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Yesterday, #ElderlyChristmasSongs trended on Twitter. Yes, it’s meant to be a joke, and, yes, some were even funny. Now here’s the part where I get to play Employment Law Scrooge.
Let’s say you’re looking to fill a position at your company that requires a certain degree of technical proficiency. Or, you just want to make sure that the person you hire is comfortable with a computer, an email account, and an iPhone. Is it legal to advertise that the position requires a “digital native?” According to Fortune.com, some companies have begun using this term as a hiring criteria in job postings. Yet, is “digital native” simply code for “younger?”
“Digital native” certainly appears to be a loaded term. According to the Fortune article, some employment attorneys believe that the “trend” towards digital natives is “troubling” and “a veiled form of age discrimination.”
“This is a very risky area because we’re using the term that has connotations associated with it that are very age-based. It’s kind of a loaded term.” Ingrid Fredeen, attorney and vice president of NAVEX Global
“I don’t believe using ‘digital native,’ a generational term, as a job requirement would stand up in court. I think older individuals could definitely argue ‘digital native’ requirements are just a pretext for age discrimination.” Christy Holstege, California civil rights attorney
Let me offer a counter-argument. I’m 42 years old, more tech savvy than most, and, by any definition, a digital native. I’ve been using computers since my early grade-school years. I’d fit any criteria seeking a “digital native,” and, yet, I’m also inside the age-protected class. While I do not believe companies should use “digital native” in job advertisement or descriptions (just as I wouldn’t use “recent graduate”), one challenging its use cannot examine that use in a vacuum. Instead, take a look at the hiring demographics. How many employees over 40 (over 50, over 60) hold a position that calls for a digital native. If the answer is “none,” then the employer has a huge problem. If, however, there exists a good mix of ages—both outside and inside the protected class—then there also exists a great argument that the term “digital native” has no loaded, illegal subtext.
I do a lot of speaking. One speech that I’ve been giving over the past couple of years is entitled, “X+Y+Z = A Generational Mess for Your Workplace.” I teach how employers can best manage the diverse needs and abilities of four different generations of employees. I discuss some broad-based generalizations about Traditionalists (age 70+), Baby Boomers (50-69), Gen X (35-49), and Gen Y (under 35). I always finish by discussing the very real risk of age discrimination if you treat these generalizations as gospel, and do not treat each employee, of age any, as an individual, with individual talents and abilities.
Target saw the need to offer the same type of training to its managers, but it left off the part about age discrimination. Gawker (h/t Business Management Daily) published Target’s training materials, entitled, Managing Generational Differences,” which, among other things, describe its oldest workers as “slow to adapt to change,” “rarely question[ing] authority” and see[ing] technology as “complex and challenging.”
When you are sued for discrimination, your training materials are fair game in litigation. While you write them to aid your employees, you must do so with (at least) one eye on the jury that will read them during trial. You do not want to have your manager explain to a jury, in an age discrimination case, if he thought the plaintiff was “slow to adapt to change” when he made the termination decision.
The National Law Journal reports that Texas Roadhouse has sued the EEOC, demanding background on the agency’s prior age discrimination suit against it. The restaurant chain is suing under the Freedom of Information Act, seeking the genesis of the lawsuit, which it claims the EEOC filed without first receiving a charge of discrimination.
According the the NLJ, “By law, the EEOC doesn’t have to wait for someone to come forward with a discrimination complaint. It can act on its own by filing a commissioner’s charge, or initiating a directed investigation…. In part, the agency relies on statistical evidence culled from reports that all employers with 100 or more workers (and federal contractors with 50 or more) must file annually with the agency, showing the sex and race or ethnicity of workers by job category.”
According to the FOIA complaint, “The very agency that has attempted to enforce the law against discrimination—by launching an unprovoked attack against Texas Roadhouse, then waging a media campaign declaring Texas Roadhouse guilty before a single day, indeed, a single minute, in court—is defying the law applicable to it. This cannot stand in a society governed by fundamental principles of fairness, due process, and the rule of law.”
Rhetoric aside, I question whether scouring EEO-1s for employers who appear, based on demographics alone, to discriminate, is the best use of the EEOC’s limited resources. The EEOC can do a lot of good to further civil rights opinion this country (see EEOC makes history by filing its first ever transgender-discrimination lawsuits). Cases such as this one, however, cause me to question the EEOC’s motives, and cause employers to lose confidence in what should be a worthy agency.
Yesterday’s New York Daily News ran the following headline: “Long Island man, 76, sues company for age discrimination after ‘workforce reduction’ of one man.” The article suggests that there is something nefarious or underhanded about a layoff of one.
In reality, provided the layoff is bona fide, the number of people included is irrelevant. What is a bona fide layoff? According to one Ohio court:
In determining whether a valid work force reduction occurred, the key inquiry is whether or not the employer replaced the plaintiff. If an employer did not replace the plaintiff, but rather consolidated jobs in order to eliminate excess worker capacity, then a work force reduction took place.
In other words, it’s not a question of quantity, but one of quality. It does not make a difference if the layoff includes one employee or 100 employees, provided that those eliminated are not replaced.
This distinction is not one without a difference. Whether a job loss qualifies as a reduction-in-force matters. Workforce reductions require plaintiffs to come forward with additional evidence (direct, circumstantial, or statistical) to support an inference of age discrimination. Otherwise, the employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason (the economic necessity for the layoffs) will carry the day.
So, New York Daily News, I take issue with your headline. Yes, it is perfectly legal to have a one-person layoff, provided it is bona fide, and not a subterfuge to hire younger.
Suppose an employee applies for a transfer to an open position. The company decides to hire an external candidate and passes on transferring the employee. Yet, when the same position again becomes vacant nine months later, the company involuntarily transfers that same employee into the position. Is the transfer to the very same position (with the same pay, benefits, prestige, and responsibility), for which, just nine months earlier, that employee had applied, an “adverse employment action” sufficient to support a claim of discrimination?
Amazingly, in Deleon v. City of Kalamazoo (1/14/14) [pdf], the 6th Circuit answered, “Yes.”
[A]n employee’s transfer may constitute a materially adverse employment action, even in the absence of a demotion or pay decrease, so long as the particular circumstances present give rise to some level of objective intolerability…. [W]e conclude that Deleon has met his threshold at the summary judgment stage…. Deleon provided evidence that he was exposed to toxic and hazardous diesel fumes on a daily basis. He testified further that he had to wipe soot out of his office on a weekly basis. As a result, Deleon claims that he contracted bronchitis, had frequent sinus headaches, and would occasionally blow black soot out of his nostrils….
We emphasize that the key focus of the inquiry should not be whether the lateral transfer was requested or not requested, or whether the aggrieved plaintiff must ex tempore voice dissatisfaction, but whether the “conditions of the transfer” would have been “objectively intolerable to a reasonable person.”
There is so much wrong with this opinion that I don’t know where to start. Perhaps the best place is Judge Sutton’s scathing, common-sense dissent, which ends thusly (as will today’s post):
Whatever the correct interpretation of the employment retaliation laws may be, they surely stop at this line: imposing liability on employers whether they grant or deny an employee’s request for a transfer…. An interpretation of the retaliation laws that subjects employers to liability coming and going—whether after granting employee requests or denying them—will do more to breed confusion about the law than to advance the goals of a fair and respectful workplace. Even after plumbing the depths of logic, experience, case law and common sense, I must return to this surface point: When an employee voluntarily applies for, and obtains, a job transfer, his employer has not subjected him to an adverse employment action.
It’s no secret that Ohio’s age discrimination statute is a hot mess. The statute has four different ways a plaintiff can file an age claim against an employer, each with a different statute of limitations and available remedies. What’s more, the statute requires that the plaintiff elect which one of the four specific statutory provisions the claim is asserted. Filing under one provision precludes a plaintiff from asserting a claim under any of the other three. This election can have a significant impact on the litigation, because it will dictate the remedies a plaintiff can seek.
If this scheme not complicated enough, federal law also requires that a plaintiff file an age discrimination charge with the EEOC as a prerequisite to filing a lawsuit alleging a violation of the ADEA. Because Ohio is a deferral state, any charges filed with the EEOC are automatically deemed dual-filed with the OCRC.
Not all Ohio state-law age discrimination claims, however, require exhaustion with the civil rights agency. In fact, R.C. 4112.99, which provides the most expansive remedies, has no exhaustion requirement at all. What happens, however, if a plaintiff files an age discrimination charge with the EEOC? Does that mean that the dual filing with the OCRC asks an election by the plaintiff to pursue an administrative claim (with limited remedies) instead of a civil lawsuit with more expansive remedies?
In Flint v. Mercy Health Partners of Southwest Ohio (S.D. Ohio 4/16/13), the district court concluded that filing first with the EEOC does not serve as an election of administrative remedies under Ohio’s age discrimination statutes:
This Court concludes that the Ohio Supreme Court would likely rule that filing a charge of age discrimination with the EEOC does not comprise an election of remedies…. Therefore, the Court holds that Plaintiffs’ pro se filing of an EEOC charge was not an election of remedies under the Ohio statute. This result acknowledges the complementary nature of federal and state employment discrimination procedures and disarms the “minefield” Ohio’s statutory scheme creates for the litigant wanting to pursue a remedy for age discrimination — something this Court finds particularly important when an employee is attempting to navigate that minefield without the assistance of legal counsel.
Ohio is contemplating expansive changes to its employment discrimination laws. The legislature should take the opportunity to disarm this "minefield" by creating one unified statute of limitations for all discrimination claims (I suggest one year to bring Ohio more in line with its federal counterpart), and eliminate the goofy and confusing election requirement that results from having four different types of age discrimination claims.
Employers who eliminate headcount as part of a reduction in force receive special protection under the age discrimination laws. In a bona fide RIF, the employer has a built-in legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for a termination—the business considerations and economic necessities that caused the job eliminations. In such a case, an employee cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination without some additional direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence showing that age was a factor in the termination. The mere termination of a competent employee in the face of economically based cutbacks is not enough to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.
What happens, though, when an employer cuts headcount in stages? For example, what if an employer facing economic distress lays off a number of employees, and a year later lays off someone else? Can the employer claim the benefit of the more stringent age discrimination test that accompanies a bona fide RIF for the later termination?
Such was the case in Weisfeld v. PASCO, Inc. (Ohio Ct. App. 4/17/13) [pdf]. In 2009, PASCO lost a contract that accounted for 80 – 90 percent of its revenue. As a result, it laid off more than 80 percent of its employees. Most of those firings happened shortly after the lost contract. The company waited a year, though, to fire six key employees, including Todd Weisfeld, its 48-year-old director of technology, who declined a restructured job as a network coordinator.
In his ensuing age discrimination lawsuit, Mr. Weisfeld argued that the passage of time between when PASCO terminated him as compared to the bulk of his co-workers precluded the company from claiming that Weisfeld’s termination was part of a reduction in force. The court, however, disagreed:
Contrary to Mr. Weisfeld’s understanding, an employee is terminated pursuant to a reduction in force whenever “business considerations” are the driving force behind the company’s decision. It is immaterial that PASCO eliminated some positions immediately after losing the California contract and waited over a year to eliminate other positions. So long as the company’s decision was because of business considerations and it did not replace Mr. Weisfeld with another employee, his discharge was pursuant to a reduction in force.
Absent any evidence that PASCO lacked a legitimate business reason for eliminating its director of technology position, Mr. Weisfeld’s age discrimination claim failed.
This case shows the powerful advantage that employers hold in defending discrimination cases that arise out of reductions in force. It also shows that RIFs can occur in stages and over time. At least according to Weisfeld v. PASCO, an employer can retain key employees during a layoff and still claim the evidentiary benefit of the RIF when economic realities dictate a later termination of those key employees.
All that changes today. Today, I turn 40. Today, I fall under the generous protections of the age discrimination laws.
The thing is, I don’t feel old; I feel young. I have young kids (6 and 4). I still watch cartoons and play video games. Alt Nation is my go-to channel on Sirius. My back only hurts some of the time.
Scientists say 40 is the new 30. If that’s the case, then why does the law protect 40 as age discrimination? If 40 is the new 30, then 50 is the new 40.
Today, to mark the ruby anniversary of my birth, I am starting a movement to change the protections of age discrimination laws from age 40 to age 50. If I can’t get cheap AARP hotel rooms for another 10 years, then I shouldn’t be able to claim age discrimination either. I am willing to give up my newly found protected status for an age cutoff that makes sense.
Now, I’m heading outside to yell at those kids to get off my lawn.
photo credit: Beautification Syndrome via photopin cc
Subjective criteria, it is true, sometimes make it difficult to distinguish between lawful and unlawful employment actions, and they deserve careful scrutiny…. When all is said and done, the use of subjective evaluation criteria does not by itself show discrimination, particularly in a reduction in force case.What factors did the court rely upon to conclude that this employer’s use of subjective criteria in this layoff did not create an inference of discrimination?
In 2008, Hawaii Healthcare’s owner, Carolyn Frutoz-De Harne, ordered the firing of then 54-year-old Debra Moreno. Frutoz-De Harne proceeded with the termination over the protest of the facility manager, who hired and supervised Moreno, and who thought she was a thorough and efficient worker. In ordering the termination, Frutoz-De Harne allegedly told the manager that Moreno “looks old,” “sounds old on the telephone,” and is “like a bag of bones.” After the termination, the manager reported the ageist comments to Moreno, who in turn filed an age discrimination charge with the EEOC. The agency subsequently filed a lawsuit on Moreno’s behalf.
Last week, a federal court ordered Hawaii Healthcare Professionals to pay Moreno $193,236 for the discrimination. According to the EEOC:
Age should never be a factor when evaluating an employee or job applicant’s worth. What makes this case especially appalling is the flagrant disregard for a worker’s abilities, coupled with disparaging ageist remarks and thinking.
Procedurally, this case is unique because the district court entered a default judgment against Hawaii Healthcare after it failed to respond to the EEOC’s amended complaint. Even if this case proceeded to trial, however, Hawaii Healthcare would have faced an uphill battle. An executive terminating an employee over a manager’s objections and after referring to the fired employee as “bag of bones”? Sounds to me like a tough age case to defend.
In Litton v. Talawanda Sch. Dist. (6th Cir. 6/26/12) [pdf], a demoted and transferred custodian sued his employer for age and race discrimination. At trial, the jury returned the following special verdict:
The jury concluded that Litton did not prove that he had suffered an adverse action, yet proved that he was treated differently because of his race. Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the lack of an adverse action should dispose of the case. If one cannot show a prima facie case (which includes the suffering of an adverse action), the ultimate issue of discrimination should never be reached.
The 6th Circuit, however, disagreed. It disregarded the jury’s finding on the existence of an adverse action as irrelevant to its subsequent finding on the ultimate issue of whether discrimination occurred:
The jury’s assessment of Litton’s prima facie case did not control its finding on the ultimate question of discrimination…. he district court was not only permitted to disregard the jury’s answer to the adverse employment action question, it was required to do so, and instead to evaluate the strength of the evidence as a whole.
As I read the opinion in Litton, I mapped out in my head a grand critique. Then I read Judge Batchelder’s dissent, and decided I couldn’t say it any better:
The core problem with the majority’s holding is that it treats the question of whether Litton suffered adverse discrimination as distinct from “the ultimate question of discrimination vel non.” The two are one…. Title VII does not ban mere discrimination, but only adverse discrimination…. It is, to me, beyond obvious that Title VII applies only where there has been discrimination against an individual. That requirement is not merely some vestigial prima facie element that fades into the background as the case progresses—it is at the heart of the claim itself….
In sum, “the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” … The majority should not relieve Litton of his burden, and it certainly should not grant him victory in the face of a jury verdict finding that he never proved that he suffered adverse discrimination at all. The whole purpose of Title VII … is preventing harmful discrimination, not the lamentable-but-benign discrimination that the jury found Litton experienced.
Did the 6th Circuit unwittingly create a cause of action for benign discrimination? Or, is this case an anomaly that future courts will distinguish and disregard? Common sense mandates the latter. Right?
The EEOC has published its draft strategic plan for fiscal years 2012 – 2016. A quick Ctrl-F for the word “systemic” reveals 16 different hits in this relatively short document.
“Systemic” cases, according to the EEOC, are those that “address a pattern, practice or policy of alleged discrimination and/or class cases where the alleged discrimination has a broad impact on an industry, profession, company, or geographic area.” The identification, investigation, and litigation of this category of cases remains a “top priority” of the agency. When the EEOC publishes the final version of its strategic plan, expect to see a target percentage of systemic cases in the agency’s litigation pipeline.
What does this mean for employers? It means that company-wide policies that have the potential affect certain groups more than others very much remain on the EEOC’s enforcement radar. What are some of these issues for employers to heed:
Keep an eye on these issues, because you can bet the EEOC will be (at least for the foreseeable future).
It’s no secret that I’m not a fan of arbitration of employment disputes. Conventional wisdom says that binding arbitration keeps down costs and speeds up resolutions. I’ve yet to be convinced. Many employers, though, continue to drink the arbitration Kool-Aid by requiring employees sign alternative dispute resolution agreements as part of their employment. Sherwin-Williams appears to be one of them. Its choice of one key word in its Problem Resolution Procedures, however, cost the paint company its chance to litigate an ex-employee’s age discrimination claim in its forum of choice.
The word at issue in Hyde v. Sherwin-Williams Co. (8/25/11) [pdf] is “may.” Sherwin-Williams’s Problem Resolution Procedures provide:
These procedures may be used by employees to challenge the unresolved differences regarding application of Company policies, procedures or practices which affect their employment situation. These procedures are intended to be an exclusive, final and binding method to resolve all covered claims to the fullest extent permitted by law. Failure to use these procedures may preclude employees from pursuing any other legal right they may have in court or in other forums.
An Ohio appellate court concluded that the use of the word “may” disposed of Sherwin-Williams’s attempt to force an ex-employee to litigate his age discrimination claim in court:
We find that Sherwin-Williams’ repeated representations that an employee’s failure to follow the PRP “may” preclude that employee from seeking redress in outside forums expressly contradicts appellants’ position that the procedures outlined in the PRP are the exclusive method for resolving employee disputes. By virtue of the language used … appellants implied that there would be circumstances where an employee would not be prevented from pursuing resolution of their legal claims in outside forums, i.e., that the PRP procedures are not mandatory, final, or binding.
What’s worse for Sherwin-Williams is that 8 years ago another panel of the same appellate court reached the same conclusion about the same language in a prior version of the same PRP.
What’s the takeaway from this case for employers? In drafting agreements and policies, words matter. If you mean “must,” say it. Don’t say “may” (especially when a court has already told you that “may” doesn’t pass muster).
Written by Jon Hyman, a partner in the Labor & Employment group of Kohrman Jackson & Krantz. For more information, contact Jon at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.
Suppose you apply for a job. The job has certain dress code requirements for all employees. You, however, think the mandatory clothing will look unflattering on your over-40-year-old body. Do you…
If you’re most people, you choose either of the first two options. If you’re attorney Roy Lester, however, you opt for number three.
When the New York Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation refused to hire 58-year-old Lester as a lifeguard, he sued, claiming age discrimination. The lawyer-by-day claims that the job requirement that he wear certain swimwear discriminates against him because of his age. From CNN.com:
The rule, still in operation, requires that to be re-hired as a lifeguard, participants must wear either “boxers, briefs or board shorts” when completing a qualifying swim test…. Lester who believes that “as you age you should show less skin” prefers jammers; tight lycra shorts that end a couple of inches above the knee. The bankruptcy attorney claims “Speedos are not appropriate for a 61-year-old” and refused to wear loose-fitting shorts because they would slow him down.
According to the Wall Street Journal’s Law Blog, “Peter Brancato, spokesman for New York state’s Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation, [said] that there never was a policy specifically requiring lifeguards to wear Speedos. For the annual swim test, lifeguards are required to wear regular work gear, which for men could be a Speedo, a boxer-type swimsuit or a board suit.”
In other words, the employer subjected Lester to the same dress code as every other employee and applicant. Guess what? That’s not age discrimination, even according to the EEOC: “In general, an employer may establish a dress code which applies to all employees or employees within certain job categories.” Exceptions include dress codes that conflict with an employee’s religious practice or disability. The law makes no such exception, however, for an employee’s age.
(An appellate court just reinstated Lester’s claim, following a dismissal by the trial court. That fact does not make me think his claim is any less ridiculous).
Written by Jon Hyman, a partner in the Labor & Employment group of Kohrman Jackson & Krantz. For more information, contact Jon at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.
I came across an article yesterday on The Huffington Post which says that many large retailers are requiring job applicants to disclose their ages as part of the application process. Are businesses really asking for age on employment applications?
While there’s nothing per se illegal about asking for age on a job application, why ask for certain information that’s illegal to consider? Simply, you should not ask for age, or for any information that suggests age: date of birth, year of high school or college graduation, or anticipated retirement age. The only age-related questions you should ask on job application is whether the applicant is age 18 or over and eligible to work. Anything more crosses the line, and will help a rejected candidate create an inference of discrimination. Why take that risk?
For more information on illegal questions during the hiring process, see Avoid hidden interviewing traps.
Do you want to know if your job application and other hiring processes are legal? Consider KJK’s proprietary (and free) HR and employment law audit.
Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.
The Internet is a fabulous resource for businesses. For example, I could conduct a Google search for “social media policy” and fine some wonderful results, including an online database of 164 real-world examples. Because of the Internet’s easy access to information, it creates a strong temptation for businesses to do-it-themselves when it comes to policies and forms.
Not all websites, however, are created equal. Just because you find something on the Internet does not mean that its legal. Take, for example, Pre Employment Medical Questionnaire, which has at least 8 different questions that violate the ADA:
(For good measure, it also asks for employees’ dates of birth, which would constitute unlawful age discrimination, and height and weight, which could have a disparate impact based on sex).
The website says, “During the recruitment process most companies require to find out the medical history of all prospective employees.” Trust me, the only companies that ask for this information from prospective employees are those that want to find themselves on the losing end of a disability discrimination lawsuit. When searching the Internet for DIY policies and forms, do yourself and your business a favor and run them by employment counsel before using them. One 15 minute consultation could save you years in court and hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal bills.
Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.
