The only fight I’ve even been in was in 4th grade. For reasons that I can’t remember, Yale Weinstein and I squared off in the schoolyard of Loesche Elementary School. There were no winners, only losers, and the only thing that saved both of us from suspension that day was the fact that the principal knew my dad from his childhood and was friends with my grandmother. It’s not what you know, but who you know, right?
Let’s suppose you have two employees who get into a fight at work, and one happens to be white and one black. Does Title VII require you to fire both employees, or can you make an honest assessment of the instigator, and only fire the responsible party?
According to the 6th Circuit in Wheat v. Fifth Third Bank (5/7/15) [pdf], an employer potentially violates Title VII when an it fires only one participant in a workplace fight, when both are of different races.
The facts are relatively simple. Wheat (black) and Hatfield (white) first got into an argument, which later escalated into a physical altercation. The employer’s HR department immediately investigated, concluded that Wheat was the instigator, and fired him for violating its workplace violence policy.
The 6th Circuit concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing Wheat’s Title VII claim on summary judgment. Critically, the appellate court reviewed the deposition testimony and found that the evidence showed that Hatfield, and not Wheat, was the aggressor.
Even the most cursory of examinations of the evidence before the district court and this court reveals that a genuine factual dispute exists regarding Wheat’s status as the aggressor in the confrontation with Hatfield. In fact, the deposition testimony establishes that it was Hatfield, not Wheat, who pursued the altercation after the two men had separated initially and gone to their respective “corners.” Even Hatfield himself admitted that it was he who took the ill-advised step of reengaging with the plaintiff after their initial encounter. Moreover, even if the defendant’s position is premised upon its belief that Wheat was the initial aggressor when the two men met in the hallway of the bank, the argument must fail. Although Hatfield claimed that the plaintiff “put his hand in [Hatfield’s] face,” Wheat stated during his deposition that he was turning around to extricate himself from the argument when Hatfield “assaulted” him by swatting him on his arm.
Based on the appellate court’s reading of the deposition testimony, it concluded that “divergent explanations of the unfolding of the relevant events creates an obvious dispute of fact that should preclude the grant of summary judgment to the defendant at the prima-facie-case stage of the litigation.”
To that, I say hogwash. Courts have long held that they do not, and will not, sit as super-personnel departments, second-guessing an employer’s business decisions. Indeed, an employer’s “honest belief” in its decision will act as a shield from a later claim of discrimination. As another panel of this same court recognized a few years ago, in Brooks v. Davey Tree Expert (internal quotations omitted):
Under the “honest belief” rule … so long as the employer honestly believed in the proffered reason, an employee cannot prove pretext even if the employer’s reason in the end is shown to be mistaken, foolish, trivial, or baseless…. For an employer to avoid a finding that its claimed nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual, the employer must be able to establish its reasonable reliance on the particularized facts that were before it at the time the decision was made.
[W]e do not require that the decisional process used by the employer be optimal or that it left no stone unturned. Rather, the key inquiry is whether the employer made a reasonably informed and considered decision before taking an adverse employment action. Although we will not micro-manage the process used by employers in making their employment decisions, we also will not “blindly assume that an employer’s description of its reasons is honest. Therefore, when the employee is able to produce sufficient evidence to establish that the employer failed to make a reasonably informed and considered decision before taking its adverse employment action, thereby making its decisional process unworthy of credence, then any reliance placed by the employer in such a process cannot be said to be honestly held.
It seems to me that as long as Fifth-Third Bank’s HR department engaged in a reasonable-under-the-circumstances investigation of the fight between Wheat and Hatfield, a court is not in a position to second-guess the results of that investigation or the terminations that flowed therefrom. Yet, by examining the deposition testimony and reaching its own independent conclusion of which employee was responsible for the fight, hasn’t this court undermined (or, more accurately, ignored) the employer’s “honest belief?” And, if that’s the case, what does it say about the future of the honest-belief rule as a viable defense to a discrimination claim in the 6th Circuit?
For now, however, if you are faced with two employees of different races (or national origins, or religions…) fighting in your workplace, is it just best to fire them both, if your honest belief of who was the instigator won’t protect you if that “instigator” happens to be of different race?
One of the curricular pieces I love about my kids’ school is that they start foreign language in kindergarten. My daughter, Norah, is now in her 4th year of French (which she gets every other day), and my son, Donovan, gets both French and Spanish, alternating each day.
When we attending Norah’s first parent/teacher conference when she was in kindergarten, I remember her French teacher telling us all about the play that would cap their year. I sat in disbelief as she explained how the kids would perform “La Poule Maboule” (Chicken Little), all in French. Imagine my surprise a few months later when I sat at school and watched the kids masterfully pull it off.
Now, three years later, the performances are no longer a surprise, but are still a delight to experience how little minds soak up foreign languages.
So, I present Donovan’s kindergarten class performing “La Poule Maboule,” and Norah’s 3rd grade class performing “Comment y Aller.”
Here’s the rest of what I read this week:
Discrimination
Social Media & Workplace Technology
HR & Employee Relations
Wage & Hour
Labor Relations
OSHA is no stranger to regulating workplace bathrooms. Now, Employment Law 360 [sub. req.] reports that OSHA and the National Center for Transgender Equality “have entered into a partnership to develop and distribute information to ensure transgender employees have safe and adequate access to workplace restrooms.” According to NCTE Executive Director Mara Keisling, “Transgender workers can be prevented from using common workplace restrooms, which is a threat to their physical health and a violation of federal law.” Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health Dr. David Michaels adds, “Through this alliance, we will jointly work with the NCTE to develop products and guidance materials to improve workplace safety and health for all workers.”
This is an interesting issue, and, especially for employees and employers for whom this issue causes some degree of discomfort, can present a real problem. Yet, this is a problem with a simple solution—establish a unisex bathroom. Or, you can permit transgender employees to use the bathroom of the gender with which they identify. Either way, this is an issue you should be discussing with your employees and building in your EEO / anti-harassment training. This issue is not going away (see Bruce Jenner), and the sooner you address it in your workplace, the less risk you are taking.
[Image courtesy of Robin Shea’s Employment & Labor Insider]
Let’s say you’re looking to fill a position at your company that requires a certain degree of technical proficiency. Or, you just want to make sure that the person you hire is comfortable with a computer, an email account, and an iPhone. Is it legal to advertise that the position requires a “digital native?” According to Fortune.com, some companies have begun using this term as a hiring criteria in job postings. Yet, is “digital native” simply code for “younger?”
“Digital native” certainly appears to be a loaded term. According to the Fortune article, some employment attorneys believe that the “trend” towards digital natives is “troubling” and “a veiled form of age discrimination.”
“This is a very risky area because we’re using the term that has connotations associated with it that are very age-based. It’s kind of a loaded term.” Ingrid Fredeen, attorney and vice president of NAVEX Global
“I don’t believe using ‘digital native,’ a generational term, as a job requirement would stand up in court. I think older individuals could definitely argue ‘digital native’ requirements are just a pretext for age discrimination.” Christy Holstege, California civil rights attorney
Let me offer a counter-argument. I’m 42 years old, more tech savvy than most, and, by any definition, a digital native. I’ve been using computers since my early grade-school years. I’d fit any criteria seeking a “digital native,” and, yet, I’m also inside the age-protected class. While I do not believe companies should use “digital native” in job advertisement or descriptions (just as I wouldn’t use “recent graduate”), one challenging its use cannot examine that use in a vacuum. Instead, take a look at the hiring demographics. How many employees over 40 (over 50, over 60) hold a position that calls for a digital native. If the answer is “none,” then the employer has a huge problem. If, however, there exists a good mix of ages—both outside and inside the protected class—then there also exists a great argument that the term “digital native” has no loaded, illegal subtext.
In Neely v. Benchmark Family Services (S.D. Ohio 4/21/15), the plaintiff claimed that his employer retaliated against him for failing to accommodate his undiagnosed alleged sleep disorder. His symptoms included averaging two or three hours of sleep per night, and randomly falling asleep during the day, including while at work. The court dismissed Neely’s ADA discrimination claim and failure to accommodate claim, in large part because there was no evidence that his sleep issues had a medical root. Then the court turned to Neely’s retaliation claim:
One might wonder how retaliation claim in the absence of a disability can be squared with the text of the statute…. The line of cases relied upon by the Sixth Circuit explains that “[a]n individual who is adjudged not to be a qualified individual with a disability may still pursue a retaliation claim under the ADA as long as [he] had a good faith belief that [a] requested accommodation was appropriate.” Thus, “although ‘[i]t is questionable’ whether an employee who merely requests a reasonable accommodation ‘fits within the literal language of the statute,’ we are bound … to conclude that making such a request is protected activity….”
Plaintiff would have the Court extend this reasoning even further to himself, a litigant who was not disabled under the act, unlike the cited cases, did not request an accommodation and had not yet filed a formal charge…. Other courts have refused to extend retaliation claims to employment actions taken after an employee’s complaints of health conditions to a manager, and so will this Court.
What does this mean for you, as a practical matter? When an employee complains about a health problem at work, do your diligence. Determine if the employee is requesting an accommodation. If so, seek and gather from the employee medical information in support of the claimed disability and the requested accommodation. Then, make an informed decision about whether the employee is disabled if and if you should offer an accommodation. These steps will put you in the best position to defend against discrimination, accommodation, and retaliation claims under the ADA.
Earlier this week, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in Obergefell v. Hodges, one the Court’s most anticipated cases in years, which will (hopefully) decided the fate of same-sex marriage rights.
The web’s best coverage of the oral argument and its implications comes from SCOTUSblog:
Stay tuned. The decision is expected in June, and I’ll be sure to report on its implications for your workplace.
Here’s the rest of what I read this week:
Discrimination
Social Media & Workplace Technology
HR & Employee Relations
Wage & Hour
Labor Relations
One question that employers always ask upon receipt of an EEOC charge of discrimination is, “How does this process work?” After the EEOC concludes its investigation, it has two basic options. It can conclude that no reasonable cause exists that the employer violated Title VII and dismiss the charge (leaving the employee to file his or her own lawsuit in federal court within 90 days), or conclude that reasonable cause does exist (again leaving the employee to file his or her own lawsuit, or instituting a lawsuit on the employee’s behalf).
Before the EEOC can file its own discrimination lawsuit against an employer, Title VII requires that the agency “endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” What happens, however, if the EEOC fails to conciliate? What is scope of the EEOC’s conciliation obligation? And does a failure act as a bar to any subsequent lawsuit filed by the EEOC?
These were the question the Supreme Court considered in Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC [pdf]. This is what the Court unanimously concluded:
Courts have authority to review whether the EEOC has fulfilled its Title VII duty to attempt conciliation.
The statute only requires the EEOC to notify the employer of the claim and give the employer an opportunity to discuss the matter. Such notice must describe what the employer has done and identify the employees (or class of employees) that have suffered. The EEOC then must try to engage the employer in a discussion to provide the employer a chance to remedy the allegedly discriminatory practice. Title VII does not, however, require a good-faith negotiation.
The appropriate scope of judicial review of the EEOC’s conciliation activities is narrow, enforcing only the EEOC’s statutory obligation to give the employer notice and an opportunity to achieve voluntary compliance. A sworn affidavit from the EEOC stating that it has performed these obligations should suffice to show that it has met the conciliation requirement.
Should a court conclude (based on “concrete evidence” presented by the employer) that the EEOC did not provide the employer the requisite information about the charge or attempt to engage in a discussion about conciliating the claim, the appropriate remedy is to stay the proceedings and issue an order requiring the EEOC to undertake the mandated conciliation efforts. Dismissal of the lawsuit is not warranted in these circumstances.
Technically speaking, you can chalk this case up as a victory for employers, albeit a narrow one. The Supreme Court refused to hold that Title VII imposes a duty on the EEOC to negotiation in good faith, and that the agency satisfies its obligation to conciliate merely by providing notice and an opportunity to discuss. Moreover, a failure to conciliate doesn’t serve as a jurisdictional bar to litigation, but merely results in the EEOC being told to “try again, this time with meaning.”
If nothing else, this case sends a strong message that courts favor resolution, not litigation.
Yesterday, the Supreme Court finished its Spring 2015 term with oral argument in Obergefell v. Hodges, the same-sex-marriage case. Earlier in the week, it added another case to its docket for its 2015 – 2016 term, agreeing to hear Green v. Donahoe, which asks the following question:
Under federal employment discrimination law, does the filing period for a constructive discharge claim begin to run when an employee resigns, as five circuits have held, or at the time of an employer’s last allegedly discriminatory act giving rise to the resignation, as three other circuits have held?
While this case is not as sexy as some other employment issues recently before the Court, it is nevertheless important. Under the federal employment discrimination statutes, an employee only has 300 days to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which serves as the prerequisite to the filing of a later lawsuit in federal court. If the Supreme Court holds that the filing period begins to run at the employer’s last allegedly discriminatory act, then an employee who later resigns and claims constructive discharge will have a shorter window within which to file an administrative charge after the resignation.
Stay tuned, as this case will be heard towards the end of this year or early next year.
In Clayton v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, an Ohio appellate court was faced with the issue of whether Ohio’s disability discrimination statute protects asymptomatic HIV as a “disability.” The court relied on the following exchange from the plaintiff’s deposition to conclude, wrongly, that the employee was not suffering from a protected disability.
Q. How does your HIV status impair you?
A. It doesn’t.
Q. All right. So you would say that it doesn’t substantially limit any of your activities of daily life?
A. No. Thank God. Praise him.
Q. When you were at the Cleveland Clinic Foundation, would you agree with me that you could perform all of your essential functions of being a housekeeper without any accommodations?
A. I was able to perform any duty without any accommodations.
Let’s start with the basics. Even before Congress amended the ADA in 2009 to liberalize the statute’s definition of “disability,” the law recognized and protected asymptomatic HIV as a disability. The United States Supreme Court said as much as far back as 1998, in Bragdon v. Abbott:
In light of the immediacy with which the virus begins to damage the infected person’s white blood cells and the severity of the disease, we hold it is an impairment from the moment of infection. As noted earlier, infection with HIV causes immediate abnormalities in a person’s blood, and the infected person’s white cell count continues to drop throughout the course of the disease, even when the attack is concentrated in the lymph nodes. In light of these facts, HIV infection must be regarded as a physiological disorder with a constant and detrimental effect on the infected person’s hemic and lymphatic systems from the moment of infection. HIV infection satisfies the statutory and regulatory definition of a physical impairment during every stage of the disease.
The Clayton court was not only wrong about whether HIV qualifies as a disability, but also on the interplay between a disability and a reasonable accommodation. One has a “disability” if one has a a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, period. For the ADA to further protect that individual on the basis of that disability, the employee must be able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation. The determinations, however, are separate and distinct from each other. The essential function analysis has zero impact on whether one suffers from a protected disability as a threshold issue.
By conflating these two tests, this court set a dangerous precedent. Make no mistake, asymptomatic HIV is a disability. If an employee presents with HIV (or some other systemic illness), assume that the ADA covers the employee, and shift the analysis: 1) to ensure that the employee receives a reasonable accommodation if necessary to perform the essential function(s) of the job; and 2) to ensure that no one treats the employee differently because of the disability or some (mis)perception about the disability.
It’s not news that employer social media policies are on the NLRB’s radar. What is newsworthy, though, is when the NLRB considers a social media policy and concludes that it does not unlawfully infringe on employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activity under the National Labor Relations Act.
Consider, then, Landry’s Inc., decided last week by the NLRB, as newsworthy.
In that case, the NLRB considered the following social media policy:
While your free time is generally not subject to any restriction by the Company, the Company urges all employees not to post information regarding the Company, their jobs, or other employees which could lead to morale issues in the workplace or detrimentally affect the Company’s business. This can be accomplished by always thinking before you post, being civil to others and their opinions, and not posting personal information about others unless you have received their permission. You are personally responsible for the content you publish on blogs, wikis, or any other form of social media. Be mindful that what you publish will be public for a long time. Be also mindful that if the Company receives a complaint from an employee about information you have posted about that employee, the Company may need to investigate that complaint to insure that there has been no violation of the harassment policy or other Company policy. In the event there is such a complaint, you will be expected to cooperate in any investigation of that complaint, including providing access to the posts at issue.
The Board concluded that the policy was lawful:
Employees reading the Respondent’s social media policy could reasonably conclude … that they are being urged to be civil with others in posting job-related material and discussing on social media sites their grievances and disagreements with the Respondent or each other regarding job-related matters.… There is no restriction in the social media policy against posting “personnel” information or “payroll information,” or “wage-related information”; and obviously, posting information that in common parlance is generally understood to be personal such as, for example, matters regarding social relationships and similar private matters, could result not only in morale problems but could also constitute “harassment” to which the Respondent’s social media policy refers. It is readily apparent that such postings would likely create enmity among employees in the workplace which could, in turn, adversely affect the Respondent’s business.
Why is this newsworthy? Because, for years, the NLRB has urged for an expansive reading of employer policies, suggesting that a hypothetical parade-of-horribles that could lead to union-related, or other protected concerted, activity renders any facially neutral workplace policy unlawful. In Landry’s, the Board is adopting (at least in this case) a more reasonable, real-world reading of a social media policy to conclude that because no employee could reasonably read the policy, in context, to unreasonably infringe on employees’ rights.
This case provides a good illustration of the fine distinctions the NLRB is drawing between lawful and unlawful social media policies, and provides a good reminder of the need for all employers to routinely review your own social media and other workplace policies for compliance.
It’s been a crazy week. I gave four different seminar presentations over an eight-day span:
Thanks to all who invited me to speak to your organizations. It is always my pleasure.
Here’s the rest of what I read this week:
Discrimination
Social Media & Workplace Technology
HR & Employee Relations
Wage & Hour
Labor Relations
What happens when the alleged perpetrator of sexual or other unlawful harassment is also the person to whom the victim lodges a complaint of harassment? If the alleged perpetrator later fires (or causes the firing of) the victim, has the victim engaged in protected conduct (opposition of the harassment) to support a retaliation claim? According to the 6th Circuit, in EEOC v. New Breed Logistics (4/22/15) [pdf], the answer is yes.
The jury concluded that Calhoun, a supervisor, sexually harassed three women (Hines, Pearson, and Pete), retaliated against them after they objected, and further retaliated against a male employee (Partee) “who verbally opposed Calhoun’s sexual harassment and supported the women’s complaints.” The evidence at trial was that Calhoun laughed and responded “that he wasn’t going to get in trouble, that he ran th[e] area, [and that] anybody who went to [HR] on him would be fired.” Calhoun then fired each of the four employees, claiming performance and attendance issues.
As the threshold issue, the 6th Circuit had to determine whether complaints or objections made to the accused harasser constitute protected activity to support a retaliation claim. The 6th Circuit had little difficulty concluding that these four employees had engaged in protected activity:
We conclude that a demand that a supervisor cease his/her harassing conduct constitutes protected activity covered by Title VII. Sexual harassment is without question an “unlawful employment practice.” If an employee demands that his/her supervisor stop engaging in this unlawful practice—i.e., resists or confronts the supervisor’s unlawful harassment—the opposition clause’s broad language confers protection to this conduct. Importantly, the language of the opposition clause does not specify to whom protected activity must be directed…. Here, at the very least, all four complainants requested that Calhoun stop his sexually harassing behavior before their terminations. Consistent with our holding today, these complaints constitute protected activity.
While I agree that this holding makes sense, consider the awful position in which it could place employers who are lax with their termination decisions. An employer is vicariously liable for the actions of a supervisor or manager (e.g., harassment or retaliation). Thus, an employer will be liable for the rogue actions of a harasser trying to protect his or her turf from an objecting employee.
The solution? More diligence and scrutiny of termination decisions by HR departments and senior management. One cannot merely rubber stamp a manager’s or supervisor’s decision to terminate. If that individual harbors a discriminatory animus, we know that the cat’s paw will nab you. Now, we also know, per New Breed Logistics, that retaliation liability has the same potential issues when an alleged harasser is involved.
Bottom line: Do not rubber stamp termination decisions. Fact-check and confirm before allowing the company to pull the trigger.
Lucas’s employer, Gregg Appliances, maintained a drug-free workplace policy which required periodic testing of employees. Lucas’s promotion to a general manager position was contingent upon him passing just such a drug test. When Lucas (and his shy bladder) could not complete the drug test, the testing clinic reported to the employer: “PER COLLECTOR: DONOR LEFT COLLECTION SITE BEFORE COMPLETION OF DRUG TEST.” When confronted by management, Lucas never mentioned his difficulty urinating or his paruresis. Indeed, he did not even visit a physician for his condition until the day after Gregg Appliances fired him for failing to take the required drug screen.
In Lucas v. Gregg Appliances (S.D. Ohio 4/15/15), an Ohio federal court concluded that Lucas could not proceed with his ADA claim. The court dismissed Lucas’s claim for two reasons:
The employer had no knowledge of his disability. Lucas never told anyone at the employer before taking his drug test, or after he failed to complete the test. He only relayed his condition to his boss after he was fired. Just because an employer knows that an employee has a health problem (i.e., the inability to pee after drinking several glasses of water over the span of two hours) does not mean that the employer also knows that the employee suffers from an ADA-protected disability. Where the disability is not obvious, the burden is on the employee to make the employer aware.
The ADA does not require an employer to guess and play detective. Instead, it anticipates a collaborative conversation between employer and employee about disabilities and accommodations. The party that fails to take part in this conversation will usually be the one that ends up the loser in any ADA lawsuit.
Recently, a California federal court examined this very issue in Sweet v. LinkedIn Corporation [pdf], and concluded that LinkedIn’s Reference Search function does not render it subject to the FCRA.
Unlike other social sites, LinkedIn maintains a specific tool that helps employers’ reference checks—a premium tool called “Reference Search,” which creates “a list of people who have worked at the same company during the same time period as the member you’d like to learn more about.” More simply, Reference Search generates a list of potential employment references.
In Sweet, a group of unsuccessful job applicants argued that LinkedIn failed to comply with the FCRA in how it operates and maintains “Reference Search.” The court disagreed, concluding that LinkedIn’s Reference Search is not a Consumer Report under the FCRA.
LinkedIn’s publications of employment histories of the consumers who are the subjects of the Reference Searches are not consumer reports because the information contained in these histories came solely from LinkedIn’s transactions or experiences with these same consumers. The FCPA excludes from the definition of consumer report any “report containing information solely as to transactions or experiences between the consumer and the person making the report.”
In other words, because LinkedIn creates its databases solely from information submitted by its account holders, it falls outside the FCRA’s coverage.
While employers still have EEO concerns with the use of social networks for background checks, this case should give employers some relief, as it appears that the FCRA is one statute they needn’t worry about when using social media to vet candidates or for other employment purposes.
Several months ago, the EEOC announced its intent to issue regulations interpreting whether employer wellness plans are legal or illegal medical exams under the ADA. Thankfully, last Thursday the EEOC published its proposed regulations, and its good news for employers who use these programs to keep down the cost of their group health insurance.
So, what does this all mean for employers? Let’s take a look, via the helpful Q&A the EEOC published alongside its proposed regs:
Q: What is a Wellness Program?
A: The term “wellness program” refers to programs and activities typically offered through employer-provided health plans as a means to help employees improve health and reduce health care costs. Some wellness programs ask employees to engage in healthier behavior (for example, by becoming more active, not smoking, or eating better), while other programs obtain medical information from employees by asking them to complete a health risk assessment (HRA) or undergo biometric screening for risk factors (such as high blood pressure or cholesterol).
Q: How does the ADA affect workplace wellness programs?
A: The ADA generally restricts employers from obtaining medical information from employees but allows medical examinations of employees and inquiries about their health if they are part of a “voluntary” employee health program…. However, … the Affordable Care Act allows wellness programs to offer incentives—in the form of rewards to participating employees who achieve certain health outcomes or penalties if participating employees fail to achieve health outcomes.
The proposed rule clarifies that the ADA allows employers to offer incentives up to 30 percent of the cost of employee-only coverage to employees who participate in a wellness program and/or for achieving health outcomes.
Q: When is a wellness program considered “an employee health program” within the meaning of the ADA?
A: A wellness program is considered an employee health program when it is reasonably designed to promote health or prevent disease. The program must not be overly burdensome, a subterfuge for violating the ADA or other laws prohibiting employment discrimination, or highly suspect in the method chosen to promote health or prevent disease. For example:
- Asking employees to complete a HRA or have a biometric screening for the purpose of alerting them to health risks (such as having high cholesterol or elevated blood pressure) is reasonably designed to promote health or prevent disease.
- Collecting and using aggregate information from employee HRAs to design and offer programs aimed at specific conditions prevalent in the workplace (such as diabetes or hypertension) also would meet this standard.
However, asking employees to provide medical information on a HRA without providing any feedback about risk factors or without using aggregate information to design programs or treat any specific conditions would not be reasonably designed to promote health.
Q: When is a health program considered “voluntary”?
A: The NPRM lists several requirements that must be met in order for participation in employee health programs that include disability-related inquiries or medical examinations to be voluntary. Specifically, an employer:
- may not require employees to participate;
- may not deny access to health coverage or generally limit coverage under its health plans for non-participation; and
- may not take any other adverse action or retaliate against, interfere with, coerce, intimidate, or threaten employees (such as by threatening to discipline an employee who does not participate or who fails to achieve certain health outcomes).
Additionally, if a health program is considered a wellness program that is part of a group health plan, an employer must provide a notice clearly explaining what medical information will be obtained, how it will be used, who will receive it, and the restrictions on disclosure.
Here’s the $64,000 question:
Q: How much of an incentive may employers offer to encourage employees to participate in a wellness program or achieve certain health outcomes?
A: 30 percent of the total cost of employee-only coverage.
I am thrilled that the EEOC did not go nuclear and blow up wellness programs as discriminatory under the ADA. Given the surging cost of health insurance and the massive burden those costs place on employers and employees, it is relief that the EEOC is leaving these beneficial programs intact. Moreover, the EEOC’s 30% hard cap is certainly more palatable than a fuzzy “reasonableness” standard that begs for litigation and uncertainty. While both employers and employees can quibble over whether 30% is too low, too high, or just right, I’d rather have this Goldilocks debate over a number we can see than a different debate over a fuzzy standard that we cannot.
A full copy of the proposed regulations is available here [pdf].
“Daddy, this guy wants to talk to me, but he needs your permission first.” My daughter came running over to me last Saturday at the Rock Hall with those words. She was waiting backstage for her Joan Jett band to go on. Typically, that statement would have given me pause, but given the number of news cameras that were around, I had an idea “this guy” was legit. Here’s the result:
This wasn’t Norah’s only press of the day. Here’s a clip from another local news channel, this one of a “future superstar” (their words, not mine) doing her thing on stage:The hits keep on coming for my little girl, and I’ll keep sharing them.
Here’s the rest of what I read this week:
Discrimination
Social Media & Workplace Technology
HR & Employee Relations
Wage & Hour
Labor Relations
In January, authorities arrested Eddie Raymond Tipton, the Director of Information Security for the Multi-State Lottery Association, a non-profit organization that runs multi-state games for 33 different state lotteries, on charges of fraud.… Tipton is being accused not just of claiming a winning ticket he wasn’t allowed to have, but hacking into the lottery’s random number-generator software to engineer a win for himself.…
According to the court documents, the Multi-State Lottery Association’s random-number generator computers are disconnected from the Internet and kept in a locked, glass-walled room that is under 24-hour video surveillance. Prosecutors allege that Tipton entered the room on November 20, 2010, changed the camera’s settings to have it record less frequently, and inserted a USB drive containing malware that would manipulate the results of the upcoming lottery drawing.I'm not saying that the threat from your employees comes from the type of malicious mischief of which Tipton is accused. With data security, sins of omission can be as deadly as sins of commission. Do you have a Bring Your Own Device Policy? Do you have employees sign confidentiality agreements? Do you train your employees on the evils of unsecured WiFi and what to do when a mobile device goes missing? If not, you are being cavalier with your data security, which places your entire business at risk of being the next big data breach story.
Last week the EEOC settled, for $150,000, one of its first cases alleging sex discrimination against a transgender employee. This week, another transgender employee filed a remarkably similar lawsuit in federal court in Louisiana. The key difference between the two cases? The Louisiana employer had a formal policy against employees presenting at work as a gender other than their birth gender:
Title VII does not (yet) specifically identify “sexual orientation” as a protected class. But, sexual stereotyping has been illegal for decades. Keep this in mind, and keep an open mind, if your employee shows up as John on Friday and Joan the following Monday.