Insubordination or protected conduct? 6th Circuit has the answer.

Is there a line that separates an employee’s insubordinate outburst from an expression of protected conduct? Yazdian v. ConMed Endoscopic Technologies, Inc. (6th Cir. 7/14/15) suggest that the answer may be “no”.

Reza Yazdian, a former territory manager for ConMed, believed that he was being singled out because of his national origin or religion. He chose, however, to express that belief to management in a less-than-professional manner, which included becoming combative during a disciplinary meeting.

The 6th Circuit concluded that it should be up to a jury to decide whether, despite Yazdian’s “combative” style, the company nevertheless terminated him because of his expression of protected conduct.

Yazdian cites as direct evidence of retaliation that Sweatt [his manager] specifically referenced Yazdian’s protected statements as examples of insubordination. When Sweatt provided ConMed with examples of Yazdian’s communication problems and “unwillingness to accept and apply constructive coaching,” Sweatt cited Yazdian’s hostile-work-environment and discrimination comments as examples. Sweatt described Yazdian’s claim that Sweatt was “creating a hostile working environment for [him],” as “unprofessional” and “totally unacceptable.” Sweatt cited the incident when Yazdian said to Sweatt, “I guess you don’t like my race either” as an example of Yazdian’s alleged “unwillingness to accept and apply constructive coaching.” And, crucially, Sweatt testified that he made the decision to fire Yazdian immediately after this phone call in which Yazdian said the following: (1) that Yazdian was going to file a lawsuit, (2) that Sweatt was creating a hostile work environment, and (3) that Yazdian would respond to the warning letter with charges.… [T]hese documents are direct evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Sweatt believed Yazdian’s protected activity constituted insubordination, and therefore that Sweatt terminated Yazdian because of the protected statements that Yazdian had made.

Employee have a right to express protected conduct without reprisal, just as employers have the right to discipline or terminate insubordinate employees. When the expression of protected conduct swallows the alleged insubordination, you should expect most courts to do as the 6th Circuit did here, and side with the employee. Act accordingly, and be careful not to confuse protected expressions of opposition to alleged discriminatory employment practices with insubordination.

6th Circuit: reasonable belief about unlawful conduct enough for SOX retaliation

It’s hard to imagine that in the eight-plus years I’ve written this blog, there is any area of employment law that on which I have not yet touched—except, I think, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Today, that changes.

For the uninitiated, Sarbanes-Oxley (or SOX) is a federal statute, enacted in reaction to a several corporate and accounting scandals (think Enron), which establishes conduct standards for public company boards, management and public accounting firms.

In Rhinehimer v. U.S. Bancorp Investments, Inc. (6th Cir. 5/28/15) [pdf], the 6th Circuit addressed the standard for protected conduct under SOX’s anti-retaliation provisions. Does the plaintiff have to prove an underlying fraud, or it is sufficient for the plaintiff to have a reasonable belief that a fraud was committed?

The facts in Rhinehimer are not complicated. Prior to taking a disability leave, Rhinehimer, a certified financial planner, transferred some of the assets of a long-term, elderly client into low risk, conservative investments. While on leave, Rhinehimer’s assistant alerted him to the fact that a co-worker moved some of those assets into riskier investments. Believing those moves to be contrary to the client’s estate plan, Rhinehimer sent an email to his supervisor complaining about the transactions. Upon his return from leave, Rhinehimer was disciplined for his “unprofessional” email. That email spawned an investigation by FINRA. When Rhinehimer informed his employer that he had retained an attorney in response to the FINRA investigation, he was fired.

At issue on appeal was whether a plaintiff claiming retaliation under SOX must allege the specific elements of fraud relating to the underlying transaction, or if a reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the illegality of the underlying (mis)conduct will support the retaliation claim.

The 6th Circuit held for the more liberal proof standard.

Although it is true that Plaintiff had no specific knowledge of whether Harrigan had omitted or misrepresented material information in his communications with Purcell, much less any knowledge of whether Harrigan did so intentionally or with reckless disregard, these gaps in Plaintiff’s knowledge are immaterial. Even if, in fact, everything about the trades were above board, courts universally recognize that [SOX] protects employees who reasonably but mistakenly believe that the conduct at issue constitutes a violation of relevant law.… 

The information that was available to Plaintiff was more than adequate to allow him reasonably to believe that the trades were the result of conduct constituting unsuitability fraud. When USBII retaliated against him for reporting that information, it therefore violated Sarbanes–Oxley’s whistleblower protections.  

If you are a publicly-trade company, employees who lodge complaint about financial improprieties or other financial issues require special treatment. If faced with one of these complaints, do not get hung up on the rightness or wrongness of the complaining employee’s belief about the illegal conduct, because, if you later fire that employee, it appears the reviewing court will not care. 

“Stop harassing me!” = protected conduct to support retaliation claim, says 6th Circuit

What happens when the alleged perpetrator of sexual or other unlawful harassment is also the person to whom the victim lodges a complaint of harassment? If the alleged perpetrator later fires (or causes the firing of) the victim, has the victim engaged in protected conduct (opposition of the harassment) to support a retaliation claim? According to the 6th Circuit, in EEOC v. New Breed Logistics (4/22/15) [pdf], the answer is yes.

The jury concluded that Calhoun, a supervisor, sexually harassed three women (Hines, Pearson, and Pete), retaliated against them after they objected, and further retaliated against a male employee (Partee) “who verbally opposed Calhoun’s sexual harassment and supported the women’s complaints.” The evidence at trial was that Calhoun laughed and responded “that he wasn’t going to get in trouble, that he ran th[e] area, [and that] anybody who went to [HR] on him would be fired.” Calhoun then fired each of the four employees, claiming performance and attendance issues. 

As the threshold issue, the 6th Circuit had to determine whether complaints or objections made to the accused harasser constitute protected activity to support a retaliation claim. The 6th Circuit had little difficulty concluding that these four employees had engaged in protected activity:

We conclude that a demand that a supervisor cease his/her harassing conduct constitutes protected activity covered by Title VII. Sexual harassment is without question an “unlawful employment practice.” If an employee demands that his/her supervisor stop engaging in this unlawful practice—i.e., resists or confronts the supervisor’s unlawful harassment—the opposition clause’s broad language confers protection to this conduct. Importantly, the language of the opposition clause does not specify to whom protected activity must be directed…. Here, at the very least, all four complainants requested that Calhoun stop his sexually harassing behavior before their terminations. Consistent with our holding today, these complaints constitute protected activity.

While I agree that this holding makes sense, consider the awful position in which it could place employers who are lax with their termination decisions. An employer is vicariously liable for the actions of a supervisor or manager (e.g., harassment or retaliation). Thus, an employer will be liable for the rogue actions of a harasser trying to protect his or her turf from an objecting employee.

The solution? More diligence and scrutiny of termination decisions by HR departments and senior management. One cannot merely rubber stamp a manager’s or supervisor’s decision to terminate. If that individual harbors a discriminatory animus, we know that the cat’s paw will nab you. Now, we also know, per New Breed Logistics, that retaliation liability has the same potential issues when an alleged harasser is involved.

Bottom line: Do not rubber stamp termination decisions. Fact-check and confirm before allowing the company to pull the trigger.

Federal appeals court rejects “retaliatory rehiring” claim

As part of massive reorganization, Allstate severed the employment of approximately 6,200 employee agent. In connection with the layoff, Allstate offered all of the employee agents the opportunity to convert their employment status into that of an independent contractor selling Allstate insurance products, provided that they signed a release of all legal claims against Allstate, including federal employment discrimination claims.

In filing suit on behalf of the employees, the EEOC took the position that conversion from an employee to an independent contractor, coupled with a general release, constitute unlawful retaliation under the federal civil rights laws.

In EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2/13/15) [pdf], the Third Circuit flatly rejected the EEOC’s folly.

It is hornbook law that employers can require terminated employees to release claims in exchange for benefits to which they would not otherwise be entitled. Nothing in the employment-discrimination statutes undermines this rule….

According to the Commission, Allstate could have complied with the antiretaliation statutes by simply firing all its employee agents for good, instead of giving them the opportunity to sell Allstate insurance in a different capacity. We are confident that federal laws designed to protect employees do not require such a harmful result….

The EEOC here fails to articulate any good reason why an employer cannot require a release of discrimination claims by a terminated employee in exchange for a new business relationship with the employer.…. [W]e are not persuaded by the Commission’s efforts to arbitrarily limit the forms of consideration exchangeable for a release of claims by a terminated employee.

In other words, the employer, and not the EEOC, gets to decide the post-employment benefit to provide an employee in exchange for a release of claims—whether it’s severance pay, continued health benefits, an engagement as a independent contractor, or something else. As long as the consideration is not something to which the employee is already entitled, a court will not second-guess its sufficiency.

Employers seek to halt EEOC’s efforts to drum up plaintiffs for its “Onionhead” lawsuit

You may recall the lawsuit filed the EEOC claiming that a New York employer forced its employees to join a religion called “Onionhead.”

Now, Employment Law 360 reports that the company’s counsel is trying to block the EEOC from reaching out to the company’s employees to seek additional plaintiffs for its lawsuit.

The employers have asked the federal judge hearing the case to block the EEOC from any further “solicitations of Defendants’ current and former employees for participation in the lawsuit.” You can download a copy of the employers’ letter to the court here [pdf].

According to the company, the EEOC’s letters, printed on government letterhead, provided the employees a one-sided description of the case, omitted a statement that liability has yet to be decided, and created the impression that the employee must contact the EEOC.

Decide for yourself.

If the employer is true, the EEOC is going to have issues. A federal agency cannot misrepresent litigation to drum up support among employees. It also cannot provide employees a mistaken impression that they must cooperate.

At the same time, however, employers faced with alleged misconduct like that alleged in the Onionhead lawsuit must tread very carefully so that they do not unlawfully retaliate against the employees by interfering with their participation rights. For example, an employer cannot forbid employees from cooperating with the EEOC, or even dissuade them from contacting the agency.

What should employers do?

• They can tell employees that it is their choice whether to contact, or cooperate with, the EEOC.
• They can tell employees to be truthful when talking with the EEOC.

What must employers do? 

• They must guarantee employees that they will not suffer any retaliation, no matter their choice.

Employers faced with an EEOC investigation should know that the agency is using these tactics, so that they can proactively, and lawfully, respond by delivering the right message to their employees.

Jury verdict teaches that “open door” policies must still comply with EEO laws

There exists an inherent tension  between open-door and other self-reporting policies and the EEO laws.

Consider, for example, a recent $100,000+ jury verdict against a trucking company for disability discrimination. The company maintained a written “Open Door” policy, and an unwritten policy that prohibited any driver who self-reported alcohol abuse from ever returning to driving. The EEOC sued after an employee who availed himself of the Open Door policy to self-report an alcohol addiction was banned from any future driving for the company. Even though the company offered the driver a part-time dock position as an accommodation, the EEOC successfully argued that the employer failed to “make an individualized determination as to whether the driver could return to driving and provide a reasonable accommodation of leave to its drivers for them to obtain treatment,” and that “to maintain a blanket policy that any driver who self-reports alcohol abuse could never return to driving—with no individualized assessment to determine if the driver could safely be returned to driving—violates the ADA.”

Employees need to be able to engage in protected activity without any retribution or other negative consequences. In this case, the employer learned of a disability and failed to engage in the interactive process for a reasonable accommodation. In others, employers might retaliate against an employee who uses an open-door policy to complaint about discrimination or harassment.

Open-door policies are laudable. They foster the communication that is necessary between employees and management necessary for a healthy (and hopefully union free) work environment. With that openness, however, comes responsibility—the responsibility to learn information without retaliating. Employees need to train management so that they know what to do with protected information once they learn it, and how to act without violating any of our EEO laws. Without this training, employers are setting up their open-door policies and programs for a litigation fail.

The full press release about this jury verdict is available here.

Why retaliation claims should keep you up at night

In early 2009, Aker Plant Services terminated the employment of Tommy Sharp as part of workforce reduction. When Sharp asked his supervisor why the company chose him, as opposed to his less experienced, less senior co-workers, the supervisor replied that the company decided to keep younger employees who could stay with the company longer. Sharp then sued for age discrimination.

While Sharp’s age discrimination lawsuit was pending, a staffing agency attempted to place him for a temporary position at Aker. The company, however, immediately rejected Sharp’s candidacy,  notifying the staffing agency, via email, as follows:

Yes, we do know Tom. He does acceptable work as a designer, but he violated a DuPont mandate on the use of electronic recording devices on company property when last employed here. There are combustible materials in the plant that can potentially be ignited by the use of cell phones, recorders, cameras, etc… [sic] DuPont maintains a zero-tolerance approach to safety violations on its property so, unfortunately, we will not be able to consider Mr. Sharp for this role.

Sharp then brought a second suit, this time for retaliation. The district court dismissed the retaliation claim, concluding that the 15-month gap between Sharp’s initial notification of an intent to sue for age discrimination and the email to the staffing agency severed any potential causal connection between the two events.

The 6th Circuit, however, in Sharp v. Aker Plant Services Group (6th Cir. 1/13/15) [pdf], disagreed:

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Sharp, one could reasonably infer that Aker declined to rehire Sharp in retaliation for his then-pending discrimination action. Yes, it was fifteen months later…. Aker terminated Sharp before he filed his age-discrimination lawsuit, and therefore could not retaliate against him in any manner until he returned seeking temporary employment a year and a half later. Evidence showing that an employer had no opportunity to retaliate sooner supports a finding of temporal proximity.

Retaliation are the most dangerous claims that employers face. This employer likely felt safe refusing Aker’s placement because of the 15-month gap. That time gap, however, was tempered by the fact that the company no longer employed Aker, and its next interaction with him was the claimed act of retaliation. When an employee engages in protected activity, you must treat that employee with added care, as any act that could dissuade an employee from engaging in protected activity could give rise to a retaliation claim.

Adverse actions come in all shapes and sizes

Consider these facts, taken from Kudla v. Olympic Steel (Ohio Ct. App. 11/20/14). Employee, age 65, is fired from his job as part of a corporate reorganization. Employer has a change of heart, however, and rescinds the termination after Employee lawyers up and alleges age discrimination. He claimed, however, that his employment following his rehire was substantively different, including a forced move out of his prior office into a cubicle, the exclusion from meetings, and the placement on surveillance.

Based on these facts, the court of appeals had little problem deciding that the trial court should have allowed Kudla to present his claim to a jury:

He contends that he was essentially demoted and cites in support of his contention, for example, that many of his responsibilities, except clerical ones, were reassigned to his younger coworkers, and that he was moved out of his office into a cubicle.

Olympic Steel, on the other hand, denies Kudla's demotion claim and cites that his pay was not reduced, his job title did not change, and he still performed important work for the company. The company also contends that putting Kudla in a cubicle was a temporary situation necessitated by the reorganization of the human resources department; as part of the reorganization, Kudla no longer needed to discuss personal, confidential information with employees and managers and, thus, he did not need an office….

[W]e find that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Kudla did suffer an adverse employment action.

It is not impossible to terminate, or otherwise take an adverse action against, an employee on the heels of protected activity. Moreover, something as innocuous as moving an employee out of his office could be deemed sufficiently “adverse” to support a retaliation claim.

Bad employees cannot bulletproof themselves merely by complaining about discrimination. However, you must have a rock-solid legitimate non-retaliatory and non-pretextual reason for your action to survive the lawsuit that is likely to follow.

EEOC 0-2 on severance-agreement lawsuits … but does it matter?

Recall that in October, a Chicago federal court dismissed a lawsuit filed by the EEOC against CVS, claiming that the pharmacy retailer’s severance agreements violated Title VII by employing allegedly retaliatory language. That court, however, failed to reach the merits of the case, instead dismissing the EEOC’s claims on procedural grounds (the agency’s failure to engage in pre-suit conciliation), thereby depriving employers guidance on whether certain garden-variety provisions in employment agreements violate Title VII’s anti-retaliation provisions. I held out hope that the practical guidance employers seek on this issue would come from a similar lawsuit pending in Colorado.

Last week, a Denver federal court dismissed that other EEOC severance-agreement-as-retaliation lawsuit. Like the earlier CVS dismissal, however, the dismissal in EEOC v. CollegeAmerica Denver was on procedural grounds, and offers little practical import for employers moving forward on this important issue.

Perhaps if there is any solace for employers looking to sue separation agreements to halt future litigation, and not to buy a future lawsuit by the EEOC, employers can look to footnote 3 in the EEOC v. CVS decision:

The “covenant not to sue” provision prohibits an employee from “initat[ing] or fil[ing] … a complaint or proceeding asserting any of the Released Claims.” The general release of claims is set out in ¶ 7 of the Agreement, but that section also includes the caveat that the release does not limit “any rights that the Employee cannot lawfully waive.” However, there is a specific carve out for an employee’s “right to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws”; and further provides, “nor shall this Agreement prohibit [the employee] from cooperating with any such agency in its investigation.” … The verb participate is defined as “to be involved with others in doing something” and “to take part in an activity … with others.” http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/participate. It is not reasonable to construe “the right to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal … agency,” to exclude the right of the employee from filing an EEOC charge. And, even if the Separation Agreement explicitly banned filing charges, those provisions would be unenforceable and could not constitute resistance to the Act.

In other words, the CVS court, albeit in dicta, believes that the EEOC is chasing an unsupportable claim by arguing that covenants not to file charges violate Title VII’s prohibitions on retaliation.

Employers, however, should not lull themselves into a false sense of security. Neither employer won either of these cases on the merits. For whatever reason, this issue is on the agency’s radar, and it will likely seek another case to prove its point regarding these agreements.

For now, the prudent course of action is to make sure that your agreements clearly and unambiguously, in a provision separate and distinct from the release, waiver, and covenant not to sue, state that employees retain their federally protected rights. I am using something like the following:

Nothing in this Agreement is intended to, or shall, interfere with Employee’s rights under federal, state, or local civil rights or employment discrimination laws to file or otherwise institute a charge of discrimination, to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state, or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws, or to cooperate with any such agency in its investigation, none of which shall constitute a breach of any of the provisions of this Agreement. Employee shall not, however, be entitled to any relief, recovery, or monies in connection with any such brought against any of the Released Parties, regardless of who filed or initiated any such complaint, charge, or proceeding.

“He liked breasts” is never an appropriate response to a harassment complaint

Ruby Blackmon claimed that for a ten-month period, her second-level manager inappropriately stared at her breasts three to 10 times per day, would sexually rub her back, and would breath on her back and ear. Blackmon made ten different complaints to an HR manager, an administrative manager, and her immediate supervisor, all of which were ignored, except for one occasion when her immediate supervisor simply told her that the alleged harasser “liked breasts.” To make matters worse, on the heels of one complaint, her immediate supervisor gave her a negative evaluation. She filed suit after her termination.

Surprisingly, the district court granted this employer’s motion for summary judgment. Not surprisingly, the 6th Circuit reversed in Blackmon v. Eaton Corp. (10/16/14), concluding that genuine issues of material fact exists on the objectively hostile nature of the work environment and on whether there existed a causal nexus between Blackmon’s complaints and her termination.

We know that “He liked breasts” is an inappropriate response to a harassment complaint. What is an appropriate response? Here are 10 steps to follow if you receive a harassment complaint from an employee.

1. If you are not the person in your organization trained to address and investigation these situations, immediately refer the matter to the person who is. If no one is, hire a consultant or attorney who specializes in these issues to do the investigation for you. One word of caution. If you hire an attorney to do the investigation, do not make the mistake of assuming that the investigation will be privileged. It likely won’t be, meaning that the lawyer conducting the investigation might not be able to represent your company in any subsequent lawsuit.
2. Separate the complaining employee from the accused harasser. If that means you need to send someone home, with pay, while you complete the investigation, so be it. Better you eat a few days pay than risk the accused making matters worse by harassing again.
3. As soon as possible, interview the complaining employee (or, if someone else made the complaint, the victim), the accused, and any witnesses.
4. Don’t demean, belittle, or joke about the alleged victim. It will undermine the objectivity of your investigation.
5. Compile and review any pertinent documents. Don’t forget social media accounts, email, and text messages. They are your best friends in these cases.
6. Guard against retaliation, and ensure all employees that their participation will be free of retaliation.
7. Review all information and make a reasoned decision as to the credibility of those involved and what happened.
8. Take prompt and effective remedial action, and communicate your conclusions to the complaining employee.
9. Document the investigation.
10. Never, never, never retaliate.

This is what a retaliatory waiver of EEOC rights looks like

In case you missed it last Friday, a federal judge dismissed the EEOC’s lawsuit against CVS, which had challenged as retaliatory various garden-variety provisions in the retailer’s employment separation agreement.

On that same day, the EEOC announced the filing of another lawsuit, which also challenged as retaliatory a provision in an employment document. Unlike the CVS lawsuit, however, this lawsuit likely has merit.

The EEOC alleges that a Florida restaurant franchisor operator requires, as a condition of employment, all applicants and employees to submit all employment-related claims to binding arbitration, and waive their rights to file discrimination charges with the EEOC. You can read the allegedly offending arbitration clause here.

Unlike the challenged clauses in the CVS case, this clause expressly prohibits individuals from pursuing discrimination charges with the EEOC (or its state or local counterparts). The employment discrimination laws, however, prohibit as retaliatory any effort by an employer to require employees to forsake their rights to see redress with the EEOC. Thus, in my opinion, as a management-side employment lawyer, this employer’s agreement has problems.

The proper way to draft an arbitration agreement, or other agreement that waives certain rights or remedies, is to carve out EEOC charges. You would say something like this:

Nothing in this Agreement is intended to, or shall, interfere with the employee’s rights under federal, state, or local civil rights or employment discrimination laws to file or otherwise institute a charge of discrimination, to participate in a proceeding with any appropriate federal, state, or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws, or to cooperate with any such agency in its investigation, none of which shall constitute a breach of this Agreement. Employee shall not, however, be entitled to any relief, recovery, or monies in connection with any such brought against the Employer, regardless of who filed or initiated any such complaint, charge, or proceeding.

Because this clause protects the EEOC’s right to investigate and remedy violations of, and otherwise enforce, the law, it should pass muster with the EEOC. (Of course, before you implement any such language in your agreements, you must consult with your own employment counsel).

My advice to the employer in this case is to settle with the EEOC as soon as possible on the best terms possible, and avoid the expense of a costly uphill legal battle that will be difficult to win.

BREAKING: Federal judge dismisses EEOC severance agreement lawsuit against CVS

The Chicago Tribune is reporting that U.S. District Judge John Darrah has granted CVS’s motion to dismiss a lawsuit filed by EEOC, which challenged the company’s severance agreements as overly broad and retaliatory. 

Recall that the lawsuit challenged several garden-variety terms in standard employee severance agreements, including non-disparagement, confidentiality, and a covenant not to sue (which expressly disclaimed EEOC charges).

When the EEOC filed this lawsuit earlier this year, I exclaimed that a ruling for the agency could be ruinous for employers. Kudos to this judge for recognizing the folly of the EEOC’s position.

The Tribune reports that the court granted CVS’s motion at a hearing, and said that a written opinion would follow. I’ll have full coverage of this significant rebuking of the EEOC’s extreme position as soon as the opinion publishes.

In the meantime, this is not the end of this issue. It is possible, it not probable, that the EEOC will appeal this dismissal to the 7th Circuit. Also, the EEOC has filed a similar case in at least one other court. There is always a chance that another judge will see this issue the EEOC’s way, creating a split, and a headache for employers.

[Hat tip: Ameet Sachdev]

Protected activity doesn’t protect against poor performance

Yesterday brought us two different 6th Circuit cases upholding dismissals of lawsuits in which the employees alleged that their terminations followed their exercise of protected activity.

• In Wilson v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, the hospital fired a patient transporter for failing to follow proper procedures for moving a post-surgical patient. That incident was not her first breach of protocol, as the hospital had previously suspended her for leaving a corpse unattended in a patient room. She had filed an EEOC charge after the corpse incident.
• In Travers v. Cellco Partnership, the employer fired an employee with a history of performance problems on her first day back from FMLA leave, after she made yet another on-the-job mistake.

These cases illustrate that it is not impossible for fire an employee on the heels of protected activity. In both cases, the court concluded that there existed no factual dispute as to the veracity of the performance problems, and that each was a terminable offense.

“Terminability,” however, is the key. If an employee can show either that stated reason for the termination (1) had no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the employer’s action, or (3) was insufficient to motivate the employer’s action, then the employer cannot prevail on summary judgment.

Consistency is crucial. How did the Clinic and Verizon treat other employees who committed similar violations? If the treatment is consistent, it becomes difficult for the employee to establish either of the three indicia of pretext, even if the termination follows on the heels of the protected activity.

What can you learn from these cases? Protected activity does not per se protect a poor performer from termination, provided that you can demonstrate a history of treating similarly situated poor performers similarly.

When the cat’s paw strikes retaliation

What happens when a decision-maker acts with an innocent motive, but unwittingly carries out the retaliatory motive of a subordinate? Does the cat’s paw impute the unlawful intent to the otherwise innocent manager or supervisor? In Seoane-Vazque v. The Ohio State University (6th Cir. 8/19/14) [pdf], the 6th Circuit held that while the cat’s paw applies to retaliation claims, it is still bound by the higher but-for causation standard the Supreme Court applied to retaliation claims in University of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar.

Following Nassar, “a Title VII plaintiff alleging retaliation cannot establish liability if her firing was prompted by both legitimate and illegitimate factors.” … So long as the untainted factors were sufficient to justify [the] ultimate decision, the University will be entitled to summary judgment.

Thus, in any claim alleging retaliation under Title VII, courts must apply the stricter “but for” causation standard, regardless of the identity of the purported decision-maker. As a result, retaliation claims remain harder for employees to prove, and easier for employers to win on summary judgment.

This all makes for an interesting academic discussion, but once you reach these platitudes of burden of proof and causation, you’ve already lost. You’ve already fired an employee who engaged in protected conduct. You’ve already gotten sued. And, you’ve already spent a tidy sum investigating the complaint, taking discovery, and preparing a (hopefully winning) motion for summary judgment. You’ve spent $100,000 (or more) to justify the termination of a marginal employee. In that case, have you really won?

What’s the safer course of action? Only terminate as a last resort. Treat employees who engage in protected activity with kid gloves. Make an informed decision early in any case whether it is one worth fighting or settling. Better yet, consider severance pay in exchange for a release claims in all but the most egregious of terminations. Nassar’s “but-for” causation standard may shift employers’ decisions to fight over flight in more cases, but employers should resist the litigation urge, which is usually a losing proposition for all. I know this is odd advice coming from a litigator, but a termination decision must be fully informed, and the vast void of litigation costs must be a key part of that decision.

When retaliation stands the test of time

Often when we consider the issue of temporal proximity in a retaliation case, we examine it from the standpoint of whether temporal proximity is sufficient to infer retaliatory intent when the adverse action happens right on the heels of the protected activity. What happens, however, if the converse is true—if a long period of time elapses between the protected activity and the adverse action. Can an employer save itself from a retaliation claim simply by waiting it out? This was the question the court faced in Malin v. Hospira, Inc. (7th Cir. 8/7/14).

Deborah Malin worked in the IT department of the Abbott Laboratories’s hospital product division (spun off to a new company, Hospira, in 2006). In July 2003, she informed her direct boss, Bob Balogh, that she was going to complain to HR about sexual harassment by her indirect supervisor, Satish Shah, who reported to Mike Carlin. Before she could complain to HR, Balogh told her that Carlin told him to do everything in his power to stop Malin from going to HR. Malin ignored the stop sign and lodged her harassment complaint with HR.

Between the 2003 complaint and the 2006 Hospira reorganization, Malin applied for several promotions but received none of them. On June 14, 2006, the management team (including Carlin, then the CIO) met to discuss new roles for current IT employees. Five days later, Malin took emergency FMLA leave. Several weeks later, the IT department announced its reorganization, which again resulted in Malin being passed over for a promotion.

Among other claims, Malin claimed that when Hospira executed its 2006 reorganization, it retaliated against her for the 2003 harassment complaint. The court concluded that the intervening three-year gap between the harassment complaint and the decision not to promote Malin was insufficient to defeat her retaliation claim:

[A] long time interval between protected activity and adverse employment action may weaken but does not conclusively bar an inference of retaliation…. Rather, if the time interval standing alone is long enough to weaken an inference of retaliation, the plaintiff is entitled to rely on other circumstantial evidence to support her claim….

The evidence in this case permits an inference that Carlin had a long memory and repeatedly retaliated against Malin between 2003 and 2006. Malin was denied promotions numerous times between 2003 and 2006. During that time, Carlin was the final decision-maker on all promotions in the IT department, both at Abbott and after the spin-off at Hospira. Malin’s immediate supervisors repeatedly told her that she would be an excellent fit for newly-available positions at higher salary grades and that they would recommend that she be promoted into them. Nevertheless, Malin did not receive any promotions at Hospira between 2003 and 2006…. These incidents are circumstantial evidence that Carlin remembered Malin’s complaint about Shah and acted to prevent her from being promoted at Hospira long after the complaint was made.

This case serves as a solid reminder that an employer cannot hold a grudge against an employee who engaged in protected activity, with the hope that the passage of time will permit later retaliation. If an employee can connect the dots between the protected activity and the adverse action, the employer faces risk, no matter how much time has passed.

Image via Robbert van der Steeg (originally posted to Flickr as Eternal clock) [CC-BY-SA-2.0], via Wikimedia Commons

Time after time: temporal proximity and retaliation

Marla Montell reported an allegation of sexual harassment against her supervisor, Austin Day, to human resources  at Diversified Clinical Services. The HR rep contacted Day almost immediately. The next day, Day called Montell and told her that she should resign or would be fired. Chose the former, and then sued the company for retaliation. 

The only evidence Montell presented in support of her retaliation claim was the timing of her termination in relation to her internal harassment complaint. For its part, the company claimed that Day was motivated by Montell’s performance history, which included a PIP, a documented oral counseling and development plan, a Final Warning, and an Amended Final Warning. The Amended Final Warning, issued on May 3, 2011, provided Montell until June 2 to improve her performance or be fired. She resigned in lieu of termination on May 20.

In Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs. (6/27/14), the 6th Circuit was faced with the question of whether the mere timing of Montell’s resignation was sufficient to support her retaliation claim under Title VII. Following its own precedent, and that of the Supreme Court, the 6th Circuit concluded that Montell’s retaliation claim should go to a jury to determine whether there existed a nexus between her protected activity and her forced resignation:

[E]mployees who are about to be fired should not abuse the civil-rights protections by filing frivolous harassment complaints. However, it cannot be open season for supervisors to sexually harass poorly performing employees. Such employees must still be provided with their legal protections.… [W]e must analyze the evidence of how and when the adverse employment action occurred to determine whether it squares with the action previously contemplated. If it does, then temporal proximity is not evidence of causality, but if the adverse employment action is unlike the action previously contemplated or does not occur on the schedule previously laid out, then the temporal proximity of the adverse action to the protected conduct is certainly evidence of causation.

In other words, was the decision to terminate Montell a mere continuation of her performance history, or a reaction to her protected activity? In this case, because Montell faced termination before the June 2 date contemplated by the Amended Final Warning, the court concluded that the adverse action sufficiently deviated from the performance history to create a jury issue over the timing of the termination.

If you are going to terminate an employee on the heels of protected activity, you best have all of your ducks in a row. If Montell’s performance objectively had not improved by June 2, I suspect this case would have come out differently. Because the employer jumped the gun on the termination, it called into question the employer’s motivation, especially within 24 hours of a harassment complaint.

Employees who complain about harassment or discrimination aren’t bulletproof. But, you better be damn sure you’re using the right ammo. If there can be any doubt about your motivation, you take a huge risk in firing an employee on a timeline such as that in Montell.

Dont' be that boss: company pays big for use of the n-word

If you’re African-American, your boss (who happens to be the president’s son and part owner) calls you and other African-American employees a “n***er,” and places a handgun on his desk for intimidation whenever meeting with African-American employees, do you have a case for discrimination and harassment? You bet you do.

Those were the facts in Smith v. Superior Production (Ohio Ct. App. 5/8/14) [pdf], in which the trial court had tossed out a $550,000 jury verdict in favor of a laid-off African-American employee working under those conditions.

One issue in the case was the commonness of the use of the n-word. The majority opinion concluded that the use of the n-word, coupled with the brandishing of a handgun, was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict:

Reasonable minds can easily conclude that Holstein’s use of the n-word, directly to Smith, while on the production floor, at the same time telling him to go home, was humiliating. The trial court also disregarded the other testimony, including testimony about laying a cocked firearm on the desk when Holstein talked to Smith. Further, the trial court improperly discounted other evidence of a hostile work environment. The trial court argued that racially offensive language was bantered around the plant, but it was not humiliating because it was not directed at Smith most of time. The trial court also argued that Smith was not subject to a hostile work environment even though he was intimidated when Holstein would routinely pull his gun out of a drawer, cock it, and then set it on the desk when meeting with Smith.

The dissent, however, disagreed:

The majority decision also points to management’s common use of “n___” in the workplace as evidence of discriminatory animus. Smith testified that, during the ten-year period between 1998 and 2008, he heard five people—three co-workers, one of Superior’s owners, and Holstein—refer to African Americans as “n___s” in the workplace. Smith, however, failed to testify as to how frequently he heard that racial slur. Given this gap in the evidence, I do not believe that a factfinder could conclude that the use of  “n___” was common. 

How does one reconcile this differing opinions? You don’t. Instead, you understand that while differing minds could come to different decisions, the behavior exhibited in this case is abhorrent and has no place in your workplace. Have a strong anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policy. Train your employees on what it means. Take a zero-tolerance stance on this type of behavior. That way, you should never have to worry about what a judge or jury will do with these types of facts.

If you're caught sunbathing nude, on the roof of your elementary school-employer, don't sue for retaliation

Charles Davis is a long-time custodian for Unified School District No. 500. In 2007, he was caught on the roof of the elementary school at which he worked, sunbathing, in the nude. Instead of firing him, the school board suspended him for 30 days without pay and demoted him. Over the next five years, he applied for seven different head custodian jobs with the district. Each job went to a different applicant. Davis filed three different charges with the EEOC stemming from those rejections, first for race discrimination, and later for retaliation.

In Davis v. Unified School District No. 500, the 10th Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of Davis’s retaliation claim:

In a nutshell the key issue is whether a common purpose to retaliate against Davis must be inferred from the sheer volume of his promotion denials; we think not when seven independent and informed decision makers are involved.

Some employees are unworthy of protection by the anti-retaliation laws. Yes, Davis filed many EEOC charges claiming discrimination resulting from his employer’s failure to promote him. But, he was also caught sunbathing, nude, on the roof of the elementary school at which he worked. One decision maker would be justified in concluding that Davis was unworthy of a promotion. Seven different decision makers reached the same conclusion. Thus, barring evidence of a grand conspiracy against Davis because he had filed some EEOC charges, he could not prevail on his retaliation claim.

The moral of the story: not all protected activity is protected.

(Hat tip: Judy Greenwald at Business Insurance)

EEOC continues fight against severance agreements,while employers fight back

Earlier this year, I reported on a groundbreaking lawsuit the EEOC filed against CVS challenging as retaliatory some garden-variety provisions in employee separation agreements (here and here). 

Earlier this week, the EEOC reported that it has filed a similar lawsuit in Colorado, against CollegeAmerica. From the EEOC’s news release:

Debbi D. Potts, the campus director of CollegeAmerica's Cheyenne, Wyo., campus, resigned in July 2012 and signed a separation agreement in September 2012 that conditioned the receipt of separation benefits on, among other things, her promise not to file any complaint or grievance with any government agency or to disparage CollegeAmerica. These provisions would prevent Potts from reporting any alleged employment discrimination to the EEOC or filing a discrimination charge.…

The EEOC also claims that provisions which similarly chill employees’ rights to file charges and cooperate with the EEOC exist in CollegeAmerica’s form separation and release agreements, routinely used with its employees.…

“Rights granted to employees under federal law, like the right to file charges of discrimination and participate in EEOC investigations into alleged discrimination in the workplace, cannot be given up in agreements between private parties,” said Mary Jo O’Neill, Regional Attorney for the EEOC’s Phoenix District Office…. “Otherwise, employers could easily do an end run around the law, employees would not be free to complain about discrimination, and the EEOC would never learn about violations of the law or have an opportunity to enforce it.”

Meanwhile, CVS is fighting back against the EEOC in its lawsuit. CVS has asked the district court to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, cap arguing that the mere inclusion of terms in a severance agreement does not violate Title VII. Business groups are also weighing in, the court has granted permission to the Retail Litigation Center to file a brief in support of CVS’s motion to dismiss. 

I continue to believe that this issue is the most important issue to employers that the EEOC is currently litigating. 

It is becoming clear that the CVS lawsuit was not an anomaly, and that challenging these types of provisions in severance agreements is high on the EEOC’s radar. For now, however, I think employers should take a wait-and-see approach. This issue is too important for employers to knee-jerk pull these key clauses from their agreements.

For now, what I wrote in February (which includes a draft carve-out) still holds true:

Don’t shred your settlement and severance agreements just yet.… Modify your agreements to bolster and clarify the protected-activity carve-out.… Given the EEOC’s position, prudence dictates the breadth of this carve-out, which is more expansive than what I traditionally use. The alternative, however, is to omit these provisions all together, and draft agreements that looks like a Swiss-cheese of risk.

Examining the low standard for adverse actions in retaliation claims

Mark Laster worked as a Public Safety Officer/Emergency Officer for the Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety for more than 23 years. After complaining to his superiors that the department was treating him differently because of his race, he alleged that he was denied training opportunities and privileges, singled out for violating at least two department policies that were selectively enforced against him, and disciplined more harshly than his peers for identical violations. 

The district court, however, dismissed Laster’s Title VII retaliation claim, concluding that none of the challenged actions were materially adverse sufficient to support a claim of retaliation. 

The 6th Circuit disagreed. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo (3/13/14) hi-lights the low standard for establishing an “adverse action” to support a retaliation claim:

Plaintiff’s burden of establishing a materially adverse employment action is “less onerous in the retaliation context than in the anti-discrimination context.” … “[A] plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” … “This more liberal definition permits actions not materially adverse for purposes of an anti-discrimination claim to qualify as such in the retaliation context.”

Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded that the trial court had erred by dismissing Laster’s retaliation claim:

Facing heightened scrutiny, receiving frequent reprimands for breaking selectively enforced policies, being disciplined more harshly than similarly situated peers, and forced to attend a pre-determination hearing based on unfounded allegations of wrongdoing might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. There is a genuine issue of fact regarding whether or not Plaintiff was subject to materially adverse action, and whether Plaintiff’s protected activity was the cause of such action.

By way of contrast, the 6th Circuit also concluded that the same set of facts could not legally support Laster’s constructive discharge claim under Title VII, because of the higher “adverse action” standard under a Title VII disparate treatment claim.

What does all this legal jargon mean from a practical standpoint? It means that when an employee complains about discrimination, or otherwise engages in protected conduct, you must treat that employee with kid gloves. Any action you take against that employee, which one could view as reasonably dissuading any employees from engaging in other protected conduct, will likely be “adverse” under Title VII’s anti-retaliation protections.

Employees who complain aren’t bulletproof, and you can still discipline or terminate a worthy employee, even on the heals of complaint about discrimination or other protected conduct. You must, however, tread very carefully, and make sure that all your i’s are dotted and t’s are crossed, because even the slightest misstep could ring the retaliation bell.