Ohio Supreme Court holds that retained memory can constitute a trade secret

It has long been thought that under Ohio's trade secret statute, R.C. 1333.61, that which an employee holds in retained memory does not meet the definition of a trade secret. Thus, prior courts have differentiated, for example, between employees who remove documents or files and those who recreate the contents of those documents from memory. The former were covered by the trade secret statute, while the latter were not. This week, the Ohio Supreme Court, in Al Minor & Assoc., Inc. v. Martin, has upended this conventional wisdom, and in doing so has greatly expanded the enforceability of not only the trade secret law, but also noncompetition agreements.

R.C. 1333.61(D) defines a "trade secret" as:

[I]nformation, including the whole or any portion or phase of any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or improvement, or any business information or plans, financial information, or listing of names, addresses, or telephone numbers, that satisfies both of the following:

(1) It derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.

(2) It is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

At issue in Al Minor & Assocs. v. Martin was whether a customer list compiled by a former employee strictly from memory can form the basis for a statutory trade secret violation. The Ohio Supreme Court unanimously answered this question in the affirmative, holding that information that constitutes a trade secret under R.C. 1333.61(D) does not lose its character by being recreated from memory. In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied upon the language of the statute, which does not differentiate between physical information and that which is reproduced from memory.

While this will change the landscape of trade secrets, it does not alter the longstanding rule that information which can otherwise be discovered through reasonable means does not qualify as a trade secret. Thus, customer lists often lose trade secret protection if they can be reverse engineered, such as by simply looking in the phone book. This decision, however, will make it more difficult for an employee to demonstrate that a customer list was reverse engineered, because of the fact that the fruits of such reverse engineering is often the product of the employee's memory.

This case will not only expand trade secret protection, but also the class of employees against whom noncompetition agreements can be enforced. One of the key factors that courts examine in the enforcement of such agreements is whether the agreement seeks to protect a legitimate interest of the employer. That component will be much easier to satisfy with the expansion of trade secrets to include retained memory.

This decision will be a boon for employers who want to protect information or lock up employees with noncompetition agreements. The flip side, however, is that employers must now be more diligent than ever in the hiring process. It will no longer be enough to simply ask that an employee not bring anything (documents, files, etc.) with him or her to a new job. At the same time, it is impossible to ask an employee to turn off his or her mind or erase his or her memory.

Thus, one possible unintended consequence of this decision will be an increase in the transaction costs of recruiting and hiring. Anytime an employee is recruited, that employee now has the potential to bring trade secrets with him or her in memory. The recruiting process might now have to include the former employer in the hiring process to ensure against any future legal claims concerning retained memory trade secrets. Otherwise, I don't know how an employer hiring anyone who had access to anything that could remotely be construed as a trade secret can have any comfort level with the hiring.

Carnival of HR #26 is available

This post comes to you from the Holiday Inn Express in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Three Star Leadership Blog has posted the 26th Carnival of HR. It includes posts on predatory employees, the problems with bored employees, 10 ways to screw up a performance appraisal, and a post from yours truly on bullying bosses and unemployment compensation. I recommend that everyone take a few minutes to click over to the Carnival and read some of the best HR posts from the past few weeks.

Don't confuse "family status" for "family responsibility discrimination"

I've blogged a lot on "family responsibility discrimination," which is discrimination against parents or caregivers because of their status as such. "Family responsibility" or "caregiver status", however, are not protected classes in and of themselves. They are only illegal if the alleged conduct otherwise violates Title VII or the ADA. In other words, the law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ancestry, color, age, and disability. Thus, for example, it is not illegal to discriminate against all parents because of their parental status, but only if you treat moms differently than dads, or black parents differently than white parents, or parents of disabled children different than parents of non-disabled children.

Adamson v. Multi Cmty. Diversified Servs., Inc. clarifies this important distinction. In that case, decided last week by the 10th Circuit, the plaintiffs, a husband, wife, and daughter who were terminated by a non-profit organization, claimed that "familial status" is a protected classification under Title VII. The Court rejected that argument:

Title VII protects neither the family unit nor individual family members from discrimination based on their "familial status" alone…. "Familial status" is not a classification based on sex any more than is being a "sibling" or "relative" generally. It is, by definition, gender neutral. The use of gender to parse those classifications into subcategories of "husbands, wives and daughters" is a social and linguistic convention that neither alters this fact nor elevates those subcategories to protected status. Mr. Adamson’s claim that he was terminated in violation of Title VII based on his status as Patricia's "husband" (and Jessica's "father"), and Patricia and Jessica's claims that they were terminated by virtue of being Barry's "wife" and "daughter," respectively, fall outside the scope of Title VII and its purpose in protecting employees against invidious discrimination on the basis of sex, and we reject those claims….

Thus, an employer that discriminates against an individual solely on the basis of his or her "familial status" violates no law, unless the discrimination is tied to some specific protected class.

Appeals court allows ex-employee's retaliation caim to proceed based on the filing of a lawsuit against an employer

Retaliation cases continue to be one of the hot button employment law issues. This term, the Supreme Court has agreed to hear three separate retaliation cases. (See Retaliation Cases Hit High Court En Masse). Not to be outdone, the Ohio Supreme Court has handed down several important retaliation decisions in the past few months, including one which held that an employer's lawsuit against an employee who has engaged in protected activity is not retaliation if the employer has an objective basis for filing the lawsuit. On the issue of brining a lawsuit against an employee, I have cautioned, "The decision of whether to file a claim against an employee or ex-employee is not an easy one, and should not be undertaken without careful thought, a clear strategy of the goals to be achieved, and consideration of whether those goals are worth the risk of defending against a likely retaliation claim or the perception in court that the counter-suit is merely retaliatory." These words ring more true than ever after last week's decision by the 4th Circuit in Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., which permitted an employee's retaliation claim based on a lawsuit filed by the employer.

Larry Darveau filed a complaint against his former employer employer, Detecon, seeking compensation for unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Two weeks later, Detecon filed an action against Darveau, alleging fraud arising out of a sales contract whose termination Darveau allegedly hid to meet his goal for an annual bonus. In response, Darveau amended his own complaint to include a retaliation claim, contending that Detecon's lawsuit constituted retaliation under the FLSA in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). That section makes it unlawful "to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter." Because Darveau's complaint alleged that Detecon filed its lawsuit with a retaliatory motive and without any reasonable basis in fact or law, he stated a proper reclaim and the district court improperly dismissed the retaliation claim.

Detecon argued that it could not retaliate against Darveau because he was no longer its employee when it filed its lawsuit against him. The 4th Circuit roundly rejected that position:

Somewhat surprisingly, Detecon contends that looking to the Supreme Court's Title VII jurisprudence in this FLSA case will generate the "anomalous result" of extending protection from retaliation to former employees who no longer enjoy the substantive protections of the FLSA. Yet in Burlington Northern, the [Supreme] Court rejected this very argument in the Title VII context, observing that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision serves a different purpose than its substantive provisions and that such "differences in ... purpose ... remove any perceived 'anomaly.'" The more unfortunate anomaly would be if an employee’s underlying FLSA claim could be brought after he quit, but the employee's protection from retaliation ended when the employee stepped beyond the employer's doorstep. ... There is nothing in the language or history of [the FLSA] to indicate that Congress intended to penalize dissatisfied employees who voluntarily leave an employer by thereafter denying them the protections of [the Act]. There is every reason to conclude precisely the contrary.

This case reminds us that retaliation does not end when employment ends, because an employee can be chilled from exercising protected rights long after he or she leaves one's employ. It also underscores the myriad legal problems that companies potentially face when choosing to pursue a claim, meritorious or not, against a current or former employee.

The importance of confidential settlement agreements

Kathleen Peratis at the Jewish Daily Forward is proposing the passage of legislation to prohibit settlement agreements in employment discrimination cases from containing confidentiality clauses, and requiring their filing with a court so that they are publicly available. Her rationale is that because most of the enforcement of our civil rights laws is done by private lawsuits, the confidential settlement of those lawsuits chills public knowledge about discriminatory misconduct and the enforcement of the laws against it. In Ms. Peratis's own words:

Lately, however, a new and alarming flaw has emerged, a flaw that urgently warrants response: Although the number of employment discrimination cases filed has nearly tripled in the last 10 years, the amount of public information about them has dwindled to practically nothing. About 70% of employment discrimination lawsuits are settled — less than 4% actually go to trial — and nearly all settlement agreements require strict "confidentiality," meaning no one can reveal the terms of the settlement, including the amount paid to the plaintiff.

Thus, an important aspect of civil rights enforcement has become invisible. A weak system has become a secret system, and the public interest is suffering. None of this was supposed to happen.

"Employment discrimination statutes were not envisioned to promote secret settlement," says Minna Kotkin, a law professor at Brooklyn Law School who has studied the issue. "The whole thrust of the legislation was that, by facilitating employee suits, discrimination would be brought to public attention and the litigation process would serve to deter other employers from similar conduct." ...

With secret settlements, the penalties for job discrimination become invisible. Deterrence value is squandered. After expenditure of judicial resources and perhaps a blaze of media coverage, the silenced victim appears to say, "Oh, never mind." The general public comes to believe, as some surveys suggest, that employment discrimination is a thing of the past, attitudes of jury pools are skewed, and the chances of success for the next victim are diminished....

The problem has an easy fix: Prohibit the parties from withdrawing or dismissing any employment discrimination lawsuit unless the settlement agreement is filed as a public document with the court. Of course, as with all rules, there could be exceptions for good cause shown, but the default position would favor openness.

Ms. Peratis correctly points out that most employers will not settle an employment claim without confidentiality, perceiving that public knowledge of a settlement will only encourage others to bring claims. Her argument, however, has several key flaws, each of which underscores why I oppose her proposal.

First, it rests on the faulty premise that all settled claims have merit. Nothing could be further from the truth. Confidentiality is a necessary component of settlements to deter the disgruntled employee from filing a questionable lawsuit to make a quick dollar. Confidentiality has no effect on whether those who are being discriminated against, or perceive they are being discriminated against, will file a lawsuit. That class of employees will still seek lawyers, and those claims will still be filed.

Secondly, information about lawsuits is already publicly available. All court dockets are open and available to anyone who wants to go to the courthouse or, in most cases, to anyone who can access the Internet. The mere fact that a lawsuit has been filed serves Ms. Peratis's purpose of keeping the public informed about workplace discrimination claims.

Finally, while according to Ms. Peratis only 4% of employment cases proceed to trial, the jury verdicts for those that are successful are routinely large and frequently reported in the press. You tell me which of the following will have a greater impact on the likelihood of an employee filing a lawsuit - a tiny docket entry noting a $10,000 nuisance value settlement that no one will ever find unless they are specifically looking for it, or a front page article about a $16 million discrimination verdict? Indeed, if what Ms. Peratis says is correct, and the number of employment discrimination cases filed in the last 10 years has tripled, how can this alleged secrecy be a problem?

[Hat tip: Professor Paul Secunda at the Workplace Prof Blog]

Bullying boss justifies unemployment award

It has long been accepted that our discriminations laws do not set forth "a general civility code for the American workplace." (Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services). Certain fringe groups hope to change this by passing anti-bullying legislation (see Sticks and stones may break my bones...). Nevertheless, as it stands now, employees cannot sue their employers for bullying or being abusive unless the harassment is because of sex or some other protected class.

This week the Summit County Court of Appeals, in Ro-Mai Industries, Inc. v. Weinberg, awarded unemployment compensation to an employee who quit his job because he could not deal with his admittedly abusive boss.

According to the opinion:

Weinberg accepted a position at Ro-Mai after interviewing with Maier. Weinberg, who had extensive experience in sales, was told that his position at Ro-Mai would involve sales work and would require him to be at the office from approximately 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. After a few days of work, however, it became clear that Weinberg's actual duties differed from the job description that he received. He was not given any sales work and he often worked well over the nine hour shift that he was promised. Moreover, Weinberg discovered that Maier had a habit of yelling at the employees. Although Weinberg told Maier that he did not appreciate being treated in such a manner, Maier continued to yell.

On November 3, 2005, Weinberg informed Ro-Mai's head of human resources that he intended to quit. However, before Weinberg left the office Maier sought him out, promised to stop yelling at him, and convinced him to stay. Weinberg returned to work the next day, and Maier resumed his habit of yelling at him. Accordingly, Weinberg quit the following day….

Maier admitted that he often yelled at his employees. During the hearing, he stated: "When I hired [Weinberg], I told him I'm probably the worst employer to ever work for[.] I'm difficult. I expect a lot. And I warned him in advance that I'm very difficult…. [W]hen it comes to the business, I – I can yell. I did yell." Weinberg testified that when he complained to human resources about Maier’s yelling, he was told: "[O]h, it[] gets worse. That’s the way he is."

Maier’s yelling was not a single, isolated incident…. It was a repetitive problem that Weinberg unsuccessfully tried to address with Ro-Mai’s human resources department prior to quitting. Weinberg even agreed to resume work the first time that he intended to quit because Maier asked him to stay and promised to stop yelling. He did not abandon his employment without warning, or leave with utter disregard for the good of the business.

Thus, the Court concluded that Weinberg was justified in quitting his job because of his abusive boss and upheld his award of unemployment.

I've always subscribed to the law and economics model on the issue of bad bosses. Bad bosses beget transitory workforces and ultimately cannot succeed as bosses because of their revolving door. Good bosses create loyalty, retain good employees, and succeed accordingly. Imposing liability (even for unemployment comp) merely for being subjected to a bad boss sets a dangerous precedent that has the real potential to eliminate the "at will" from all such employment relationships.

What else I'm reading this week #16

Last week, I gave everyone my thoughts on IBM's reaction to its $65 million wage and hour settlement (An expectational argument for overtime pay). HR World has been kind enough to compile some other thoughts from around the blogosphere on this topic, and let's just say I'm decidedly in the minority.

The HR Capitalist comments on the pitfalls of political banter in the workplace.

John Phillips' Word on Employment Law has a timely post on how e-mails and instant messages can come back to haunt those who use their work computers for evil.

Tracy Coenen's Fraud Files comments on the extension of unemployment benefits under President Bush's economic stimulus package, and opines that it will actually hurt the economy by de-incentivizes people from working.

Suits in the Workplace discusses a 2nd Circuit case in which a doctor was found to be an employee and not an independent contract, and therefore covered by Title VII.

Finally, Workplace Privacy Counsel reports on the California Supreme Court's proclamation that an employee's legal use of medical marijuana does not insulate that employee from being terminated for failing a drug test.