Monday, June 17, 2013

Fox Searchlight case confirm that unpaid interns are a dying breed


Out of the millions of page-views this blog has received over the six-years of its existence, the most popular post (by an almost three-to-one margin over its closest competitor) is You should pay attention to this post if you have unpaid interns. In that post, I discussed a lawsuit filed by two unpaid interns who claimed that they should have been paid while working for Fox Searchlight pictures.

Last week, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York agreed.

In Glatt v. Fox Searchlight [pdf], the Court applied the Department of Labor’s six-factor test and determined that that the internships should have been paid.

1. Is the training similar to what would be given in a vocational school or academic educational instruction?

While classroom training is not a prerequisite, internships must provide something beyond on-the-job training that employees receive…. Footman did not receive any formal training or education during his internship. He did not acquire any new skills aside from those specific to Black Swan’s back office, such as how it watermarked scripts or how the photocopier or coffee maker operated.

2. Is the training for the benefit of the trainees or students?

Undoubtedly, Glatt and Footman received some benefits from their internships, such as resume listings, job references, and an understanding of how a production office works. But those benefits were incidental to working in the office like any other employee and were not the result of internships intentionally structured to benefit them…. On the other hand, Searchlight received the benefits of their unpaid work, which otherwise would have required paid employees

3. Do the trainees or students work under their close observation of regular employees without displacing them?

Glatt and Footman performed routine tasks that would otherwise have been performed by regular employees…. His supervisor stated that “[i]f Mr. Glatt had not performed this work, another member of my staff would have been required to work longer hours to perform it, or we would have needed a paid production assistant or another intern to do it.”

4. Does the employer derive no immediate advantage from the activities of the trainees or students, and on occasion are the employer’s operations actually impeded?

Searchlight does not dispute that it obtained an immediate advantage from Glatt and Footman's work. They performed tasks that would have required paid employees. There is no evidence they ever impeded work at their internships. Menial as it was, their work was essential. The fact they were beginners is irrelevant

5. Are the trainees or students not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the training period?

There is no evidence Glatt or Footman were entitled to jobs at the end of their internships or thought they would be.

6. Do the employer and the trainees or students understand that the trainees or students are not entitled to wages for the time spent in training?

Glatt and Footman understood they would not be paid. But this factor adds little, because the FLSA does not allow employees to waive their entitlement to wages.

Based on the balancing of these six factors, the Court concluded the the employees “were classified improperly as unpaid interns and are ‘employees’ covered by the FLSA.”

This issue is not going away. According to Friday’s New York Times, last week two former interns sued Condé Nast for unpaid wages. I think it’s fair to say that the sun in quickly setting on the use of unpaid internships in corporate America.

In light of these cases, it bears repeating the conclusion I reached in The Employer Bill of Rights (p. 159):

Employers that use unpaid interns should pay careful attention to this issue. It is far better to scrutinize interns under the DOL’s six factors before the agency, or a group of plaintiffs, swoop in and do it for you. It is even better to formalize the relationship in a written internship agreement that formally spells out how each of these six questions is answered in your favor. Or maybe it is best simply to assume that except in rare cases, there is no such animal as an “unpaid intern,” and you should simply accept the fact that if you are going to label entry-level employees as interns, you need to pay them for their services.

Friday, June 14, 2013

WIRTW #278 (the “carnival barker” edition)


This coming Wednesday, I’m hosting the Employment Law Blog Carnival. For the uninitiated, a blog carnival a collection of submitted links arranged around a particular theme. To get a better idea of what the Employment Law Blog Carnival is all about, you can read my prior two hosting stints:

If you have a link you’d like me to share in this month’s Carnival, please email it to me no later than Monday.

Because of my Carnival-hosting duties, WIRTW will not run next Friday, and will return on June 28.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

photo credit: burakiewicz via photopin cc

Thursday, June 13, 2013

Cancer as a protected disability


The Am Law Daily reports that the former CFO of Proskauer Rose is claiming that the international law firm violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by terminating her after a three-month leave of absence for breast cancer. Earlier this month, the EEOC published an updated Q&A discussing the treatment of cancer in the workplace under the ADA. As the EEOC notes, there is little doubt that the ADA protects cancer as a disability:

As a result of changes made by the ADAAA, people who currently have cancer, or have cancer that is in remission, should easily be found to have a disability within the meaning of the first part of the ADA’s definition of disability because they are substantially limited in the major life activity of normal cell growth or would be so limited if cancer currently in remission was to recur. Similarly, individuals with a history of cancer will be covered under the second part of the definition of disability because they will have a record of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity in the past. Finally, an individual is covered under the third (“regarded as”) prong of the definition of disability if an employer takes a prohibited action (for example, refuses to hire or terminates the individual) because of cancer or because the employer believes the individual has cancer.

The newly published Q&A answers the following four questions:

  • When can an employer ask an applicant or employee questions about his cancer and how should it treat voluntary disclosures? The ADA prohibits employers from requesting or compiling any medical information during the hiring process. Once a conditional job offer is made, an employer can require a medical examination, as long is it does the same for all employees in the same job classification. An employer may also require an employee returning from a medical leave of absence to certify his or her ability to adequately and safely perform the essential functions of the job. As with any medical information, the ADA obligates an employer to keep information about an employee’s cancer confidential.
  • What types of reasonable accommodations may employees with cancer need? Some exemplar accommodations include time off for doctors’ appointments, periodic breaks during the workday to rest or take medications, modified work schedules or shift changes, permission to telecommute, permission to use a work telephone to contact doctors, and redistribution of marginal and non-essential work tasks to other employees.
  • How should an employer handle safety concerns about applicants and employees with cancer? An employer may only exclude an individual with cancer from a job for safety reasons when the individual poses a “direct threat.” A direct threat is an objective determination of a “significant risk of substantial harm to the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced through reasonable accommodation.”
  • How can an employer ensure that no employee is harassed because of cancer or any other disability? The ADA prohibits disability-related harassment. The best means to prevent or eliminate this misconduct from the workplace is via written policies or handbook provisions, coupled with education and training. Also, employers should take seriously all complaints of harassment of any kind (including harassment related to an employee’s disability), investigate all complaints, and take prompt remedial action to ensure that it stops and does not repeat.

The EEOC’s Q&A on cancer is chock-full of useful information, including practical examples of how to handle many situations that could arise. Of course, if you have any doubt at all about how to handle an employee with cancer or a history of cancer, consult your employment counsel to ensure that you do not make a costly mistake.

This post originally appeared on The Legal Workplace Blog.

Wednesday, June 12, 2013

Can you ban foreign languages in the workplace? English-only policies.


USA Today reports that Whole Foods has suspended two employees for allegedly speaking Spanish to each other on the job. For its part, Whole Foods denies the claim, and insists that it suspended the employees for “rude and disrespectful behavior.”

Regardless of who is correct, in our increasingly multi-cultural country, this story begs the questions of how, when, and why is a company permitted to limit languages spoken in the workplace.

I initially addressed this issue almost six(!) years ago in a post entitled, English-only workplaces spark lawsuits. In that post, I made the point that English-only rules are legal as long as the employer can show a business need for the policy (for example, inter-employee communication or workplace safety). An overly restrictive rule (for example, prohibiting non-English-speaking in non-work areas such as the lunchroom), however, might violate Title VII’s prohibition against national origin discrimination. You can read my original post to learn the ins and outs of this interesting and seldom litigated issue.

According to the USA Today story, Whole Foods’s “policy states that all English speaking team members must speak English to customers and other team members while on the clock” and that “team members are free to speak any language they would like during their breaks, meal periods, and before and after work.” To me, that policy is perfectly legal under Title VII, and should raise no issues for the employer, even if it disciplined these two employees for speaking Spanish on the shop floor.

Tuesday, June 11, 2013

What do you do when an employee refuses to complain?


Do you know what to do if you believe an employee was sexually harassed, but refuses to provide any details or other information? Do you have an obligation to investigate as if the employee had lodged a formal, detailed complaint? Crockett v. Mission Hospital (4th Cir. 5/30/13) provides some insight.

Stephanie Crockett worked at Mission Hospital as a radiologic technologist. Her supervisor (albeit one without the authority to hire or fire) was Harry Kemp. Following several disciplinary notices and a final written warning, Crockett asked if she could speak to Kemp. He agreed to a private conversation. Kemp insisted they meet in an unused office, expressing that he thought his office had been bugged. Then, behind closed doors, Kemp requested that Crockett remove her clothes before they spoke to prove that she wasn’t wearing a wire. Crockett complied, albeit begrudgingly and through tears. Following their discussion, Kemp requested that she not tell anyone what happened.

While Crockett on a leave of absence, Kemp went to HR and accused Crockett of “flashing” him in an attempt to persuade him not to report new disciplinary violations. Crockett denied to HR that she had flashed Kemp, and further told them that he had done something “horrific” to her and was trying to cover it up. She refused to elaborate, but later told HR that the incident involved sexual advances by Kemp. She again, however, refused to provide any details. HR then interviewed at least 5 co-workers, each of whom denied seeing or hearing anything inappropriate. The hospital later terminated Crockett for admitting to having recorded conversation between Kemp and her, and conversations about patient information, in violation of hospital policy.

The appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Crockett’s sexual harassment claim, concluding that the hospital “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior;” and that Crockett “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”

McCarthy, Jones, and Ensley immediately began an intensive investigation on February 25, 2010, after Crockett accused Kemp of “horrific” behavior toward her, despite the fact that she refused to provide any further details or information. They interviewed numerous employees and supervisors in Crockett’s department, but were handicapped by Crockett’s refusal to cooperate and give Mission some clue as to her complaint. Since Crockett had refused to provide any information, their attempts to investigate her claim were unsuccessful….

The uncontradicted evidence establishes that Mission met with Crockett on numerous occasions in an effort to promptly correct the situation, counseled her in the procedure for filing a formal complaint, and provided her with a copy of the sexual harassment policy, despite Crockett’s unwillingness to cooperate with the investigation.

Harassment is harassment, regardless of whether the victim complains or management learns of the harassment allegations another way. A company’s obligations to investigate, and, if necessary, take corrective action does not change merely because the victim won’t cooperate.

For more information on how to appropriately and effectively respond to a harassment complaint, I suggest reading How NOT to respond to a harassment complaint. I also cover the topic in-depth in Chapter 6 of The Employer Bill of Rights.

Monday, June 10, 2013

NLRB judge strikes down Red Cross employee confidentiality policy


A couple of months ago, I suggested that there was hope for a friendship between the NLRB and me, following the Board’s pronouncement that most at-will employment disclaimers would not violate the NLRA’s protected concerted activity laws. I reached this conclusion because of the Board’s statement concerning reading employment policies “in context” to determine whether potentially violative phrases in employment policies can conceivably be read to restrict Section 7 activity.

If the Board is supposed to read employment policies “in context,” then can you please explain the recent ruling by an NLRB Administrative Law Judge in American Red Cross Blood Services, Western Lake Erie Region (6/5/13) [pdf]?

In American Red Cross, the ALJ examined the following confidentiality policy:

I acknowledge that I may, in the course of my employment with Red Cross (“Employment”), have access to or create (alone or with others) confidential and/or proprietary information and intellectual property that is of value to Red Cross. I understand that this makes my position one of trust and confidence. I understand Red Cross’ need to limit disclosure and use of confidential and/or proprietary information and intellectual property…. Therefore, I agree to the following:

Confidential information shall include but not be limited to: … information relating to Red Cross’ … personnel … matters.

The ALJ held that this policy violates Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by reasonably chilling employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights:

By defining confidential information as including information regarding “personnel” and “employees” the [policy] would be reasonably understood by employees to prohibit the disclosure of information including wages and terms of conditions of employment to other employees or to nonemployees, such as union representatives. It is, of course, clearly established that employees have a Section 7 right to discuss wages and  terms and conditions of employment among themselves and with individuals outside of their employer.… 

The specific employee handbook provision that prohibits the release of confidential employee information without authorization is clearly facially overbroad, … in that such a rule would reasonably be understood by employees to prohibit the disclosure of information regarding wages and terms and conditions of employment to other employees or to union representatives.

I do not agree that employees would reasonably understand that a policy that covers “personnel” matters would prohibit employees from discussing matters of compensations and wages. Indeed, there were no allegations in the case that the Red Cross acted against any employee under this policy. Instead, the ALJ was reviewing the policy in the abstract.

The ALJ also rejected the employer’s argument that a “savings clause” in its handbook rendered an otherwise unlawful policy lawful:

“[T]his Agreement does not deny any rights provided under the National Labor Relations Act to engage in concerted activity, including but not limited to collective bargaining.” As the Charging Party correctly noted in its brief, under Board law, such a disclaimer does not make lawful the content of a provision that unlawfully prohibits Section 7 activity.… The “savings clause” noted above arguably would cancel the unlawfully broad language, but only if employees are knowledgeable enough to know that the Act permits employees to discuss terms and conditions of employment with each other and individuals outside of their employer.

I have two takeaways for employers from this decision.

  1. The NLRB continues to scrutinize facially neutral employment policies for violations of employees section 7 rights to engage in protected concerted activity, even in cases in which there is no allegation of any adverse action against any employee under an alleged unlawful policy.
  2. Savings clauses and disclaimers might save a policy that the NLRB views as overly broad, but likely only if specifically drafted. Board and non-specific savings clauses will not save the day. Instead, employers should draft savings clauses such that employees can reasonably understand their specific rights that are protected.

Friday, June 7, 2013

WIRTW #277 (the “come on down” edition)


Some of my fondest memories as a child were watching The Price is Right with my Grandmom Annie on the TV in her basement. We’d watch Family Feud, The Price Is Right, and The Match Game, and then she’d make me a grilled cheese sandwich for lunch. Heaven on earth to a 4-year-old.

Harkening back to those childhood days, I always wanted to see The Price is Right live. I fulfilled that dream during the spring break of my 1st year of law school. The experience was surreal. We sat next to a guy wearing a pink, bespangled, “I ♥ Bob Barker” sweatshirt. It was his 250th taping, and he knew the names of all of Bob Barker’s cats and dogs (restraining order not included). We also saw one of the curtains break down as they were about to reveal the prize for one of the pricing games, followed by Bob Barker telling the confused contestant, “When we start rolling tape, I will have already said, ‘And you can win this!’ The first thing the camera will see is your reaction. So, whatever piece of s**t is behind that curtain, you better react like it is the best thing you’ve ever seen.”

I tell this story because earlier this week, The Huffington Post reported that a North Carolina postal worker pleaded guilty to workers’ compensation fraud. The employee had lied about her inability to stand, sit, kneel, squat, climb, bend, reach, grasp, or lift. The smoking gun? An appearance on TPIR on which she spun the big wheel, twice.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Thursday, June 6, 2013

Your employees are BYODing, whether you like it or not


According to a survey released yesterday by the Pew Internet & American Life Project, 61 percent of Americans own a smartphone. Employers need to pay attention to this number. Ownership of smartphones has reached a critical mass in our society.

Given the proliferation of these devices, it makes sense that employees are bringing them to work, whether employers permit it or not. According to another recent survey, conducted by analyst house Ovum [h/t: ZD Net], 56.8 percent of employees use personal devices at work. Seventy percent of those employees who use personal devices at work are using a smartphone, and of those smartphone-owning employees, more than one-third bring them to work either without the knowledge of their IT department, or in spite of an outright corporate ban on personal devices in the workplace.

These numbers mean that a Bring Your Own Device program is no longer an option, but should be required. If employees are going to bring personal devices into the workplace, and use them to connect to your network, you need to deploy reasonable policies  to govern their use and protect your network and security, instead of ignoring the issue or instituting prohibitions that employees will ignore anyway.

To put it another way, consider this thought from Adrian Drury, practice leader for consumer impact IT with Ovum, as quoted by ZD Net, “If you take the King Canute approach and try and drive that behaviour underground you just lose control of it.” Regain the control you need by rolling out a BYOD program.

If you are considering implementing a BYOD program, start with these posts from the archives to gain some background on the issues you should be thinking about:

My latest book — The Employer Bill of Rights: A Manager’s Guide to Workplace Law — also contains a sample BYOD policy for you to consider.

Wednesday, June 5, 2013

Controlling the comparative can control the discrimination case


One of the key analyses in any discrimination lawsuit is whether the plaintiff is “similarly situated” to those whom he or she claims the employer treated more favorably. If the plaintiff can establish disparate treatment of those “similarly situated,” he or she can make out a prima facie case and proceed to the discrimination bonus round to prove that the employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason was a pretext. Conversely, a failure to prove “similarly situated” dooms a claim to the summary judgment scrapheap.

Louzon v. Ford Motor Co. (6/4/13) [pdf] illustrates the important role a determination of “similarly situated” plays in discrimination cases.

Moien Louzon, a product engineer at Ford, took an approved leave of absence to visit family in Gaza. While abroad, Israel closed its borders, stranding Louzon in Gaza. Ford initially extended his leave of absence, but by the time the State Department could evacuate him, the extension had expired and Ford had terminated him.

In Louzon’s subsequent national-origin discrimination lawsuit, Ford filed a motion in limine, which sought to precluded Louzon from offering at trial any evidence of comparable employees on the basis that none were similarly situated as a matter of law. The district court granted Ford’s motion and, on its own accord, granted summary judgment to Ford and dismissed Louzon’s case.

The appellate opinion dealt with two issues — one procedural and one substantive.

  • Procedurally, the court decided that the district court had improperly decided a non-evidentiary issue via the motion in limine — whether there existed any comparable employees similarly situated to Louzon. A motion in limine is a procedural mechanism to decide evidentiary issues before trial. The trial court, however, used it to decide a disputed legal issue at the heart of the case. By doing so, it treated the motion in limine as a motion for summary judgment, but without providing Louzon the procedural protections in place in responding to a summary judgment motion. The court made is clear that litigants cannot use motions in limine to get a second bite at the summary judgment apple.
  • Substantively, the court took up the issue of whether the trial court correctly determined that there did not exist any comparable employees similarly situated to Louzon. The court was concerned over the district court’s reliance on an outdated rule that mandated that comparative employees share the same supervisor. Instead, the 6th Circuit clarified that in determining whether employees are similarly situated, a court must “make an independent determination as to the relevancy of a particular aspect of the plaintiff’s employment status and that of the non-protected employee.” Merely examining whether there exists a shared supervisor is too narrow of a standard.

Similarly situated lies in the eyes of the beholder. How a court frames who is, and who is not, “similarly situated” can be dispositive of the issue of discrimination. For this reason, it is wise to examine any potential similarly situated employees for similar or dissimilar treatment under like circumstances before taking action against a protected employee.

Tuesday, June 4, 2013

Facebook posts as evidence of retaliation


I’ve written before about the dangers of employers accessing employee’s social media accounts without appropriate controls in place. One of the biggest risks is that an employer will learn some protected fact about an employee (e.g., medical information) that could lead to an inference of a discriminatory motive if that employee later suffers some adverse action.

Deneau v. Orkin, LLC (S.D. Ala. 5/20/13), illustrates this risk in practice. One week before Orkin terminated Tammy Deneau for repeatedly working overtime without authorization, Deneau posted the following on her personal Facebook page: “anyone know a good EEOC lawyer? need one now.” At his deposition, Deneau’s branch manager testified that he saw the comment on her Facebook page and faxed it to the division human resources manager, who, in turn, recalled that management-level discussion about the Facebook post preceded Deneau’s termination.

The court concluded, with very little discussion, that the Facebook post qualified as protected activity to support Deneau’s retaliation claim, and that she had made out a prima facie case of retaliation:

Based on the close temporal proximity between Orkin learning of the Facebook comment and Plaintiff’s termination, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of retaliation.

Nevertheless, Deneau lost her retaliation claim, because she could not prove that the employer’s legitimate non-retaliatory reason (the repeated unauthorized overtime) was a pretext for retaliation.

Even though the employer won this case, it nevertheless illustrates the dangers employers face when reviewing employees’ social media accounts. Facebook, Twitter, and other social media channels can prove to be treasure trove of protected information — information about an employee’s personal and family medical issues, religious issues, genetic information, and, like this case, protected complaints about discrimination.

If you have a legitimate reason to review an employee’s social media accounts (e.g., is the employee trashing your business online, or is the employee divulging confidential information?) do so with appropriate controls in place. Have a non-decision maker conduct the review, and provide to the appropriate decision makers a report sanitized of any protected information. This simple control will insulate your organization from any argument that the decision maker was motivated by an unlawful animus based on protected information discovered in the employee’s social media account, and could prevent an expensive and risky lawsuit.

Monday, June 3, 2013

Lactation discrimination = pregnancy discrimination


Last February I reported on EEOC v. Houston Funding, in which a Texas district court held that an employee, fired after asking to pump breast milk at work, could not go forward with her pregnancy discrimination claim. The court reasoned that because lactation does not start until after pregnancy, it is not a condition “related to” pregnancy, and therefore the Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title VII do not protect lactation as sex discrimination.

At the time, I urged everyone not to overreact to one anomalous decision:

[T]he last I checked, women are the only gender that can naturally produce milk, and therefore denying a woman the right to lactate is sex discrimination. ...

Before people over-react and scream from the rooftops for remedial legislation to clarify that lactation discrimination equates to sex discrimination, one case does not make a rule. In fact, it is much more likely that one case is merely an aberration. I stand by my conviction that ... Title VII’s prohibitions against sex and pregnancy discrimination adequately cover the rights of working moms to lactate.

Late last week, the 5th Circuit agreed, and reversed the district court’s decision dismissing the case. Specifically, the court held that lactation is a medical condition related to pregnancy because it is a “physiological result of being pregnant and bearing a child.” In reaching this conclusion, the court analogized lactation to other physiological changes women undergo during and immediately after pregnancy:

Menstruation is a normal aspect of female physiology, which is interrupted during pregnancy, but resumes shortly after the pregnancy concludes. Similarly, lactation is a normal aspect of female physiology that is initiated by pregnancy and concludes sometime thereafter. If an employer commits unlawful sex-based discrimination by instituting a policy revolving around a woman’s post-pregnancy menstrual cycle, as in Harper, it is difficult to see how an employer who makes an employment decision based upon whether a woman is lactating can avoid such unlawful sex discrimination. And as both menstruation and lactation are aspects of female physiology that are affected by pregnancy, each seems readily to fit into a reasonable definition of “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”

To simplify matters, because men cannot lactate, it is discriminatory to deny an employee’s lactation request, because such a denial would necessarily treat women (or, more specifically, child-bearing women) differently than men.

When you couple this decision with the FLSA’s recent amendment that require employers to accommodate workplace lactation needs, it is more clear than ever than employees have a workplace right to lactate.

You can download a pdf of the 5th Circuit’s EEOC v. Houston Funding decision here.

Hat tip: Workplace Prof Blog

Friday, May 31, 2013

WIRTW #276 (the “HR in strange places” edition)



Recently, an employee, described as an organization’s “most difficult,” received a scathing performance review. Among his faults detailed in an unearthed internal memo — he failed to file his expense reports on time, ignored phone calls and meetings, and did not undertake any spectacular operations.

Any guesses on the identity of the organization? Believe it or not, it’s Al Qaeda. The Daily Beast provides all of the details.

I have two thoughts about this news. First, this story gives a whole new meaning to “this memo will self-destruct in 10 seconds.” Secondly, when you are terminated from Al Qaeda, you are really terminated from Al Qaeda.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination
Social Media & Workplace Technology
HR & Employee Relations
Wage & Hour
Labor Relations

Thursday, May 30, 2013

Is your wellness program discriminatory?


It is no secret that health care costs for employers and their employees are out of control in this country. Many employers have attempted to hold down these rising costs by offering wellness-program incentives — insurance premium reductions to employees who meet certain health-related incentives such as tobacco-use cessation, BMI goals, or minimum cholesterol levels.

Yesterday, however, the Obama administration made these wellness incentives more difficult for employers to implement. Pursuant to the Affordable Care Act, the administration issued final regulations on Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans [pdf].

Among other restrictions, these regulations require companies to provide “reasonable alternatives” to employees who cannot meet health benchmarks but still want the discounts. The regulations further clarify that this “reasonable alternative” standard is different than an ADA-required reasonable accommodation, and providing a reasonable alternative to achieve a wellness-program incentive does not mean that an employer has met its obligations under the ADA. Note that earlier this month, the EEOC held a public meeting discussing the treatment of employer wellness programs under the ADA.

These new rules will affect all group health plans for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2014.

If you are among the many of employers that has implemented a wellness program, these regulations are required reading to ensure that your program meets these new nondiscrimination rules.

(an)G(el)INA


r5wstgjqThe Earth stopped rotating on its axis earlier this month when Angelina Jolie announced that she is undergoing a voluntary double mastectomy. Her rationale? Because she carries the BRCA1 gene, she is 87 percent likely to contract breast cancer at some point in her life.

Have you heard of GINA, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act? As Phil Miles points out on his Lawffice Space blog, Ms. Jolie “just became the poster-child for GINA.”

Among other things, GINA prohibits employers from:

  • making an employment-related decision with respect to an employee because of genetic information; or
  • requesting or requiring that an employee disclose their own genetic information, or that of a family member.

It is fortuitous for the EEOC that Ms. Jolie has done so much to raise the profile of genetic profiling, since earlier this month, that agency announced that it settled the very first case it ever filed alleging genetic information discrimination. In its lawsuit, the EEOC alleged that the employer violated GINA when it asked an employee for a family medical history as part of its post-offer pre-employment medical examination. The EEOC’s press release quotes EEOC Regional Attorney Barbara Seely, “Although GINA has been law since 2009, many employers still do not understand that requesting family medical history, even through a contract medical examiner, violates this law.”

Ms. Seely is correct. Even though GINA has been law for more the four years, it is seldom discussed or understood. Employers need to take this lesson to heart. Genetics—both an employee’s and that of one’s family members—is off limits in employment.

Photo by Georges Biard [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

This post originally appeared on The Legal Workplace Blog.

Wednesday, May 29, 2013

There are no magic words to invoke the FMLA


The Family and Medical Leave Act does not require an employee to use the word “FMLA” to request leave under, and invoke the protections of, the FMLA. Instead, an employee only needs to do the following:

  • For foreseeable leave, an employee only needs to provide “verbal notice sufficient to make the employer aware that the employee needs FMLA-qualifying leave, and the anticipated timing and duration of the leave.”

  • For unforeseeable leave, an employee only needs to provide “sufficient information for an employer to reasonably determine whether the FMLA may apply to the leave request.”

In either instance, this informal notification triggers an employer’s designation obligations under the FMLA.

How vague can verbal notice by an employee be to trigger an employer to consider the notice a request for FMLA leave? In Wiseman v. Awreys Bakeries LLC (6th Cir. 5/22/13) [pdf], the plaintiff, an employee with a history of back problems, verbally complained that he was “injured” and “couldn’t work.” The company fired him for unexcused absences, claiming that he provided no explanation or medical reason.

The appellate court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the FMLA claim, finding that an issue of fact existed over whether the employee provided FMLA-qualifying notice. The court held that the employee’s verbal statement that he was “injured” and “couldn’t work,” coupled with the company’s knowledge of his history of back injuries and the employee’s request to see the company’s doctor, could lead a jury to conclude that the employee had invoked the FMLA.

Cases like Wiseman should rarely happen. The FMLA provides protections for employers who, in good faith, doubt whether the FMLA covers an employee’s request for time off. When there exists any doubt over whether an employee is seeking time off for a reason that could qualify under the FMLA, there is no harm in treating the request as one for FMLA leave. In fact, an employer has greater protection in an FMLA-covered scenario than not.

  • If the employer fails to treat the request as one for FMLA leave, the employer assumes all of the risk. If the employer is wrong, and the employee was requesting FMLA leave, an employer is severely limited it its ability to defend an FMLA interference lawsuit.

  • If, however, the employer treats the request as one for FMLA leave, the employee assumes all of the risk. The FMLA provides an employer tools  to verify the legitimacy of the request. The employer can (and should) require that the employee provide a medical certification justifying the need for the FMLA leave. Moreover, if the employer doubts the initial certification, it can require a second (and, sometimes, even a third) medical opinion. If the employer ultimately concludes that the leave does not qualify under the FMLA, it can retroactively deny the leave and treat all intervening absences as unexcused, which usually results in termination.

photo credit: ShellyS via photopin cc

Tuesday, May 28, 2013

“Fire me. … Make my day” does not equal protected concerted activity (thank god)


The Rolling Stones famously sang, “You can’t always get what you want.” One employee recently got exactly what she wanted (and needed) from her employer, yet filed a claim anyway. After taking to Facebook and pleading to be fired, she sought the help of the NLRB, claiming that she had been fired in retaliation for protected concerted activity. Thankfully, the NLRB concluded that she should not be entitled to proceed with her case.

In a group discussion with some co-workers, the employee said the following about her employer:

“They are full of shit … They seem to be staying away from me, you know I don’t bite my [tongue] anymore, FUCK … FIRE ME. … Make my day…”

When an annoyed colleague took a print-out of the rant to management, the disgruntled employee was fired.

Earlier this month, the NLRB Office of General Counsel issued an advice memo [pdf], opining that a termination under these circumstances is legal, and recommended the dismissal of the unfair labor practice charge:

In the instant case, the Charging Party’s comments merely expressed an individual gripe rather than any shared concerns about working conditions. … These comments merely reflected her personal contempt …, rather than any shared employee concerns over terms and conditions of employment. Thus, although her comments referenced her situation at work, they amounted to nothing more than individual “griping,” and boasting about how she was not afraid to say what she wished at work.

Even the NLRB had no sympathy for this devil of any employee. An employee who begs to be fired cannot seek satisfaction when her employer takes her up on her offer.

This case illustrates that a line of reasonableness does exist between protected concerted conversations about working conditions and a lone wolf spouting off at the mouth. Thankfully, the NLRB is not always a beast of burden for employers.

Regardless of the employer’s victory in this case, however, businesses should still tread carefully when considering terminating an employee for speech (online or offline) about working conditions. The NLRB remains active in this area, and a mis-step could prove costly (especially in light of Lafe Solomon’s recent re-nomination as general counsel of the NLRB).

For more on this case, you can read the following:

Friday, May 24, 2013

WIRTW #275 (the “reality bites” edition)


Last night, Fox debuted its new reality show, Does Someone Have To Go?, which Entertainment Weekly bills as Survivor meets The Office. Here’s the premise:

 

Needless to say, the New York Times is not impressed, unflatteringly calling the show “a victory” for companies and horrible for employees:

The squabbles are petty, ill-informed and sometimes personal, and seemingly dredge up unacknowledged tensions around race and age…. The stakes, as they are presented, are dramatic. For signing up to be on this show, employees … run the risk of conflict, humiliation and, possibly, unemployment. (Presumably, these workplaces are not unionized.)

As for me, I was glued to the TV, and will be through this show’s run. Yet, I couldn’t help but think about the scope of the release agreement these employees had to sign before appearing on the show.

Did you watch? Share your opinion in the comments below, or on Twitter with the hashtag #WorkplaceReality

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Until next week:

(Bonus points if you know the link between the new wave hit My Sharona, by The Knack, and this post.)

Thursday, May 23, 2013

When state law conflicts with the EEOC on criminal background checks, who wins?


Last year, the EEOC issued its long awaited Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions under Title VII. While the Guidance was much more fair and balanced than many employer advocates (me included) expected, it does include some head-scratchers for businesses. One such conundrum is how regulated employers are supposed to act when across-the-board criminal background searches are required by state law, as the EEOC takes the position that a blanket requirement violates Title VII.

Per the EEOC:

States and local jurisdictions also have laws and/or regulations that restrict or prohibit the employment of individuals with records of certain criminal conduct. Unlike federal laws or regulations, however, state and local laws or regulations are preempted by Title VII if they “purport[] to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice” under Title VII. Therefore, if an employer’s exclusionary policy or practice is not job related and consistent with business necessity, the fact that it was adopted to comply with a state or local law or regulation does not shield the employer from Title VII liability.

How is an employer supposed to handle this conflict? Waldon v. Cincinnati Public Schools, currently pending in the Southern District of Ohio, may provide some future guidance.

That case concerns the application of Ohio H.B. 190, which became law in 2007. That law requires criminal background checks of all current school employees, regardless of whether their duties involve the care, custody, or control of children, and mandates the termination of any employee with a certain number of historical convictions, regardless of the convictions’ age.

Two African-American employees challenge that H.B. 190 has an unlawful disparate impact because of race. Both were terminated based on decades-old convictions. All told, the Cincinnati Public Schools fired 10 employees as a result of background checks conducted pursuant to H.B. 190; nine of the 10 fired were African-American.

It is early in the litigation of the Waldon case. The court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss.

First, it concluded that it was clear that the Plaintiffs pleaded a prima facie case of disparate impact.

Although there appears to be no question that Defendant did not intend to discriminate, intent is irrelevant and the practice that it implemented allegedly had a greater impact on African-Americans than others.
The existence of statistically significant disparate impact, however, if only the first step in the analysis. An employer can avoid liability if the challenged practice is justified by business necessity. While the court believed this issue to be “a close call,” it ultimately concluded that it could not make that call on a motion to dismiss:
Obviously the policy as applied to serious recent crimes addressed a level of risk the Defendant was justified in managing due to the nature of its employees’ proximity to children. However, in relation to the two Plaintiffs in this case, the policy operated to bar employment when their offenses were remote in time, when Plaintiff Britton’s offense was insubstantial, and when both had demonstrated decades of good performance. These Plaintiffs posed no obvious risk due to their past convictions, but rather, were valuable and respected employees, who merited a second chance.… Under these circumstances, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Defendant’s policy constituted a business necessity.
Talk about a tough position in which to place an employer. Does the employer violate state law or violate Title VII? Ultimately, I think the correct answer should be neither. Shouldn’t the need to follow state law provide the employer’s “business necessity?” If not, employers will be faced in the untenable position of following one law and violating the other.

photo credit: kevin dooley via photopin cc

This post originally appeared on The Legal Workplace Blog.

Wednesday, May 22, 2013

Email surveillance as evidence of retaliation


Employees should not operate under any false ideas that they enjoy an expectation of privacy in their work email accounts. Just because an employer has the right to snoop through an employee’s email, however, does not mean the practice does not carry some degree of risk.

Consider, for example, Fields v. Fairfield County Board of Developmental Disabilities (6th Cir. 12/6/12). Fields claimed that her employer retaliated against her after it discovered an email she sent to some co-workers threatening a lawsuit against the Board. The court concluded that the email surveillance was insufficient evidence of pretext.

Simple enough? What if, however, the claim was that the company only started watching her email after it learned of the protected activity, and used evidence of misconduct in the email to support the termination decision. Could the email surveillance, in and of itself, be an adverse action sufficient to support a claim of retaliation? The legal standard for an adverse action sufficient to support a claim of retaliation is very broad. Anything that “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination,” qualifies as a retaliatory adverse action. If you don’t regularly review employee email accounts, and only start examining an employee’s electronic activities after that employee engages in some protected activity, might that dissuade others from engaging in protected activity?

If you are going to enforce a policy or exercise some employer right (like surveillance of corporate email or computer systems), do it consistently, not selectively and only after an employee complains about discrimination. Otherwise, you could change a legal and reasonable act (e.g., email surveillance) into evidence of unlawful retaliation.

Tuesday, May 21, 2013

Social media is the digital water cooler


Let’s say your business is located in a less-than-desirable neighborhood. Three of your employees engage in the following conversation on their personal Facebook pages:

Holli Thomas — needs a new job. I’m physically and mentally sickened.

Vanessa Morris — It’s pretty obvious that my manager is as immature as a person can be and she proved that this evening even more so. I’m am [sic] unbelievably stressed out and I can’t believe NO ONE is doing anything about it! The way she treats us in [sic] NOT okay but no one cares because everytime we try to solve conflicts NOTHING GETS DONE!! …

Vanessa Morris — And no one’s doing anything about it! Big surprise!

Brittany [Johnson] — “bettie page would roll over in her grave.” I’ve been thinking the same thing for quite some time.

Vanessa Morris — hey dudes it’s totally cool, tomorrow I’m bringing a California Worker’s Rights book to work. My mom works for a law firm that specializes in labor law and BOY will you be surprised by all the crap that’s going on that’s in violation 8) see you tomorrow!

Can you fire these three employees? If you answered yes, you just bought yourself an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board, at least according to Bettie Page Clothing (4/19/13) [pdf]. Per the NLRB:

The Facebook postings were complaints among employees about the conduct of their supervisor as it related to their terms and conditions of employment and about management’s refusal to address the employees’ concerns. The employees also discussed looking at a book about the rights of workers in California so that they could determine whether the Respondent was violating labor laws. Such conversations for mutual aid and protection are classic concerted protected activity.

Social media is today’s water cooler. Employees still might gather around the lunch table or coffee machine to gossip about work, but they are also just as likely, if not more likely, to carry over those conversations outside of the workplace through their personal social media accounts. If you wouldn’t fire an employee for a water-cooler conversation you happen to overhear, then don’t fire them for a similar conversation on a Facebook wall. In fact, you are much worse off with the social-media-based termination because the employee has a digital paper trail with which to hang you.

Employees gossip with and gripe to each other. Instead of firing these employees, maybe you need to look inward to figure out if their concerns are legitimate, and if there is something you can do about it.

[Hat tip: Employer Law Report]