BREAKING NEWS: State halts new maternity leave regulations

So I've been saying for the past few months that once the OCRC adopted its new maternity leave regulations, passage by the legislative Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review would be a mere formality. Boy do I have egg on my face.

In a 9-1 vote, the JCARR sent the new regulations back to the OCRC for a more complete fiscal analysis. The Committee was unhappy that the OCRC said there would be no fiscal impact on school districts or local governments from the rule change. Today's Plain Dealer quotes State Senator and JCARR member Tom Niehaus, who cited as an example a small township police department that would be forced to cover shifts for a pregnant employee and pay overtime costs. Sen. Niehaus also expressed concern as to whether the OCRC has the authority to enact these regulations, although the Committee as a whole sidestepped that issue. The OCRC must now wait at least 90 days before returning with an updated application for the rule change. One now has to question whether the JCARR will ever approve the new regulations.

The bottom line for employers is that for now the old rule remains, that women must given a "reasonable" amount of time off work for maternity leave. I caution, however, that courts that have looked at the current 4112-05-5(G) have interpreted 12 weeks as "reasonable" because it is what the FMLA provides.

How far to the right has the Supreme Court swung?

In reporting on yesterday's oral argument in Sprint/United Management v. Mendelsohn, the New York Times asks the question: "Has the Supreme Court drifted so far toward the employer's side in job discrimination cases that it is now to the right of the Bush administration?" The answer will not be known until all of this term's employment cases have been decided, but yesterday's oral argument may give us a clue that employees could have a tough go under the Roberts Court.

Many of the Justices seemed very concerned that the admission of "me, too" evidence in discrimination cases would lead to mini-trials of each "me, too" witness. The Justices were also concerned that admission of "me, too" testimony would require correlative admission of "but not us" witnesses in rebuttal by the employer. Trials that could last a mere two days could "last a thousand years," in the words of Justice Breyer, who is not known for his conservative views. The Justices questioned whether it was just simpler and cleaner to exclude the evidence in all but the clearest of cases, such as when the same decisionmaker is involved. After reading the argument transcript, I stand by yesterday's prediction -- the Court will hold that the appellate court erred in reversing the trial court's discretionary exclusion of the "me, too" evidence, and rule that such evidence is neither per se admissible or inadmissible in discrimination cases, but is left to the sound discretion of the trial court under Evidence Rule 403. The Court may also set forth some guideposts for trial courts to follow in exercising its discretion, such as whether the same decisionmaker was involved in the decision to terminate the "me, too" witnesses, or whether there is objective, independent evidence of a policy or practice of discrimination.

Supreme Court to hear arguments today on issue of "me too" discrimination

Sprint/United Management v. Mendelsohn, which will be argued today at the Supreme Court, raises an important evidentiary issue that arises time and again in discrimination cases: "whether a district court must admit 'me, too' evidence — testimony by nonparties, alleging discrimination at the hands of persons who played no role in the adverse employment decision challenged by the plaintiff." Although this is an age discrimination case, the Court's holding will almost certainly affect race, gender, and other discrimination lawsuits. The issue is important for businesses, as permitting "me, too" evidence of discrimination will likely make discrimination cases more time-consuming, expensive, and difficult to defend, by forcing companies to defend against allegations brought by employees not parties to the lawsuit.

The facts of Mendelsohn are relatively simple. Ellen Mendelsohn, 51 years old, was one of 18 people in her group laid off by Sprint in the fall of 2002. Company-wide, Sprint laid off 15,000 employees. Sprint claimed that it included Mendelsohn in the RIF because of poor job performance. Mendelsohn claimed age bias in the decision.

At trial, she sought to call five other former Sprint employees, all over the age of 40, to testify that they too suffered age discrimination at Sprint. Sprint objected on the grounds that none of those five employees had worked for the same supervisor who had made the decision to lay off Mendelsohn. The district court agreed, and ruled that only workers laid off by the same supervisor could be called to testify. Ultimately, the jury ruled in Sprint's favor.

The 10th Circuit reversed, ruling that a district court must admit any testimony of other workers who claimed to suffer the same sort of bias against them, even if a different decisionmaker was involved. It rejected Sprint's contention that the testimony was irrelevant because the witnesses were not terminated by the same supervisor as Mendelsohn. The court concluded that Mendelsohn was entitled to show that there was an unwritten "company-wide policy" of discrimination, under which multiple supervisors, and not just Mendelsohn's, were participating. Further, the court was unconcerned whether there was any evidence substantiating the existence of such a policy other than the plaintiff's subjective belief. Instead, the court found that the evidence is relevant and admissible because a jury could reasonably find the alleged discrimination was made more likely by proof of "an atmosphere of age discrimination" and "Sprint's selection of other older employees to the RIF."

There are any number of reasons why this decision should be reversed. In a discrimination case liability can only be shown by demonstrating discriminatory intent on the part of the decisionmaker (i.e, the person who made the relevant employment decision). Mendelsohn's five "me, too" witnesses, however, could offer nothing to show that Mendelsohn's supervisor acted with discriminatory intent. Additionally, no one had any proof that the various different decisionmakers were acting under some common scheme or plan, other than their own unsupported subjective beliefs. I would concede that the case would be different if there was some independent corroboration of a company-wide policy. Finally, I question the appellate court's reversal of a district court's discretionary evidentiary ruling.

This case will also be interesting from a Court-watching perspective, as it will be the third substantive employment decision out of the the Roberts Court. Last term, the Court was 1-1 in employments cases, with the Ledbetter pay discrimination case coming down for the employer, and the Burlington Northern retaliation decision for the employee. My prediction — a reversal with a holding that "me, too" evidence is not per se admissible in discrimination cases. Dicta will make it clear that such evidence is relevant when it is from the same decisionmaker, or from a different decisionmaker with independent evidence of a company-wide policy of discrimination.

A copy of the oral argument transcript is available from the Supreme Court here.

What else I'm reading this week #7

It's been a busy week in the blogosphere. Everyone is back at work, having digested their turkey and probably having started their holiday shopping. So, it is appropriate that we begin our weekly roundup with the following:

Beating the Crowds: Online Shopping at Work?, from HR World, on the monitoring of employees' use of work computers for holiday shopping.

Is the Family Leave Act Too Soft or Too Tough?, from the Wall Street Journal's Career Journal, debating whether the FMLA is too small of a benefit to employees or too big a burden to employers.

Exploring Tough Questions on E-Mail Confidentiality, from Ediscoveryinfo, noting the importance of reminding your employees that e-mails are not confidential. The advice that I always tell people in regards to whether to put something in an email -- if you do not want it read by your boss, shown to a jury, published on the front page of your local newspaper, or seen by your mother, it is probably best not to send it.

Business Week: "Unions: Less Impact and a Lower Profile", from The Union-Free Employer, commenting on the shrinking importance of labor unions in today's business climate.

Layoffs and Reductions in Force: Five Things every HR Generalist should know, from the Pennsylvania Employment Law Blog, giving a rundown of hot-button issues for mass layoffs and reductions in force.

Finally, we started with an issue of importance for the holiday season, and we'll finish with a couple of others:

Employer Liability at Office Holiday Parties - Beyond Sexual Harassment, Part I and Part II, from the Connecticut Employment Law Blog, summarizing the legal issues other than sexual harassment liability that can arise from over-lubricated employees at holiday parties.

For another reason why not to overindulge at the office holiday party:

Cheers!

Computer awareness should be important part of harassment policies and training

Danial Schwartz at the Connecticut Employment Law Blog posted yesterday on a case from the Second Circuit, which held that the mere presence of pornography in the workplace can be enough to create an objectively hostile work environment. Danial's point is similar to one that I wrote about couple of weeks ago, that businesses must take all harassment complaints seriously through prompt and thorough investigations. (See Remedial action must be meaningful to save employer from harassment liability).

Danial's post raises another important issue. Computers, email, and the Internet have become indispensable tools in most workplaces. They also make pornography readily available at the click of a mouse or the strike of a key. If courts are going to view the mere presence of pornography in the workplace sufficient to state a claim for sexual harassment, then employers must be vigilant about policing against it. This policing requires three important steps:

1. Implement a technology use policy (which includes computers, email, and the Internet), which patently forbids the downloading, display, or viewing of pornography, and makes it a terminable offense.
2. Incorporate training on the appropriate use of technology into your annual or every-other-year harassment training.
3. Consistently enforce the policy.

As I've repeatedly said, there is no such thing as a bulletproof employer. Taking these three simple, proactive steps, however, will go a long way towards limiting your risk and exposure should an employee file a harassment lawsuit based on workplace pornography.

Carnival of HR #21

The Carnival of HR (#21 for those keeping count) is available at Race in the Workplace. For those unfamiliar with the Carnival of HR, it is a traveling semimonthly compilation of the best HR-related posts in the blogosphere. Please jump on over to Race in the Workplace and support the efforts of the many bloggers who are linked.

ADA may require leaves of absence beyond FMLA mandates

Managing medical leaves of absence is the bane of nearly every HR department I come in contact with. In my experience, companies either react too harshly (immediate termination upon the expiration of 12 weeks of FMLA-eligible employees), or too passively (extending leaves of absence indefinitely). HR World has posted an interesting article on extending FMLA leaves of absence beyond 12 weeks, and attempts to strike a balance by asking how long is too long.

The article points out that a company may want to extend a leave beyond 12 weeks so as not to lose a valuable employee. The issue, however, runs much deeper, and under certain circumstances an extended unpaid leave of absence might be required as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA for employees with a qualifying disability. The ADA's regulations specifically provide that an unpaid medical leave qualifies as a reasonable accommodation and must be provided to an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o). Thus, an employer may still have to provide unpaid leave as a reasonable accommodation: 1) after an employee exhausts the 12 weeks of FMLA leave, or 2) if an employer has fewer than 50 employees or if the employee has less than one year of service.

The EEOC's Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (at Q. 21) gives the following helpful example:

An employee with an ADA disability needs 13 weeks of leave for treatment related to the disability. The employee is eligible under the FMLA for 12 weeks of leave (the maximum available), so this period of leave constitutes both FMLA leave and a reasonable accommodation. Under the FMLA, the employer could deny the employee the thirteenth week of leave. But, because the employee is also covered under the ADA, the employer cannot deny the request for the thirteenth week of leave unless it can show undue hardship. The employer may consider the impact on its operations caused by the initial 12-week absence, along with other undue hardship factors.

No leave must be extended indefinitely, and at some point a leave of absence is going become an undue hardship to the employer and can be ended. When that is, though, is not only going to vary from employer to employer, but also from employee to employee. Each specific leave of absence must be analyzed on its own merits, case by case. Six months is generally a good rule of thumb to follow, but there are many circumstances where a court could deem six months unreasonably short. The bottom line is to work with the employee and the medical caregiver to determine how long an employee needs to be off work, and make the best efforts, within reason, to accommodate the necessary leave for employees who qualify for protection under the ADA.