"Maternal Profiling" listed as buzzword of 2007

With the calender barely having turned to 2008, I'm still catching up reviewing year end lists for 2007. One list, the New York Time's Buzzwords of 2007, should be of particular interest to employment lawyers, employers, and HR personnel. It lists "maternal profiling" as one of the phrases that took its place in the national conversation for 2007. Maternal profiling is defined as:

Employment discrimination against a woman who has, or will have, children. The term has been popularized by members of MomsRising, an advocacy group promoting the rights of mothers in the workplace.

A trip over to MomsRising.org reveals some frightening statistics about the workplace impact of maternal profiling. It cites one study which found that mothers are 79% less likely to be hired than non-mothers with equal resumes and job experiences. It cites another study that women without children make 90% as compared to a comparable man, as compared to 73% for women with children and 60% for single moms. It cites one final study that mothers were offered $11,000 less in starting pay than non-mothers with the same resumes and job experience, while fathers were offered $6,000 more.

I've spent a lot of time this year writing about family responsibility discrimination in light of the EEOC's recent enforcement guidance on the subject, and the $2.1 million verdict against Kohl's Department Stores for repeatedly passing over a qualified mom for promotion. Maternal profiling may have been one of the buzzwords of 2007, but it certainly appears that family responsibility discrimination is going to be a key employment issue in 2008 and beyond. Depending on how the political winds blow after the November elections, FMLA expansion, paid sick and parental leave, and incentives for family-friendly work programs will all be in play in 2009.

I am not suggesting that everyone rewrite their leave policies, but those who can afford to be family-friendly will have an advantage in recruiting and retention of employees for whom it is an important benefit (i.e., most people between the ages of 25 and 50). At a minimum you should be building the concept of maternal profiling into your harassment and EEO/diversity training. Discrimination in largely subconscious, and education is the first step towards prevention.

Hat tip to Carrie Kurzon at the New York Employment Lawyer Blog.

An argument for broader protection of confidential and proprietary information

Nelson Jewellery Arts Co. v. Fein Design Co., out of the 9th District Court of Appeals, involves two companies fighting over what we can only assume is a key employee. As is often the case in such disputes, the old employer claimed that the employee took with him to the new employer certain confidential and proprietary information, such as pricing and customer information. The appellate court, however, rejected the claim because the information did not meet the statutory definition of a "trade secret." It was readily ascertainable by other means such as telephone books and trade publications, and the company did not take reasonable measures to maintain the secrecy of its alleged confidential information. Therefore, the claim was dismissed. In so ruling, the court rejected any common law protection over the information, and limited the law's reach to that narrow category of corporation information that meets the specific statutory definition of a "trade secret" pursuant to O.R.C. 1333.61(D):

(D) "Trade secret" means information, including the whole or any portion or phase of any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or improvement, or any business information or plans, financial information, or listing of names, addresses, or telephone numbers, that satisfies both of the following:

(1) It derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.

(2) It is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

This case raises the question of what corporate information should the law protect. Is is just information that meets the statutory definition of a trade secret, or is some broader category of information worthy of legal protection? It seems that companies should be able to stop employees from walking out the door with corporate information whether or not such information qualifies as a trade secret. After all, that which a company creates is its property, and it should be able to prevent its disclosure to or use by a competitor. Limiting such protection merely to "trade secrets" is overly restrictive, and ignores the property interest that businesses have in their documents, data, and other information.

How do we help put ourselves in the best position to protect stuff that may not meet the high threshold of a trade secret? Let me make a few suggestions:

1. Put provisions in employee handbooks that define the scope of the company's property - not just as trade secrets, but as all confidential and proprietary information, and everything that is created by or for the company.
2. Separate and apart from the employee handbook, have all employees who will come in contact with any information you might want to protect sign an agreement that defines what belongs to who, and specifically sets forth the company's right to the information at the end of employment.
3. When an employee leaves, have that employee sign a receipt that all company property and information has been returned, and that the employee is not taking anything with him or her. Where the separation is not voluntary, it may not always be easy to have the employee sign something on his or her way out the door. In that case, you can still protect yourself by sending the employee a certified letter reminding him or her of the corporate policy and their agreement to it.
4. If you think the ex-employee is not being forthcoming with you, correspond with the new employer, placing it on notice that you will hold it responsible for any of your information that is in its possession.
5. When all else fails, litigate. Bear in mind, however, that adherence to steps 1 - 4 will put you in a much better light should you have to litigate to seek protection over your information, whether or not it qualifies as a trade secret.

9th Circuit creates new affirmative defense under the ADA

Earlier this month I reported on the EEOC's Fact Sheet on Employment Tests and Selection Procedures. United Parcel Service provides an example of one such screening criteria, and gives some hope to employers who use medical or other criteria to screen out certain disabled employees.

UPS imposes a Department of Transportation hearing standard on all package-car drivers, even though the standard only applies to those who drive vehicles over 10,000 pounds. UPS disqualifies from employment any employee or applicant who cannot meet that standard, whether or not the vehicle that individual will operate is over or under the 10,000 pound threshold. Last week, the 9th Circuit, in Bates v. United Parcel Service, reversed a lower court, which had held that application of the standard to those who do not drive covered vehicles violated the ADA.

Section 12113(a) of the ADA makes it a defense to a disability discrimination claim "that an alleged application of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a disability has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation." This defense breaks down into three elements: 1) job-relatedness; 2) consistent with business necessity; and 3) that job performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation.

As evidence of the lawfulness of its hearing qualification standard, UPS offered up the DOT standard to show that a certain level of hearing is necessary to safely drive even non-DOT-regulated vehicles. The 9th Circuit found the 10,000 pound threshold irrelevant to whether UPS could lawfully rely on the DOT safety standard as a qualification standard for all driver positions:

To be sure, DOT's regulation does not apply to the category of vehicles at issue in this case. However, that circumstance does not mean that the standard has no relevance to the employer's safety argument. UPS is entitled to use as some evidence of its business necessity defense the fact that it relied on a government safety standard, even where the standard is not applicable to the category of conduct at issue.... Thus, while certainly not dispositive of UPS's showing of job-relatedness, business necessity or the reasonableness of potential accommodations, UPS's reliance on the government safety standard with respect to other vehicles in its fleet should be entitled to some consideration as a safety benchmark.

Thus, employers are entitled to rely on objective safety criteria (such as governmental regulations) as a qualification for a position, even if the at-issue regulations are not mandated for the specific position. Such reliance, however, is not dispositive as to the lawfulness of the qualification. Instead, one must examine the congruence between the safety standard and the position to which it is being applied. In other words, is there a bona fide, demonstrable correlation between the standard and performance of the essential functions of the position?

While this decision does not bind companies in Ohio, it should give employers everywhere some solace that objective screening criteria will not necessarily be found to be discriminatory, even if they effectively screen out from consideration for a position all disabled applicants and employees. It also lets employers know that they can employ reasonable selection criteria and safety standards without fear of necessarily being second-guessed by a court.

My New Year's resolutions for everyone

While it may be trite, the approach of a new year causes us to reflect on the past year and make some resolutions on how to better ourselves for the coming year. While we generally think of these resolutions in personal terms, it makes sense also to think of them from an organizational viewpoint. With that in mind, let me suggest some resolutions for your employment practices to make 2008 a better, more compliant year than 2007:

1. Review your employee handbooks and other personnel policies.
2. If it's been longer than 2 years since you did company-wide harassment training, schedule it for 2008.
3. Make sure you are using the new I-9 form for all new hires.
4. Audit your wage and hour practices.
5. Make a concerted effort to document all discipline and performance problems.
6. Do not make promises to your employees that you cannot keep.
7. Make hiring and firing decisions based on performance.
8. Be more understanding of your employees' family responsibilities outside of the office.
9. Employ the golden rule - treat your employees as you would want to be treated.
10. Above all else, try to have some fun at work.

My hope for everyone (except me) is that 2008 brings no lawsuits, no EEO charges, no sexual harassment complaints, no wage and hour audits, and no disgruntled employees. Be happy and be safe, and I'll see everyone in 2008.

President Bush expected to veto FMLA expansion

In what can only be described as a surprising turn of events, and in a lesson that would make any grade school civics teacher proud, President Bush is expected to use a pocket veto to kill the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. That bill includes an expansion of FMLA leave rights for the families of wounded service members. A couple of weeks ago, I reported that the President would be hard pressed to veto a bill that authorized $696 billion in military programs. Now, as the New York Times is reporting, the White House has stated that the President will veto the bill. At issue is one specific section over which the Iraqi government is concerned that Iraqi assets in American banks could be vulnerable to claims from victims of Saddam Hussein.

Given the overwhelming majority this bill passed both the House and Senate, one could assume that these issues will be resolved after Congress resumes in the new year. I'm done making predictions about this legislation, however, after my last prediction turned out to be wrong. All I can is to watch this space for further updates about this potential expansion of FMLA rights.

Hat tip to the Connecticut Employment Law Blog.

What else I'm reading this week #11

Given the mid-week holiday, it's still been pretty active in the blogosphere. As always, please take the time to click through these links and support my fellow employment law and HR bloggers.

John Phillips' The Word on Employment Law reports on a story that's had a lot of traction this week, Wikipedia's failure to discover the criminal history of its former COO, and draws some important lessons on the importance of conducting background checks for critical positions.

HR World blogs on how to handle bullying bosses. You can also read my thoughts on this issue here: Sticks and stones may break my bones...

The Manpower Employment Blawg draws some important lessons on FMLA leaves of absence from a case which held that formal notice is not necessary for an employee to be entitled to FMLA leave.

Finally, Texas' HR Lawyer's Blog discusses some employment law pitfalls that await those who carelessly e-mail.

Ohio Supreme Court upholds constitutionality of tort reform legislation

Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, decided today by the Ohio Supreme Court, upheld the constitutionality of legislation that caps the amount of non-economic and punitive damages available in Ohio tort actions. The at-issue legislation applies to all "tort" claims except medical, dental, optometric, and chiropractic claims, and civil actions for damages for a breach of contract or another agreement. There is no exception for employment-related claims, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, or wrongful discharge public policy claims.

The tort reform statute caps non-economic damages at the greater of $250,000, or 3 times the economic loss, to a maximum of $350,000 for each plaintiff or $500,000 for each occurrence that is the basis for the claim. There is no statutory cap for economic losses. Punitive damages are capped at 2 times the total amount of compensatory damages. However, for small employers (5o0 or less employees for manufacturing companies, and 100 or less employees for all others) and individuals, punitive damages are capped at the lesser of 2 times the total compensatory damages, or 10% of the small employer's or individual's net worth measured at the time the tort was committed, up to a maximum of $350,000.

No court has yet to rule whether this tort reform legislation specifically applies to statutory employment discrimination claims. While there is a clear distinction between common law tort claim, and statutory claims, one could certainly argue that discrimination claims, which are claims for harm to the person, are tort claims covered by the statute. Most likely, however, these claims are not covered by this tort reform because of their statutory nature. Regardless, this case marks another milestone in what has become a very business-friendly Supreme Court.

EEOC allows employers to reduce retiree health benefits at age 65

Pursuant to a new Rule published yesterday by the EEOC, employers can take Medicare into account when structuring retiree health benefit packages without violating the age discrimination laws. The rule clarifies the long standing practice of most companies that provide retiree health benefits, by which they reduce their health insurance expenses for retired workers once they turn 65 and qualify for Medicare. In other words, employers can lawfully spend more on retirees under the age of 65 years than those over 65 without running afoul of age discrimination laws. Practically, though, retirees in both age groups will most likely receive essentially the same benefits, just at a lower costs to employers.

A copy of the EEOC's new Rule on Retiree Health Benefits is available here, along with a Q&A explaining the Rule here.

7th Circuit holds that hostile environment is not defined by statutory limitations period

The facts of Bright v. Hill's Pet Nutrition explain that Elizabeth Bright was subject to pervasive harassment because of her sex during the her employment for the pet food company:

Elizabeth Bright was hired at the Richmond plant during February 2000, ... and quit in November 2002.... Bright was assigned to a Processing Team, where she worked for about 10 months before being transferred to a Stretchwrap Team. Between October 2001 and November 2002, ... and Bright [was] assigned to a Stretchwrap Team. Bright filed her charge of discrimination early in 2003 and filed suit later that year.

Bright presented evidence that the men routinely vexed the women in an effort to make them quit. The tactics included unwelcome sexual overtures and sex-related chatter, streams of misogynistic invective, refusal to train (team leaders tried to get women to view pornographic images on the men's computers, and, when women declined, the men would declare that they had no time for training), assigning women to the dirtiest jobs (which team leaders called "women’s work"), and threats of violence, some of which were fulfilled (for example, Bright's dog was shot, supposedly as a warning to her). According to one of Bright's witnesses, on being told that men referred to female workers as "whores," "c**ts," and "bitches," Vanderpool replied: "a hostile work environment is a productive work environment." ...

Hill's Pet Nutrition contended that none of this testimony should be believed. It did, however, concede having, a problem with pornography in the workplace, and it suspended 11 men for two weeks in March 2002 in response to their accumulation and viewing of inappropriate materials on the firm's computers. The employer maintains that this step solved the only problem that women had encountered at work.

The trial judge instructed the jury that it could not consider anything that happened to Bright before March 29, 2002, 300 days before she filed her EEOC charge, and could not consider any of the incidents related to the pornographic images. With that instruction, the jury returned a verdict against Bright.

According to the 7th Circuit, the trial court's instruction to the jury about which evidence it could not consider was in error. The evidence that predated the statutory filing period was relevant to the totality of the hostile environment in which Bright worked:

[A] hostile working environment must be treated as one unlawful practice even if the employee moves from one team to another.... [A] hostile environment in a single posting is one practice. Bright was part of a Stretchwrap Team for 22 months, from the beginning of 2001 until she quit in November 2002, but the judge allowed the jury to consider only the events of the final eight months, from April through November.... [T]he judge should have allowed the jury to consider the working conditions that Bright encountered for her entire employment at the Richmond plant.... [I]t is inappropriate to draw lines by time.

Moreover, to the extent that the employer remedied some or all of the harassment, the proper evidentiary ruling would not be to exclude the pre-remedy harassment, but instead to permit the jury to consider such evidence as part of parcel of its decision as to the employer's liability (i.e., was the employer negligent in responding to complaints of harassment or remedying the harassment):

When an employer takes steps such as the suspensions and purge of objectionable material from the computers' hard drives, these acts matter not to the duration of the unlawful practice or the evidence a plaintiff may offer, but to the question whether the employer is responsible. "[A]n employer can be liable ... where its own negligence is a cause of the harassment. An employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it. Negligence sets a minimum standard for employer liability under Title VII".

Hill's Pet Nutrition may be able to show that its handling of the sexual images solved part of the problem and prevents attribution. Similarly it may be able to show that it neither knew nor should have known about some of the events that Bright encountered. If an employee unreasonably fails to take advantage of preventive or corrective opportunities, and the employer consequently does not know about the problem, then it cannot be held liable. The fact that an employer has raised these contentions, however, does not curtail the scope of the employee's proofs.... Unless the evidence is so lopsided that the employer is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, both the plaintiff and the employer must be allowed to present their full evidentiary cases at trial, and the district judge should instruct on all of these issues.

This case illustrates the important role that companies play in remedying and correcting harassment in the workplace, and how those efforts, or lack thereof, come into play in a sexual harassment trial. Employers will not be able to escape or minimize liability simply by relying upon Title VII's 300-day statute of limitations as a point in time by which to compare working conditions, and argue that because conditions were better during the 300 day period as compared to prior, the judge or jury should not consider the totality of the employee's work environment.

Court treats bias against transsexual job applicant as gender discrimination

Since the Supreme Court decided Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 18 years ago, it has been well established that Title VII's protections against gender discrimination also encompass sexual stereotypes. An employer violates Title VII by punishing employees for failing to conform to sex stereotypes, including stereotypes regarding dress and appearance. For example, it is illegal for an employer to take action against an male employee for having feminine mannerisms, or against a female employee who is too macho or aggressive.

Recently, in Schroer v. Billington (as reported here by CCH), the federal district court for the District of Columbia permitted a male-to-female transsexual job applicant to continue her Title VII sex discrimination case against the Library of Congress. The Library withdrew is job offer for a research position after Schroer disclosed that he was under a doctor's care for gender dysphoria, and that consistent with the treatment, he would present at work as a woman, change his name, and dress in traditionally female clothing. Schroer claimed discrimination based on a failure to comply with the Library's sex stereotypical notions about women's appearance and behavior, and not on her status as a transsexual. Because the claim was grounded on a failure to conform to sexual stereotypes, it fell under Title VII.

In so ruling, the D.C. Court followed the lead of the Sixth Circuit in Smith v. Salem, which, as far as a I know, the only other case to recognize such a cause of action. Smith v. Salem not only protected the transsexual plaintiff because of sexual stereotyping, but also based on a rationale that Title VII's reference to "sex" encompasses biological differences between men and women. The Court in Schroer, though, differentiated between Smith v. Salem's two different legal theories. Based upon the recent legislative wrangling over the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, it rejected the latter. It relied upon the ENDA's legislative history, which took out protections for gender identity (i.e., transsexual and transgender individuals) (see House approves law to protect gay workers).

The difference is not merely one of semantics. Schroer concerned a motion to dismiss - that is, did the complaint state a legally recognized cause of action? The case will now continue to discovery and a likely Motion for Summary Judgment. The key issue in the case will be whether the Library rescinded the job offer because of her transsexual status, or because of sexual stereotypes. Only the latter will be permitted to go to a jury under Title VII. As the ENDA's Congressional debates illustrate, Title VII does not protect the former, nor will it, at least in the foreseeable future.

Merry Christmas

To all of my readers who have made the first 7 months of the Ohio Employer's Law Blog such a success, and to those who have simply stumbled upon me by happy accident or random Google search, happy holidays and merry Christmas. Now put the mouse down, stop thinking about employment law, and enjoy your holiday. I'll be back on Boxing Day.

NLRB rewrites employee solicitation rules

It is no secret that employers often use non-solicitation policies as a lawful means to limit union activities on company time and property. Last week, the NLRB delivered an early Christmas gift to employers. Register-Guard, decided 3-2 by the Board, signaled a strong victory for an employer's right to control its computer and e-mail system, and at the same time severely restricted an employee's ability to solicit using company property.

Register-Guard is a unionized newspaper publisher. In 1996, it began installing a new computer system. Around the same time it also implemented a new Communications Systems Policy ("CSM"), which governed employees' use of its communications systems, including e-mail. The policy stated, in relevant part:

Company communication systems and the equipment used to operate the communication system are owned and provided by the Company to assist in conducting the business of The Register-Guard. Communications systems are not to be used to solicit or proselytize for commercial ventures, religious or political causes, outside organizations, or other non-job-related solicitations (emphasis added).

Despite the policy, the company allowed its employees to send and receive personal e-mails, such as such as baby announcements, party invitations, and the occasional offer of sports tickets or request for services such as dog walking. However, it never allowed solicitations regarding any outside agency other than the United Way. The employer gave two warnings to an employee who sent three union-related e-mails, which lead to the charge that the employer was discriminatorily enforcing the policy.

In ruling that the policy, on its face, did not violate the NLRA, the Board relied upon an employer's legitimate business interest in its "basic property right to regulate and restrict employee use of company property," including its computer system. The Board saw no distinction between a traditionally bulletin board and an e-mail system:

[T]he Respondent's CSP does not regulate traditional, face-to-face solicitation. Indeed, employees at the Respondent's workplace have the full panoply of rights to engage in oral solicitation on nonworking time and also to distribute literature on nonworking time in nonwork areas.... What the employees seek here is use of the Respondent's communications equipment to engage in additional forms of communication.... "Section 7 of the Act protects organizational rights ... rather than particular means by which employees may seek to communicate."

A solicitation or other communication policy can lawfully bar employees' non-work related use of an employer-owned e-mail system or other property, unless, on its face, it discriminated against employees' exercise of Section 7 rights. Thus, a policy that prohibits employee use of an e-mail system for "non-job-related solicitations" does not violate the NLRA.

Along the same lines, the Board found that "discrimination" in the context of rules limiting employee solicitations means drawing a specific distinction along Section 7 lines. In the Board's words:

Thus, in order to be unlawful, discrimination must be along Section 7 lines. In other words, unlawful discrimination consists of disparate treatment of activities or communications of a similar character because of their union or other Section 7-protected status. For example, an employer clearly would violate the Act if it permitted employees to use e-mail to solicit for one union but not another, or if it permitted solicitation by antiunion employees but not by prounion employees.

This case concerned two different sets of e-mails. In the first, an employee called employees to take action in support of the union (such as wearing certain clothing and participating in a parade). While the employer tolerated personal employee e-mails (baby announcements, etc.), there was no evidence that the employer permitted employees to use e-mail to solicit for specific groups or causes. Thus, disciplining the employee for this set of e-mails did not discriminate along Section 7 lines, because the CSP did not permit any group or cause related solicitations. The second set of e-mails, however, presented a different problem. Those were not a solicitation or some call for collection action. Instead, they merely clarified the facts surrounding a union rally. Because the CSP only prohibited non-work-related "solicitations," and because the company permitted a wide range of non-work-related e-mails, disciplining the employee for an e-mail that disseminated information about the Union (as opposed to soliciting some action on its behalf) did discrimination along Section 7 lines and therefore violated the NLRA.

For employers, non-solicitation policies are always tricky. Now, the Board has given employers broad latitude to draft and enforce such policies, even as to e-mail communications, to bar all non-work-related solicitations. Further, enforcement is only a problem if it draws a clear line between Section 7 activities. While future Board and Court decisions will further flush out these standards, for now it is safe to say that non-solicitation and computer use policies will have to be reviewed, rewritten, and most likely broadened in light of this case and its new discrimination standards.

(Hat tip to the Pennsylvania Employment Law Blog).

Department of Labor investigations highlight important wage and hour compliance issues

Today's Cleveland Plain Dealer reports that the U.S. Department of Labor has found that housekeepers working in Ohio hotels are routinely underpaid. Indeed, in wage and hour audits conducted in 2007, the DOL reports that only 28% were in full compliance with federal wage and hour laws. As a result, it has promised "a 'significant' number of hotel investigations in 2008 and reinvestigations of some of the employers it already found in violation of wage requirements," according to the PD.

Speaking from experience, the DOL audits companies in one of three instances: randomly (which seldom happens), after receiving a complaint, or as part of a targeted initiative against a particular industry or class of businesses. These hotel investigations fall into the latter category.

If you find yourself being audited, the DOL will examine your wage and hour records for the past two years to ensure that all non-exempt employees have been paid at least minimum wage and overtime for all hours worked in excess of 40. It will also look at child labor issues if you employ any minors. The DOL may examine whether salaried employees are properly classified as exempt. Finally, it may interview employees to gather additional information. It will then make recommendations for changes, and try to reach a resolution as to any back overtime and wages. If the employer fails to cooperate, or is a repeat offender, it may request that the Solicitor General's office file an enforcement action in federal district court.

There is no way to prevent an audit from occurring, but you should self-audit your company's wage and hour practices to help get a clean bill of health if the DOL calls. Look at your personnel, payroll, and time records to make sure your are retaining everything the FLSA requires. Reevaluate positions and job descriptions for proper exemption classifications. It should go without saying that if you are not paying minimum wage, or overtime to non-exempt employees, start doing so immediately. With the new year quickly approaching, I'd like to see all businesses make a resolution to get their wage and hour practices in order during 2008.

What else I'm reading this week #10

We'll start this week with a couple of posts on issues surrounding the drafting and enforcement of employment agreements:

Jottings by an Employer's Lawyer lists the 8 parts of an executive employment agreement.

Suits In The WorkPlace gives some sage advice on how to draft solid non-compete agreements. The discussion is under Illinois law, but the principles transfer well to Ohio law.

On other topics:

Dan Schwartz at the Connecticut Employment Law Blog draws some lessons from his recent middle school mock trial coaching, and recommends that to avoid employment law issues, HR should keep things simple.

The Evil HR Lady gives some advice on how to handle a job applicant's prior criminal conviction. As long as the policy is neurally applied (i.e., disqualifying anyone with a conviction other than a traffic offense), you should not run into any problem using conviction histories in employment decisions. Arrest records are another story, because arrests may disparately impact one race over another.

Should you fail to hire someone and end up defending an administrative charge, the Pennsylvania Employment Law Blog tells us 5 things every HR generalist should know in responding to EEOC and state agency discrimination charges. Let me add #6 - call your employment counsel.

John Phillips, at The Word on Employment Law, has posted the 2nd half of his excellent 6-part series on the art of firing employees. (Part IV, Part V, and Part VI).

In the wake of the debacle over the proposed maternity leave regulations, the Ohio Practical Business Law Counsel asks, "Where is the Ohio Civil Rights Commission going?"

Finally, the Wall Street Journal's Law Blog asks the self-evident question of whether the jury trial is an endangered species.

Some more shameless promotion

I commend to everyone's reading an article in this week's Business Insurance on the Huber v. Wal-Mart case that the Supreme Court last week decided to hear - High court to hear case on ADA job applicants. I has a collection of quotes from lawyers all over the country predicting how the Court will rule, including me:

Jonathan T. Hyman, an employer attorney with Kohrman, Jackson & Krantz P.L.L. in Cleveland, said he expects the court to rule in Wal-Mart's favor.

"I think it would be a dangerous precedent to write affirmative action into the ADA by saying you don't have to hire the most qualified person for a position," said Mr. Hyman. Hiring the most qualified person is "one of the cornerstones of employment law," he said.

Ohio Supreme Court holds that no wrongful discharge claim exists for employee terminated while on workers' comp leave

Four months ago, I reported on Klopfenstein v. NK Parts Industries, Inc., an Ohio appellate decision which held that Coolidge v. Riverdale Local School Dist. created an independent public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine. Klopfenstein stood in direct contrast to other Ohio appellate districts, such as Cuyahoga County in Brooks v. Qualchoice, which held that Coolidge does not create a new public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine, but instead illustrates conduct that is retaliatory under R.C. 4123.90 (the workers' comp anti-retaliation provision). At that time, I predicted that given the conflict, the Ohio Supreme Court would soon be asked to revisit this issue, and that it should reject the Klopfenstein line of cases:

Klopfenstein will not be the last word on this issue. Whether in an appeal from that case, or some future case, the Ohio Supreme Court will be called upon to clarify its Coolidge holding and definitively state the proper statute of limitations. In anticipation of that future battle, let me suggest that Klopfenstein was wrongly decided. R.C. 4123.90 states: "No employer shall discharge ... any employee because the employee filed a claim ... under the workers’ compensation act for an injury ... which occurred in the course of and arising out of his employment with that employer." If an employee is terminated because of workers' comp-related absences, that employee is being terminated because of the claim. Thus, the termination falls squarely within the coverage of R.C. 4123.90. It is the job of the legislature, and not the courts, to expand the statute of limitations for Coolidge claims if it sees fit to do so.

Today, the Ohio Supreme Court has proved me to be both prescient and correct. In Bickers v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., the Court has held: "An employee who is terminated from employment while receiving workers' compensation has no common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy underlying R.C. 4123.90, which provides the exclusive remedy for employees claiming termination in violation of rights conferred by the Workers' Compensation Act." In so ruling, it greatly limited the reach of its 2003 Coolidge decision, limiting Coolidge to considerations of "good and just cause" for termination under R.C. 3319.16 (which involves terminations of contracts by boards of education). The Court explained its rationale for limiting employees to a statutory claim under the workers' comp retaliation provision:

The policy choice between permitting and prohibiting the discharge from employment of an employee who has been injured at work is a difficult one, as it inevitably creates a burden of some degree upon either the employer or the employee.

Should the policy choice be to deny employers the exercise of their employment-at-will prerogative and require them to hold open the jobs of injured employees for indefinite periods of time, then employers will be burdened with employees unable to perform the work for which they were hired and an inability to obtain permanent replacements. This would be particularly onerous on small employers with few employees, who lack the ability to shift the duties of an injured employee to other employees.

Should the policy choice be to permit an employer to terminate a worker who is injured on the job and cannot work as a result, then the worker suffers not only the burden of being injured but also the burden of unemployment at a time when seeking a new position is made more difficult by the injury.

In addressing this difficult policy issue, which lacks wholly satisfactory solutions, the General Assembly chose to proscribe retaliatory discharges only. Employers may not retaliate against employees for pursuing a workers’ compensation claim. R.C. 4123.90. It is within the prerogative and authority of the General Assembly to make this choice when determining policy in the workers' compensation arena and in balancing, in that forum, employers' and employees' competing interests. We may not override this choice and superimpose a common-law, public-policy tort remedy on this wholly statutory system.

In holding the employee to the statutory remedy, the Court continued its string of recent opinions limiting the scope of Ohio's wrongful discharge tort (see Ohio Supreme Court rejects common law wrongful discharge age discrimination claim). What is becoming more and more clear under Ohio law is that if a statute provides a remedy that an aggrieved employee can take advantage of, that employee will not have a valid common law wrongful discharge claim.

The Bickers opinion is also interesting for the debate between the majority and the minority on the actual holding of Coolidge and whether the Court is merely clarifying its prior holding, or outright reversing binding precedent. That debate, while interesting from a jurisprudential standpoint, is ultimately immaterial to the practical impact of Bickers for companies: employers no longer have to hold jobs open in perpetuity for employees who are off work because of a workers' comp injury. The FMLA and the ADA, where applicable, will still have something to say about the duration of a medical leave of absence (see ADA may require leaves of absence beyond FMLA mandates), but at least as to the workers' comp law employees are limited to their statutory remedy and the 180-day statute of limitations that goes along with it.

Offensive comments are not just for proof of direct evidence

Today, we are going to play a little game. The following is an excerpt from Vincent v. Brewer Company, a sex discrimination case decided by the 6th Circuit. So that you can follow along: Brewer Company, the employer, lays natural gas pipes; Jama Vincent, the plaintiff, was demoted from a crew leader position to a laborer position, and was laid-off (even though replaced by a man) 7 months later for lack of work and failure to follow company rules; Ken Parker was Vincent's immediate supervisor and the decisionmaker who laid her off; Sal Dilillo is another supervisor and a peer of Ken Parker; Jay Fetters and Kevin Parker are crew leaders who reported to Ken Parker. After reading the following excerpt, decide whether the employee or the employer won the case:

Vincent and other former Brewer employees testified that members of Brewer’s management team frequently made degrading comments regarding the capabilities of female employees, and expressed a desire to rid the Utility Division of their presence. Among the remarks alleged to have been made by Brewer management are the following:

(1) Ken Parker stated that he believed that women do not belong at Brewer and that he would not hire them.

(2) Kevin Parker told a crew leader, Ronald Ayres, that he did not permit his female laborers to do any work aside from directing traffic and that Ken Parker would fire Ayres if he discovered Ayres allowing female laborers to perform any other task.

(3) Ken Parker told a female employee, Tina Updike, that the only jobs available to women at Brewer were those involving traffic direction.

(4) Kevin Parker told Vincent and another female employee, Tammy Ayres, that Ken Parker instructed him to only permit female laborers to direct traffic.

(5) Kevin Parker told Tammy Ayres that she could not be in charge of a project because women are "not leaders" at Brewer.

(6) Ken Parker told Tammy Ayres that "the problem with you is you're a f***ing woman."

(7) Kevin Parker stated that Dilillo disliked women even more than Ken Parker, and that Dilillo wanted to remove all of the Utility Division’s female employees because they made it look bad.

(8) Fetters frequently referred to Tammy Ayres using nicknames such as "sweetheart" and "cupcake," and often asked female employees graphic sexual questions.

(9) Ken Parker told Updike that if she wanted to earn a man's pay then she would have to work like a man or she would be replaced by a man.

Okay, that wasn't meant to be a trick question, and hopefully its obvious from that litany of offensive comments that Vincent won her appeal. What interesting about this case, though, is that despite all of those offensive comments, many attributable to the decisionmaker, and all attributable to high-level officials with managerial authority over the decision, this case was not treated as a direct evidence case, but decided under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis. In fact, the actual legal holding of the case is: "To establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, ... a plaintiff who can prove that she was replaced by a member of the opposite sex need not show that she possesses qualifications similar to those of her replacement." The district court erred by requiring Vincent to show that her replacement was outside of the protected class and similarly qualified as her. The latter is simply not part of the prima facie case.

Many of the offensive comments could be subject to exclusion in a direct evidence case because they may not have a sufficient nexus to the at-issue termination decision. However, in this case they were used as part of the pretext analysis, to show that Brewer's legitimate non-discriminatory reason did not actually motivate the discharge. The lesson to take away from this case is that courts will hold you to your legitimate non-discriminatory explanations, and evidence that might otherwise be excluded as unrelated to the challenged decision will become relevant to show pretext and rebut that explanation.

Groping of mall Santa raises potential sexual harassment issues

The story of the Connecticut woman arrested for inappropriately groping a mall Santa is making the rounds this morning. (Woman accused of groping mall Santa). Harassment is not confined to employees. Just as companies have a responsibility to investigate and remedy harassment of employees by other employees, companies have a similar responsibility when the alleged harasser is a non-employee, such as a customer, a vendor, or a delivery person. For a thorough discussion of these issues, I recommend taking a look at Harassment by Nonemployees: How Should Employers Respond?, from HR Magazine.

Lord of the pants - When is the right time to countersue?

This morning's USA Today is reporting that famed Irish dancer Michael Flatley has won an $11 million judgment against a woman who had accused him of raping her in a Las Vegas hotel room. According to the article, the woman threatened to sue Flatley unless he agreed to a "seven figure" settlement. When he refused, she sued him, but the case was dismissed. Flatley responded with a lawsuit against the woman and her lawyer, alleging extortion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation.

While the Flatley case does not involve an employer/employee relationship, it is nevertheless interesting to look at in relation to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision last week in Greer-Burger v. Temesi. I cautioned that employers should tread lightly in filing lawsuits against employees who have engaged in protected activity. Flatley illustrates one situation where it might make sense to file a lawsuit against an employee - where the value of one's personal reputation is harmed by the mere filing of the employee's claim. For example, a CEO or celebrity accused of sexual harassment has a lot to lose even by having a meritless claim alleging sexual misconduct filed against him or her. Another example that comes to mind, although not implicated by the Flatley case, is where an employee has stolen trade secrets. In those examples, the individual or the company has something of value to gain other than mere retribution.

The decision of whether to file a claim against an employee or ex-employee is not an easy one, and should not be undertaken without careful thought, a clear strategy of the goals to be achieved, and consideration of whether those goals are worth the risk of defending against a likely retaliation claim or the perception in court that the counter-suit is merely retaliatory. For Michael Flatley, the decision was a no-brainer, as he was being accused of rape and being extorted. For your company, the decision should be of the same degree of certainty before a similar decision is reached.

The Fox who cried wolf: 6th Circuit finds that mere discussions of a pending lawsuit does not amount to protected activity

If an employee files a charge of charge of discrimination, and then openly discusses with others his strong desire to sue the company for discrimination, do those discussions constitute "protected activity" under the anti-retaliation provisions of the employment discrimination statutes. According to the 6th Circuit's ruling late last week in Fox v. Eagle Distributing Co., the answer is no.

After being passed over for a promotion, James Fox filed a charge of discrimination. After filing that charge, he repeatedly told co-workers and customers that the company was out to get him, and that he was going to sue the company for $10 million. Other than his charge of discrimination, however, he never told anyone that he believed he was the victim of age discrimination. When the company found out that he had been complaining to customers, it fired him for a "poor attitude" which impeded the company's ability to develop good customer relations. Fox then claimed that he was being retaliated against. The only protected conduct he alleged was his boasts that the company was out to get him and that he was going to sue the company.

The 6th Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Fox's retaliation claim. It reasoned that Fox had not engaged in protected activity because he had never complained that he had been discriminated against. According to the 6th Circuit, to qualify as protected activity, the opposition must be tied to a violation of a specific statute, and not merely generalized grievances.

We conclude that Fox’s discussion with Poplin is not protected activity under the ADEA and, therefore, Fox has failed to establish a prima facie claim of retaliation. Specifically, we hold that Fox’s statements to Poplin are not protected because they did not amount to opposition to an unlawful employment practice by Eagle. In order to receive protection under the ADEA, a plaintiff’s expression of opposition must concern a violation of the ADEA.... Here, the record does not contain any evidence that Fox specifically alleged discriminatory employment practices in his discussion with Poplin. In her affidavit, Poplin states that Fox mentioned suing Eagle and "that he had made comments about not getting promoted to a pre-sell position.... Although Fox’s lawsuit against Eagle alleged age discrimination, Poplin did not state – either in her affidavit or as recounted in the personnel memo – that Fox alleged that he was denied the promotion due to age discrimination or that Eagle engaged in any unlawful employment practices."

In other words, a vague charge that management is out to get an employee, and discussions of a pending lawsuit without specific reference to alleged discrimination are insufficient to constitute opposition of an unlawful employment practice and does not merit protection.

Typically, companies should treat employees who have alleged discrimination with kid gloves. The lesson to take away from this case is that no employee is protected from termination merely because he or she files a charge of discrimination or a lawsuit. Eagle got off because Fox did not complain in the right way, These issues, however, operate in very gray areas, and companies would be wise to move cautiously if deciding whether to fire an employee like James Fox - a disgruntled employee with a history of crying discrimination.