It is axiomatic that a plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC before filing a complaint alleging discrimination in federal court, and that the EEOC charge must contain a written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, to describe generally the action or practices complained of, and identify the specific type of discrimination alleged. Allen v. Highlands Hosp. (6th Cir. 10/21/08), which I discussed yesterday, may alter this conventional wisdom in a significant way. It held that exhaustion is a statutory element of a plaintiff’s discrimination claim, but not a jurisdictional requirement to filing suit.
In Allen, the plaintiffs’ EEOC charges alleged age discrimination, but not the specific disparate impact theory pursued in the case. The Hospital argued that the disparate-impact claim should be dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their EEOC administrative remedies, and that identifying the specific claim of discrimination before the EEOC with sufficient precision is a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintaining that claim in federal court.
The 6th Circuit overturned its prior precedent and disregarded the employer’s argument. Six years ago, in Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. of E. Tenn. (6th Cir. 7/15/02), the 6th Circuit held that “federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear [ADEA] claims unless the claimant explicitly files the claim in an EEOC charge or the claim can be reasonably expected to grow out of the EEOC charge.” In Allen, however, the court reversed court and held “that although administrative exhaustion is still a statutory prerequisite to maintaining claims brought under the ADEA, the prerequisite does not state a limitation on federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction over such claims.”
The distinction between a jurisdictional and statutory requirement is significant. A jurisdictional requirement would serve as an absolute bar to any plaintiff pursuing a claim without exhaustion. By making this requirement statutory, the 6th Circuit makes available arguments such as equitable tolling, which would enable a plaintiff to stay in federal court even if the charge was filed late.
Practically, this ruling should have a minimal effect on discrimination claims in Ohio. Ohio’s state employment discrimination statute has no exhaustion requirement at all. Under Ohio Rev. Code 4112.99, an aggrieved employee can proceed directly to court without first filing any charge whatsoever with any administrative agency. Thus, in Ohio discrimination claims, exhaustion rarely becomes an issue. Where this decision may have some effect is in age discrimination claims. Age claims under Ohio law are subject to a short 180-day statute of limitations, as compared to all other forms of employment discrimination, which have a six-year filing period. An employee, however, has 300 days to file an age discrimination charge with the EEOC. For an employee who misses the shorter 180-day filing period under 4112.99, an EEOC charge and later federal lawsuit under the ADEA is always an option. Thus, this decision could impact those employees who miss the relatively short state statute and have to go the EEOC for relief to enable a federal court filing under the ADEA.