Tattoos at work: more acceptance, yet still some legal risk

By ABC TV [Public domain],
via Wikimedia Commons

I am not a tattoo person. Yet, a whole lot of people are. And the numbers are increasing.

In fact, according to one recent survey, 3 in 10 Americans have at least one tattoo, up 50% in just four years. And, the younger you are, the more likely you are to sport a tattoo: 47% of millennials have a tattoo, as compared to 36% of gen Xers and only 13% of baby boomers.

What does it mean to be religious?

Lately, I’ve been thinking a lot about religion. Or, rather, what it means to be religious.

I am not religious. Or at least not in the organized sense.

This does not mean that I am an atheist, or a pagan, or a heathen, or whatever other aspersion you’d like to cast upon me.

It just means that I do not believe I need a building and a structure upon which to ascribe my beliefs.

Accommodating employees should be a common sense issue

I spent a high-school summer working on a warehouse loading dock. One of my co-workers was named Harland Jester. (I provide his name because he named his son “Court,” and this context provides the necessary color for the rest of the story.)

Four days in to my summer job, a co-worker pulled me aside and ask, “Did Harland get a hold of you yet?”

“Uh, no. Why?”

“Just wait.”

Court rules that religious accommodation request is not protected activity for retaliation claim

A Minnesota federal court has ruled that an employee’s request for a religious accommodation did not qualify as protected activity to support the employee’s retaliation claim. EEOC v. North Memorial Health Care (D. Minn. 7/6/17) involves a hospital that withdrew a conditional job offer to a nurse after she disclosed that she was a Seventh Day Adventist and could not work Friday nights because of her religion.

Trump’s un-American travel ban and the workplace

I’ve had an internal debate all weekend long over whether I should blog about Trump’s executive order that that bans immigration from seven Muslim countries, suspends refugees for 120 days, and bars all Syrian refugees indefinitely. Ultimately, I decided that if you are not part of the solution you are part of the problem, and this issue is too important to remain silent. I choose to be on the correct side of history.

If you are a staunch defender of the President who does not care to read an opposing view, I suggest you stop reading now, and come back tomorrow for a more benign post. Or, better yet, post a comment and let’s have an intelligent debate about this issue. And, if you choose to unfollow or unfriend me because of my opinion, you are more than welcome to do that too. This is still America, and I respect your right to have an opinion even if I disagree with it. I hope, however, that you show me and my opinion the same respect and patriotism that I would show you and yours.

Mandatory flu shots cost employer bigly

You may recall that in September I reported on a lawsuit the EEOC filed against a Pennsylvania hospital, alleging that it unlawfully fired six employees after denying their request for a religious exemption from the flu vaccine.

How did that case turn out for the employer? Not well. From the EEOC:

Can you require flu shots for your employees?

As the calendar winds its way into autumn, and as the temperature starts to trend downward, we move into flu season. Which is why should pay special attention to this story from Employment Law 360:

An anniversary love story

Thirteen years ago today I married my best friend. I’m happy to report that the thunderstorms that rocked Cleveland on August 29, 2003, were not of the foreshadowing kind. It hasn’t been perfect. No marriage is. But every day is better because I get to experience it holding Colleen’s hand. And that makes us very, very lucky.

So, I thought I’d re-run a post from four years ago today. Enjoy.

EEOC offers guidance for Youth@Work

Do you employee minors? If so, you should be aware of the wage-and-hour laws for child labor. The Department of Labor, however, isn’t the only federal agency taking a look at your under-18 employees. Recently, the EEOC launched an entire portal devoted to the issue.

The microsite, entitled Youth@Work, is the agency’s education and outreach campaign to promote equal employment opportunity for teenage workers.

Can you legally deck the workplace halls?

The holiday season is in full swing. Gifts are flying off the shelves, FedEx is delivering too many Amazon-logoed boxes to count, and lights, trees, and wreaths are everywhere.

What about the workplace? Can you legally decorate for the holidays at work? And, if you do, does the law require that you accommodate all religions in your holiday displays? The answer might surprise you.

We stand with France; we stand against discrimination

Photo by Jon Hyman, 8/6/15

What happened Friday evening in France is unfathomable. Except, really, it isn’t. We experienced it 15 years ago in New York City. And, in the aftermath of 9/11, discrimination against Muslims and Arabs increased by 250 percent.

From the EEOC:

Time off for religious holidays

Today is Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New Year, which means that many Jewish employees are taking the day off. Is an employer obligated, however, to grant a request for time off when requested for a religious observance?

Title VII requires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee whose sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance conflicts with a work requirement, unless doing so would pose an undue hardship. An accommodation would pose an undue hardship if it would cause more than de minimis cost on the operation of the employer’s business. Factors relevant to undue hardship may include the type of workplace, the nature of the employee’s duties, the identifiable cost of the accommodation in relation to the size and operating costs of the employer, and the number of employees who will in fact need a particular accommodation.

Scheduling changes, voluntary substitutions, and shift swaps are all common accommodations for employees who need time off from work for a religious practice. It is typically considered an undue hardship to impose these changes on employees involuntarily. However, the reasonable accommodation requirement can often be satisfied without undue hardship where a volunteer with substantially similar qualifications is available to cover, either for a single absence or for an extended period of time.

In other words, permitting Jewish employees a day off for Rosh Hashanah, and next week for Yom Kippur, may impose an undue hardship, depending on the nature of the work performed, the employee’s duties, and how many employees will need the time off. Employees can agree to move shifts around to cover for those who need the days off, but employers cannot force such scheduling changes.

In plain English, there might be ways around granting a day or two off for a Jewish employee to observe the holidays, but do you want to risk the inevitable lawsuit? For example, it will be difficult to assert that a day off creates an undue hardship if you have a history of permitting days off for medical or other reasons.

Legalities aside, however, this issue asks a larger question. What kind of employer do you want to be? Do you want to be a company that promotes tolerance or fosters exclusion? The former will help create the type of environment that not only mitigates against religious discrimination, but spills over into the type of behavior that helps prevent unlawful harassment and other liability issues.

When religious liberty clashes with job requirements

By now, you’ve likely heard about the Muslim flight attendant who filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, claiming that her employer refused to accommodate her religion by requiring her serve alcohol on flights. There is much to say about this issue, but I do not think I can say it any better than Eugene Volokh did in the Washington Post. I highly recommend his thorough and thoughtful essay.

The practical question, however, is what to do when an employee requests such an accommodation. Consider:

• A Catholic pharmacist who refuses to sell birth control.
• A Muslim truck driver who refuses to deliver any pork.
• A Christian Scientist nurse who refuses a flu vaccine.
• An Orthodox Jew who refuses to sell any non-Kosher items.
• An IRS employee with religious objections to working on certain tax-exemption applications.

How you feel about each of these particular cases will depend, in large part, on your view of Religion, or certain religions. Yet, Title VII does not make any such distinctions. Instead, Title VII requires employers to exempt religious employees from generally applicable work rules as a reasonable accommodation, so long as the accommodation won’t impose on the employer an “undue hardship” (something more than a modest cost or burden). If the job can get done without much of a burden, then Title VII requires the employer to provide the accommodation.

Volokh makes six observation about this reasonable-accommodation rule, which are worth repeating:

1. The rule requires judgments of degree. Some accommodations are relatively cheap (again, always realizing that any accommodation involves some burden on employers), while other are more expensive. The courts have to end up drawing some fuzzy line between them. Maybe that’s a bad idea, but that’s what Congress set up with the “reasonable accommodation” requirement. So if you want to argue that one religious objector shouldn’t get the relatively easy accommodation she wants, you can’t do that by analogy to another claim where the accommodation would be very expensive.

2. The rule turns on the specific facts present in a particular workplace. An accommodation can be very expensive when the objecting employee is the only one at the job site who can do a task, but relatively cheap when there are lots of other employees. It can be very expensive when all the other employees also raise the same objection, but relatively cheap when the other employees are just fine with doing the task. Again, maybe that’s a bad rule, but it’s the rule Congress created. And if you want to argue that one religious objector shouldn’t get an accommodation that’s easy at the objector’s job site, you can’t do that by pointing out that the accommodation would be expensive at other job sites.

3. The rule accepts the risk of insincere objections. Of course, when sincere religious objectors can get an exemption, others can ask for the same exemption even just for convenience rather than from religious belief. That’s not much of a problem for many exemption requests, since most people have no personal, self-interested reasons not to transport alcohol on their trucks, or raising an American flag on a flagpole. But for some accommodations, there is a risk of insincere claims, for instance when someone just wants Saturdays off so he can do fun weekend things. The law assumes that employers will be able to judge employees’ sincerity relatively accurately, and to the extent some insincere objections are granted, this won’t be too much of a problem. Again, the law might be wrong on this, but it’s the law.

4. The rule accepts the risk of slippery slopes, and counts on courts to stop the slippage. Once some people get a religious exemption, others are likely to claim other religious exemptions; indeed, some people who before managed to find a way to live with their religious objections without raising an accommodation request might now conclude that they need to be more militant about their beliefs. Here too, the law accepts this risk, and counts on courts to cut off the more expensive accommodations.

5. The rule rejects the “you don’t like the job requirements, so quit the job” argument. Again, that argument is a perfectly sensible policy argument against having a Title VII duty of religious accommodation. It’s just an argument that religious accommodation law has, rightly or wrongly, rejected.

6. The rule focused on what specific accommodations are practical. If someone demands as an accommodation that a company completely stop shipping alcohol, that would be an undue hardship for an employer. But if it’s possible to accommodate the person by just not giving him the relatively rare alcohol-shipping orders, then that might well not be an undue hardship.

In other words, Title VII’s religious accommodation provision is the law of the land, and it does not permit value judgments based on the religion of the person making the request, no matter how different a religion may seem from ours. If the request is based on a sincerely held religious belief, is reasonable, and does not impose an undue hardship, an employer must provide it. Value judgments will result in litigation, in which the employer will likely be on the wrong side of the law. Treat each religion equally, consider each accommodation request on its merits, and err on the side of inclusion.

#SCOTUS requires employers to stereotype in ruling for EEOC in hijab-accommodation case

Yesterday, the United States Supreme Court ruled that an employer violates Title VII’s religious accommodation requirements if the need for an accommodation was a “motivating factor” in its decision, regardless of whether the employer had actual knowledge of the religious practice or its need to be accommodated.

The case, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores [pdf], is an unambiguous win for religious freedoms, while, at the same time, places an added burden on employers to make educated guesses about applicants’ and employees’ potential needs for workplace religious accommodations.

Abercrombie involved a conflict between a hijab-wearing Muslim job applicant and the employer’s “look policy.” The unusually terse seven-page opinion (of which only a little more than three was dedicated to actual legal analysis) focused on the difference between motive and knowledge in explaining its holding:

Motive and knowledge are separate concepts. An employer who has actual knowledge of the need for an accommodation does not violate Title VII by refusing to hire an applicant if avoiding that accommodation is not his motive. Conversely, an employer who acts with the motive of avoiding accommodation may violate Title VII even if he has no more than an unsubstantiated suspicion that accommodation would be needed.…

For example, suppose that an employer thinks (though he does not know for certain) that a job applicant may be an orthodox Jew who will observe the Sabbath, and thus be unable to work on Saturdays. If the applicant actually requires an accommodation of that religious practice, and the employer’s desire to avoid the prospective accommodation is a motivating factor in his decision, the employer violates Title VII. 

So, if knowledge is irrelevant, what is an employer to when faced with one’s potential need for a religious accommodation? More the point, isn’t an employer faced with having to make educated guesses (based on stereotypes such as how one looks or what one wears) of the need for an accommodation? Title VII is supposed to eliminate stereotypes from the workplace, not premise the need for an accommodation on their use. And that’s my biggest critique of this opinion—it forces an employer into the unenviable position of applying stereotypes to make educated guesses.

Nevertheless, employers are stuck with the Abercrombie “motivating factor” rule as the rule for religious accommodations moving forward. Thus, let me offer a simple suggestion on how to address this issue in your workplace—talk it out. Consider using the following three-pronged approached to ACE religious-accommodation issues in your workplace.

• Ask: Even if an employee comes to a job interview wearing a hijab, it’s still not advisable to flat-out ask about his or her religion. Nevertheless, if you believe an applicant’s or employee’s religion might interfere with an essential function of the job, explain the essential functions and ask if the employee needs an accommodation. 

• Communicate: If the individual needs an accommodation, engage in the interactive process. Have a conversation with the applicant or employee. Explain your neutral policy for which an exception will have to be made. Talk through possible accommodations, and decide which accommodation, if any, is appropriate for your business and for the individual.

• Educate: Do you have written policy on religious accommodation? Of course, merely having a policy is never enough. You must communicate it to your employees, explain its meaning and operation, and enforce it when necessary.

This decision is a potential game-changer for employers. Make sure you understand the implications of Abercrombie, so that you are as accommodating as the law requires.

Image courtesy of Jeffrey Weston’s Ape, Not Monkey
http://www.apenotmonkey.com/2012/04/09/religious-accommodation/

“Daddy, why do Jewish people not like Catholics?”

On Wednesday nights, my wife and I drop our daughter off at band practice, and then take our son to dinner before his keyboard lesson starts. While sitting at dinner last night, my son hit us with this bomb: “Daddy, why do Jewish people not like Catholics? … Why did the Jews kill Jesus?”

If you’ve been a long-time reader, you know that my family is interfaith. Even though my kids are being raised Catholic, they understand that their Catholicism is only half of their religious background. I could go into a long dissertation as to why they are being raised Catholic, but the reality is that I am much more a secular Jew than a religious Jew, and since kids need to be raised something, Catholicism makes more sense, even to me.

Be that as it may, I certainly don’t want my kids thinking that their Jewish side doesn’t like their Catholic side. This morning on the way to the school bus I probed Donovan on where he got the idea that Jews don’t like Catholics. As it turns out (and as I suspected), it was his takeaway from hearing the crucifixion story at PSR on Monday night. I have no doubt that the message wasn’t one of hate, but rather one of miscommunication. Nevertheless, in Donovan’s developing six-year-old brain, when he was heard, “The Jews didn’t like/support/belive-in Jesus,” he understood it as, “Jews don’t like Catholics.” It an honest interpretation from an intelligent six-year-old boy, since he’s been taught his whole life that Catholicism and Jesus are intertwined.

I will explain to Donovan tonight that Jews and Catholics love each other. After all, he’s Catholic, as is his sister, mom, grandma, grandpa, aunts, uncles, and cousins—and I love all of them. I will try to explain, as best as I can, the historical context of what happened 2,000 years ago, and, hopefully, he’ll understand that what some people did those millennia long ago does not translate to today. Then, I will explain to the PSR teacher that she needs to be sensitive to the fact that she is teaching at least one interfaith child, and must tailor her message so as not to alienate or upset. We should be teaching inclusion, not estrangement.

The same lesson translates to your workplace. We live in a multi-cultural, multi-religious society, yet we are becoming more and more fragmented. Our great melting pot is not longer an olio, but an mishmash of separate ingredients holding for dear life to the edge of the pot. We are fragmented by religion, national origin, and political belief. Your challenge as an employer is to ensure that your workplace is integrated. You need to ask yourself what kind of workplace you desire. Do you want a workplace of inclusion or exclusion? Do you want employees to feel as though they are part of a team, or part of a tribe that happens to work among other tribes in the same building? To me, the former not only makes for a more cohesive workplace, but also one that limits the risk of liability for harassment, discrimination, and retaliation.

Reading the #SCOTUS tea leaves: headscarves, religious accommodations, and Abercrombie

Yesterday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (transcript here [pdf]), which will hopefully determine the circumstances under which an employer must, as a religious accommodation, grant an exception to its “Look Policy” for a hijab-wearing job applicant. More broadly, employers hold out hope for some more generalized guidance on what they should do when a corporate policy conflicts with an employee’s sincerely held religious belief.

What an interesting argument. The Justices seemed very skeptical of requiring employees to raise the issue of a reasonable accommodation in a job interview, and instead suggested that the burden should fall on an employer to bring up the issue. For example, Justice Kagan asked:

You’re essentially saying that the problem with the rule is that it requires Abercrombie to engage in what might be thought of as an awkward conversation…. But the alternative to that rule is a rule where Abercrombie just gets to say, “We’re going to stereotype people and prevent them from getting jobs. We’ll never have the awkward conversation because we’re just going to cut these people out.”

The criticism of the employer, however, was not limited to the Court’s left wing. Justice Alito also seems skeptical that an employer can simply ignore an obvious potential need for an accommodation simply by denying employment.

All right.  Let’s say …­­ four people show up for a job interview at Abercrombie…. So the first is a Sikh man wearing a turban, the second is a Hasidic man wearing a hat, the third is a Muslim woman wearing a hijab, the fourth is a Catholic nun in a habit. Now, do you think … that those people have to say, we just want to tell you, we’re dressed this way for a religious reason. We’re not just trying to make a fashion statement….

I want to know the answer to the question whether the employee has to say, I’m wearing this for a religious reason, or whether you’re willing to admit that there are at least some circumstances in which the employer is charged with that knowledge based on what the employer observes.

Justice Alito then offered a very practical solution:

Well, couldn’t the employer say, we have a policy no beards, or whatever, do you have any problem with that?

Reading the tea leaves, I predict another employee-side victory from this conservative-majority court. If we are assigning burdens, it seems to me that the Court thinks it makes sense to place the burden on the party with more information (the employer) to explain the job requirements to determine if a potentially obvious religious belief conflicts. Otherwise, you are requiring the employee to guess at whether an accommodation is needed at all.

Stay tuned. This will be a very interesting opinion to read when it is released later this year.

Can you require vaccines for your employees?

You may heard that we have a bit of a measles issue going on around the country.

At his HR Solutions blog, and on his Twitter, Make Haberman asked, “Are measles protected by the ADA?”

The ADA no longer carves-out “short-term” impairments from its definition of “disability.” Thus, there is an argument to be made that the measles could qualify as an ADA-disability, provided that it substantially limits a major life activity of the sufferer. Given that one only suffers from measles symptoms (albeit rather severe symptoms) for a week or so, I have my doubts that a one-week impairment “substantially limits a major life activity” of the sufferer. No matter how loosely the Act’s 2009 amendments liberalized the definition of “disability,” I can’t imagine Congress intended the ADA to apply to short-term viruses.

Whether or not the ADA covers the measles as a disability, if you are going to fire an employee who cannot come to work because of the measles (FMLA notwithstanding), you need to engage in some serious self reflections about the type of employer you are.

Of course, if everyone was vaccinated against the measles, we wouldn’t need to have this discussion. So, can you require that your employees present proof of vaccination as a condition of employment? Here’s what the EEOC has to say on the issue:

An employee may be entitled to an exemption from a mandatory vaccination requirement based on an ADA disability that prevents him from taking the influenza vaccine. This would be a reasonable accommodation barring undue hardship (significant difficulty or expense). Similarly, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, once an employer receives notice that an employee’s sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance prevents him from taking the influenza vaccine, the employer must provide a reasonable accommodation unless it would pose an undue hardship as defined by Title VII (“more than de minimis cost” to the operation of the employer’s business, which is a lower standard than under the ADA).

Generally, ADA-covered employers should consider simply encouraging employees to get the influenza vaccine rather than requiring them to take it.

At least as far as the EEO laws are concerned, private employers can require vaccinations, as long as you are willing to accommodate employees’ disabilities and religions.

Employers seek to halt EEOC’s efforts to drum up plaintiffs for its “Onionhead” lawsuit

You may recall the lawsuit filed the EEOC claiming that a New York employer forced its employees to join a religion called “Onionhead.”

Now, Employment Law 360 reports that the company’s counsel is trying to block the EEOC from reaching out to the company’s employees to seek additional plaintiffs for its lawsuit.

The employers have asked the federal judge hearing the case to block the EEOC from any further “solicitations of Defendants’ current and former employees for participation in the lawsuit.” You can download a copy of the employers’ letter to the court here [pdf].

According to the company, the EEOC’s letters, printed on government letterhead, provided the employees a one-sided description of the case, omitted a statement that liability has yet to be decided, and created the impression that the employee must contact the EEOC.

Decide for yourself.

If the employer is true, the EEOC is going to have issues. A federal agency cannot misrepresent litigation to drum up support among employees. It also cannot provide employees a mistaken impression that they must cooperate.

At the same time, however, employers faced with alleged misconduct like that alleged in the Onionhead lawsuit must tread very carefully so that they do not unlawfully retaliate against the employees by interfering with their participation rights. For example, an employer cannot forbid employees from cooperating with the EEOC, or even dissuade them from contacting the agency.

What should employers do?

• They can tell employees that it is their choice whether to contact, or cooperate with, the EEOC.
• They can tell employees to be truthful when talking with the EEOC.

What must employers do? 

• They must guarantee employees that they will not suffer any retaliation, no matter their choice.

Employers faced with an EEOC investigation should know that the agency is using these tactics, so that they can proactively, and lawfully, respond by delivering the right message to their employees.

Mark this beastly religious accommodation case for the employer

Last Monday, I wrote about a jury verdict against an employer that refused to make accommodation for an employee who objected to the use of the company’s time-keeping hand scanner for religious reasons. In response, one reader commented:

Seems to me that the law should require some sort of reasonableness requirement on the plaintiff. There’s no reason we should have to accommodate every ridiculous whack-a-doodle demand…. “The Mark of the Beast”? Seriously??? We should not have to cater to such nutjobs, and it makes a mockery of our legal/political/economic system to have to do so.

Well, captain_quirk, this one’s for you.

Last week, the 6th Circuit, in Yeager v. FirstEnergy Generation Corp., held that an employer does not have to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs if those religious beliefs conflict with a requirement of federal law.

When the plaintiff, Donald Yeager, turned 18, he disavowed his social security number. As a Fundamentalist Christian, he believed that being identified by any number, including the federally mandated social security number, was having the “Mark of the Beast.” (Amazingly, Yeager is not alone in this thinking.) FirstEnergy refused to hire Yeager because he would not provide his social security number. Yeager sued, and lost.

Every circuit to consider the issue has [held] that Title VII does not require an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs if such accommodation would violate a federal statute. Some courts have [held] that a statutory obligation is not an “employment requirement,” while others have held … that violating a federal statute would impose an “undue hardship.” These dual rationales arrive at the same, sensible conclusion: “[A]n employer is not liable under Title VII when accommodating an employee’s religious beliefs would require the employer to violate federal … law.”

The Internal Revenue Code requires employers such as FirstEnergy to collect and provide the social security numbers of their employees. In this case … FirstEnergy’s collection of Yeager’s social security number is a “requirement imposed by law” and therefore not an “employment requirement.”

Despite this highly sensible decision, I stand by my conclusion from last week’s discussion—much more often than not, requests for accommodations are not the demarcation on a battleground, but the call for a middle ground … unless the request asks you to violate a federal law, in which case all bets are off.

Should it matter if your employee thinks hand scanners are tools of Satan?

If you’re a long time reader of my blog, you might recall a story I shared a few years ago about a co-worker at one of my high-school jobs, who held some interesting opinions about Lee Iacocca, Satan, and the end of the world. At the time, I made a point about taking the path of least resistance with reasonable accommodations.

Apparently, Consol Energy is not a blog subscriber.

The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette brings us the story of Beverly Butcher Jr., an employee at its Robinson Run, West Virginia, mine, and an Evangelical Christian, who refused to use the company’s hand scanner to clock in an clock out, because he believed it would imprint him with the “mark of the beast.” Instead of working with Butcher, or providing him an alternative way to track his time, the company mandated his use of the hand scanner. He quit, the EEOC sued on his behalf, and, last week, a federal jury ruled in his favor, awarding him $150,000 in compensatory damages on his religious discrimination claim. Later this year the court will rule on back pay, front pay, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees.

Whether or not an employee is entitled to a religious accommodation is not dependent upon whether or not you happen to agree with the employee’s religious beliefs. Instead, it hinges solely on whether the beliefs are sincerely held, and, if so, whether you can provide the accommodation without it imposing an undue hardship. While this employer could make a credible undue-hardship argument based on the need for accurate time tracking, and uniformity among employees, it it worth it. Denying the requested accommodation—not using the hand scanner and tracking time in and time out with a different tool—is not worth the headache and associated costs of a federal lawsuit (verdict included).

Requests for accommodations (whether for religious or disability purposes) are not the demarcation on a battleground. Instead, they are a call for a middle ground. Employers need to recognize this truth, and starting wars that simply are not worth fighting.