination. 


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus.

For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.